FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #030
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 29th day of June, 2026 are as follows:
BY McCallum, J.:
2025-KK-01398 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. MESSIAH OWNEY (Parish of Orleans
Criminal)
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION.
Weimer, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-KK-01398
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MESSIAH OWNEY
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal
MCCALLUM, J.*
An attorney, in the zealous representation of his client, has afforded this Court
the opportunity to correct a practice of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court system that,
although authorized by its local rules, nevertheless conflicts with governing laws
that cannot be disregarded. The issues before us are narrow but consequential:
whether local court rules permitting a juvenile court hearing officer to issue arrest
and search warrants are valid under state law; and, if not, whether warrants already
issued in accordance with those rules must be set aside. The latter issue calls into
question whether arrests or searches made pursuant to warrants issued by hearing
officers are valid.
After reviewing the relevant statutory framework and the limited
jurisprudence addressing these issues, we hold that Subsections (B) and (E) of Rule
41 §12 of the Local Rules of Court for the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, infra,
conflict irreconcilably with the Louisiana Children’s Code, the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the Louisiana Constitution, each of which reserves warrantissuing authority to judges and magistrates, except where expressly provided to the
contrary. Those provisions are null and void, as a local court rule cannot supplant
*
Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, heard this case as Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in the First District. She is now appearing as an ad hoc for Justice William Burris.
what the Legislature has withheld. What a local rule cannot authorize, it cannot
validate.
Having determined these provisions of the local rule are invalid, we
considered the second question presented by this appeal—whether warrants issued
by a hearing officer prior to this decision are also invalid. This issue is readily
resolved by applying the de facto officer doctrine. Grounded in public policy and the
orderly function of government, the de facto officer doctrine validates actions taken
despite defects in authority. Guided by the de facto officer doctrine, we find that
warrants issued by a hearing officer who is later determined to have acted without
authority are not rendered void solely by virtue of this legal infirmity. As a result,
although the hearing officer here issued the arrest and search warrants without valid
authority, he nevertheless reasonably acted in reliance on an apparently valid rule of
court. For this reason, the defendant’s arrest was lawful, and the evidence obtained
is admissible. The public is entitled to the protection the de facto officer doctrine
affords.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 23, 2024, defendant Messiah Owney was arrested and charged with
armed robbery with a firearm, attempted armed robbery with a firearm, attempted
second degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, unlawful possession of
a machine gun, and carrying of a weapon on school property. He was seventeen
years old at the time of the offense. A hearing officer signed an arrest warrant and
related search warrants from which evidence against the defendant was obtained.1
The hearing officer issued these warrants pursuant to a local rule of the Orleans
Parish Juvenile Court authorizing hearing officers to review applications and issue
1
In fact, as discussed infra, the local rule in question requires the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) to contact the elected judges only in the event of the hearing officer’s unavailability.
2
warrants. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing the hearing officer
lacked statutory authority to act as a magistrate in issuing the warrants.
The trial court agreed that the warrants were improperly issued and thus
invalid. The State moved for reconsideration on the basis that the Orleans Parish
Juvenile Court’s local rules authorize the hearing officer to issue warrants. The trial
court agreed to reconsider its ruling as the local rule had not been discussed during
the first hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court reversed its previous decision
and denied the motion to suppress the evidence.
Defendant appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which denied the writ without
reasons. Defendant then filed a writ application with this Court, challenging (1) the
statutory authority of an Orleans Parish Juvenile Court hearing officer to issue arrest
and search warrants under La. Ch. Code art. 423 and La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 931;
and (2) the constitutionality of a local rule authorizing hearing officers to issue
search and arrest warrants. We granted the application. State v. Owney, 25-01398
(La. 2/12/26), 427 So. 3d 737.
DISCUSSION
We first consider whether a local rule authorizing hearing officers to issue
warrants is constitutional.
This Court has long recognized that rules of court have the effect of law upon
both the judge and the litigants. Trahan v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 250 La. 949, 956;
200 So. 2d 6, 8-9 (1967); see also, Jefferson v. Jefferson, 244 La. 493, 500-01; 153
So. 2d 368, 370 (1963) (“a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of
law”). But that authority yields entirely when a local rule conflicts with legislative
enactment. Id. See also, Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 591 So. 2d 1171, 1171-72 (La. 1992).
A local rule that contravenes legislation is null and void and cannot be enforced.
Trahan, 250 La. at 956, 200 So. 2d at 8-9. Similarly, when a conflict exists between
3
a local rule and legislation, the legislation controls. State v. Cooper, 10-2344, p. 5
(La. 11/16/10), 50 So. 3d 115, 121.
The Code of Criminal Procedure permits courts to adopt local rules “for the
conduct of criminal proceedings before it, not in conflict with provisions of this Code
or of other laws.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 18. While Article 18 allows for a court’s adoption
of local rules, those rules must still pass constitutional muster. As this Court has
observed, “[t]he general principle concerning the rule-making power of courts is
stated in 21 Corpus Juris Secundum, Courts, §172, p. 266, as follows: ‘The principle
that courts may prescribe reasonable rules, not contravening the constitution or
statutes, nor affecting substantive law, has been applied to rules regulating various
matters of practice and procedure.’ (Italics ours.).” Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v.
Connolly, 201 La. 342, 365; 9 So. 2d 582, 589 (1942). It is thus well-settled that
“[l]ocal rules of court . . . cannot conflict with legislation and will be declared null
and void to the extent they conflict with a statute.” Willrige v. Willrige, 2023-47, p.
14 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/23), 373 So. 3d 731, 740 (citing Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 591
So. 2d 1171 (La. 1992)).
As Article 18 specifically states, a local rule adopted by a court may not
conflict with any other laws. This is consistent with the constitutional mandate that
lawmaking authority rests exclusively with the legislature. See Krielow v. Louisiana
Dep’t of Agric. & Forestry, 13-1106, p. 5 (La. 10/15/13), 125 So. 3d 384, 388 (“the
legislature is vested with the sole law-making power of the State”); La. Const. Ann.
art. III, §1(1)(A) (“The legislative power of the state is vested in a legislature.”).
When the legislature has enacted certain laws governing a particular matter, a local
court rule may not alter or deviate from the statutory scheme. Thus, as here, where
the legislature has not authorized hearing officers to issue arrest or search warrants,
a local court rule purporting to confer that authority is null and void because it
4
enlarges the limited statutory authority of the court officer rather than merely
regulating procedure.
The provisions at issue in this case are Subsections (B) and (E) of Rule 41 §12
of the Local Rules of Court for the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court. The former
provides that a hearing officer “shall be subject to call for emergency hold orders
and/or arrest and search warrants,” and further, that applications for arrest and search
warrants are to be handled by the hearing officer. The latter reinforces this
arrangement, providing that “[i]n cases where the issuance of a search and/or arrest
warrant is required, the NOPD shall attempt to contact the hearing officer” first, with
the duty judge contacted only upon the hearing officer’s absence or unavailability.
The local rules of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court define “Hearing Officer”
as “an attorney appointed by the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court on a full or part-time
basis to hear cases and to make recommendations to the court, as allowed by law.”
La. Dist. Ct. Rules, Orleans Par. Juv. Ct., Title V, Ch. 41, R. 41, (“Local Rule 41”),
Definitions and Abbreviations. While this local rule authorizes hearing officers to
“hear cases” and “make recommendations,” it does permit a hearing officer to issue
warrants. Further, the inclusion of such authority in a local court rule could not be
reconciled with other state laws, as the legislature has not granted hearing officers
this authority. By contrast, the legislature has specifically authorized certain
commissioners to issue warrants. See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:713 B(1)(g) (commissioners
of the Nineteenth Judicial District may “[s]ign and issue search and arrest
warrants”); La. R.S. 13: 716 B(1) (commissioners of the Fifteenth Judicial District
may “sign and issue search and arrest warrants”).
Similarly, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature has expressly
designated warrant-issuing authority to judges and magistrates. Article 162 provides
that a search warrant may be issued only by a judge. La. C.Cr.P. art. 162(A) (“A
search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of
5
the judge, by the affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause
for issuance of the warrant.”) (emphasis added). Articles 202 and 203 allow arrest
warrants to be issued by a magistrate. La. C.Cr.P. art. 202(A) (“A warrant of arrest
may be issued by any magistrate. . . ”); La. C.Cr.P. art. 203(6) (An arrest warrant
may “[b]e signed by the magistrate with the title of his office.”). Notably, La. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 931 defines “magistrate” as “any judge, a justice of the peace, or a
mayor of a mayor’s court.”
In State v. Umezulike, 03-1404, p. 12 (La. 2/25/04), 866 So. 2d 794, 802, this
Court found La. R.S. 13:716(B)(1)—which delegated authority to issue search
warrants to the Commissioner of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court—
constitutional. In Umezulike, we analyzed whether the issuance of a search warrant
by a commissioner constitutes a “judicial power” as intended by the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974,2 and whether this delegation of authority violates the
separation of powers doctrine. We observed that Louisiana Const. art. 1, §5 “does
not specifically require that a warrant shall be issued by a judge.” Id., 03-1404, p. 6,
866 So. 2d at 799. We concluded that the issuance of a search warrant is a quasijudicial function, therefore, the statute permitting the commissioner to issue search
warrants “is constitutional as it does not delegate a solely ‘judicial power’ to the
commissioner.” Id., 03-1404, p. 12, 866 So. 2d at 802.
Unlike the instant matter, Umezulike dealt with a legislative grant to a
commissioner of the authority to issue warrants. Here, no legislative enactment
confers the authority to issue search and/or arrest warrants to a hearing officer. A
hearing officer is neither a judge, a commissioner, nor a magistrate as defined by
Article 931, supra. This distinction is dispositive: whereas Umezulike involved a
2
The “judicial power” inquiry in Umezulike focused on La. Const. Ann. art. V, §1, providing that “[t]he judicial power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts authorized by this Article.” Umezulike, 03-1404, p. 4, 866 So. 2d at 797-798.
6
commissioner acting pursuant to a statute the legislature had the authority to enact,
the hearing officer in this matter acted pursuant to a local court rule that directly
contravenes statutes enacted by the legislature. The former is constitutionally
defensible whereas the latter is not. A local court rule cannot confer authority that
the legislature has declined to grant.
Accordingly, we find that Subsections (B) and (E) of Local Rule 41 §12 are
null and void and cannot be enforced. By designating the hearing officer as the
primary and preferred warrant-issuing official—with an elected judge as a
contingency—the rule disregards the hierarchy established by Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure Articles 162, 202-203, and 931. That conflict is fatal to the local
rule. Rodrigue, 591 So. 2d at 1171-72; Trahan, 250 La. at 956, 200 So. 2d at 9.
We find further support for our holding in the legislature’s decision not to
extend to hearing officers the territorial jurisdiction to issue warrants. Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 161 provides that this territorial jurisdiction
extends throughout the court’s district—but this authority is expressly reserved to
judges and justices of the peace, “only in those cases specifically provided by law.”
Read with Articles 162, 202, and 203, Article 161 further demonstrates the
legislature did not contemplate granting this authority to hearing officers.
Our holding is also supported by the provisions of the Louisiana Children’s
Code, which define and limit the authority of juvenile court hearing officers. Article
423 of the Children’s Code lists the duties of a hearing officer; namely:
(1) Administering oaths.
(2) Compelling the attendance of witnesses and issuing
subpoenas.
(3) Taking testimony.
(4) Making a record of the hearings.
(5) Summarizing testimony, making findings of fact, and
submitting a written recommendation to the court
concerning the disposition of the assigned matter.
7
(6) Hearing and making recommendations on all restraining
orders and protective orders filed in accordance with
Articles 1569 and 1570.
La. Ch. C. art. 423(C). This article is silent as to the issuance of arrest or search
warrants, signifying that this authority was deliberately omitted by the legislature. A
local rule cannot expand that which the legislature has clearly withheld. See Trahan,
250 La. at 956, 200 So. 2d at 9; see also, Filson v. Windsor Court Hotel, 04-2893,
p. 6 (La. 6/29/05), 907 So. 2d 723, 728 (“the doctrine of Expressio Unius est Exclusio
Alterius,3 dictates that when the legislature specifically enumerates a series of things,
the legislature’s omission of other items, which could have easily been included in
the statute is deemed intentional.”).
Local Rule 41 itself reinforces this conclusion by allowing the hearing officer
to perform duties “not inconsistent with the Louisiana Children’s Code or with the
constitution and laws of the state.” Local Rule 41 §2. By assigning hearing officers
the power to issue warrants, the local rule is inconsistent with the Children’s Code,
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Louisiana Constitution. Therefore,
Subsections (B) and (E) of Local Rule 41 are null and void on their face—under both
the governing legislation and even its own limiting terms. Rodrigue, 591 So. 2d at
1171-72.
We must now determine whether, based on the nullity alone, search and arrest
warrants previously issued by a hearing officer pursuant to the local rules are invalid;
and, whether arrests made and evidence seized pursuant to these warrants must be
suppressed. For the following reasons, we find such warrants and arrests are valid,
and the evidence seized is admissible.
The de facto officer doctrine, a well-recognized principle, validates acts
performed by a person acting under the color of official title, even where the legal
3
The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
8
basis for that authority is later found to be deficient. O’Reilly, 00-2864, p. 12, 785
So. 2d at 776-77 (quoting Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995)). “A person is a
‘de facto’ officer when he or she is in possession of an office and discharges its
functions under color of authority.” Id., 00-2864, p. 12, 785 So. 2d at 777. Grounded
in public policy, this doctrine protects the public by ensuring the orderly function of
the government despite technical defects in the actor’s authority. Id.
A person qualifies as a de facto officer when exercising the duties of an office
under the color of an appointment made pursuant to an invalid law or rule, before
that infirmity has been judicially declared. Id. at 777-78. As this Court made clear
in O’Reilly, even where “an office is provided for by an unconstitutional statute. . . ,
for the sake of public policy and public justice, [the incumbent] will be recognized
as an officer de facto until the unconstitutionality of the Act has been judicially
determined in a direct proceeding for that purpose.” Id. at 777. Until that
determination is made, the acts of a de facto officer are valid and effective as to the
public and the rights of third parties, as though the officer was acting de jure. Id.
In an analogous case, State v. Stripling, 354 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (La. 1978), the
defendants challenged the validity of a search warrant issued by a commissioner on
the basis that “Act 548 of the Legislature for the year 1974, which purported to create
the office of the Commissioner, did not have a vote of two-thirds of the membership
of the House of Representatives as required . . . [by] the Constitution of 1921.” Id.,
354 So. 2d at 1300. This Court, noting that a determination of whether the act was
constitutional was not essential to the case, held:
The commissioner issuing the warrant was at least a de facto officer
acting under color of authority. Until his title to the office is attacked
directly and held to be invalid, the acts of a de facto official are as valid
and effectual, when they concern the public or the rights of third parties,
as though he were an officer de jure and cannot be collaterally attacked.
Id., 354 So. 2d at 1300-01.
9
The application of the de facto doctrine is appropriate even where, as here, the
underlying grant of authority is deemed legislatively infirm. In this case, the hearing
officer appointed by the court acted in reliance on an apparently valid local rule by
discharging duties under that rule when he issued the arrest and search warrants. He
acted in full public view and presented no appearance of being an intruder or usurper.
See O’Reilly, 00-2864, p. 12, 785 So. 2d at 777 (quoting Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180) (“to
satisfy the de facto officer doctrine the officer must be in the unobstructed possession
of an office and discharging its duties in full view of the public, in such manner and
under such circumstances as not to present the appearance of being an intruder or
usurper.”). The warrant-issuing authority purportedly granted by Local Rule 41
§12(B) and (E) had not been judicially declared invalid when the warrants at issue
were signed. The hearing officer was, at minimum, a de facto officer acting under
the color of right. The warrants issued pursuant to that authority are valid and may
not now be set aside on the basis of the local rule’s invalidity alone. Consequently,
both defendant’s arrest and the seizure of evidence under the authority of the search
warrant are likewise valid.4
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find that Subsections (B) and (E) of Local Rule
41 §12 of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court are unconstitutional as they purport to
vest authority to issue arrest and search warrant in its hearing officers, as those
provisions directly conflict with Louisiana Children’s Code Article 423 and
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 18, 161-162, 202-203, and 931.
However, the warrants previously issued by the hearing officer pursuant to those
provisions are valid under the de facto officer doctrine. The trial court’s ruling,
4
There is no evidence of invidious behavior of the NOPD officers that would be discouraged by suppression of the evidence.
10
denying defendant’s motion to suppress, is affirmed. We remand this case further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
11
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-KK-01398
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MESSIAH OWNEY
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
Parish of Orleans
WEIMER, C.J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that the evidence should not be suppressed based on
the de facto officer doctrine because the local court rule is presumed constitutional
until this court determines otherwise. As such, the police officers who procured the
warrant could not be in bad faith.
“According to [La. Const. art. V, § 1], judicial power is vested in certain courts
which are comprised of elected judges.” State v. Umezulike, 03-1404 (La. 2/25/04),
866 So.2d 794, 803 (Weimer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because
the Louisiana Constitution does not authorize hearing officers to issue warrants, I
agree with the determination that the hearing officer lacked the authority to issue a
warrant. Consequently, it is not necessary to review any statute or local rule that
purports to give a juvenile hearing officer authority to issue warrants.
1