Opinion issued June 16, 2026.
In the
Court of Appeals
for the
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00617-CR
TERRELL WALLS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 248th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1635968
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Terrell Walls, appeals the adjudication of his guilt after he
violated the terms of his deferred adjudication probation, claiming that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel (1) did not
investigate and present evidence of his mental-health history at the adjudication hearing and (2) did not investigate the issue of his sanity. In two cross-points, the
State asks us to modify the trial court’s judgment to correct statements in the
judgment that are inconsistent with the record of appellant’s adjudication hearing.
Because the record does not affirmatively show that appellant’s trial
counsel’s performance was deficient in either of the respects alleged by appellant,
we overrule appellant’s points of error. Consistent with the State’s cross-points, we
modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that appellant did not plead “TRUE” to
the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate and that the trial court did not
find that appellant had violated all of the conditions of community supervision set
forth in the State’s motion to adjudicate. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as
modified.
Background
The State charged appellant by indictment with aggravated robbery and
alleged that appellant had two prior felony convictions. After appellant pleaded
guilty on the aggravated robbery charge and that the punishment-enhancement
allegations were accurate, the trial court placed him on deferred-adjudication
community supervision for eight years. Roughly 18 months later, the State moved
to adjudicate appellant’s guilt. While the State included multiple grounds in its
motion to adjudicate, the adjudication hearing went forward only on the State’s
claim that appellant had violated the terms of his community supervision when he
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traveled to California and failed to report to the community supervision department
as required.
The trial court held an adjudication hearing on August 12, 2024. The trial
court heard evidence that, beginning approximately 16 months after he was
sentenced and continuing for a period of at least a year, appellant failed to report to
the community supervision department as required. Appellant’s counsel told the
trial court that appellant had become scared to report after a warrant was issued for
his arrest in connection with a different alleged offense.
Following the hearing, the trial court found the State’s failure to report
allegation to be true, adjudged appellant guilty of the offense of aggravated
robbery, and sentenced appellant to the minimum jail-time sentence available, 25
years in prison. The trial court noted that appellant had been charged with a new
crime while on probation and stopped reporting. The trial court observed further
that, while 25 years was a long time, appellant had a “considerable” record going
back to 1991.
Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal, and the trial court certified his
right of appeal.
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his first point of error, appellant argues that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not investigate and present
evidence of his mental-health history at the adjudication hearing.
A. Standard of Review
We review a claim that an appellant received ineffective assistance of
counsel at a hearing on a motion to adjudicate under the same standard applicable
to a claim that an appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at the
punishment stage of a non-capital trial. See Ex parte Jones, No. AP-76,318, 2010
WL 2396565, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 2010) (per curiam) (not designated
for publication) (reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from
motion to adjudicate under standard applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel
claim arising from punishment stage of a non-capital trial).
The two-pronged standard, established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), requires a showing of (1) deficient performance, and
(2) prejudice. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish deficient
performance, the appellant must show that his counsel’s assistance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017); Dryer v. State, 674 S.W.3d 635, 646 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2023, pet. ref’d). The appellant must overcome a strong presumption that
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counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. Prine, 537 S.W.3d at 117; Dryer, 674 S.W.3d at 646.
Any deficiency in counsel’s performance must therefore be firmly founded
in the record; it is not enough that counsel’s performance may seem questionable
in hindsight. Prine, 537 S.W.3d at 117; Dryer, 674 S.W.3d at 646-47. We cannot
find that counsel’s performance was deficient based on conjecture. Dryer, 674
S.W.3d at 647 (citing Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004)). Nor can we infer that counsel’s performance was deficient based on
portions of the record that are unclear. Id. (citing Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425,
432 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Rather, the record must affirmatively show that
counsel’s performance was deficient. Prine, 537 S.W.3d at 117; Dryer, 674
S.W.3d at 647.
The trial record, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to show deficient
performance by counsel. Dryer, 674 S.W.3d at 647 (citing Nava v. State, 415
S.W.3d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). The reasonableness of counsel’s
decisions often depends on facts that do not appear in the record. Id. (citing
Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “Hence, counsel
ordinarily should be afforded the opportunity to explain his conduct before we find
that his performance was deficient.” Id. (citing Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308).
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If counsel has not been given that opportunity, we cannot find counsel’s
performance deficient unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent
lawyer would have engaged in it. Id. (citing Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591,
593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). In other words, “the record must demonstrate that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as a
matter of law, and that no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts
or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Lopez v. State, 343
S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Generally, we will assume that counsel
had a reasonable strategic motive if any reasonable trial strategy can be imagined.
Dryer, 674 S.W.3d at 647 (citing Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013)).
To show prejudice, the appellant must show a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Johnson v. State, 624 S.W.3d 579, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);
Yonko v. State, 702 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet.
ref’d). A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 587; Yonko, 702 S.W.3d at
854.
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B. Failure to investigate and present mental-health history
Appellant claims on appeal that his trial counsel’s performance in
connection with his adjudication hearing was deficient in that she did not
investigate or present to the trial court evidence that appellant “left Houston and
went straight to a ‘mental health institute’ for weeks during the time he failed to
report.” He argues that his trial counsel was aware of that fact, and the significance
of his failure to report, and yet argued to the trial court only that appellant had
failed to report due to his fear of being arrested on the new charge made against
him.
At the start of the adjudication hearing, the trial court asked if it was correct
that appellant wished to represent himself, and appellant responded that it was not.
When appellant indicated that he had attempted to file a “grievance,” the trial court
asked him what his issue was with his attorney. Appellant responded in pertinent
part that he had given information to his counsel that she told him she “wasn’t
going to share with the DA because it’s incriminating,” and that:
I -- she haven’t came to sit down with me to have a defense -- to set
up a defense of nothing with me. I’ve given her stuff to talk about that
will help me in my defense. First off my mental health. She told me --she said it’s not important. I told her today that I left Houston, Texas,
and I went straight to a mental health institute and I stayed there for
weeks. I said since I was -- since she had -- she won’t believe --believe that I went to California.
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The trial court denied appellant’s motion for new counsel, noting that his
counsel had likely advised him against stating that he had gone to California
because it was an admission that he had violated the terms of his community
supervision. When the trial court asked if appellant had anything else he wanted to
say before the trial court proceeded with the hearing, appellant responded: “I’d like
to, yes, ma’am. Well, I was mainly going to – I’m killing myself. I don’t know, but
I’m trying to fight for my life.” The trial court responded, “I understand that, sir,”
and that “[w]e are now about to start your motion to adjudicate hearing.”
Appellant cites as support for his argument that his counsel should have
investigated and presented to the trial court his mental-health history the decision
of the court of appeals in Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d), in which a jury had found the appellant guilty of
felony driving while intoxicated and given him the maximum sentence of 99 years
in prison. Id. at 917-19. Lampkin’s trial counsel had concerns about his mental
status but ultimately concluded that Lampkin was competent and, he explained, for
that reason ignored the fact that Lampkin had not answered his questions about his
mental health. Id. at 912. Had Lampkin’s trial counsel investigated further, he
would have discovered substantial mitigating evidence in the possession of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a mental-health facility to which the
appellant had been admitted, including evidence that Lampkin had experienced
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mental-health issues due to long-term drug use, was taking medicine for paranoia,
was hearing voices, and had been diagnosed with a major depressive disorder with
psychotic features. Id. at 904, 922-23. The court of appeals found that Lampkin’s
trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that, had the mental-health evidence
been presented at trial, there was a reasonable probability that Lampkin’s sentence
would have been less severe. Id. at 916, 926.
Appellant acknowledges that, while Lampkin received the maximum
sentence available, appellant received the minimum sentence available. But
appellant argues that his mental-health history “is also very material to the decision
to adjudicate.”
Unlike in Lampkin, the record here does not affirmatively show that
appellant’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient due to a failure to investigate
and present appellant’s mental-health history. Appellant has presented no evidence
of the scope of his trial counsel’s investigation of his mental-health history, does
not identify what evidence she would have uncovered had she investigated further,
and has presented no evidence of her explanation for her conduct. The absence of
evidence of the scope of counsel’s investigation and what further investigation
would have uncovered is fatal to appellant’s claim. See Martinez v. State, 449
S.W.3d 193, 209-10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (rejecting
ineffective-assistance claim where defendant “presented no specific indication of
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the [mitigation and other] evidence that he claims should have been introduced by
his trial counsel, nor is there any indication that such evidence actually exists”).
Further, because appellant’s trial counsel has not been afforded the
opportunity to explain her conduct, we must assume that she had a reasonable
strategic motive if any reasonable trial strategy can be imagined. Dryer, 674
S.W.3d at 647 (citing Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 693). This presumption is difficult
to overcome where, as here, there was also no motion for new trial or associated
evidentiary hearing. See Starr v. State, No. 01-18-00947-CR, 2020 WL 4006447,
at *4 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (citing Morrison v. State, 132 S.W.3d 37, 47 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d)). Without a motion for new trial or
other opportunity to supplement the record in the trial court, the appellate record
typically will not contain evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that
counsel’s conduct was reasonable because the reasonableness of counsel’s choices
often involves facts that would not appear in the record. Levy v. State, No. 01-13-00379-CR, 2014 WL 3408697, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10,
2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op, not designated for publication).
The record on appeal shows at most that appellant’s trial counsel knew that,
during the period in which appellant did not report, he spent weeks at a
mental-health institute in California. As the trial court noted, counsel could have
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concluded it was a better trial strategy to require the State to prove its claim that
appellant had violated the terms of his community supervision by leaving the state
than to have appellant admit to leaving the state but offer an excuse for doing so.
We cannot conclude that counsel’s choice was “so outrageous that no competent
lawyer would have engaged in it.” See Dryer, 674 S.W.3d at 647; see also Vasquez
v. State, No. 01-23-00722-CR, 2025 WL 1738315, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] June 24, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting
ineffective-assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate and
present mitigation evidence concerning appellant’s drug and alcohol use where
appellant offered no evidence of whether or to what extent trial counsel conducted
any such investigation, did not identify what evidence any such investigation
would uncover, and did not give his counsel an opportunity to explain his decision
whether and to what extent to conduct such investigation, noting that appellant’s
counsel may have decided that evidence of drug and alcohol use would have
harmed appellant’s defense); Levy, 2014 WL 3408697, at *5 (rejecting
ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to investigate appellant’s
mental health because “record [was] silent as to what investigative steps counsel
actually may have taken and what conclusions he may have subsequently drawn,”
barring court of appeals from speculating as to why counsel acted as he did).
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Finally, even if appellant’s trial counsel had been deficient, appellant has not
shown a reasonable probability that, but for her error, the result of the adjudication
hearing would have been different. See Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 587; Yonko, 702
S.W.3d at 854. Before the adjudication hearing began, appellant himself told the
trial court that he had spent time at a mental-health institute in California during
the period in which he did not report. See Jagaroo v. State, 180 S.W.3d 793, 800
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (rejecting ineffective-assistance
claim based in part on appellant’s failure to show how testimony by live witnesses
not called by trial counsel would have differed from statements and letters
submitted to trial court). Moreover, while appellant failed to report for at least a
year, he stated that he had spent just “weeks” at the mental-health institute. See
Green v. State, 554 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no
pet.) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim where “omitted mitigating evidence
was not very compelling”). Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably probable
that, had appellant’s trial counsel offered evidence at the hearing of appellant’s
stay at the California mental-health institute, the trial court would have decided,
instead of adjudicating guilt and giving him the minimum jail sentence available,
not to adjudicate guilt.
We overrule appellant’s first point of error.
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C. Failure to investigate possible insanity defense
Appellant also claims on appeal that his trial counsel’s performance in
connection with his adjudication hearing was deficient because, despite knowing
that appellant spent weeks in a mental-health institute, she did not investigate the
issue of appellant’s sanity. Appellant argues that, under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68 (1985), in cases where an indigent defendant’s sanity is likely to be a significant
factor at trial, the State is obliged to provide funds to the defendant for psychiatric
experts. Appellant alleges that his trial counsel did not file a motion requesting
such funds, and none appears in the appellate record.
In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant may
have a due-process right to the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in his defense
if he has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is
likely to be a significant factor at trial. 470 U.S. at 74. The defendant’s preliminary
showing must go beyond just undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance
would be beneficial. In re City of Lubbock, 666 S.W.3d 546, 560 n.64 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2023) (citing Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 881-82 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012)).
The record reflects appellant’s assertion that he “went straight to” a
California mental-health institute and “stayed there for weeks,” but contains no
evidence of the nature of appellant’s alleged mental-health issues, much less that
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they have at any point threatened his sanity. The record thus does not affirmatively
show that appellant’s mental health would have been a significant factor at the
adjudication hearing. See Starr, 2020 WL 4006447, at *4 (holding that appellate
record did not show that trial counsel erred by failing to timely request funds to
hire mental-health expert before adjudication hearing for reasons including that
“there [was] no evidence that appellant’s mental health would have been a
significant factor at the hearing on the motion to adjudicate guilt”); Maldonado v.
State, No. 14-03-00074-CR, 2004 WL 234377, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Feb. 10, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to request
appointment of mental-health expert because appellant had not demonstrated that
his sanity was likely to be significant factor at trial).1 Because appellant has not
1
In both Starr and Maldonado, a court-appointed expert had deemed the appellant
to be competent to stand trial. See Starr v. State, No. 01-18-00947-CR, 2020 WL
4006447, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Maldonado v. State, No. 14-03-00074-CR, 2004
WL 234377, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 10, 2004, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). Both courts of appeals treated that
opinion as some, but not dispositive, evidence of the appellant’s competency. See
Starr, 2020 WL 4006447, at *5 (noting that appellant counsel’s representations
that his client suffered from mental illness conflicted with court-appointed expert’s
opinion that appellant did not exhibit significant pathology to warrant
mental-health diagnosis, leaving no evidence of appellant’s sanity being
significant factor at trial); Maldonado, 2004 WL 234377, at *2 (noting that neutral
expert may help in identifying whether sanity will be significant factor at trial). In
the case at issue, we do not view the absence of a court-appointed expert’s
competency determination as a factor weighing heavily for or against our
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shown that he was entitled to a defense mental-health expert, we cannot say
counsel was ineffective for failing to request one. See Maldonado, 2004 WL
234377, at *2.2
Also, the record does not show what testimony any psychiatric expert would
have provided. See Hudgins v. State, No. PD–0163–17, 2018 WL 525716, at *3
(Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2018) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call a witness to the stand,
including an expert witness, an appellant must show that the appellant would have
benefitted from that witness’s testimony.”); Starr, 2020 WL 4006447, at *4
(holding that appellate record did not show that trial counsel erred by failing to
timely request funds to hire mental-health expert before adjudication hearing for
determination that appellant has not shown that his mental health would have been
a significant factor at the adjudication hearing.
2
Appellant cites no case in which a Texas court reviewing a claim similar to
appellant’s ineffective-assistance claim found that the appellate record
affirmatively showed that appellant’s mental health would have been a significant
factor at trial. Of the three discussed in Maldonado, one involved a concession by
the State and the other two involved a more developed factual record. See
Maldonado, 2004 WL 234377, at *2 (discussing cases). In Woods v. State, the
record contained “a substantial amount of information regarding Woods’ previous
mental health history,” including a head injury and multiple commitments to
mental-health institutions beginning at age 13. 59 S.W.3d 833, 837-38 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 108 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). In In re R.D.B., the appellant’s mother testified regarding his severe
brain injury, which caused him to have to re-learn how to speak, his associated
medical conditions and treatments, and his having been seen by a psychiatrist). 20
S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
15
reasons including that “the record [did not] reflect what favorable evidence, if any,
a psychiatric evaluation would have shown”).
Further, there is no evidence as to whether or to what extent appellant’s trial
counsel investigated the issue of appellant’s sanity. The record shows at most that,
despite knowing that appellant had recently stayed for weeks in a mental-health
institution, counsel did not file a motion requesting funds to hire a mental-health
expert. The record does not include any other evidence related to appellant’s stay
at the mental-health institution. Counsel may have learned that appellant was
released with a clean bill of health, was diagnosed with a condition with no bearing
on his competency, or had a dependence on illegal drugs that the trial court might
have viewed in a negative light. See Levy, 2014 WL 3408697, at *6 (holding that
counsel’s unexplained decision not to disclose to trial court reports of
mental-health expert was not “so outrageous that no competent attorney would
have engaged in it” given reports described appellant as cognitively intact,
referenced history of drug abuse that trial court might have weight negatively, and
included diagnoses that “were not of such striking severity or plainly exculpatory
character that only an incompetent attorney would fail to bring them to the court’s
attention”). Appellant’s counsel’s conduct was not “so outrageous that no
competent lawyer would have engaged in it.” See Dryer, 674 S.W.3d at 647.
We overrule appellant’s second point of error.
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Cross-Issues
The State filed no notice of appeal but, in its responsive brief, raises two
cross-issues in which it asks the Court to modify the trial court’s judgment and
affirm the judgment as modified. In its judgment, the trial court states that
appellant pleaded “TRUE” to the State’s motion to adjudicate and finds that
appellant violated all of the conditions of community supervision set forth in the
State’s motion to adjudicate. The State argues that, while “appellant essentially
admitted to some of the allegations when he addressed the trial court, the reporter’s
record does not appear to reflect that he formally pleaded ‘true’ to the motion to
adjudicate guilt.” The State suggests further that the record of the adjudication
hearing reflects that appellant committed the alleged failure-to-report violation.
Because the State is not seeking greater relief than that awarded by the trial court,
its failure to file a notice of appeal does not bar its cross-points.3
3
Rule 25.1(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “[a] party
who seeks to alter the trial court’s judgment . . . must file a notice of appeal,” and
that “[t]he appellate court may not grant a party who does not file a notice of
appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause.” Under
Rule 25.1 as applied, a party must file a notice of appeal only if it seeks greater
relief than that awarded in the trial court’s judgment. City of Austin v. Whittington,
384 S.W.3d 766, 789 (Tex. 2012); Dean v. Lafayette Place (Section One) Council
of Co–Owners, 999 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no
pet.). A party that has not filed a notice of appeal may raise independent grounds
for affirmance in a cross-point as long as the appellee is not requesting greater
relief than that awarded by the trial court. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d at 789; Reg’l
Specialty Clinic, P.A. v. Randle, No. 14-23-00368-CV, 2024 WL 3420244, *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing
Dean, 999 S.W.2d at 818).
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We agree that the trial court’s judgment is erroneous in the two respects
identified by the State. We thus modify the judgment to state, under the heading
“Plea to Motion to Adjudicate,” that appellant’s plea was “Not True.” See Bell v.
State, 566 S.W.3d 398, 401, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
(reforming trial-court judgment to reflect that appellant pleaded “not true” to
allegations); Davila v. State, No. 03-15-00072-CR, 2015 WL 5000856, at *1-2
(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (where record showed that appellant made no formal plea to
allegations in State’s motion to adjudicate, modifying trial-court judgment to state
that appellant’s “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate” was “Not True”).
We further modify the finding in the trial court’s judgment in which the trial
court currently states that appellant violated all of the conditions of community
supervision set forth in the State’s motion to adjudicate to state that appellant
“violated the conditions of community supervision, as set out in the State’s
Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt, as follows: FAILED TO REPORT FOR
THE MONTHS OF MARCH 2022 AND APRIL 2022.”4 See Hayhurst v. State,
No. 01-18-00412-CR, 2019 WL 922066, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Feb. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying
4
In its motion to adjudicate, the State argued in part that appellant had violated the
terms of his community supervision by “[f]ailing to report as directed for the
months of March and April of 2022.”
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trial-court judgment to conform findings as to appellant’s violations of terms of
supervision to written record).
Conclusion
Because trial court’s judgment erroneously states that appellant pleaded
“TRUE” to the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate, we modify the trial
court’s judgment to state, under the heading “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate,” that
appellant’s plea was “Not True.” And because the trial court in its judgment
erroneously included a finding that appellant violated all of the conditions of
community supervision set forth in the State’s motion to adjudicate, we modify
that sentence to state that appellant “violated the conditions of community
supervision, as set out in the State’s Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt, as
follows: FAILED TO REPORT FOR THE MONTHS OF MARCH 2022 AND
APRIL 2022.” We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. Any pending
motions are denied as moot.
Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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