Opinion issued June 18, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00655-CR
MICHAEL COATES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 184th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1812497
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael Coates appeals his conviction for murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 19.02. He asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient for the jury to reject
his self-defense theory. He also argues that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a necessity instruction in the jury charge. We affirm.
Background
Coates shot and killed Marcus Mercado outside of a corner store in Houston,
Texas. Mercado died from multiple gunshot wounds to his face, scalp, torso, and
wrist. Eyewitness Dexter Fennie testified that he was parked in front of the store,
smoking a cigarette inside his truck, when he heard two men start arguing. Fennie
said that Mercado was with another person, whom investigators later identified as
Demorian Howell. Fennie testified that Mercado started an argument with Coates
and gestured that he was preparing to fight by pulling his pants up. Fennie saw
Coates take out a gun from under his jacket and began shooting.
Fennie testified that, when Coates started shooting, Howell ran away while
Mercado tried to hide behind a tree. Coates shot at Mercado again, and Mercado
fell to the ground. Coates walked up to Mercado and “hovered” over him, shooting
him again. At that point, Coates saw Fennie in his truck and walked over to him.
Fennie put his hands up, closed his eyes, and stayed still. Coates went back to
Mercado on the ground and then left. Fennie identified Coates in court as the
shooter.
The jury viewed surveillance video showing Mercado wrapped in a blanket
sitting along the road by the grocery store. In the video, Howell walks past
Mercado several times, in and out of the camera’s field of vision. Eventually,
Coates appears in the surveillance video. When he sees Coates, Howell moves off
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the sidewalk, and Mercado stands up, tosses his blanket on the ground, and walks
toward Coates.
Coates and Mercado exchange words. Coates continues walking toward the
grocery store with his hands in his pockets. Mercado and Howell are slowly
moving toward Coates. Coates takes out a gun and opens fire.
When Coates starts shooting, Howell runs away. Mercado tries to hide
behind a tree. Coates shoots Mercado, who falls to the ground writhing. Coates
runs over to Mercado, stands over him, and points the gun at Mercado’s head. He
shoots Mercado at least twice. Mercado stops moving. Coates wanders around for
a few minutes before coming back over to Mercado. He then walks away, leaving
the field of vision.
The jury also heard testimony linking Coates to the murder weapon.
Investigators found eight spent cartridges at the scene of the crime. A firearms
expert concluded that the casings were discharged from a pistol that was recovered
from Coates’s apartment a few days after the shooting. A medical examiner
testified that Mercado died from multiple gunshot wounds. He had two gunshot
wounds to his scalp, two to his torso, one to his face, and one to his wrist. The
medical examiner testified that the gunshot wound to Mercado’s torso would have
been fatal within a few minutes, but each gunshot wound to his head, including the
one to his face and the two to his scalp, would have been instantly fatal. The
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medical examiner also testified that Mercado’s blood alcohol level was .161 grams
per deciliter, twice the legal driving limit.
The State offered as evidence a recorded jail phone call between Coates and
his uncle, in which the uncle advises Coates on how to handle jury selection and
trial. During the call, Coates admits shooting Mercado and claims to have done so
in self-defense.
At the conclusion of evidence, the jury found Coates guilty of murder and
sentenced him to 80 years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. He appealed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Coates challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim. According to
Coates, no rational jury could have concluded that deadly force was not
immediately necessary for him to defend himself.
A. Standard of Review
A defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support a claim
of self-defense. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018) (“The defendant’s burden of production requires him to adduce some
evidence that would support a rational finding in his favor on the defensive
issue.”). The State, in turn, bears the burden of persuasion to negate self-defense.
See id. at 608. The State’s burden “is not one that requires the production of
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evidence; rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (quoting Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).
A jury’s guilty verdict is an implicit finding rejecting a defendant’s self-defense
theory. London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet.
ref’d).
We review both legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the jury’s
rejection of self-defense under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)). Under that standard, “the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Rankin v. State, 617 S.W.3d 169,
182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). Viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient under this standard when
either: (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence,
probative of an element of the offense; or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes
a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 319 n.11, 320. We “may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence and thereby substitute
our judgment for that of the fact finder.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in the
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testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). We presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
B. Applicable Law
A person commits murder if he “intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of an individual” or “intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” See TEX.
PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). The jury may infer that the defendant intended to
kill the complainant from the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon and from other
circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s acts, words, and the extent of
the complainant’s injuries. See Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (stating jury may infer intent “from any facts in evidence which it
determines proves the existence of such intent to kill, such as the use of a deadly
weapon”); see also Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (stating defendant’s “intent to commit murder may also be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, including his acts and words”); Lopez v. State, 672
S.W.3d 915, 923 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2023, pet. ref’d) (“Intent to
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kill may also be inferred from the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted on the
victim.”).
The use of deadly force in self-defense is a defense to prosecution for
murder if the use of deadly force is “justified.” TEX. PENAL CODE §§. 9.02, 9.31–
.32. Section 9.31(a) of the Penal Code states that “a person is justified in using
force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the
force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful force.” Id. § 9.31(a). The phrase “reasonably believes”
contains “subjective and objective components.” Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25,
32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “A defendant must subjectively believe that another
person used or attempted to use unlawful force . . . against the defendant and that
the defendant’s use of unlawful or deadly force in response was immediately
necessary.” Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(42)); see also TEX. PENAL
CODE § 1.07(a)(42) (defining “reasonable belief” as one held by “an ordinary and
prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor”).
Deadly force in self-defense is justified “if the actor would be justified in
using force against the other under Section 9.31” and when and to the degree the
actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the
actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force or to
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prevent the other’s imminent commission of murder, among other crimes. Id.
§ 9.32(a).
A defendant need not testify to raise the issue of self-defense. See Bernard v.
State, No. 01-22-00877-CR, 2024 WL 3350253, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] July 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
VanBrackle v. State, 179 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.)
(“Defensive issues may be raised by the testimony of any witnesses, even those
called by the State.”)); see also Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (“While a non-testifying defendant may be
entitled to a charge on self-defense, it is rare for the defense to be raised when the
defendant fails to testify.”). Nevertheless, there must be some evidence of the
defendant’s subjective belief that another person used or attempted to use unlawful
force against the defendant and that the defendant’s use of unlawful or deadly force
in response was immediately necessary. See Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 32. When, as
here, a defendant does not testify, the record must contain “observable
manifestations” of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the alleged act of
self-defense or some evidence from which the jury can infer the defendant had the
requisite mens rea. See id. at 33 (“[A] person’s belief, absent direct evidence,
generally must be inferred from the circumstances of the case.”).
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C. Rejection of Self-Defense
Coates argues that he was justified in using deadly force to defend himself
against Mercado and Howell because (1) Mercado and Howell approached him;
(2) Mercado pulled up his pants just before Coates shot him; (3) toxicology
evidence showed Mercado was drunk at the time; (4) and during the recorded call
with his uncle, Coates admitted shooting Mercado but claimed he was afraid and
did so in self-defense.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record reflects that
Howell and Mercado had a verbal altercation with Coates outside the corner store.
They were several feet from each other, but they were slowly moving closer
together. The surveillance video shows Coates pulling out a weapon and shooting
as Howell and Mercado retreat. There is no evidence that Howell or Mercado
pointed a gun at Coates or otherwise used force against him. Howell ran away after
the first shots. Coates shot at Mercado a second time, and Mercado fell to the
ground. Coates then stood over Mercado and shot him additional times in the head.
A rational jury could have concluded that when he drew and fired his gun,
Coates did not reasonably believe that the use of deadly force was immediately
necessary to protect himself from Mercado and Howell, who had not displayed
weapons or attacked him. See Harris v. State, 668 S.W.3d 83, 90 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (explaining that even “[a]ssuming that
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[defendant] was aware that [victim] was armed and prepared to take the drugs by
force, a rational jury could have found that” defendant did not have “a reasonable
belief that deadly force was immediately necessary at the time of the shooting, as
[victim] had not yet drawn his gun or otherwise threatened to use it at that time”).
A rational jury also reasonably could have concluded from the evidence that
Coates’s conduct was inconsistent with his claim of self-defense because he shot at
Mercado three separate times in succession, the last of which were shots in the
head as Mercado lay on the ground. See Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 381
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (stating jury could have
reasonably concluded that defendant’s conduct in continuing to stab his wife’s
back as she lay bleeding on floor was inconsistent with his claim of self-defense);
see also Russell v. State, No. 05-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“Additionally, the jury could also reasonably infer that the sheer number of bullets
that were fired . . . are beyond what can be considered immediately necessary to
protect appellant from any action taken by Tell or Garcia.”).
Finally, the jury was free to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and
testimony in listening to the recorded phone call from jail between Coates and his
uncle. The jury was free to disbelieve Coates’s statement that he was afraid and
shot Mercado in self-defense.
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
a jury rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Coates
intentionally caused Mercado’s death by shooting him and that Coates did not
reasonably believe that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself
against Mercado’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, thus rejecting
Coates’s self-defense claim. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Rankin, 617 S.W.3d
at 184. We overrule Coates’s first issue.
Jury Charge Error
In his second issue, Coates argues that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. He argues that he
admitted to shooting Mercado during the phone call he made to his uncle, and that
the phone call proves that he reasonably believed he “had to shoot the two men
because it was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm from them and
because the urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweighed the law against
killing Mercado.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on any defensive theory raised
by evidence or testimony when such an instruction is properly requested. Krajcovic
v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Whether the evidence or
testimony is presented by the defense or the State is irrelevant, as is the strength of
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the evidence or testimony. Booth v. State, 679 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984). Whether the record contains such evidence is a question of law, which
means we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s
requested submission. Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
Necessity, like self-defense, is a defense of justification. See TEX. PENAL
CODE §§ 9.02, 9.22, 9.31, 9.32. The defense of necessity provides that conduct that
otherwise would be criminal is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately
necessary to avoid imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly
outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm
sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the
conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.
Id. § 9.22. At issue here is the third element, which is a question of law. Toliver v.
State, No. 01-23-00802-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2025 WL 3028897, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 30, 2025, pet. ref’d). “[I]f there is a plain legislative
purpose to exclude the defense of necessity, then [element] (3) precludes that
defense from being included in the [trial court’s] charge [to the jury].” Id. (quoting
Chase v. State, 666 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023, pet. ref’d)).
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B. Analysis
Coates asserts that because he satisfied the first two elements of the
necessity defense, he was entitled to an instruction under Texas Penal Code section
9.22. The State asserts that the defense of necessity does not apply because the
Legislature’s detailed and nuanced self-defense provisions reflect its intent to
preclude necessity in violent-offense cases where deadly-force self-defense is
claimed.
Our Court and the majority of courts of appeals in Texas that have addressed
the propriety of a necessity instruction in a murder case have concluded that a
defendant may not raise a necessity defense when deadly force in self-defense is
the conduct that the defendant alleges was immediately necessary under Texas
Penal Code section 9.22(1), and the jury was also instructed as to deadly-force selfdefense pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 9.32. See Toliver, 2025 WL
3028897, at *7–8 (holding same and listing cases from courts of appeals with same
holding). “This is because the plain language of the statute governing the defense
of deadly-force self-defense . . . ‘evidences a legislative intent that precludes an
accompanying necessity instruction.’” Id. at *8 (quoting Chase, 666 S.W.3d at
835). As we explained in Toliver, section 9.32 justifies deadly force only when the
actor’s life is immediately threatened by another person’s use of unlawful deadly
force or to prevent the commission of specific violent crimes, but a necessity
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defense involves a lower showing, requiring only that the conduct be necessary to
avoid imminent harm. Id. (noting that in absence of binding authority from Court
of Criminal Appeals, our Court agrees with majority of Texas appellate courts that
have addressed this issue).
Coates was charged with murder and requested and received an instruction
on deadly force self-defense in accordance with Texas Penal Code 9.32. We hold
that the trial court did not err in denying Coates’s request for an instruction on the
defense of necessity.
We overrule Coates’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Susanna Dokupil
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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