[Cite as State v. McKnight, 2026-Ohio-2346.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case Nos. 25CA14
25CA15
v. :
RICKEY L. MCKNIGHT, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES:
Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.1
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven K. Nord, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________ CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:6-9-26
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is a consolidated appeal from a Lawrence County
Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence and a
judgment that imposed sentence for a violation of communitycontrol sanctions. Rickey L. McKnight, defendant below and
appellant herein, assigns the following error for review:
“MR. MCKNIGHT’S CONVICTIONS ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court
1
proceedings.
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 2
{¶2} On December 10, 2024, Ironton Police Department Officer
Corey Allison responded to a reported burglary and assault at
the premises where J.M. resided. Upon the officer’s arrival,
J.M. reported that appellant had entered the premises and
assaulted him.
{¶3} A Lawrence County Grand Jury subsequently returned an
indictment that charged appellant with (1) aggravated burglary,
in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), and (2) felonious assault,
in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). Appellant entered not
guilty pleas.
{¶4} In March 2025, the trial court held a jury trial. At
trial, J.M. testified that he had been renting a residence from
appellant’s family. J.M. explained that he knew that appellant
had a key to the residence, but he did not give appellant
permission to enter the residence.
{¶5} J.M. stated that, on December 10, 2024, while he was
sleeping, appellant entered the residence and hit J.M. on the
foot to awaken him. After appellant hit J.M. on the foot, he
rose from the bed and told appellant to leave. J.M. indicated
that appellant then pushed J.M. and caused him to fall into a
drum set. J.M. stated that after he got up and pushed appellant
away, appellant then hit him near his eye. J.M. asserted that
as a result of the incident, he suffered a fractured vertebra
and a broken rib and required five stitches on his eyelid. Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 3
{¶6} Ironton Police Captain Brandon Blankenship testified
that he spoke with appellant about the incident. Blankenship
stated that appellant explained the circumstances that
surrounded the incident and related that appellant went to
J.M.’s residence to ask about $20 that J.M. owed appellant.
J.M. told appellant that he was not paying appellant $20. J.M.
then poked appellant in the eye. Blankenship stated that
appellant alleged that he had acted in self-defense.
{¶7} Appellant testified in his defense and explained that,
on December 10, 2024, he went to the residence to ask J.M. to
pay appellant the money that J.M. owed him. Appellant stated
that he used his key to enter the residence. Appellant claimed
that he had a verbal agreement with J.M. “to come and go as [he]
please[d] day or night.”
{¶8} Appellant indicated that, when he entered the
residence, J.M. was asleep, so he yelled at him to awaken him.
Appellant stated that when J.M. awoke and asked appellant what
he wanted, appellant told J.M. he wanted to ask about the money
that J.M. owed. J.M. then informed appellant that he was not
“giving [appellant] a damn thing” and then “headbutted”
appellant. Appellant stated that J.M. fell into the drum set,
and appellant “grabbed him by the hair of the head” to restrain
him. Appellant contended that he was trying to prevent J.M. Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 4
from fighting with him and that he only acted in self-defense.
After appellant’s testimony, the defense rested.
{¶9} After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant
not guilty of aggravated burglary, but guilty of burglary and
felonious assault.
{¶10} The trial court later sentenced appellant to serve 18
months in prison for the burglary offense and 6 years in prison
for the felonious assault offense. This appeal followed.
{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts
that his convictions are against “the manifest weight of
sufficient evidence.” Regarding his burglary conviction,
appellant asserts that the greater amount of the evidence shows
that he did not (1) “gain access to the property by force,
stealth, or deception,” or (2) trespass into the house.
Appellant further claims that the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to establish either of the foregoing
elements.
{¶12} Appellant also argues that his felonious assault
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. He
contends that the State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he did not act in self-defense.”
A
Standard of Review
{¶13} We initially observe that appellant’s assignment of Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 5
error appears to blend the “quantitatively and qualitatively
different” standards that apply to sufficiency and manifestweight challenges. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386 (1997) (“The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence
and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and
qualitatively different.”). A challenge to the manifest weight
of the evidence requires a court to evaluate whether the greater
amount of credible evidence offered at trial supports the
defendant’s conviction. See id. at 387, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990) (“Weight of the evidence concerns
‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence,
offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than
the other.’”). A court that considers a manifest weight
challenge must “‘review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of
witnesses.’” State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 208, quoting
State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. Reviewing courts also
must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is an
issue for the trier of fact to resolve. See Eastley v. Volkman,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67
(2001); State v. Murphy, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.).
“‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is
particularly competent to decide “whether, and to what extent,
to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,” we must afford Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 6
substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’”
Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20, quoting State v.
Konya, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Lawson,
1997 WL 476684 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997). As the Eastley court
explained:
“‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is
manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every
reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption
must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of
facts....
If the evidence is susceptible of more than one
construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it
that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict
and judgment.’”
2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn.3 (1984), quoting 5 Ohio
Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192
(1978).
{¶14} Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of
evidence weight and witness credibility to the fact finder, as
long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision.
State v. Picklesimer, 2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); accord
State v. Howard, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“We will not
intercede as long as the trier of fact has some factual and
rational basis for its determination of credibility and
weight”).
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 7
{¶15} Accordingly, a judgment of conviction is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence when the record contains
substantial, credible evidence upon which the trier of fact
reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
essential elements of the offense had been established. See
State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Getsy,
84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193–194 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio
St.2d 169 (1978), syllabus (“‘The question to be answered when a
manifest-weight issue is raised is whether “there is substantial
evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all
the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt’”
[emphasis omitted.]). A court may reverse a judgment of
conviction only if it appears that the fact finder, when it
resolved the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983); accord State v. Brown,
2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 31. A reviewing court should find a
conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence only in
the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175; accord State v. Clinton,
2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 166; State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483 Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 8
(2000).
{¶16} On the other hand, a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence does not permit a reviewing court to assess the
credibility of the evidence. See Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, at ¶
17, quoting State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19, quoting State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the
syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other
grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, fn.
4 (1997) (sufficiency review does not allow a reviewing court to
“ask whether the evidence should be believed but, rather,
whether the evidence, ‘“if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”’”); see
generally State v. Balmert, 2025-Ohio-5588, ¶ 10, quoting State
v. Groce, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7 (a sufficiency challenge requires
a reviewing court to determine “‘whether the evidence presented,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would
allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’”). Instead, the
question is whether the State’s evidence, if believed, is
legally sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction. See
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386 (“sufficiency is a test of
adequacy”).
B
Burglary
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 9
{¶17} Appellant first contends that the record does not
contain sufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction
and that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Appellant claims that the evidence fails to establish
that he trespassed by force, stealth, or deception.
{¶18} R.C. 2911.12(B) sets forth the elements of the
burglary offense at issue. The statute provides that “[n]o
person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in a
permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person
other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to
be present.” Id. For purposes of this offense, trespass means
to “knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another” without a privilege to do so. See R.C. 2911.10; R.C.
2911.21(A)(1).
1
Trespass
{¶19} We first consider appellant’s argument that the
evidence fails to establish that he trespassed on the premises.
He appears to contend that he could not have committed a
trespass because (1) he was the landlord and had a key to the
residence, and (2) the victim understood that appellant “could
come and go to the house.” We believe, however, that
appellant’s assertions are without merit.
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 10
{¶20} Regarding appellant’s assertion that he did not commit
a trespass because he was the landlord and had a key, the law is
well-established that a person “can commit a trespass and
burglary against property of which one is the legal owner if
another has control or custody of that property.” State v.
Lilly, 87 Ohio St.3d 97, 102 (1999). Thus, appellant’s
purported status as the landlord and key holder does not prevent
him from being a trespasser.
{¶21} Furthermore, even if the victim had given appellant
permission to enter the premises, “a [person] who initially
gains entry to one’s home by consent may subsequently become a
trespasser if consent is withdrawn.” State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio
St.3d 239, 243 (1988), citing State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d
111 (1987). Any consent is considered withdrawn if the
defendant engages in an offense of violence against the
occupant. State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 318 (the defendant’s
privilege to remain on the premises terminated after the
defendant started assaulting the occupants); Steffen at 115
(privilege given to a door-to-door salesman to enter the home
terminated the moment he commenced the assault on the victim);
State v. Wisecup, 2004-Ohio-5652, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.) (even if the
defendant’s initial entry was lawful, the defendant’s privilege
to remain on the premises “terminated upon the commencement of
his conduct constituting gross sexual imposition”).
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 11
{¶22} In the case at bar, therefore, even if the evidence
had shown that the victim had given appellant consent to enter
the premises, the victim did not give appellant permission to
remain on the premises once appellant entered the victim’s
bedroom and began to assault him. Not only did the victim tell
appellant to leave, thereby revoking any consent given, but
appellant’s attack upon the victim withdrew any consent the
victim may have given to appellant to enter or to remain on the
premises. See State v. Campbell, 2019-Ohio-5004, ¶ 51 (6th
Dist.) (any privilege to remain in the residence “terminated
when [the defendant] started threatening [the victim] and
chasing her with guns”); State v. Metcalf, 2012-Ohio-6045, ¶ 21
(2d Dist.) (“any privilege that [the defendant] may have had to
enter [the victim]’s house was revoked or terminated the moment
he shot [the victim] in the head”); State v. Stewart, 2006-Ohio1071, ¶¶ 16-21 (8th Dist.) (any permission the defendant “may
have had to be in the apartment was negated the moment [the
victim] told him to leave”); State v. Bouchioua, 2000 WL 336434,
*13 (4th Dist. Mar. 27, 2000) (“any privilege appellant may
arguably have had to enter or to remain in the victim’s home
terminated once he began assaulting her”).
{¶23} Consequently, we do not agree with appellant that the
State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the
element of trespass or that the jury’s finding that appellant Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 12
trespassed is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
2
Stealth or Deception
{¶24} Appellant also asserts that the evidence does not
establish that he trespassed by stealth or deception. Regarding
deception, appellant contends that the evidence does not show
that he “made any statements or committed any acts that would
create a false impression in [the victim’s] mind.”
{¶25} Appellant further contends that the evidence fails to
show that he trespassed by stealth. He states that, rather than
acting in a stealthy manner when he entered the victim’s
residence, he announced his presence by shouting to the victim.
Appellant contends that he “was cavalier, did not act with a
sense of urgency, and did nothing to avoid being detected.” He
additionally claims that he “did not act in a secret, sly or
clandestine way to avoid discovery.”
{¶26} The State counters that the evidence establishes that
appellant used stealth or deception to enter the victim’s
residence.2 The State maintains that appellant’s use of his key
to enter the residence, rather than ringing the doorbell,
knocking on the door, or calling the victim on the phone to
2 At trial, the State did not argue that appellant trespassed (i.e.,
entered or remained on the premises) by force. Moreover, the State has not asserted on appeal that appellant trespassed by force. We therefore do not address the issue.
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 13
notify him that he would be coming over, demonstrates stealth.
The State further asserts that appellant’s stealth or deception
continued when he entered the victim’s bedroom and slapped the
victim’s foot to awaken him.
{¶27} We begin by considering appellant’s assertion that he
did not trespass by stealth.
Merriam-Webster defines “stealth” as “intended not
to attract attention.” Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 1221 (11th Ed.2003). And “stealth” has been
defined in caselaw as “‘any secret, sly or clandestine
act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or to
remain within a residence of another without
permission.’” State v. Ward, 85 Ohio App.3d 537, 540,
620 N.E.2d 168 (3d Dist.1993), quoting State v. Lane, 50
Ohio App.2d 41, 47, 361 N.E.2d 535 (10th Dist.1976).
State v. Bertram, 2023-Ohio-1456, ¶ 14.
{¶28} Courts generally have held that evidence that the
defendant “sneak[ed] up on sleeping or distracted occupants”
establishes that the defendant acted with stealth. See State v.
Silver, 2025-Ohio-2771 (8th Dist.). In Silver, for example, the
court upheld the defendant’s aggravated burglary conviction when
the evidence showed that he trespassed by stealth into the
sleeping victims’ rooms. The evidence presented at trial
demonstrated that the defendant “sneaked into the murdered
victims’ room — catching them all by surprise to the extent that
their bodies were found where they were sleeping or lying.” Id.
at ¶ 35. The court concluded that the defendant’s conduct
established that he “actively avoid[] discovery” when he entered Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 14
the sleeping victims’ rooms and that his conduct thus
illustrated that he trespassed by stealth. Id.; see also State
v. Stone, 2024-Ohio-177, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.) (“[e]ntering a house at
night while ‘under the cover of darkness,’ particularly when
occupants are likely to be asleep, is sufficient to establish
the element of stealth”).
{¶29} In the case sub judice, the State presented sufficient
evidence to establish that appellant trespassed by stealth. The
State’s evidence showed that appellant entered the victim’s home
using a key and did not announce his presence. He then
proceeded to step into the room where the victim was sleeping
and hit the victim on the foot to awaken him. The jury could
have reasonably concluded that appellant’s conduct in secretly
entering the victim’s home while he slept demonstrated stealth.
See Silver, 2025-Ohio-2771, at ¶ 35 (8th Dist.); Stone, 2024-Ohio-177, at ¶ 27 (2d Dist.); see also State v. Steen, 2020-Ohio-4598, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Buelow, 2004-Ohio6052, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.) (“a defendant’s uninvited entry into an
unlocked house in the middle of the night while the occupants
were sleeping was sufficient to establish the element of stealth
to support a burglary conviction”); State v. Stewart, 2006-Ohio1071, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (evidence sufficient to establish the
element of stealth when the defendant “secretly entered [the
victim’s] home after she went to sleep”); State v. Bell, 1994 WL Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 15
29877, *3 (12th Dist. Jan. 31, 1994) (evidence that the
defendant entered the victim’s “home by opening the door without
first knocking, ringing the doorbell, or obtaining an answer or
permission from someone in the house is sufficient evidence to
support a finding that appellant entered the house by stealth”).
Thus, the evidence presented at trial supports a finding that
appellant trespassed by stealth.
{¶30} Moreover, the jury was entitled to reject appellant’s
version of events, including his assertion that he announced his
presence by calling out the victim’s name. See, e.g., State v.
Willey, 2026-Ohio-242, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.) (“The trier of fact is
free to believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.”).
Appellant’s disagreement with the jury’s interpretation of the
evidence does not mean that the jury clearly lost its way and
committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding that
appellant trespassed by stealth. See, e.g., State v. Hall,
2014-Ohio-2959, ¶ 2 (4th Dist.) (“When conflicting evidence is
presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence simply because the jury rejected the
defendant’s version of the facts and believed the testimony
presented by the state.”). The State thus presented
substantial, credible evidence to establish that appellant
trespassed by stealth and the jury’s finding that appellant
trespassed by stealth is not against the manifest weight of the Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 16
evidence.
{¶31} Because the State presented substantial, credible
evidence to establish that appellant trespassed by stealth, we
need not consider appellant’s argument that the evidence fails
to demonstrate that he trespassed by deception.
{¶32} Consequently, in view of the foregoing, we do not
believe that appellant’s burglary conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant has not established
that the case at bar is one of the exceptional cases in which
the evidence weighs heavily against his burglary conviction.
C
Felonious Assault
{¶33} Appellant also asserts that his felonious assault
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. He
contends that the weight of the evidence shows that he acted in
self-defense.
{¶34} “R.C. 2901.05(B) codifies a person’s right to use
force in self-defense.” State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 190.
To invoke the affirmative defense of self-defense, a defendant
must point to some evidence that tends to show that (1) the
defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise
to the affray, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that the
defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
and that the only means of escape from the danger was in the use Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 17
of force, and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to
retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio4562, ¶ 14 and 22; R.C. 2905.01(B)(1). If the defendant
satisfies this burden of production, the State then bears the
burden “to ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
person did not use the force in self-defense.’” Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, at ¶ 190, quoting R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); accord
Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 19 (“the defendant has the
burden of producing legally sufficient evidence of self-defense
to trigger the state’s duty to overcome that evidence”).
“Because each element must exist for a self-defense claim to
prevail, the state can defeat a self-defense claim by disproving
any one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Citations omitted.) Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, at ¶ 191.
{¶35} In the case sub judice, appellant asserts that he was
not at fault in creating the situation that gave rise to the
affray and that he had a bona fide belief that he was in
imminent danger. We recognize that appellant presented evidence
that tended to show that the victim was the initial aggressor
when appellant claimed that the victim poked him in the eye.
The victim’s testimony, however, suggested that appellant was
the initial aggressor. The victim stated that appellant pushed
him and caused him to fall. The victim’s testimony thus
indicated that appellant was at fault in creating the situation Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 18
giving rise to the affray, and his testimony allowed the jury to
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant did not act
in self-defense. We therefore do not agree with appellant that
his felonious assault conviction is against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
{¶36} As a final matter, we observe that appellant also
appealed the trial court’s judgment that sentenced him to prison
for violating the community control sanctions that the court
imposed in a different case. He has not, however, assigned any
error to this judgment. Given the absence of any assignment of
error pertaining to this judgment, we affirm the court’s
judgment. See Ford v. Crawford, 2021-Ohio-454, ¶ 3 (2nd Dist.)
(“If a brief fails to articulate an assignment of error with a
supporting argument, an appellate court may affirm the trial
court’s decision on this basis.”).
{¶37} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the
trial court’s judgments.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.
Lawrene App. No. 25CA14 & 25CA15 19
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail
has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.