NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 251049
Decision filed 06/29/26. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-1049
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
In re PARENTAGE OF W.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(Preston C., ) Marion County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 25-FA-32
)
Zakariya S., ) Honorable
) Wesley A. Gozia,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Bollinger concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Vaughan dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner, Preston C., filed a petition to establish parentage regarding W.C. Respondent,
Zakariya S., filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On November 20, 2025,
following two days of testimony, the Marion County trial court denied Zakariya’s motion to
dismiss. Zakariya filed a petition for leave to appeal before this court. This court allowed the
petition pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which permits
appeals from an order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
forum non conveniens.
1
¶2 On appeal, Zakariya raises four issues. First, she argues that the trial court erred by failing
to identify Iowa as W.C.’s home state. Second, she argues that the trial court erred by considering
factors that occurred outside of the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to
establish parentage. Third, she argues that the trial court erred by finding that Illinois, not Iowa,
had significant connections as set forth in section 201(a)(2) of the Uniform Child-Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Act) (750 ILCS 36/201(a)(2) (West 2024)). Finally, she argues
that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a conference pursuant to the Act with the judge
presiding in Iowa upon learning of the pending action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The evidence demonstrated that Zakariya and Preston were in a dating relationship. They
became the biological parents of W.C., born in December 2020. W.C. was born in Centralia,
Illinois, and resided there with his parents until October 2021. In October 2021, W.C. moved with
both parents to Ottumwa, Iowa. The parties ended their relationship in March 2023.
¶5 Preston returned to Illinois. Zakariya remained in Iowa. W.C. traveled with Preston to
Illinois in order to allow Zakariya to make childcare arrangements. In March 2023, the parties
implemented an alternating parenting schedule, where each party had parenting time for a period
of two weeks at a time. This schedule continued until October 2024, when W.C. was enrolled in a
preschool program in Iowa. At that time, W.C. resided primarily with Zakariya. W.C. traveled to
Illinois periodically for approximately a week at a time for Preston to exercise parenting time. This
schedule continued until April 2025.
1
This case is accelerated pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), with a disposition date of May 21, 2026. Zakariya received an extension of time to file her brief, and her brief was ultimately filed on March 16, 2026. Preston’s brief was filed on April 28, 2026. We find that good cause exists for filing the decision after May 21, 2026.
2
¶6 On April 9, 2025, Preston filed a petition to establish parentage. In the petition, Preston
alleged that Illinois had jurisdiction over the subject matter, where Preston resided in Marion
County, Illinois. Preston sought a judgment establishing him as the natural father of W.C. and that
he be awarded parenting responsibility over the educational, medical, religious, and extracurricular needs of W.C. Preston requested majority parenting time, and he sought temporary and
permanent child support from Zakariya. He also filed a verified petition for temporary relief,
wherein he sought allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting time, and he sought child
support.
¶7 On July 9, 2025, Zakariya filed a three count motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
under the Act “pursuant to [the Act] Sections 201, 203 & 207.” In the motion, Zakariya argued
that she was a resident of Iowa, and W.C. resided in Iowa since October 2021. She pointed
specifically to sections 201, 203, and 207 of the Act (id. §§ 201, 203, 207). Zakariya filed an
affidavit in support of her motion to dismiss.
¶8 Looking specifically at section 207 of the Act, Zakariya pointed to section 207(b)(1),
alleging that the relationship between the parties ended as a result of Preston’s sexual manipulation
and emotional abuse. Id. § 207(b)(1). Turning to section 207(b)(2), Zakariya argued that W.C.
“never resided within the State of Illinois for any significant length of time.” Id. § 207(b)(2).
Pointing to section 207(b)(3), Zakariya argued that the distance between Marion County and a
court of jurisdiction in Iowa was significant. Id. § 207(b)(3). Turning to section 207(b)(4),
Zakariya argued that it would be a financial hardship for her to maintain the parentage action in
Illinois. Id. § 207(b)(4). Looking at section 207(b)(5), she noted that the parties originally moved
to Iowa with W.C., and Preston returned to Illinois, alone. Id. § 207(b)(5). Turning to section
207(b)(6), Zakariya alleged that W.C. and “any potential witnesses are all located and/or reside in
3
the State of Iowa or outside the State of Illinois, and Iowa would be the more appropriate forum
for this action.” Id. § 207(b)(6).
¶9 On August 1, 2025, Zakariya filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and
support in a Wappello County trial court in Iowa. In her petition Zakariya stated, “The Petitioner
and the Respondent are natural parents of the following minor child: W.C.” In the petition,
Zakariya alleged that Iowa had jurisdiction over the parties. She requested joint legal custody with
W.C. in her primary physical care. In the pleading, Zakariya noted that “the parties are currently
involved in custody proceedings in the State of Illinois, Marion County, Case number 2025-FA32, to which [Zakariya] is contesting jurisdiction pursuant to the [the Act].” She requested child
support.
¶ 10 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on August 18, 2025. Zakariya’s first
witness was Tralawney Ellis. Ellis was the director of the Discovery Lane Early Childhood Child
Care Center (Discovery Lane), a licensed daycare and preschool facility in Iowa. W.C. attended
Discovery Lane from January 16, 2024, until he “graduated” from the preschool program on May
13, 2025. Zakariya informed Ellis that W.C. would attend a four year old preschool in the fall of
2025 in the Ottumwa area. However, the program was not part of Discovery Lane.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, Ellis testified that W.C. attended preschool “less than half the time”
where in 2024, W.C. attended for 106 days. Ellis explained that Discovery Lane was open “except
for major holidays” and “the week between Christmas and New Year’s.” Ellis testified that the
center was a “full year-around day care/school year” program. She testified that W.C.’s 106 days
of attendance constituted “less than half” of the days that the center was open.
4
¶ 12 Dr. Eric Dodson, a pediatrician at All Ages Pediatrics, next testified. Dr. Dodson was
W.C.’s pediatrician since July 10, 2023. Dr. Dodson testified that he never personally examined
or observed W.C. On March 25, 2024, W.C. had a nurse visit in the office and received vaccines.
¶ 13 Zakariya testified. During the first day of the hearing, Zakariya testified that there was an
action pending in Wapello County, Iowa, where she resided. Zakariya also filed for child support
in Iowa.
¶ 14 At the time of her testimony, Zakariya was 24 years old and worked as a federal employee
in the social security office in Ottumwa, Iowa. She worked there for approximately four years.
Zakariya testified that she was in a relationship with Preston from 2019 to 2023, and they had a
child together.
¶ 15 Zakariya testified that she and Preston moved from Illinois to Iowa in October 2021.
Zakariya, Preston, and W.C. lived together in Iowa for approximately two years. She testified that
they broke up because there was “domestic violence” and “sexual concerns.” Zakariya testified
that “it wasn’t a healthy relationship to raise a child in.” Zakariya remained in Iowa, and Preston
moved back to Illinois. The parties agreed to split custody equally.
¶ 16 The parties shared equal custody until 2024. Zakariya testified that they “had the
conversation that I would be the primary, he would go to school in Iowa, and [Preston] decided he
would like to have the summers.” Zakariya testified that the two talked about this in person.
Zakariya introduced a document from September 16, 2024, that memorialized a conversation
“based off of the agreement that we had” that Zakariya would have custody of W.C. “the majority
of the time” and Preston “would have him at least once a month for a few days, typically over the
weekend.” The document also indicated that Preston would keep W.C. over the summer. Zakariya
testified that Preston agreed that W.C. would be enrolled in school in Iowa.
5
¶ 17 Zakariya testified that the parties agreed to split the cost of preschool. Zakariya requested
that Preston pay child support, because it was hard for her to financially support W.C. on her own.
She explained that she and Preston exchanged text messages to coordinate drop offs and pickups
between homes. W.C. received health insurance through her employer in the State of Iowa.
Zakariya enrolled W.C. in Pickwick Early Education for a prekindergarten program.
¶ 18 Zakariya testified that the longest period of time that W.C. remained in Illinois with Preston
was in May 2025, where W.C. spent all but one week with Preston. From September 2024 to April
2025, W.C. spent most of the “Christmas month” with Preston. She estimated that W.C. spent
approximately a week and a half to two weeks with Preston over Christmas 2024.
¶ 19 Zakariya testified that she and W.C. are active in the community. They attend church
together through New City Church. They go to the arcade and amusement park. Zakariya testified
that they “helped out with the women and children’s center in Ottumwa, Iowa as volunteer work.”
Zakariya testified that W.C. had friends at school that he saw on a regular basis.
¶ 20 Zakariya testified that she did not have family in Iowa. The last time Zakariya was in
Illinois was June 2025, when she saw her family with W.C. Zakariya’s family did not see W.C.
during Preston’s parenting time. Zakariya testified that the distance from her home in Ottumwa,
Iowa, and Preston’s home in Salem, Illinois, is approximately a 5½ hour drive.
¶ 21 Tim Quick next testified. He was a commercial team leader marketing president for UMB
Bank in Clive, Iowa. Quick had been in a romantic relationship with Zakariya for approximately
two years. Quick had a biological daughter around the same age as W.C. Quick spent time with
W.C. and his daughter by going to the fair, to church, out to eat, and to parks. Quick considered
himself a community tie for W.C. to Iowa. Quick testified that W.C. was with Zakariya a
substantial amount of the time, “roughly 70 percent, 75 percent.”
6
¶ 22 On cross-examination, Quick testified that the goal was for Zakariya and W.C. to move to
Des Moines or Clive to live with him. This would result in W.C. switching schools.
¶ 23 Samira V., Zakariya’s sister, next testified. Samira testified that she lived in Centralia,
Illinois. In the 4½ years prior to the hearing, she saw W.C. less than 15 times. Samira did not see
W.C. when Preston had custody.
¶ 24 Preston began his presentation of evidence. He first called Harold C. Harold was Preston’s
father and W.C.’s grandfather. Harold testified that he had a “great” relationship with W.C. Harold
saw W.C. “often when he’s with Preston.” The family usually had a cookout every Sunday with
all seven of Harold’s children. Preston and W.C. attended Sunday cookouts. Harold had a large
extended family with children W.C.’s age, including other grandchildren. Harold testified that
W.C. participated in T-ball, and he often went to watch him.
¶ 25 Alyssa Barringer, Preston’s girlfriend, next testified. Barringer and Preston lived together
and planned to marry. W.C. resided with Barringer and Preston when Preston had custody.
Barringer stayed home with W.C. while Preston worked, and W.C. did not attend daycare in
Illinois.
¶ 26 From October 2024 until the filing of the petition, W.C. went to the park, splash pad, and
spent holidays with Preston’s family. Barringer testified that on Sundays the family had cookouts
at Harold’s house, went to the lake, and went swimming. Barringer testified that there were many
children W.C.’s age in Preston’s extended family. Barringer testified that W.C. was close with his
grandfather, Harold. Barringer testified that she had a good relationship with W.C. Barringer and
Preston intended to purchase a home in Illinois.
¶ 27 Jada Berkel next testified. Berkel was the fiancée of Dillon C., Preston’s brother. Berkel
testified that the brothers had a close relationship and spent time together at least once a week.
7
W.C. spent time in Berkel’s home with Preston. Berkel had a three-year-old and an almost-oneyear-old who interacted with W.C. Berkel testified that the children were “close.” The family spent
holidays together, and W.C. attended holidays and enjoyed them. Berkel testified that W.C. was
connected to Preston and to her children. Berkel testified that the majority of the family resided in
southern Illinois.
¶ 28 The hearing continued to a second day on September 8, 2025. Zakariya again testified.
Zakariya indicated that she “could have” her pastor from Iowa testify along with coworkers.
Zakariya indicated that her coworkers were “very close” with W.C., because she often brought
him to work with her. Zakariya’s family resided “all over the place” with a sister in Alabama, her
mother in Missouri, and her grandmother and another sister in Illinois.
¶ 29 Zakariya testified that she did not intend to remain in Ottumwa, Iowa. She intended to
move to Des Moines, Iowa. She testified that if she moved, W.C. would change preschools and
they would move to a new apartment. Zakariya wished to move closer to her significant other, and
she hoped to receive better job promotion opportunities in Des Moines.
¶ 30 Zakariya testified that the parties did not agree on the amount of time Preston spent with
W.C. each month. Preston “wanted to have him more per month.” Zakariya testified that W.C. was
“delayed” with speech and large motor skills. Zakariya felt that a consistent routine in preschool
was beneficial to W.C., and she “wanted to promote stability for him rather than doing the
confusing back and forth.”
¶ 31 Zakariya testified that W.C. is connected to Des Moines, where he spends time with her
significant other’s family. Zakariya testified that there were “kids the same age” as W.C., and they
attended church in Des Moines. Zakariya indicated that W.C. would begin to play sports in Des
8
Moines. Zakariya believed that a move to Des Moines would provide financial stability for W.C.,
because she would be eligible for a salary increase.
¶ 32 Finally, Preston testified. At the time of the hearing, Preston was 24 years old and worked
“in an oil patch.” He resided in Salem, Illinois, with his significant other and W.C. Preston worked
Monday through Friday from seven in the morning until three in the afternoon. He was eligible for
overtime. Other than briefly residing in Iowa with Zakariya, Preston lived in Illinois his whole life.
He had a large family in Illinois. W.C. was close with Preston’s family.
¶ 33 W.C. saw Dr. Stedelin in Centralia, Illinois, when he was with Preston. Dr. Stedelin was
Preston’s childhood physician. Preston introduced exhibits demonstrating that W.C. was seen by
Dr. Stedelin for a physical and sick visits. Preston insured W.C. for the state of Illinois through his
work.
¶ 34 Preston denied ever being violent towards Zakariya. Preston testified that the two would
argue and “yell at each other,” but he denied ever hitting her. When W.C. was with Preston, he
was in the care of family members instead of daycare. Preston testified that he and Zakariya were
unable to come to an agreement on a custody arrangement for W.C. as he was nearing school age.
¶ 35 Preston enrolled W.C. in T-ball. W.C. enjoyed T-ball. Preston enrolled W.C. in
prekindergarten in Illinois. At the time of the hearing, W.C. attended prekindergarten for one week
in Illinois, and W.C. seemed to enjoy it. Preston agreed that W.C. had a “speech impediment” but
he had not taken steps for W.C. to be seen professionally for it.
¶ 36 Preston testified that W.C. was close to his cousins. Preston disagreed that Zakariya had
W.C. the majority of the time. He also disagreed with Zakariya’s statement that in March 2023,
following the demise of the relationship, that Preston returned to Illinois and W.C. and Zakariya
remained in Iowa.
9
¶ 37 On cross-examination, Preston testified that in December he had W.C. for 13 of 31 days.
In January, he had W.C. for 9 of 31 days. In February, he had W.C. for 5 of 28 days. In March, he
had W.C. for 12 of 31 days.
¶ 38 Following the conclusion of evidence on September 8, 2025, the trial court instructed the
parties to submit written closing arguments. Following review of the written arguments, on
November 20, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Zakariya’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 39 The trial court found that the parties were never married but shared one child. W.C. was
born in Illinois, where both parties resided until October 2021. In October 2021, the family moved
to Iowa. From October 2021 until March 2023, the parties and the minor child lived together in
Iowa.
¶ 40 The trial court determined that in March 2023, the parties ended their relationship. Preston
and W.C. moved back to Illinois, and for approximately one month, W.C. resided solely with
Preston while Zakariya “got her life situated in Iowa.” In May 2023, the parties agreed that W.C.
would reside with both parties and alternate time between them on a two week on, two week off,
basis.
¶ 41 According to the trial court, “This agreement worked until late 2024. At this point,
[Zakariya] decided she wanted the minor child to primarily reside with her.” The trial court
determined that Preston “did not agree to this.” The parties “attempted to come to an agreement
regarding parenting responsibility and parenting time with the minor child, but were unable to
reach one.” Preston ultimately retained counsel in Illinois.
¶ 42 On April 9, 2025, Preston filed a petition to establish parentage in Illinois. The trial court
found that at that time, “no pleading had ever been filed in any state regarding the minor child,
including the state of Iowa.” The trial court noted that the six-month period it must consider in
10
determining W.C.’s home state was October 9, 2024, until April 9, 2025. The evidence
demonstrated that W.C. resided with Preston for 50 days and Zakariya for 132 days during this
period.
¶ 43 The trial court concluded that W.C. “had health insurance in both Illinois and Iowa, had a
primary care physician in both Illinois and Iowa, and had a home set up for him with each
respective parent for him to live full time.” The trial court noted, however, that Zakariya’s
“testimony during her case-in-chief versus her testimony as an adverse witness for [Preston] was
inconsistent, causing her credibility to be questionable at best as to whether she believed there was
any agreement between her and [Preston] regarding the home state of the minor child.”
¶ 44 The trial court found that W.C. played in a T-ball league in Illinois. The trial court observed
that while in Iowa, W.C. had minimal participation in any activities. The trial court noted that
“other than” Zakariya and her “paramour,” W.C.’s family all lived in southern Illinois. The trial
court concluded that the majority of the evidence in this case “rests in Illinois.”
¶ 45 The trial court determined that in order to decide which state had subject matter
jurisdiction, it looked to the three-step process outlined in the Act. First, the trial court considered
whether Illinois was the home state of W.C. The trial court noted that if Illinois was the home state,
Illinois courts could exercise jurisdiction. If not, the trial court explained that the second step was
to determine whether Iowa is W.C.’s home state.
¶ 46 The trial court explained that if it was determined that neither Illinois nor Iowa were the
home state, or if W.C. had no home state, then Illinois could exercise jurisdiction if (1) W.C. and
at least one parent had significant connections to Illinois, and (2) substantial evidence was
available in Illinois concerning W.C.’s care, protection, training and personal relationships. The
11
trial court noted that the “home state” was the state in which a child lived with a parent for at least
six consecutive months immediately prior to the proceedings being filed.
¶ 47 Based on the evidence presented, the trial court determined that neither Illinois nor Iowa
were the home state of W.C. since he “has not resided with either parent in either state for a period
of six months prior to the filing of the petition.” The trial court determined that it was not the intent
nor agreement of the parties to agree to a home state of W.C. when he was spending periods of
time in both Illinois with Preston and Iowa with Zakariya, but instead the parties were trying to
look out for the best interest of W.C. in maximizing time with each parent until such point the
parties reached agreement on a permanent solution.
¶ 48 The trial court therefore applied the “significant connection test” and determined that both
Preston and W.C. had “significant connections in the State of Illinois due to family, medical care
and sports connections within the state.” The trial court concluded that “significant evidence exists
in Illinois, namely the witnesses, medical records from Dr. Stedelin, family connections, and
personal relationships with non-family.” Therefore, the trial court chose “to exercise jurisdiction
in this matter” and denied Zakariya’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 49 This court granted Zakariya’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). This timely appeal followed.
¶ 50 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 51 On appeal, Zakariya raises numerous issues. First, she argues that the trial court erred by
failing to identify Iowa as W.C.’s home state. Second, she argues that the trial court erred by
considering factors that occurred outside of the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition to establish parentage. Third, she argues that the trial court erred by finding that Illinois,
not Iowa, had significant connections as set forth in section 201(a)(2) of the Act. Finally, she
12
argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a conference pursuant to the Act with the
judge presiding in Iowa upon learning of the pending action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 52 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 53 As an initial matter, we note that Preston argues that this court should dismiss Zakariya’s
appeal, where this court lacks jurisdiction to proceed. Following the denial of Zakariya’s motion
to dismiss, she filed a petition for leave to appeal to seek interlocutory review of the issues now
on appeal. This court allowed the petition pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020), which permits appeals from an order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Preston contends that Zakariya’s brief “at no point” raises
the issue of forum non conveniens. As such, he requests that “her appeal should be denied as there
is no jurisdiction to proceed.” We disagree, and first consider whether this court has jurisdiction
to consider the merits of the claims herein.
¶ 54 We have an independent duty to review our jurisdiction. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95,
104 (2008). The filing of a notice of appeal “ ‘is the jurisdictional step which initiates appellate
review.’ ” Id. (quoting Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6, 7
(1998)). Unless there is a properly filed notice of appeal, a reviewing court has no jurisdiction over
the appeal and is obliged to dismiss it. Id. While the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, it is generally
accepted that such notice is to be construed liberally. Id. The purpose of a notice of appeal is to
inform the prevailing party in the trial court that the other party seeks review of the judgment. Id.
Thus, the notice should be considered as a whole and will be deemed sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on an appellate court when it fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained
of and the relief sought, thereby advising the successful litigant of the nature of the appeal. Id. at
105.
13
¶ 55 “The doctrine of forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine that assumes the existence
of more than one forum with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of a case.
[Citation.] Application of the doctrine invokes principles of convenience and fairness in choosing
between two or more forums that have jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Griffith
v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101, 105 (1990). The doctrine “gives courts
discretionary power that should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances when the interests
of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum.” (Emphasis omitted.) Langenhorst v. Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 2d 430, 442 (2006).
¶ 56 The Act has specific provisions pertaining to the inconvenient forum doctrine. The Act
“was promulgated to end custody jurisdictional disputes between states, to promote cooperation
between states in determining custody issues, and to enhance the ability of states to enforce custody
orders expeditiously.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d)
141229, ¶ 32. The Act “provides state trial courts with a method to resolve jurisdictional questions
that arise in interstate child custody disputes, and the statute gives priority to the state that is the
child’s ‘home state.’ ” Id. The “home state” means “the state in which a child lived with a parent
or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child-custody proceeding.” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2024).
¶ 57 Section 207(b) of the Act additionally instructs:
“Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this State shall consider
whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this
purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all
relevant factors, including:
14
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this State;
(3) the distance between the court in this State and the court in the state that would
assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation,
including testimony of the child;
(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
litigation.” Id. § 207(b).
¶ 58 In the case before us, Zakariya filed a three count motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
under the Act “pursuant to [the Act] Sections 201, 203 & 207.” In the motion, Zakariya argued
extensively about the factors set forth in section 207(b) of the Act.
¶ 59 First, Zakariya pointed to section 207(b)(1), alleging that the relationship between the
parties ended as a result of Preston’s sexual manipulation and emotional abuse. At the hearing on
the motion to dismiss, the trial court heard testimony related to alleged domestic violence and
sexual manipulation from Zakariya. Preston denied engaging in domestic violence. The court made
no specific findings related to the alleged domestic violence.
¶ 60 Turning to section 207(b)(2), Zakariya argued that W.C. “never resided within the State of
Illinois for any significant length of time.” At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court
15
heard extensive testimony from the parties about their custody arrangements and where W.C.
resided day-by-day over the course of the six months prior to the filing of Preston’s parentage
petition. The trial court ultimately made specific findings about the length of time that W.C. spent
in Illinois, finding that W.C. resided in Illinois with Preston for 50 days of the six-month period.
The trial court also noted that W.C. never spent a full month in either state.
¶ 61 Pointing to section 207(b)(3), Zakariya argued that the distance between Marion County
and a court of jurisdiction in Iowa was significant. Similarly, turning to section 207(b)(4), Zakariya
argued that it would be a financial hardship for her to maintain the parentage action in Illinois.
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court heard evidence about the commute
time between states and homes. Zakariya testified that it was approximately a five-hour drive from
her home in Iowa to Preston’s home in Illinois. Both parties testified about their jobs, incomes,
and the cost of childcare. The trial court considered this evidence in its written order.
¶ 62 Looking at section 207(b)(5), Zakariya noted that the parties originally moved to Iowa with
W.C., and Preston returned to Illinois alone. Zakariya’s testimony was inconsistent on this point
during the motion to dismiss hearing. The trial court ultimately determined that her credibility was
at issue, where the evidence established that upon the parties break up, W.C. returned to Illinois
with Preston while Zakariya made childcare arrangements in Iowa.
¶ 63 Turning to section 207(b)(6), Zakariya alleged that W.C. and “any potential witnesses are
all located and/or reside in the State of Iowa or outside the State of Illinois, and Iowa would be the
more appropriate forum for this action.” The trial court heard extensive evidence from numerous
witnesses. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Illinois was the appropriate jurisdiction,
where W.C. had significant connections to Illinois.
16
¶ 64 In the case before us, there was a dispute between the parties regarding the home state for
purposes of the Act. As such, the trial court was required to consider the factors set forth in section
207(b) to determine whether Illinois was an inconvenient forum and did so consider the factors.
Zakariya sufficiently pleaded and argued the factors pursuant to section 207(b). The trial court
considered evidence and made rulings related to the merits of those factors. The trial court also
references sections 201, 203, and 207 of the Act in its November 20, 2025, order. Therefore, we
find that this court may exercise jurisdiction over the merits of this appeal.
¶ 65 B. Standard of Review
¶ 66 Our consideration of the issues herein is governed by the Act (750 ILCS 36/101 et seq.
(West 2024)). While the Act uses the term “jurisdiction” to describe conditions that must be met
before an Illinois court can decide a question of initial child custody, “jurisdiction” here does not
mean “a precondition to the exercise of the court’s inherent authority.” McCormick v. Robertson,
2015 IL 118230, ¶ 27. Rather, “jurisdiction” under the Act is “simply a procedural limit on when
the court may hear initial custody matters.” Id. In finding that it has jurisdiction, the trial court
interpreted provisions of the Act. Therefore, we review the trial court’s determination de novo.
In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d 306, 313 (2005).
¶ 67 However, a decision regarding forum non conveniens is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Ruch v. Padgett, 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 36. That is, we will reverse the circuit
court’s decision only upon a showing that the circuit court abused its discretion in balancing the
relevant factors. Id. ¶ 38. A circuit court abuses its discretion in balancing the relevant factors only
where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court. Langenhorst, 219
Ill. 2d at 442. However, “we may affirm a trial court’s forum non conveniens order on any basis
17
found in the record.” Ruch, 2015 IL App (1st) 142972, ¶ 40. Under either standard of review, we
are compelled to affirm.
¶ 68 C. Home State and Significant Connections
¶ 69 Zakariya first argues that the trial court erred by finding Illinois was W.C.’s home state.
Preston responds, arguing that the trial court properly found that Iowa was not W.C.’s home state,
where W.C. did not live in either Iowa or Illinois for a period of time long enough to establish
either state as the home state. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court properly
determined that W.C. had no home state, where he did not consecutively reside in either state for
six months preceding the filing of Preston’s petition for parentage.
¶ 70 Before we address the issue of W.C.’s home state, we will briefly address an issue raised
in the dissent that was not raised by Zakariya in either the trial court or on appeal—that “the court
was first required to determine if Preston was a “person acting as a parent.” First, we note that in
her “petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and support” filed in Wapello County, Iowa,
Zakariya admitted that Preston was the father. Specifically, Zakariya stated, “The Petitioner and
the Respondent are natural parents of the following minor child: W.C.”
¶ 71 Nonetheless, the appellate court should not, and will not, consider different theories or new
questions, if proof might have been offered to refute or overcome them had they been presented in
the trial court. Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (“In exercising the power care should be
taken that the litigants are not deprived of an opportunity to present argument.”). Preston was given
no opportunity to respond to this issue in either the trial court or on appeal. Nor has this issue even
been briefed by the parties. The dissent cites no authority in support of the legal proposition that
the trial court was first required to determine if Preston was a “person acting as a parent” before
addressing the issue of the child’s home state. As this issue has not been raised in either the trial
18
court or on appeal and has not been briefed or argued by the parties, we properly decline to address
it. Id. Moreover, it is absurd for the dissent to suggest that the court erred by failing to find that
Preston was a “person acting as a parent” and not require the same of the mother.
¶ 72 Section 201(a) of the Act outlines the circumstances in which “a court of this State has
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination.” 750 ILCS 36/201(a) (West 2024).
Illinois has jurisdiction if:
“(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or
person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1) *** and:
(A) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or
a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than
mere physical presence; and
(B) substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child’s
care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more appropriate forum
to determine the custody of the child under Section 207 or 208; or
(4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified
in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).” Id.
¶ 73 The Act defines “home state” as
19
“the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.
In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.” Id. § 102(7).
¶ 74 In the case before us, the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that W.C. had no
home state. The trial court specifically looked at the process outlined in the Act. First, the trial
court considered whether Illinois was the home state of the child. Based on the evidence presented,
the trial court determined that neither Illinois nor Iowa were the home state of the minor child since
the minor child “has not resided with either parent in either state for a period of six months prior
to the filing of the petition.” This determination was supported by the record, where the parties
both testified that W.C. split time between households in Iowa and Illinois. The evidence
established that W.C. resided with Preston for 50 days and Zakariya for 132 days during the sixmonth period of October 10, 2024, to April 9, 2025. The trial court specifically noted that W.C.
never spent the entirety of a month in either Iowa or Illinois. As such, based on our review of the
evidence and testimony, the trial court properly determined that neither Illinois nor Iowa was
W.C.’s home state.
¶ 75 In addressing the issue of the child’s home state, the dissent acknowledges that “the parties
had an established parenting time schedule with 50/50 custody after Preston returned to Illinois.”
Infra ¶ 105. The dissent notes that after September 16, 2024, when the child was enrolled in an
Iowa preschool, the child primarily lived with Zakariya and spent time with Preston when not in
preschool. The dissent states that in “my opinion, it is obvious that Preston’s time with the minor
child stemmed from the tentative parenting agreement with Zakariya which provided her with
primary residential custody in Iowa.” Infra ¶ 105. First, the dissent overlooks the fact that there
20
was no custody determination made by any court as to W.C. Second, the evidence established that
W.C. did not regularly attend preschool in Iowa, where Ellis testified that he attended less than
half-time in Iowa. Third, by expressing this opinion, the dissent is substituting its judgment for
that of the trial court where it did not find Zakariya’s testimony credible as to the amount of time
W.C. spent with Zakariya in Illinois. “[A] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses.”
People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009). In rejecting Zakariya’s testimony that
the parties had a parenting time agreement, the trial court found that the parties “attempted to come
to an agreement regarding parenting responsibility and parenting time with the minor child, but
were unable to reach one.” We find no error in the trial court’s finding in that regard. Nor do we
find error in the trial court’s determination that the child did not have a home state.
¶ 76 Zakariya also contends that the trial court erred by finding that W.C. had significant
connections to Illinois. Preston responds, arguing that the trial court properly found that Illinois
had significant connections after applying the significant connections test, where the evidence
demonstrated that W.C. had significant connections to Illinois. We agree with Preston.
¶ 77 Because neither Illinois nor Iowa was W.C.’s home state, the trial court applied the
“significant connection test” and determined that W.C. had “significant connections in the State
of Illinois due to family, medical care and sports connections within the state.” The evidence
demonstrated that Dr. Stedelin saw W.C. for a physical and sick visits in Illinois. Preston had
family ties to the southern Illinois area, and W.C. spent time with his grandfather and cousins.
Harold C., W.C.’s grandfather, testified that he had a great relationship with W.C. and hosted
Sunday cookouts with his family. Harold testified that he had a large extended family with children
W.C.’s age. Both Harold and Preston testified that W.C. played T-ball in Illinois, which he
21
enjoyed. W.C. was enrolled in preschool in Illinois. Based on this evidence, the trial court
concluded that “significant evidence exists in Illinois, namely the witnesses, medical records from
Dr. Stedelin, family connections, and personal relationships with non-family.”
¶ 78 On the other hand, Zakariya testified that she did not have family connections in Iowa. She
testified that W.C. saw a physician, Dr. Dodson, in Iowa. However, Dr. Dodson testified that he
never actually examined W.C. Moreover, both Zakariya and Quick testified that Zakariya intended
to move to Des Moines with W.C., which would further uproot him from any slight connections
and community he made in Ottumwa, Iowa.
¶ 79 For these reasons, based on the record before us, the trial court did not err by finding that
Illinois had jurisdiction over this matter, where W.C. had significant connections to Illinois. We
will briefly comment on the dissent’s analysis of this issue. We note that the dissent in its analysis
of the trial court’s application of the significant connections test blends discussion of W.C.’s home
state analysis. After discussion of the trial court’s finding that W.C. had significant connections
with Illinois, the dissent circles back and again concludes that W.C.’s home state was Iowa. We
clearly view these as separate issues which the dissent has incorrectly blended into one.
¶ 80 D. Residency Period
¶ 81 Next, Zakariya argues that the trial court erred where it made factual findings outside of
the six-month residency period. Preston responds, arguing that the trial court did not err by
considering factors which occurred outside of the six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition to establish parentage. Specifically, Preston contends that Zakariya failed to allege
what specific findings the trial court improperly made. Moreover, Preston argues that Zakariya
fails to support her argument with case law or statutory support which prohibits the trial court from
considering factors outside of the six-month residency requirement. For the reasons that follow,
22
we find that the trial court considered relevant evidence to determine whether W.C. had significant
connections to Illinois.
¶ 82 The Act defines “home state” as
“the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.
In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West
2024).
¶ 83 In the case before us, the six-month residency period ran from October 10, 2024, to April
9, 2025, when father filed his petition. The trial court determined that W.C. spent 132 days with
Zakariya and 50 days with Preston. The evidence established that W.C. never spent an entire month
with either party and up until the time of the dispute, the parties shared nearly equal parenting
time.
¶ 84 Zakariya fails to specify what specific facts, if any, the trial court improperly relied upon.
She seems to suggest that the trial court’s findings related to the place of W.C.’s birth, Zakariya’s
prenatal care, pediatrician appointments, and W.C.’s T-ball participation, all fell outside of the six
months prior to Preston’s filing of the petition for parentage. However, these facts were relevant
to the application of the significant connections test, as set forth above. The trial court applied the
test and cited W.C.’s various connections with Illinois, including the presence of a network of
extended family in Illinois. As noted above, the evidence demonstrated that W.C. spent a
considerable amount of time with Preston in Illinois, was enrolled in preschool in Illinois, had a
pediatrician in Illinois, regularly spent time with extended family in Illinois, and played T-ball in
Illinois. Zakariya also had family in Illinois, and she had no family in Iowa. Therefore, the trial
23
court did not err by considering evidence relevant to determine whether W.C. had significant
connections to Illinois, even where some evidence allegedly fell outside the parameters of October
10, 2024, to April 9, 2025.
¶ 85 E. Conference Pursuant to the Act
¶ 86 Finally, Zakariya argues that the trial court erred where it failed to conduct a conference
pursuant to the Act with the presiding judge in the pending action in Iowa, relying on section
204(d). Id. § 204(d). Preston responds, arguing that the trial court did not err by failing to conduct
a conference pursuant to the Act with the judge in Iowa, where neither party sought relief under
section 204(d). As such, Preston argues that the requirement for communication with the Iowa
judge was not applicable to this cause. Although we recognize that Zakariya raises this issue under
section 204(d), we find that section 206 is the appropriate statutory section to consider this issue
under.
¶ 87 Pursuant to section 206:
“Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State, before hearing a childcustody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information supplied by
the parties pursuant to Section 209. If the court determines that a child-custody proceeding
has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this Act, the court of this State shall stay its proceeding and communicate
with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this Act does not determine that the court of this State is a more
appropriate forum, the court of this State shall dismiss the proceeding.” Id. § 206(b).
¶ 88 At the August 18, 2025, hearing, Zakariya notified the trial court of a pending action filed
on August 1, 2025, in Iowa. She referenced a child support action that was pending since April
24
2025 in Iowa. Preston filed his petition to establish parentage in Illinois on April 9, 2025, along
with a temporary custody and child support petition in Illinois on April 10, 2025.
¶ 89 We find In re Sophia G.L., 229 Ill. 2d 143, 172 (2008), instructive. In Sophia G.L., our
supreme court concluded that the court with the initial custody jurisdiction, i.e. the court where the
first action was filed, does not have an obligation to initiate communications with a second court.
Id. However, if the second court initiates communication with the first court, the first court is
required to participate in the communication. Id.
¶ 90 In the case before us, the record is vague on whether the trial court was aware of the April
2025 child support petition filed in Iowa. On the first day of the hearing, Zakariya testified that
there was an action pending in Wapello County, Iowa, where she resided. She also testified that
she filed for child support in Iowa. However, she did not provide any specific information to the
trial court about these pending actions. Zakariya ultimately filed her own action in Iowa on August
1, 2025, well after Preston’s petition for parentage was filed on April 9, 2025. Zakariya’s August
1, 2025, petition set forth the specifics of the Illinois case, including the Illinois case number.
¶ 91 Based on our interpretation of Sophia G.L., it was the duty of the Iowa judge to
communicate with the Illinois trial court. Simply stated, the trial court in Illinois lacked specific
information to initiate a conference, where it was the court of first action. Based on the specific
facts before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it did not conduct a conference
pursuant to the Act with the judge in Iowa.
¶ 92 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 93 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 20, 2025, order of the circuit court of
Marion County denying Zakariya’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 94 Affirmed.
25
¶ 95 JUSTICE VAUGHAN, dissenting:
¶ 96 I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ decision. I believe the circuit court’s findings
related to the minor child’s lack of a home state were in error.
¶ 97 First, it is undisputed that the initial pleadings filed on April 9, 2025, and April 10, 2025,
were filed by Preston. The initial pleading requested the court establish parentage and award
Preston parental responsibility over W.C.’s medical, educational, religious, and extracurricular
welfare. The second pleading was a two-count petition for temporary relief with the first count
requesting allocation of temporary parental responsibility over W.C. At that time, Preston alleged
that W.C. always resided at least 50% of the time with Preston and resided with Preston two-thirds
of the time in 2023 and 2024. He further alleged that Zakariya refused to facilitate a close and
loving relationship between Preston and W.C. The second count requested the court to direct
Zakariya to pay Preston temporary child support, maintain W.C. on her health insurance and pay
for all of W.C.’s health-related expenses which were not covered by health insurance.
¶ 98 On July 9, 2025, Zakariya filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the
Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Act) (750 ILCS 36/101 et seq. (West
2024)). Zakariya’s motion contended that W.C. had primarily resided in Iowa over the last four
years and was currently residing in Iowa. The motion further noted that “paternity of the minor
child, including establishment of [Preston] as the child’s father, has yet to be determined.” The
motion alleged that from April 2023 to September 2024, the parties shared custody of W.C. with
each party having equal parenting time throughout the year. Zakariya’s motion further alleged that
Preston received three to four days per month of parenting time from October 2024 to April 2025.
At the time of the hearing, parentage and jurisdiction under the Act remained pending.
26
¶ 99 This appeal stems from the circuit court’s denial of Zakariya’s motion and concerns
whether Illinois courts have subject matter jurisdiction to determine custody of W.C. Pursuant to
the Act, Illinois courts have
“jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if:
(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a
parent continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court
of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
State is the more appropriate forum under Section 207 or 208, and:
(A) the child and the child’s parents *** have a significant connection with
this State other than mere physical presence; and
(B) substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child’s
care, protection, training, and personal relationships[.]” Id. § 201.
¶ 100 The circuit court determined that the minor child had no home state. However, it is my
opinion that the court’s finding is erroneous. First, the court never determined if Preston was either
a parent or a “person acting as a parent.” Despite having venue (see 750 ILCS 46/604(a) (West
2024)) and jurisdiction (id. § 603) to address the parentage issue, no finding was made by the court.
As such, the court was first required to determine if Preston was a “person acting as a parent.”
However, no such determination was made by the circuit court.
¶ 101 The phrase “person acting as a parent” is defined by the Act as
“a person, other than a parent, who:
27
(A) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six
consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before
the commencement of a child-custody proceeding; and
(B) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody
under the law of this State.” 750 ILCS 36/102(13) (West 2024).
¶ 102 There was no evidence that Preston had physical custody of W.C. Indeed, the circuit court
found the opposite and determined that W.C. spent 132 days with Zakariya and 50 days with
Preston in the six months prior to the filing based on the exhibit filed by Zakariya. The only
evidence regarding the six months prior to October 2024, to complete the full year required by
section 102(13)(A) of the Act, indicated that the parties each kept the child for two weeks during
that period so at most, 91 days can be attributed to Preston. Combining the two periods, 141 days
would be attributed to Preston, and 223 days would be attributed to Zakariya.
¶ 103 Indubitably, 141 days does not amount to six months and therefore, only if the temporary
absences can be included in Preston’s time would Preston reach the required six consecutive month
threshold required by the Act. See Id. § 102(13)(A). However, the court also failed to address the
temporary absence phrase included in the statute defining “person acting as a parent.”
¶ 104 Temporary absence is not defined by the Act; however, it has been defined by case law
addressing the Act. “ ‘[T]emporary’ means ‘ “[t]hat which is to last for a limited time only, as
distinguished from that which is perpetual, or indefinite, in its duration.” ’ ” Richardson v.
Richardson, 255 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1102 (1993) (quoting Allstate Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 158
Ill. App. 3d 129, 133 (1987), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1312 (5th ed. 1979)). “ ‘[A]bsence’
means ‘[t]he state of being absent, removed, or away from one’s domicile, or usual place of
residence.’ ” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 8 (5th ed. 1979)). The temporary absence
28
provision of the home state test is “designed merely to prevent lapses in the six-month period
caused by brief inter-state visits by the child.” In re Marriage of Arulpragasam, 304 Ill. App. 3d
139, 148 (1999).
¶ 105 The facts revealed that the parties had an established parenting time schedule with 50/50
custody after Preston returned to Illinois. At that time, W.C. was three years old and was not in
school. However, after September 16, 2024, W.C. attended preschool in Iowa and primarily lived
with Zakariya, as evidenced by the greater number of days spent with Zakariya, who allowed
substantial parenting time for Preston, when W.C. was not in preschool. While Preston disagreed
that there was an actual agreement, he confirmed that it was the parenting time plan that he
followed until he filed the current action. It was undisputed that Zakariya had the minor child for
223 days during the requisite six-month period and Preston had the child for 141 days in the year
prior to the filing. In my opinion, it is obvious that Preston’s time with the minor child stemmed
from the tentative parenting agreement with Zakariya which provided her with primary residential
custody in Iowa.
¶ 106 My conclusion is bolstered by the text messages that reveal Preston requesting time with
W.C. from Zakariya, which is consistent with Zakariya’s having primary residency status. The
testimony from Preston’s girlfriend revealed a similar tone by stating that Zakariya would “let us
keep him,” noting that Zakariya dictated the schedule of one week per month. Therefore, it is my
opinion that Preston fails to meet the “person acting as a parent” requirements of the statute and
since parentage was never determined by the circuit court, only Zakariya and the State of Iowa,
where a similar petition is pending, have a valid claim for jurisdiction under the Act, and therefore,
Illinois was never a valid possibility for finding a home state as a matter of law.
29
¶ 107 Second, even if I ignore the lack of any evidentiary finding, or evidence supporting the
conclusion that Preston was either a parent or a person acting as a parent, the circuit court’s finding
of a significant connection with Illinois other than mere physical presence is simply unsustainable
under any standard of review.
¶ 108 The parties moved to Iowa when W.C. was 10 months old. Preston moved back to Illinois
in March of 2023. After approximately three weeks, during which Preston had W.C. in Illinois,
the parties began a parenting time arrangement in which each would have W.C. for two-week-long
periods. The arrangement continued until September 2024, when W.C. was enrolled in preschool
to address his speech and motor developmental delays. According to Zakariya, the preschool
environment assisted W.C. in overcoming his delays and the child was thriving in the environment.
Thereafter, W.C. remained in Iowa with Zakariya to attend school and had parenting time with
Preston when he was not in school because W.C. was required to attend the school regularly or he
would lose his spot at the school. During that time, Preston assisted with the tuition payment by
paying $400 monthly to Zakariya. Zakariya requested an increase in the payments. Preston then
unilaterally stopped making the payments, filed his parentage petition and testified that preschool
was free in Illinois.
¶ 109 While I note that the circuit court found that Zakariya was not credible as to whether she
believed there was an agreement, during both her case-in-chief and adverse witness testimonies,
Zakariya’s statements were supported by the text messages sent to Preston. Conversely, the
majority of Preston’s allegations regarding W.C. and Zakariya were controverted by the evidence.
Preston was not the primary caretaker and did not provide daily care to W.C. Further, W.C. was
not “totally dependent upon [Preston] to provide his necessary care.” Zakariya did not move to
Iowa; the parties moved to Iowa and Preston later returned to Illinois. Preston claimed it was in
30
W.C.’s best interest to “commence school” in the fall of 2025, but W.C. was already enrolled in
school in Iowa for the 2024 school year. Preston never had W.C. a majority of the time during any
relevant time periods and Zakariya’s allowance of liberal visitation when W.C. was not in school
controverted Preston’s claim that Zakariya “refuses to facilitate a close and loving relationship”
between W.C. and Preston. In fact, Preston admitted at the hearing that Zakariya never denied him
time with W.C.
¶ 110 Despite Preston testifying that he never agreed to the shorter visitation period, Preston
confirmed the parties “sort of” had an agreement for holidays and agreed that under the 2024
parenting time plan he was able to enroll W.C. in T-ball. He disagreed that the parties attempted
to share the time with W.C. equally but agreed the parties had W.C. for equal two-week-long
period for over a year. He further disagreed that Zakariya had W.C. the majority of the time but
provided no evidence controverting the calendars submitted by Zakariya that set forth the parenting
time for the six-month period prior to Preston filing the action which revealed Zakariya had W.C.
the majority of the time.
¶ 111 While Preston claimed that W.C. had established medical care in Illinois, the records
submitted revealed that the visit to “establish medical care” occurred on April 30, 2025, which was
after Preston filed the current action. Notably, Preston did not even have a copy of W.C.’s
vaccination records at the visit and medical staff requested Preston provide them with copies of
the records. The only other medical records were for W.C.’s discharge following his birth in
December 2020, and for an allergic reaction visit on November 2, 2023, that stated the child’s
mother took him to the appointment. On the same day that Preston established medical care for
W.C. in Illinois, he also enrolled W.C. in prekindergarten and admitted that he did not tell Zakariya
about either action. Zakariya only found out about the enrollment in school and medical treatment
31
when the exhibits for the hearing were exchanged, which is far from indicative of his “ultimate
goal to facilitate a relationship between the minor child and both parties.” Finally, Preston initially
testified that W.C. was on his work insurance for over a year but later admitted it was only for six
months, obtained one month before he filed the pleadings, when questioned about the effective
date on the insurance card.
¶ 112 Zakariya’s testimony also revealed that W.C. received health insurance through the
Medicaid Iowa Total Care program since September 2021. She stated that the minor child had to
be a resident of Iowa for the program to apply. After Preston enrolled the minor child for Medicaid
in Illinois in 2023, Zakariya had to “provide substantial proof” that the minor child “was a resident
of Iowa in order to avoid his Medicaid termination.” She was ultimately successful in meeting that
burden.
¶ 113 Based on the evidence submitted, the circuit court found that W.C. had “very minimal
participation in any activities” in Ottumwa, Iowa, and instead participated in activities in Des
Moines, Iowa. However, both cities are in Iowa. Further, Zakariya testified that she and the minor
child attended church and visited arcades and amusement parks in their free time. They were also
involved with the community and volunteered at the women and children’s center in Ottumwa,
Iowa. Zakariya also volunteered to assist with baking events at the minor child’s school. She stated
that W.C. had friends at school and was friends with her coworkers and their children as well as
her paramour and his children.
¶ 114 “ ‘Home state’ means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a
parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a childcustody proceeding. *** A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of
the period.” 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2024). The temporary absence provision of the home state
32
test is “designed merely to prevent lapses in the six-month period caused by brief interstate visits
by the child.” In re Marriage of Arulpragasam, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 148.
¶ 115 Based on these facts, it is my opinion that the minor child’s home state was Iowa and that
Preston’s parenting time periods were temporary absences from Iowa. It is obvious that W.C. lived
with Zakariya, went to preschool in Iowa, and that Zakariya provided parenting time with Preston
based on the time when W.C. was not in school. The Act requires a look back of six months. 750
ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2024). The “home state” test is, thus, a simple one: “where has the child
lived with a person acting as a parent for the last six months?” In re Marriage of Arulpragasam,
304 Ill. App. 3d at 148; Richardson, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 1102. The reason for the child’s presence
in the state is what matters the most, and a mutual agreement for a child to visit should not restart
the calculation elsewhere. In re Parentage of Frost, 289 Ill. App. 3d 95, 101-02 (1997).
¶ 116 Here, the six months prior to the filing reveal that W.C. lived primarily with Zakariya who
afforded Preston liberal visitation when W.C. was not in preschool. W.C.’s parenting time with
Preston was merely a temporary absence from his permanent residence with Zakariya as obviated
by his school residency as well as Zakariya’s ability to maintain Iowa insurance for W.C.
Classifying these temporary absences as “substantial evidence *** concerning the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationship[ ]” (see 750 ILCS 36/201(a)(2)(B) (West 2024)) was
erroneous. The circuit court’s interpretation of these facts undermines familial cooperation that
would provide a nonresidential parent parenting time and penalizes residential parents who are
seeking to allow as much time as possible for the noncustodial parent. See Frost, 289 Ill. App. 3d
at 101-02 (mutual agreement for the child to visit should not restart the calculation). Accordingly,
I would reverse the circuit court’s order, remand the case for a determination of parentage with
33
directions to grant Zakariya’s motion to dismiss, and transfer the allocation of custody and
parenting time to Iowa where a petition to establish parenting time and support is pending.
¶ 117 For the foregoing reasons, I believe the circuit court’s decision was erroneous, and
therefore, I dissent.
34
In re Parentage of W.C., 2026 IL App (5th) 251049
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion County, No. 25-FA32; the Hon. Wesley A. Gozia, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jeanna S. Raney, of Blake Links Raney, P.C., of Belleville, for for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Jeron Merrell Balazi, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee.
for
Appellee:
35