[Cite as State v. Oliphant, 2026-Ohio-2366.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-25-26
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MICHAEL L. OLIPHANT, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR2023 0055
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 22, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-25-26
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Michael L. Oliphant (“Oliphant”), appeals the
May 19, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common
Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from a series of events on February 12, 2023, which
began when Oliphant fired a weapon that he had purchased earlier that day at two
victims, C.F. and P.L., who were standing in the parking lot of Feltz Chiropractic
on Allentown Road in Lima, Ohio. Proceeding on foot from that location, Oliphant
then encountered a third victim, K.P., who was seated inside a white Buick.
Oliphant shot K.P. one time in the neck, causing his death. Oliphant then fled the
area, discarding the firearm and ammunition in a nearby alleyway before being
apprehended by law enforcement.
{¶3} On April 13, 2023, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Oliphant on
Counts One, Two, and Three of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2),
(D)(1)(a), second-degree felonies, Count Four of murder in violation of R.C.
2903.02(A), (D), 2929.02(B), an unclassified felony, and Count Five of murder in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), (D), 2929.02(B), an unclassified felony. The
indictment included firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.145(A) as to all of the
counts. On April 21, 2023, Oliphant filed a written plea of not guilty.
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{¶4} On May 1, 2023, Oliphant filed a written plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity. That same day, Oliphant filed a motion contesting his competency to stand
trial and his mental state at the time of the offenses. Subsequently, the trial court
ordered a competency evaluation for Oliphant in accordance with R.C.
2945.371(G)(3) and (4). Following this evaluation, on July 13, 2023, the trial court
determined that Oliphant was competent to stand trial. Thereafter, on July 19, 2023,
Oliphant filed a motion requesting a second evaluation of his mental condition at
the time of the offenses, which the trial court granted.
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial from April 7-11, 2025. On April 11,
2025, the jury found Oliphant guilty of Counts One, Two, Four, Five, and the
accompanying specifications.1
{¶6} On May 19, 2025, the trial court sentenced Oliphant to a minimum term
of 6 years in prison to a maximum term of 9 years in prison on Count One; to 6
years in prison on Count Two; to a mandatory minimum term of 15 years in prison
to a maximum term of life in prison on Count Four; and to mandatory 3-year prison
terms on the firearm specifications attached to each count.2 The trial court ordered
Oliphant to serve the sentences consecutively for an aggregate term of a minimum
of 36 years to a maximum of 39 years, up to life in prison. The trial court merged
Counts Four and Five for purposes of sentencing.
1
The State dismissed Count Three and the accompanying specification before the start of trial. 2
The trial court’s judgment entry of sentence states only that Oliphant was sentenced to a definite term of 6 years in prison on Count One.
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{¶7} Oliphant filed his notice of appeal on June 16, 2025. He raises three
assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
Appellant Was Denied His Right To A Fair Impartial Jury When
Juror 5 Was Removed In The Middle Of Trial. (Tr. pg. 847).
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Oliphant argues that he was denied the
right to a fair and impartial jury when the trial court improperly removed Juror 5 in
the middle of the trial. In particular, he contends that the juror’s brief, incidental
contact with Oliphant’s family to obtain a cigarette did not constitute misconduct or
impair his impartiality.
Standard of Review
{¶9} We review a trial court’s decision to remove a seated juror during trial
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lane, 2022-Ohio-3775, ¶ 48 (3d Dist.) (“‘A trial
judge is empowered to exercise “sound discretion to remove a juror and replace him
with an alternate juror whenever facts are presented which convince the trial judge
that the juror’s ability to perform [h]is duty is impaired.”’”), quoting State v. Brown,
2012-Ohio-1848, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Hopkins, 27 Ohio App.3d 196,
198 (11th Dist. 1985). An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
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Analysis
{¶10} “‘The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due
process.’” State v. Glass, 2024-Ohio-4535, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.), quoting Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 224-225 (1982). The constitutional right to a jury trial
inherently includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced panel. State v. Pruitt,
2003-Ohio-1882, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.). Thus, trial courts bear an imperative duty to
ensure every litigant is afforded an impartial jury. Id.
{¶11} To that end, “‘Crim.R. 24(G) and R.C. 2945.29 address removal of
jurors during criminal trials.’” Lane at ¶ 47, quoting State v. Cunningham, 2012-Ohio-2794, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). “R.C. 2945.29 provides that the trial court may
discharge a juror ‘[i]f, before the conclusion of the trial, a juror becomes sick, or for
other reason is unable to perform his duty.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2945.29. “Similarly,
Crim.R. 24(G)(1) states that alternate jurors ‘shall replace jurors who, prior to the
time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or
disqualified to perform their duties.’” Id., quoting Crim.R. 24(G)(1). “Neither R.C.
2945.29 nor Crim.R. 24 requires the court to conduct a hearing to confirm the juror’s
inability to fulfill her service.” State v. Paul, 2024-Ohio-1874, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.).
{¶12} Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing Juror 5 in the middle of trial.
Decisively, a juror’s improper contact or impairing relationship with a defendant’s
family discovered mid-trial is precisely the type of bias that warrants removal.
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Compare Pruitt at ¶ 20 (determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by removing a juror after discovering improper contact with the defendant’s family);
United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding the mid-trial
removal of a juror upon discovering their relationship with the defendant and his
family).
{¶13} Here, the record reflects that Juror 5 disclosed during voir dire that he
used to date and live with Oliphant’s sister and that he knew the family.
Notwithstanding that prior connection, Juror 5 was seated on the jury after asserting
that enough time had passed and that he could remain impartial. However, on the
fourth day of trial, court security notified the trial court that Juror 5 was observed
interacting with Oliphant’s sister and father during a recess. Prompted by the
security notification, the trial court reviewed courthouse surveillance footage, which
showed Juror 5 approaching the family members on two separate occasions,
conversing with Oliphant’s father, and receiving a cigarette from both of them.
{¶14} Upon questioning by the trial court, Juror 5 admitted to the
interactions, explaining that he approached them specifically to obtain the type of
cigarette that he preferred. Despite his assurances that the contact was minimal and
would not impact his ability to remain fair and impartial, the trial court excused
Juror 5 and seated an alternate. The trial court reasoned that Juror 5’s ability to
remain impartial was compromised because he had deliberately solicited and
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accepted a benefit from the defendant’s family members while actively serving on
the jury.
{¶15} Oliphant nevertheless contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by disregarding the juror’s claim that the contact was incidental. However, a trial
court is not required to accept a juror’s self-serving assurances of impartiality when
their conduct objectively suggests otherwise. See State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio4751, ¶ 98 (acknowledging that the trial court has “discretion ‘to accept [a juror’s]
assurances that he would be fair and impartial and would decide the case on the
basis of the evidence’”), quoting State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 338 (2001).
Indeed, “[t]he trial court was in the best position to observe the juror’s demeanor
and evaluate his responses.” State v. Sparks, 2014-Ohio-5788, ¶ 37 (9th Dist.).
Allowing Juror 5 to remain on the panel after he solicited gifts from the defendant’s
family would raise a substantial question as to the jury’s impartiality, and “the state
is no less entitled to an unbiased determination than appellant.” Pruitt, 2003-Ohio1882, at ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).
{¶16} Furthermore, Oliphant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by
the removal of Juror 5. Indeed, to the extent that Oliphant contends that he was
prejudiced because Juror 5 was the only Black juror on the panel, his argument is
unavailing. Not only did Oliphant fail to raise a Batson challenge, but even if he
had, the improper contact provided a valid, race-neutral justification for the juror’s
removal. Moreover, this race-neutral justification was not pretextual, as any claim
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of disparate treatment fails because Juror 5 and Juror 12 (who was white) were not
similarly situated. Indeed, unlike Juror 5, the contact that Juror 12 had with the
victim’s family was unsolicited, the juror refused to engage, and the incident was
promptly reported to the trial court.
{¶17} Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that Juror 5’s conduct
impaired his ability to perform his duties was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing
Juror 5 in the middle of trial.
{¶18} Oliphant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Instructed The
Jury On Consciousness Of Guilt. (Tr. 940-941).
{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Oliphant argues that the trial court
erred by instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt. In particular, he contends
that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding that he fled or attempted
to flee the scene or discard the weapon and other items, and that the instruction
unfairly prejudiced his insanity defense.
Standard of Review
{¶20} We review a trial court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wilson, 2010-Ohio-2294, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). Again,
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an abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d at 157-158.
Analysis
{¶21} “Trial courts are charged with giving juries ‘complete and accurate’
instructions that adequately reflect the issues argued in the case before them.” State
v. Vasquez, 2024-Ohio-860, ¶ 69 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Sneed, 63 Ohio St.3d
3, 9 (1992). A trial court must ordinarily give a requested jury instruction if it
correctly states the law, applies to the facts of the case, and reasonable minds could
reach the conclusion it seeks. Id.
{¶22} Courts universally recognize that a defendant’s evasive actions—such
as fleeing, escaping custody, resisting arrest, hiding, or using a false name—are
admissible to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt, and by extension, guilt itself.
Wilson at ¶ 9. See also Vasquez at ¶ 70 (“Evidence of flight is admissible to show
a defendant’s consciousness of guilt.”). “[A] jury instruction on consciousness of
guilt based upon the flight of the accused is appropriate when supported by
sufficient evidence in the record.” Wilson at ¶ 9.
{¶23} “‘Flight means some escape or affirmative attempt to avoid
apprehension.’” Vasquez at ¶ 70, quoting State v. Herrell, 2017-Ohio-7109, ¶ 24
(6th Dist.). “To constitute ‘flight,’ the defendant must ‘appreciate that he has been
identified as a person of interest in a criminal offense and is taking active measures
to avoid being found.’” Id., quoting State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 2022-Ohio-4080, ¶
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177 (8th Dist.). “Under such circumstances, the jury could infer that the defendant
“‘is avoiding the police only because he or she knows he or she is guilty and wishes
to avoid the inevitable consequences of his or her crime.”’” Id., quoting State v.
Hennigan, 2024-Ohio-404, ¶ 50 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. James, 2023-Ohio3524, ¶ 62 (11th Dist.). However, mere departure from the scene does not constitute
flight, as it is naturally unrealistic to expect a perpetrator to remain on-site for ready
apprehension. Id. “‘The jury may infer that such circumstances demonstrate that
the accused is avoiding the police only because he or she knows he or she is guilty
and wishes to avoid the inevitable consequences of his or her crime.’” State v.
James, 2023-Ohio-3524, ¶ 62 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-4054,
¶ 46 (11th Dist.).
{¶24} The probative value of flight as circumstantial evidence depends on
the strength of four sequential inferences: (1) the defendant’s behavior actually
constituted flight; (2) the flight was driven by a consciousness of guilt; (3) that
consciousness of guilt related specifically to the charged offense; and (4) the
consciousness of guilt ultimately points to actual guilt for that crime. Id. at ¶ 61.
{¶25} On appeal, Oliphant primarily argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by providing the consciousness of guilt instruction because there was
insufficient evidence that he took affirmative steps to flee or conceal his weapon.
In particular, he contends that the evidence did not support the consciousness of
guilt instruction because “[t]here was no evidence presented to demonstrate that he
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appreciated that he had been identified as a person of interest in a criminal offense
and was taking active measures to avoid being found” and because he did not discard
the weapon and other items to prevent them from being found. (Appellant’s Brief
at 13). Secondarily, Oliphant contends that the instruction unfairly prejudiced his
case by conflicting with his insanity defense.
{¶26} Even though Oliphant objected to the prejudicial effect of the
instruction, he did not challenge the consciousness of guilt instruction on the
grounds that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. “An objection on one
ground does not preserve for appeal other, unmentioned grounds.” State v. Lathon,
2024-Ohio-5886, ¶ 123 (10th Dist.). See also Crim.R. 30(A) (“On appeal, a party
may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any instructions unless the
party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.”). Consequently, we review
Oliphant’s sufficiency challenge to the consciousness of guilt instruction strictly for
plain error. Accord Lathon at ¶ 123. “A court will reverse on plain error based on
an erroneous jury instruction only upon a showing that the outcome ‘“clearly would
have been different absent the error.”’” State v. Mankin, 2020-Ohio-5317, ¶ 18
(10th Dist.), quoting State v. Petty, 2012-Ohio-2989, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting State
v. Zachery, 2009-Ohio-1180, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.).
{¶27} Because the instruction was supported by sufficient evidence, it was
not error, let alone plain error, for the trial court to instruct the jury on consciousness
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of guilt. Critically, the undisputed evidence established that Oliphant departed both
the murder scene and the secondary shooting location outside Feltz Chiropractic,
and subsequently discarded his firearm and other items. In other words, the totality
of the evidence demonstrates that Oliphant’s conduct extended well beyond simply
walking away. That is, by leaving the scenes and taking active steps to dispose of
the recently purchased weapon and other evidence, Oliphant demonstrated an
awareness of his impending implication and made a calculated effort to avoid the
consequences. See State v. Steckel, 2026-Ohio-979, ¶ 96 (12th Dist.) (finding that
“disposing of weapons used in the offense” and “removing items from the crime
scene” are proper examples of evidence establishing a consciousness of guilt
independent of traditional flight).
{¶28} Moreover, determining Oliphant’s true motive for leaving the scene
and discarding the evidence was a matter of weight and credibility strictly within
the province of the jury. See James, 2023-Ohio-3524, at ¶ 64 (11th Dist.) (noting
that jurors, “in weighing the facts consistent with the jury instruction provided,” can
reasonably infer that a defendant who fired multiple shots fled because he knew he
was guilty and would be sought by police). Indeed, a trial court is not precluded
from providing a consciousness of guilt instruction simply because the record
contains competing theories for the defendant’s actions. See State v. Lewis, 2016-Ohio-1592, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.) (rejecting the premise that the evidence “must
demonstrate only one possible motivation for a defendant’s flight before a trial court
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may instruct the jury on consciousness of guilt”). Therefore, because sufficient
evidence supported the consciousness of guilt instruction, the trial court did not err
by providing it.
{¶29} Further, to the extent Oliphant argues that the instruction unfairly
prejudiced his case—a challenge he properly preserved at trial—the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by providing the instruction. Generally, a flight instruction
is “neutral in its effect” and “all but innocuous” if it advises the jury that: (1) any
finding of consciousness of guilt is entirely permissive; (2) the instruction applies
only if the jury first determines the defendant fled out of a consciousness of guilt;
(3) the jury retains the discretion to give such evidence no weight; and (4) flight
does not create a presumption of guilt. Vasquez, 2024-Ohio-860, at ¶ 82 (6th Dist.).
“This is because such an instruction explains the limited use of flight evidence,
instructs the jury to consider flight only if it finds that consciousness of guilt was
the defendant’s motive, and allows the jury to disregard flight evidence entirely.”
Id.
{¶30} Here, Oliphant does not challenge the specific language of the
instruction, which was highly permissive and explicitly advised the jury as follows:
Testimony has been admitted, indicating that the defendant did or
attempted to flee the scene and/or discard the weapon and other items.
You are instructed that this activity alone does not raise a presumption
of guilt, but it may tend to indicate the defendant’s consciousness or
awareness of guilt. If you find that the facts do not support that the
defendant did or attempted to flee the scene and/or discard the weapon
and other items, or if you find that some other motive prompted the
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defendant’s conduct or if you are unable to decide what the
defendant’s motivation was, then you should not consider this
evidence for any purpose. However, if you find that the facts support
that the defendant engaged in such conduct and if you decide that the
defendant was motivated by a consciousness of guilt, you may, but
are not required to, consider that evidence in deciding whether the
defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. You alone will determine
what weight, if any, to give this evidence.
(Apr. 11, 2025 Tr., Vol. V, at 940-941). Compare Wilson, 2010-Ohio-2294, at ¶ 10
(3d Dist.) (noting that “the trial court’s consciousness of guilt jury instruction . . .
was clearly neutral in its effect, and only permitted, not required, the jury to draw
the conclusion that Wilson displayed a consciousness of guilt by fleeing the
police”). Importantly, by explicitly empowering the jury to consider whether “some
other motive” prompted his conduct, the instruction properly left the evaluation of
Oliphant’s true intent to the province of the jury. See State v. Byrd, 2024-Ohio2134, ¶ 95 (7th Dist.) (“Because the instruction exclusively vests in the jury both
the credibility determination (Appellant’s stated purpose for leaving the motel in a
taxicab) as well as its relevance to Appellant’s guilt, we find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.”). Consequently, because the instruction’s neutral and highly
permissive language explicitly allowed the jury to attribute his conduct to an
alternative motive, the instruction did not unfairly prejudice Oliphant.
{¶31} Furthermore, the consciousness of guilt instruction did not conflict
with Oliphant’s insanity defense because the jury was free to weigh both concepts
during its deliberations. See Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 437
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(2001) (finding no error in giving a consciousness of guilt instruction alongside an
insanity defense since a jury may properly weigh evasive conduct when determining
if a defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions).
See also State v. Smith, 2009-Ohio-1497, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.) (noting that evasive
conduct “tends to demonstrate that [the defendant] understood the wrongfulness of
his criminal conduct,” rendering an insanity defense futile). Consequently, because
the consciousness of guilt instruction was neutral, explicitly accommodated
alternative motives, and did not inherently conflict with Oliphant’s insanity defense,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing it.
{¶32} For these reasons, Oliphant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
The Jury Finding That Oliphant Failed To Establish His Not
Guilty By Reason Of Insanity Defense By Preponderance Of The
Evidence Was Against The Manifest Weight Of The Evidence.
(Tr. 981-984).
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Oliphant argues that his convictions
are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury lost its way in
concluding that he failed to prove his insanity defense.
Standard of Review
{¶34} The manifest weight of the evidence standard guides the analysis of
evidentiary support for a not guilty by reason of insanity defense. State v. Schmid,
2025-Ohio-14, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). In applying this standard, it is important to remember
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that the weight and credibility of evidence related to the insanity defense are
decisions primarily left to the jury. State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80 (1982).
{¶35} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and
determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A
reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on
matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the
manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs
heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s
judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶36} “[A] person is not guilty by reason of insanity if ‘at the time of the
commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person’s acts.’” Schmid at ¶ 18, quoting
R.C. 2901.01(A)(14). Because it is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the
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burden of proving that they are not guilty by reason of insanity. Id., citing R.C.
2901.05(A) and State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 164-165 (2001). A not guilty
by reason of insanity “defense must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id. at ¶ 19, citing R.C. 2901.05(A) and Tibbetts at 165. “‘Preponderance of the
evidence simply means “evidence which is of a greater weight or more convincing
than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.”’” Id., quoting In re Starks,
2005-Ohio-1912, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1998).
{¶37} In this case, two forensic psychology experts, Dr. Bob Stinson (“Dr.
Stinson”)—on Oliphant’s behalf—and Dr. Massimo De Marchis (“Dr. De
Marchis”)—a court-appointed evaluator who testified on behalf of the State—
presented testimony regarding Oliphant’s mental state at the time that the offenses
were committed. In particular, Dr. Stinson testified that Oliphant was actively
psychotic at the time of the offenses and was unaware that his actions were wrong.
To reach this diagnosis, Dr. Stinson evaluated a three-year history of Oliphant’s
severe mental illness, including his symptom manifestations, numerous psychiatric
hospitalizations, and treatment records leading up to and immediately following the
February 2023 incident.
{¶38} Conversely, Dr. De Marchis testified that he concluded that Oliphant
was not experiencing active symptoms of a severe mental disease or defect at the
time of the offenses and that he understood the wrongfulness of his actions.
Pertinently, Dr. De Marchis testified that he based his opinion on Oliphant’s
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purposeful actions during the incident. Specifically, Dr. De Marchis pointed to the
fact that Oliphant calmly purchased a firearm earlier that day, addressed the victims
to get their attention before shooting, fled the scene, and disposed of the weapon
and other items in an alleyway to hide evidence of the crime. Likewise, Dr. De
Marchis concluded that Oliphant was fabricating his claims of seeing “demonic
shadowy figures,” noting that Oliphant did not report these figures initially and
inconsistently claimed the figures were on foot even though he shot a victim inside
a vehicle. (Apr. 11, 2025 Tr., Vol. V, at 788).
{¶39} Further, Dr. De Marchis criticized Dr. Stinson’s methodology, noting
that Dr. Stinson conducted his evaluation months later in October 2023 and
appeared to draft his report primarily to counter Dr. De Marchis’s initial findings
rather than relying on his own independent review. Nevertheless, on crossexamination, Dr. De Marchis acknowledged Oliphant’s extensive history of
recurring mental health crises and conceded that someone with Oliphant’s severe
mental disease was prone to more psychotic episodes when not taking his prescribed
medication.
{¶40} In addition to the experts, the jury heard testimony and viewed
evidence regarding Oliphant’s erratic behavior and mental state during and after the
incident. Specifically, video evidence and officer testimony, including from
Patrolman Bryce Bedwell, demonstrated that Oliphant made irrational, spiritual
statements, stripped naked, and made multiple attempts to choke or harm himself
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following his arrest. Furthermore, evidence was presented indicating that Oliphant
seemed confused about whether he had actually harmed anyone, stating he was just
shooting in the air. The defense also introduced records of at least nine psychiatric
hospitalizations in the three years preceding the shooting.
{¶41} On appeal, Oliphant argues that the jury’s determination that he failed
to prove his insanity defense was against the manifest weight of the evidence
because the preponderance of the evidence established that he was in an active state
of psychosis. In particular, he contends that the jury arbitrarily ignored his welldocumented history of mental illness, his irrational behavior during and after the
shootings, and the fact that Dr. De Marchis evaluated him only after he had been
stabilized on medication in the county jail.
{¶42} “‘The trier of fact may reject an affirmative defense on the grounds of
credibility.’” State v. Baker, 2025-Ohio-2107, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.
Armstrong, 2003-Ohio-2154, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). “‘If the record demonstrates that the
trier of fact has considered the insanity defense, the reviewing court should defer to
the trier of fact’s interpretation of the evidence.’” Id., quoting Armstrong at ¶ 17.
“‘This is so because the jury “is best able to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing
the credibility of the proffered testimony.”’” Id., quoting State v. Pence, 2024-Ohio5121, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.), quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80
(1984). Ultimately, a reviewing court cannot conclude that a conviction is against
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the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury believes the State’s
evidence over that of the defendant.” Pence at ¶ 38.
{¶43} In this case, faced with competing psychological evaluations, the jury
was tasked with resolving the conflict between Dr. Stinson’s and Dr. De Marchis’s
conclusions. Ultimately, the jury was entitled to weigh the experts’ testimonies—
along with the balance of the other evidence presented at trial—and could
reasonably have found Dr. De Marchis’s testimony to be more credible. Accord
Baker at ¶ 21. Critically, because the resolution of conflicting expert testimony falls
squarely within the province of the jury, the jury was free to credit Dr. De Marchis’s
conclusions while discounting Dr. Stinson’s. Accord id. Indeed, Dr. De Marchis’s
testimony gave the jury a rational basis to reject Dr. Stinson’s competing diagnosis.
Accord id. Moreover, notwithstanding the extensive evidence detailing Oliphant’s
history of mental illness and psychological distress while in police custody, the jury
was able to assess the credibility of these accounts alongside his conduct leading up
to the shooting and determine that Oliphant nonetheless possessed the capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offenses. See id. at ¶
22.
{¶44} Thus, based on the record before us, we conclude that the jury did not
clearly lose its way by concluding that Oliphant failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct as a result of a severe mental disease or defect. See id. at ¶ 23.
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Therefore, the jury did not lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that Oliphant’s convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Consequently, Oliphant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶45} Oliphant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶46} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We
remand this matter, however, for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical error
in the May 19, 2025 sentencing entry regarding the indefinite sentence imposed on
Count One.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
-21-Case No. 1-25-26
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
-22-