IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Sharon Parsons, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Timothy Parsons, et al.,
Appellants-Plaintiffs FILED
Jun 22 2026, 9:14 am
v. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company,
Appellee-Defendant
and
Danielle Benjamin, et al.,
Defendants
June 22, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CT-2307
Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court
The Honorable Richard R. Stalbrink, Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 1 of 35
Trial Court Cause No.
46D02-2003-CT-471
Opinion by Judge DeBoer
Judges Brown and Altice concur.
DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Massachusetts resident Timothy Parsons died from methanol poisoning after
drinking Ethanol Extraction, a product sold by an Indiana-based chemical
processing facility that claimed it contained 190 proof ethanol. When Parsons’
parents and his estate 1 filed a wrongful death action, the facility’s commercial
insurance carrier, Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company (Crum &
Forster), determined the presence of methanol in the product was a “pollutant”
that was excluded from the policy’s Commercial General Liability (CGL)
coverage part but qualified for coverage under a separate Third-Party Pollution
Liability (TPPL) part. After the Parsons learned of Crum & Forster’s coverage
position, they filed a declaratory judgment claim asserting a right to CGL
coverage. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on that claim,
1
In this opinion, we collectively refer to Parsons’ estate and his parents as “the Parsons.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 2 of 35
and the trial court ultimately entered judgment in Crum & Forster’s favor after
finding the TPPL coverage part applied and the CGL part did not.
[2] The Parsons appeal, arguing their son’s death was not caused by a pollution
condition as defined by the Crum & Forster policy, so their claims should be
covered as a products liability action under the CGL coverage part. Bound by
precedent from our Supreme Court construing similar pollution provisions in
insurance policies, we find that because the Crum & Forster policy did not
unambiguously identify methanol as a pollutant, the trial court erred in
applying the TPPL part to the Parsons’ claims. See State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845, 851 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to deny Crum &
Forster’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Parsons’ cross-motion.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] From 2010 to 2024, Dennis Zeedyk operated a chemical processing facility in
LaPorte through an Indiana limited liability company, Glycerin Traders LLC
(Glycerin Traders). Crum & Forster issued Glycerin Traders an
“Environmental Policy” (the Policy) that contained numerous coverage parts,
including a CGL part and a TPPL part. It also issued an excess policy that
provided an additional $1,000,000 in coverage.
[4] In the fall of 2016, Zeedyk purchased roughly 6,510 gallons of denatured
alcohol from a middle-man supplier who sourced it from a cargo barge cleaning
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 3 of 35
company. 2 The barge cleaning company had combined the remnants of
industrial alcohol shipments into large holding containers, resulting in a
mixture that “had a noticeable pungent odor and an unusual slight-yellow
color.” Appellants’ Appendix Vol. 3 at 218. The bill of lading for the alcohol
delivered to Zeedyk indicated the mixture was comprised of several industrial
alcohols and additives. Without performing any tests to confirm the contents of
the mixture, Zeedyk and his employees set up a bottling line to distill and
package it for resale. Zeedyk had to distill the mixture multiple times to remove
the pungent odor and yellow tint from the final product, which he intended to
market as safe for human consumption.
[5] Eighteen days after receiving the shipment, Zeedyk sold the first bottle of a
product he called “Ethanol Extraction.” 3 Id. at 186. Ethanol Extraction was
initially sold by Glycerin Traders, but Zeedyk created a new entity in early 2017
to take over marketing and distribution. He called that company Lake
Michigan Distilling Company LLC (Lake Michigan Distilling). The product
was erroneously labeled as containing “190 proof non-denatured grain
alcohol[,]” and Lake Michigan Distilling marketed it “as consisting of 95%
ethyl alcohol (also known as ethanol) and 5% purified water.” Id. at 187; see
2
Denatured alcohol is ethanol mixed with toxic additives such as methanol. It can be used for industrial
purposes but is not safe for human consumption.
3
Ethanol can be used as a solvent to extract compounds from plant material in a process called ethanol
extraction. Ethanol extraction is a popular method for obtaining THC and CBD from cannabis, but can also
be used to extract flavors, colors, and soluble compounds for use in food or medicine.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 4 of 35
infra Figure 1. In truth, it contained high levels of methanol, which is toxic and
potentially lethal if consumed.
Figure 1: Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 199.
[6] In March 2018, Timothy Parsons purchased a few bottles of Ethanol Extraction
and had them shipped to his home in Massachusetts. Two weeks later, his
mother took him to the hospital after finding him in distress and begging for
help. Parsons’ medical providers initially believed he was suffering from
ethanol poisoning, but his bloodwork instead indicated he had lethal levels of
methanol in his system. While in the hospital, Parsons had seizures and
ultimately suffered a severe brain injury. He was declared brain dead on April
6, 2018, and he died that same day from “complications of acute methanol
intoxication.” Id. at 213.
[7] The day Parsons died, a Massachusetts Poison Control representative called
Lake Michigan Distilling to advise it that one of its customers suffered
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 5 of 35
methanol poisoning. That call prompted Zeedyk to send a sample of Ethanol
Extraction for testing, which revealed it contained 42.7% methanol and 54.6%
ethanol. Despite this information, Zeedyk did not issue a recall for the product
until May 22, 2018, and then he only did so because he was facing pressure
from federal and Indiana authorities to recall the product. A subsequent
investigation determined several purchasers of Ethanol Extraction had died or
been seriously injured after ingesting it.
[8] In August 2018, Crum & Forster received notice of two lawsuits filed against
Zeedyk and his companies. 4 One of those suits was filed by the Estate of Nisa
Baxter, a Nevada woman who died after eating THC brownies made using
Ethanol Extraction. The second was filed by Keenan Jefferson, a Missouri man
who suffered non-fatal injuries after consuming the product and sought to
certify a class action. Then, in February 2019, Crum & Forster received notice
of a third claim against Zeedyk, his companies, and other individuals allegedly
involved in producing Ethanol Extraction. That claim was brought by Jacob
Shanbrom, who alleged he suffered partial vision loss after drinking nearly a
gallon of Ethanol Extraction over the course of several months.
[9] In its initial coverage determinations for these claims, Crum & Forster
disclaimed coverage (including under the CGL and TPPL coverage parts), but
agreed to defend Zeedyk and the businesses subject to a reservation of rights. It
4
Though the Policy was issued only to Glycerin Traders, the parties agree (or at least do not dispute) that
Lake Michigan Distilling was also an insured.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 6 of 35
cited a “Total Pollution Exclusion” as the reason CGL coverage was
unavailable. As for TPPL coverage, Crum & Forster determined, among other
things, that Glycerin Traders had not submitted timely claims under the TPPL
coverage part. It later reconsidered its position and agreed that the presence of
methanol in Ethanol Extraction was a covered “pollution condition” for
purposes of TPPL coverage, and that it had received timely notice of the claims.
[10] The CGL part of the Policy provided, as relevant here:
We[ 5] will pay, in excess of the Deductible shown in the
Declarations, those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as “damages” for “bodily injury” or “property
damage” to which this insurance applies.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 155. This included any “products-completed
operations hazard” (PCOH), meaning “all ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property
damage’ occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of
‘your product’ or ‘your work’ . . . .” 6 Id. at 150. However, a “Total Pollution
Exclusion” endorsement excluded from CGL coverage any claim
based upon or arising out of:
5
As used in the Policy, “we” and “us” referred to Crum & Forster, while “you” and “your” referred to the
insureds.
6
PCOH clauses have been interpreted by our Supreme Court “to describe ‘claims arising from the placement
of defective goods into the stream of commerce by the insured.’” West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 598 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting B & R Farm Serv., Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 483
N.E.2d 1076, 1077 (Ind. 1985)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 7 of 35
. . . “Bodily injury”, “property damage” or “personal and
advertising injury” which would not have occurred in whole or
part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape, or presence or movement
of any “pollutants” at any time and any place, including, without
limitation, any indoor or outdoor commercial, industrial,
residential or agricultural locale, whether inhabited or
uninhabited . . . .
Id. at 201. The common terms of the Policy defined “pollutants” as
any solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal or biological irritant or
contaminant, including, without limitation, smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste and any matter that by
its presence, corrupts, defiles, contaminates or is harmful to the
soil, air, or water, living things or the environment.
Id. at 150.
[11] Though excluded from CGL coverage, pollution-related claims were covered by
the TPPL coverage part, in which Crum & Forster agreed to
pay, in excess of the Deductible shown in the Declarations, those
sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay:
(1) As “damages” because of “bodily injury” or “property
damage”, and
(2) For “cleanup costs”;
resulting from a “pollution condition” that was caused by an
“occurrence” and to which this insurance applies.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 8 of 35
Id. at 168. The term “pollution condition” incorporated the same definition of
“pollutant” as the CGL Total Pollution Exclusion and was further defined as
“the discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, escape, presence or
movement of” any such “pollutants.” Id. at 150. Unlike CGL coverage,
PCOH coverage was not defined as applicable to the TPPL part of the Policy. 7
[12] When the Parsons sued in March 2020, Crum & Forster—as it did with the
Baxter, Jefferson, and Shanbrom claims—agreed to defend and indemnify its
insureds under the TPPL coverage part. However, in June 2021, it informed
Zeedyk that the TPPL policy limits and the limits of the excess policy had been
exhausted by defense costs and prior settlements. In response, Glycerin
Traders’ counsel sent a letter to Crum & Forster asserting the Parsons’ claims
qualified for CGL coverage. However, Crum & Forster argued CGL coverage
was unavailable for the Parsons’ claims because Glycerin Traders had
previously accepted TPPL coverage and the Policy’s Multiple Coverages
Limitation provided that even if there were concurrent CGL and TPPL
coverage, only the TPPL part would apply. Specifically, under the Multiple
Coverages Limitation,
If . . . the [TPPL] Coverage Part . . . appl[ies] to an “occurrence”,
offense, “wrongful act” or “pollution condition” or related
“occurrences”, offenses, “wrongful acts” or “pollution
conditions”, then the [CGL] . . . Coverage Part shall not apply to
7
The Policy’s common terms defined PCOHs as applied to CGL coverage and a Contractors Pollution
Liability coverage part, but not in relation to the TPPL part. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 150.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 9 of 35
the same or related “occurrences”, offenses, “wrongful acts” or
“pollution conditions”.
Id. at 140.
[13] When the Parsons learned Crum & Forster was no longer providing Zeedyk
and his companies with a defense, they amended their complaint to assert a
declaratory judgment claim seeking CGL coverage. Thereafter, Crum &
Forster moved for summary judgment on that claim and asked the court to
declare it did “not owe an obligation to indemnify Glycerin Traders . . . or any
other [insured] . . . for any losses, damages, claims, settlements[,] or judgments
asserted by [the Parsons] . . . .” Id. at 79. It argued that “pursuant to the clear
and unambiguous language of the . . . Policy, all claims which arise out of the
same or a related ‘pollution condition’ are subject to the [TPPL policy limit],
and . . . $1,000,000 . . . is the most [Crum & Forster] will pay under the [TPPL]
Coverage Part . . . .” Id. at 72. Furthermore, “Glycerin Traders identified [that]
the ‘pollution condition’ giving rise to the [Ethanol Extraction-related] claims
‘can be traced back to a single 7,000-gallon container of ethanol that [it]
purchased believing it was pure . . . .’” Id. at 74. Then, after Glycerin Traders
accepted TPPL coverage, the limits of the TPPL part and the excess policy were
exhausted by settlements and defense costs. Finally, according to Crum &
Forster, “pursuant to the operation of the Multiple Coverages Limitation . . . , it
[was] undisputed that the [CGL] Coverage Part . . . does not afford additional
coverage . . . .” Id. at 79.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 10 of 35 [14] The Parsons opposed Crum & Forster’s motion and filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. They argued the TPPL coverage part did not apply to
their claims because Zeedyk and his companies had not “create[ed] a ‘pollution
condition’ or [had] ‘pollutants’ migrate from their premises.” Appellants’ App.
Vol. 3 at 154. Instead,
[Lake Michigan Distilling] manufactured, bottled, packaged,
sold, and delivered [a] completed, albeit defective, Ethanol
Extraction product . . . , all while marketing the product as safe
for human consumption . . . .
Given these facts, . . . the Parsons’ claim is a [PCOH] claim
under the [CGL] Coverage Part . . . .
Id. For their part, Zeedyk and his companies opposed Crum & Forster’s
motion and argued,
The Total Pollution Exclusion does not operate to exclude
coverage of any of the claims at issue here because the language
of the exclusion is ambiguous and unenforceable. See [Flexdar,
964 N.E.2d 845]. [Crum & Forster’s] erroneous reliance on the
Total Pollution Exclusion in 2018 when Glycerin Traders first
gave notice of a claim does not change the fact that Glycerin
Traders had, and still has, coverage under the CGL Coverage
Part based on the terms of the policy and Indiana law. [Crum &
Forster’s] attempt to recast the coverage as falling under the
TPPL Coverage Part is a red herring. From the beginning,
Glycerin Traders has had coverage for all claims under the CGL
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 11 of 35
Coverage Part[,] and it is entitled to such coverage for the
Parsons[’] claim[s].[ 8]
As for Crum & Forster’s contention that Zeedyk “‘admitted’ that the Parsons[’]
claim[s] arise[] out of the same pollution condition as the” other three Ethanol
Extraction claims, Zeedyk and his companies argued,
[Crum & Forster’s] motion for summary judgment doubles down
on its initial determination in 2018 that the Total Pollution
Exclusion applies and excludes coverage under the CGL
Coverage Part. Based on that initial, erroneous determination,
[Crum & Forster] only offered to defend and indemnify Glycerin
Traders under the TPPL Coverage Part. . . . Glycerin Traders
was in no position to refuse a defense under the TPPL [part] and
insist that [Crum & Forster] defend it under the CGL Coverage
Part, which [Crum & Forster] had insisted, from the beginning,
provided no coverage.
. . . . [Crum & Forster] fails to see the unfairness to its insured
under these circumstances and instead expects Glycerin Traders
to be bound by [Crum & Forster’s] erroneous coverage analysis.
If [Crum & Forster] had correctly analyzed coverage in 2018
when the first claim was made, then [it] would have defended
and indemnified Glycerin Traders under the CGL Coverage Part.
8
Glycerin Traders’ Response in Opposition to Crum & Forster’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Parsons Est. v. Lake Mich. Distilling Co. (May 21, 2024) (No. 46D02-2003-CT-471).
Neither the Parsons nor Crum & Forster included a copy of this document in their respective appendices. Nonetheless, it is a part of the record on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27 (“The Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk’s Record and all proceedings before the trial court . . . , whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on Appeal.”) (emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 12 of 35
The Court should put the parties in the position they would have
been in had the correct coverage been identified from the start.[ 9]
[15] In a combined brief supporting its motion for summary judgment and opposing
the Parsons’ cross-motion, Crum & Forster defended its determination that the
claims at issue fell under the TPPL coverage part. It argued that under the
Policy,
“pollution condition” includes the “presence of pollutants.”
“Pollutant” is defined in pertinent part as “chemicals . . . and any
matter that by its presence . . . is harmful to . . . living things . . .
.” Here, methanol was present, which was harmful, in fact
lethal, to humans. . . . Consequently, the terms of the TPPL
[coverage part] are met.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 4 at 9 (citations omitted). It also asserted “Glycerin
Traders ha[d] accepted a defense and indemnification under the TPPL coverage
part” in connection with all four claims and could not therefore assert a right to
CGL coverage “[a]fter having obtained the benefit of a defense and/or
settlement of these claims . . . .” Id. at 11. Finally, Crum & Forster argued the
enforceability (or lack thereof) of the Total Pollution Exclusion was irrelevant
to its summary judgment motion because it never
9
Glycerin Traders’ Response in Opposition to Crum & Forster’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
8, at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 13 of 35
asserted that the [exclusion] precludes coverage[ 10] . . . and did
not even mention the Total Pollution Exclusion in its motion for
summary judgment. Rather, . . . since coverage [was] afforded
for the Parsons[’] claim[s] under the TPPL coverage part . . . ,
pursuant to the operation of the Multiple Coverages Limitation .
. . , the CGL Coverage Part . . . does not afford additional
coverage . . . .
Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
[16] The trial court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment on August
22, 2024. Then, on February 11, 2025, the court issued its detailed order
granting Crum & Forster’s motion for summary judgment and denying the
Parsons’ cross-motion. It issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in
which it reasoned, in part,
2. On August 14, 2024, this Court issued an order on summary
judgment related to choice of law and held that the
substantive law of Massachusetts will apply in this matter. .
12. [Glycerin Traders and Lake Michigan Distilling] distilled,
bottled, and sold Ethanol Extraction . . . from October 2016
to May 2018. [They] used bulk denatured alcohol
10
Crum & Forster’s claim that it never asserted the Total Pollution Exclusion bars CGL coverage is difficult
to square with its assertion in a September 20, 2018 coverage determination letter that it “relie[d] on the Total
Pollution Exclusion to disclaim coverage and deny liability under the CGL coverage part” for the Ethanol
Extraction claims. Appellants’ App. Vol. 3 at 31.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 14 of 35
containing mixed solvents, including methanol, to make
[their] product . . . .
14. On August 6, 2018, [Crum & Forster] received notice . . . of
a lawsuit filed against [Zeedyk’s companies], . . . asserting
claims in connection with the death of Ni[s]a Baxter
following her use of [Ethanol Extraction] . . . . [Crum &
Forster] agreed to provide a defense to Glycerin Traders in
the Baxter Action under the [TPPL] coverage part . . . .
[Crum & Forster] agreed to settle the claims asserted . . . in
the Baxter Action, which exhausted the limits of liability
under the [TPPL] coverage part . . . and a portion of the
limits provided under the Excess Policy.
15. On August 15, 2018, [Crum & Forster] received notice . . .
of a class action lawsuit . . . asserting claims in connection
with bodily injuries sustained by Keenan Jefferson and
others from the methanol contained in Ethanol Extraction.
Again, [Crum & Forster] agreed to provide a defense . . .
under the [TPPL] coverage part . . . . [Crum & Forster]
agreed to settle the claims asserted . . . in the Jefferson
Action, eating into the limits of liability under the Excess
Policy.
16. On January 17, 2019, [Crum & Forster] received notice of a
claim by Jacob Shanbrom . . . with similar allegations as
made in the Baxter and Jefferson Actions. [Crum &
Forster] agreed to provide a defense . . . in connection with
the Shanbrom claim under the [TPPL] coverage part . . . .
17. It wasn’t until January 27, 2020[,] that [Crum & Forster]
received notice of the [Parsons’] claim[s] . . . . [Crum &
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 15 of 35
Forster] agreed to provide a defense . . . in connection with
the Parsons[’] claim[s] under the [TPPL] coverage part . . . .
18. In an April 27, 2020 letter to [Crum & Forster], counsel for
[Glycerin Traders and Lake Michigan Distilling] expressly
asserted that “[the TPPL coverage part] is the relevant
provision” of [the] Policy. The letter also stated, “It is clear
that the Parsons[’] Claim[s] arise[] out of the same pollution
condition for which there was coverage under the Baxter
and Jefferson claims.”
19. [Glycerin Traders and Lake Michigan Distilling] ha[ve]
asserted that they are also entitled to [CGL] coverage . . . .
20. This case arises out of the same “pollution condition” as the
Baxter, Jefferson[,] and Shanbrom Actions and . . . the
[TPPL] Coverage Part . . . applies to this case.
21. The same [TPPL] Coverage Part . . . was previously applied
to the Baxter, Jefferson, and Shanbrom Actions. Pursuant
to the operation of the Multiple Coverages Limitation
provision, the [CGL] Coverage Part . . . does not apply to
the claims asserted by [the Parsons].
22. [Crum & Forster’s] payment of settlements and “defense
expenses” in connection with the Baxter, Jefferson, and
Parsons claims exhausted the $1,000,000 each pollution
condition of liability under the [TPPL] [c]overage part . . .
and the $1,000,000 each occurrence limit of liability under
the Excess Policy.
23. The limits of [Crum & Forster’s] coverage have been
exhausted and no other coverage is afforded under the
Primary and Excess Policies for this action.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 16 of 35
24. [Crum & Forster] owes no further obligation under the
Policies to indemnify [Glycerin Traders and Lake Michigan
Distilling] in connection with the claims asserted against
[them] in this action.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 28-33. The Parsons now appeal. 11
Discussion and Decision12
[17] On appeal, the Parsons contend the trial court erred in granting Crum &
Forster’s motion for summary judgment and denying their cross-motion. This
Court reviews a decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo and
applies the same standard as the trial court. Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256
N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025). Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the
initial burden is on the moving party to make a “prima facie showing that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). If
11
The Parsons filed an earlier appeal of the trial court’s summary judgment order, which pended under Case
No. 25A-CT-891. On Crum & Forster’s motion, the motions panel dismissed that appeal without prejudice
because the court’s order did not resolve all claims as to each party, was not an appealable interlocutory order
as of right, and did not contain the “magic language” set forth in Trial Rule 56(C). See Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)
(“A summary judgment . . . with respect to less than all the claims or parties shall be interlocutory unless the
court in writing expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs
entry of judgment as to less than all the issues, claims or parties.”). Thereafter, the trial court amended its
order to direct the entry of final judgment on the declaratory judgment claim, and the Parsons then filed this
appeal. Additionally, though Zeedyk and his companies opposed Crum & Forster’s motion for summary
judgment below and asked the trial court to grant the Parsons’ motion, they did not file a brief on appeal.
12
On February 6, 2026, Crum & Forster filed a motion requesting oral argument. We granted that motion in
an order issued March 10, 2026, and scheduled an oral argument for June 8, 2026. On June 7, lead counsel
for Crum & Forster filed an emergency motion to continue the oral argument. We granted that motion in
part, cancelled the June 8 oral argument, and indicated that “[i]f the oral argument is rescheduled, the Court
will do so through a forthcoming order.” Order, Parsons v. Benjamin (June 8, 2026) (25A-CT-2307). Having
reviewed the matter, we find that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the issues presented in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 17 of 35
the moving party satisfies this initial burden, “the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Id. Our review is limited “to the materials
designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 90
N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. We construe any doubts as to the
facts or reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and while the
trial court’s findings and conclusions “aid our review, . . . they do not bind us.”
Sandoval v. Willow Lake Ests. Home Owners Ass’n, 255 N.E.3d 1181, 1186 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2025). “Generally, the interpretation of an insurance policy presents a
question of law and is thus appropriate for summary judgment.” Cinergy Corp.
v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 865 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. 2007), reh’g
denied.
[18] Our standard of review is not altered by the fact that the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment on the same issue. Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC,
952 N.E.2d 817, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “Instead, we must
consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 260 N.E.3d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. And
because the Parsons lost on the motions below, they have “the burden of
persuading us that the trial court erred.” Kluger v. J.J.P. Enters., Inc., 159 N.E.3d
82, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 18 of 35
1. Choice of Law
[19] We begin by noting that though the parties briefed the cross-motions for
summary judgment under Indiana law, the trial court held that it would
interpret the Policy under Massachusetts law. 13 It based that decision on its
earlier ruling that “the substantive law of Massachusetts will apply in this
matter.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 28. However, that earlier choice of law
determination focused on the damages available to the Parsons on their tort
claims, not questions of contract interpretation under the Policy. Specifically,
the court reasoned,
While there is no conflict between Indiana and Massachusetts
law with respect to the issue of product liability for a defective
product, there is a difference between the two States with respect
to the issue of recoverable damages.
When this conflict occurs, the presumption is the lex loci
delicti[ 14] rule applies. The death of Massachusetts resident, Tim
Parsons[,] in Massachusetts herein is the last act in the abovecaptioned matter, thereby the last act occurred in Massachusetts.
13
Though the trial court said it was applying Massachusetts contract principles, the court reasoned the
Policy’s pollution provisions were unambiguous without acknowledging rulings from the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court holding otherwise. See W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Mass. 1997)
(holding similarly-worded pollution provisions “should not reflexively be applied to accidents arising during
the course of normal business activities simply because they involve a ‘discharge, dispersal, release or escape’
of an ‘irritant or contaminant’” (quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 78 (Ill. 1997))).
14
Lex loci delicti (often shortened to lex loci) means “the place of the wrong” and refers to the general rule
that in a tort action, a “court applies the substantive laws of . . . ‘the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.’” Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind.
2004) (quoting Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 19 of 35
Appellants’ App. Vol. 4 at 33. The court issued this order after the parties filed
their motions for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim, so it
did not have the benefit of briefing about whether Massachusetts law should
also govern the Policy.
[20] Though the parties failed to provide an in-depth analysis of the choice of law
issue on appeal, 15 the trial court’s lex loci ruling does not control which body of
law governs the Policy. Indeed, Indiana’s choice of law rules permit a court to
“analyze a contract claim and a tort claim independently . . . .” Simon v. United
States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind. 2004); see, e.g., Allen v. Great Am. Rsrv. Ins. Co.,
766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. 2002) (analyzing “the choice between South
Carolina and Indiana law” separately for “each of the counts of the plaintiffs’
complaint”). As this Court has expressed, “although Indiana does not
recognize dépeçage, 16 the law of different jurisdictions can apply to different
counts and different defendants—just not to issues within each count.” Poultry
& Indus. Suppliers, Inc. v. Incubacol, S.A.S., 250 N.E.3d 448, 456 n.3 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2024), trans. denied.
15
Rather than challenging the trial court’s decision to apply Massachusetts contract law, the Parsons elected
to “analyze the substantive law of the policy under both States’ laws.” Appellants’ Brief at 7. For its part,
Crum & Forster asserts “there is no choice-of-law issue in this appeal” because “whether Massachusetts or
Indiana law governs is of no consequence, the result is the same . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at 36.
16
“Dépeçage is the process of analyzing different issues within the same case separately under the laws of
different states.” Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 801. Jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of dépeçage “conduct[]
separate choice-of-law analyses for different issues within a single theory of recovery, such as liability and
damages.” Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2003), certified question answered by 805 N.E.2d
798 (Ind. 2004).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 20 of 35 [21] Accordingly, the trial court should have conducted separate choice of law
analyses for the declaratory judgment claim and the Parsons’ tort claims,
especially since the lex loci framework used by the court in its tort analysis is
inapplicable to contract claims. Instead, our Supreme Court has articulated a
“uniform-contract-interpretation approach” that “applies a single state’s law to
the entire contract.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Standard Fusee Corp.,
940 N.E.2d 810, 815 (Ind. 2010), reh’g denied. The uniform contract
interpretation approach analyzes the factors listed in section 188 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine “the state in most
intimate contact with the facts.” Id. The section 188 factors are “(a) the place
of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the
domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation[,] and place of
business of the parties.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 188(2)
(1971). When these factors are applied to insurance contracts, “[t]he location of
the insured risk will be given greater weight than any other single contact in
determining the state of the applicable law . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF L. § 193 cmt. b. As our Supreme Court has summarized,
in insurance contract cases, we first attempt to determine the
principal location of the insured risk. If the principal location of
the insured risk can be determined, it is given more weight than
other factors. If no such location exists, we continue our analysis
of the most intimate contacts. The law of the state in most
intimate contact is then to be applied to the entire dispute.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 21 of 35
Standard Fusee Corp., 940 N.E.2d at 815-16 (internal citations omitted).
[22] Considering these factors, Indiana, not Massachusetts, is the state in most
intimate contact with the Policy. As an initial matter, Zeedyk and his
companies were domiciled in Indiana, and their operations were located here.
See id. at 816 (finding Maryland was the principal location of the insured risk
when the insured had one site there and one in Indiana, but its headquarters
was in Maryland); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Summit Corp. of Am., 715 N.E.2d 926,
933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (when attempting to find “the principal location of the
insured risk[,]” Indiana’s courts look for “the state with the largest number of
insured sites”). Moreover, on this record the only contact Zeedyk appears to
have had with Massachusetts was the single shipment of Ethanol Extraction
sent to Parsons. Finally, we note the Policy contains an Indiana-specific
endorsement regarding cancellation and nonrenewal, indicating Crum &
Forster (who drafted the Policy) expected that Indiana law would govern. See
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 216. For these reasons, we analyze the Policy under
Indiana law.
2. Interpreting the Policy
[23] The Parsons’ main contention on appeal is that Crum & Forster erred in
determining that the methanol present in Ethanol Extraction was a “pollutant”
under the CGL Total Pollution Exclusion and the TPPL policy part.
Furthermore, they claim Crum & Forster’s classification of their claims as
pollution-related was merely a pretext to “label[] consumer ingestion as
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 22 of 35
‘pollution’” in order “to move the claim[s] into a specialized [TPPL] coverage
part designed for environmental contamination, where limits erode for defense
costs.” 17 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 4. Crum & Forster disagrees, arguing that
under the “clear and unambiguous language of the” TPPL coverage part, the
Ethanol Extraction claims—including the Parsons’—“all . . . arise out of the
same or a related ‘pollution condition’” and are thus covered by the TPPL part
and excluded from CGL coverage. 18 Appellee’s Br. at 39-40.
[24] It’s well-settled that “[i]nsurance policies are contracts ‘subject to the same rules
of judicial construction as other contracts.’” Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Chastain,
153 N.E.3d 330, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Erie Indem. Co. for Subscribers
17
One of the Parsons’ primary gripes with Crum & Forster’s stance that the presence of methanol in Ethanol
Extraction was a “pollution condition” is that the TPPL coverage part allows defense costs to eat into the
amount of coverage available to third-party claimants, while the CGL part does not.
18
Crum & Forster also asserts the Parsons are precluded from challenging its coverage determination
because Zeedyk and his businesses accepted TPPL coverage. However, Crum & Forster’s four-paragraph
argument on this point does not contain any citation to legal authority, much less authority holding that the
insureds’ acquiescence to or agreement with Crum & Forster’s coverage position is binding against the
Parsons. Crum & Forster has therefore waived this argument for our review. See Ludwig v. Flaherty & Collins,
Inc., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 730709, at *11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (finding a party waived her argument
that a jury’s “extraordinary” verdict required a new trial because she “failed to cite any legal authority” to
support it (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring parties to support their arguments with “citation
to the authorities [and] statutes . . . relied on . . .”))).
Waiver notwithstanding, this Court has long recognized that “the injured victim of an insured’s tort has a
legally protectable interest in the insurance policy before he has reduced his tort claim to judgment.” Wilson
v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 778 N.E.2d 849, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Cmty. Action of Greater Indianapolis, Inc. v.
Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 708 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. Because
parties injured by an insured’s tortious conduct have an interest in the policy independent from the insured’s,
not even a judicial determination of the insured’s rights under the policy is binding against them. See Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ginther, 803 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding injured third parties were not
collaterally estopped by prior declaratory judgment in insurance company’s favor because they “were not
parties in [that] declaratory action and . . . did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the coverage
issue”), reh’g denied, trans. denied. As such, it’s unclear why discussions between an insurance company and
its insured—which a third party was not privy to and apparently had no knowledge of—would preclude that
party from enforcing its rights under the policy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 23 of 35
at Erie Ins. Exch. v. Est. of Harris, 99 N.E.3d 625, 630 (Ind. 2018), reh’g denied).
Unambiguous terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning, while “courts
[generally] construe ambiguous terms against the policy drafter and in favor of
the insured.” G&G Oil Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 165 N.E.3d 82, 87
(Ind. 2021). “However, when a case involves a dispute between a third party
and an insurer, as it does here, we determine the general intent of the contract
from a neutral stance.” Am. Fam. Ins. Co. v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 774 N.E.2d 932,
936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
[25] With these general principles in mind, we begin our analysis of the Policy with
the Parsons’ contention that their claims were not “excluded from CGL
[coverage] pursuant to the Total Pollution Exclusion.” Appellants’ Br. at 28.
We then turn to Crum & Forster’s claim that even if CGL coverage would
otherwise apply, there is concurrent TPPL coverage that renders the CGL part
inapplicable under the Multiple Coverages Limitation.
2.1. CGL Coverage
[26] Our Supreme Court has examined pollution exclusions like the Policy’s Total
Pollution Exclusion four times, and it has found them to be ambiguous each
time. See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied;
Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 891 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied;
Freidline v. Shelby Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 37 (Ind. 2002); Flexdar, 964 N.E.2d 845.
In Kiger, a gas station in Danville was identified as the source of petroleum that
contaminated the soil and possibly the city’s groundwater supply intermittently
from 1990 to 1992. 662 N.E.2d at 946. After spending more than $400,000 to
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 24 of 35
clean up the contamination, the Indiana Department of Environmental
Management (IDEM) filed a complaint against the gas station’s owners to
recover the cleanup costs. Id. at 946-47. The owners then filed a third-party
complaint against their general liability insurance carrier seeking a defense and
indemnification. Id. at 947. The insurance company disclaimed coverage
under the policy’s pollution exclusion, which provided as follows:
[T]his insurance does not apply to any of the following:
“Bodily injury,” “property damage” or loss, cost or expense
arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of “pollutants.”
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed.
Id. at 948. The owners and the insurance company filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, and the trial court ruled in favor of coverage. Id. at 947.
[27] Our Supreme Court granted an emergency transfer petition to answer “whether
the pollution exclusion clause[] . . . , which d[id] not specifically list gasoline as
a pollutant, preclude[d] coverage for leakage from underground gasoline
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 25 of 35
storage tanks.” Id. at 946. A divided Court held the pollution exclusion did not
preclude coverage, reasoning,
Clearly, this clause cannot be read literally as it would negate
virtually all coverage. For example, if a visitor slips on a grease
spill then, since grease is a “chemical,” there would be no
insurance coverage. Accordingly, this clause requires
interpretation. . . . . [T]he language excludes coverage for
damage caused by “alleged discharge[s]” of “pollutants,” which
could be understood to mean that a mere allegation of pollution
discharge could defeat all coverage.
In any event, since the term “pollutant” does not obviously
include gasoline and, accordingly, is ambiguous, we . . . must
construe the language against the insurer who drafted it. . . . If a
garage policy is intended to exclude coverage for damage caused
by the leakage of gasoline, the language of the contract must be
explicit.
Id. at 948-49 (second alteration in original).
[28] Two months after Kiger, the Court addressed a policy with a similar exclusion
in Seymour Manufacturing Company. There, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency sued a Seymour-based manufacturing company to recoup
clean-up costs after barrels the company used to store manufacturing waste
leaked into the soil and air. Seymour Mfg. Co., 665 N.E.2d at 891-92. The
company’s general insurance carrier refused to provide a defense, citing, among
other provisions, the policy’s pollution exclusion. Id. at 892. The company
sued the insurer alleging it had a duty to defend and moved for summary
judgment on that issue, which the trial court denied. Id. On interlocutory
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 26 of 35
appeal, the Supreme Court held that “[i]n light of . . . [Kiger], [the company’s]
motion for summary judgment should have been granted.” Id.
[29] Four years after deciding Kiger and Seymour Manufacturing Company, the Court
again confronted a similar pollution exclusion in Freidline, 774 N.E.2d at 40.
There, several employees sued, among others, the owner of the building in
which they worked alleging exposure to toxic fumes from glue used to install
carpet. Id. at 39. The building’s general liability carrier disclaimed coverage,
citing a pollution exclusion in the policy. Id. The building’s owners then filed a
third-party complaint against the insurance company seeking coverage. Id. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, which this Court reversed.
Id. A unanimous panel reasoned,
While the policy’s definition of pollutants includes the term
“fumes,” it does not include carpet glue or any other substance
used to install carpet. Furthermore, as determined by the Kiger
court, this clause cannot be read literally as it would negate
virtually all coverage. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d at 948. Thus, following
the Kiger decision, since the term “pollutant” does not obviously
include carpet glue or substances used to install carpet, the term
is ambiguous. See id. Consequently, the policy must be
construed against the insurer who drafted it to not exclude
coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims . . . .
Freidline v. Shelby Ins. Co., 739 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g
denied, summarily aff’d in relevant part by 774 N.E.2d 37 (Ind. 2002). On transfer,
the Supreme Court “summarily affirm[ed] the Court of Appeals on this point.”
Freidline, 774 N.E.2d at 40.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 27 of 35 [30] Finally, in Flexdar, an Indianapolis-based manufacturer used a chemical solvent
called trichloroethylene (TCE) in the process of making rubber stamps. 964
N.E.2d at 847. After the manufacturer discovered TCE in the soil and
groundwater on and around its facility, IDEM informed it that it would be
responsible for the costs of cleanup. Id. The manufacturer then requested a
defense and indemnification from its CGL carrier, prompting the insurance
company to seek a declaratory judgment “that coverage for the TCE
contamination . . . was excluded pursuant to the pollution exclusion present in
the policies.” Id. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial
court ruled in favor of coverage. Id. at 848. This Court affirmed, reasoning,
“Under Kiger and its progeny . . . an insurance policy must be specific if it
wishes to except from coverage claims relating to a particular alleged
contaminant. It is within the province only of our Supreme Court to decide
otherwise.” State Auto Mut. Inc. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 937 N.E.2d 1203, 1212 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010), trans. granted, opinion vacated by 964 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 2012). On
transfer, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected this Court’s invitation to
reconsider its precedents:
Applying basic contract principles, our decisions have
consistently held that the insurer can (and should) specify what
falls within its pollution exclusion. . . . Where an insurer’s failure
to be more specific renders its policy ambiguous, we construe the
policy in favor of coverage.
Flexdar, 964 N.E.2d at 851.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 28 of 35 [31] Here, the Parsons are correct that the Policy’s Total Pollution Exclusion falls
short of the specificity required by our Supreme Court. Indeed, the exclusion
purports to bar CGL coverage for any claim
which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage,
migration, release or escape, or presence or movement of any
“pollutants” at any time and any place, including, without
limitation, any indoor or outdoor commercial, industrial,
residential or agricultural locale, whether inhabited or
uninhabited[.]
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 201. In light of our Supreme Court’s pollution
exclusion precedents, one might expect the Policy to define the term
“pollutant” in a way that makes clear which substances fall under the
exclusion’s sweeping language. But far from it, the Policy’s definition of
“pollutant” is even broader than the provision at issue in Kiger:
“Pollutants” mean[s] any solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal or
biological irritant or contaminant, including, without limitation,
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste
and any matter that by its presence, corrupts, defiles, contaminates or is
harmful to the soil, air, or water, living things or the environment.
Id. at 150 (emphasis added to indicate language that did not appear in the Kiger
exclusion). And though we’re reviewing the Policy from a neutral stance,
unlike Kiger and its progeny, our Supreme Court has repeatedly given clear
instruction to insurance companies (who draft policies) to be more specific.
Crum & Forster failed to heed that instruction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 29 of 35 [32] Simply put, because the Policy does not unambiguously identify methanol as a
“pollutant,” Crum & Forster cannot rely on the Total Pollution Exclusion to
deny CGL coverage for the Parsons’ claims. That is not the end of our
analysis, however, because if Crum & Forster is right that there is concurrent
coverage under the TPPL part, the Multiple Coverages Limitations would bar
CGL coverage. As discussed above, under the Multiple Coverages Limitation,
If . . . the [TPPL] Coverage Part . . . appl[ies] to an “occurrence”,
offense, “wrongful act” or “pollution condition” or related
“occurrences”, offenses, “wrongful acts” or “pollution
conditions”, then the [CGL] Coverage Part shall not apply to the
same or related “occurrences”, offenses, “wrongful acts” or
“pollution conditions”.
Id. at 140. We therefore turn to the TPPL part of the Policy to determine
whether it applies to the Parsons’ claims, which would thus implicate the
Multiple Coverages Limitation and render the CGL part inapplicable.
2.2. TPPL Coverage
[33] Though our Supreme Court has addressed pollution exclusions numerous times,
no Indiana appellate court has analyzed how to construe a pollution liability
coverage extension. Indiana is not alone in that regard, and there is a dearth of
precedent from any jurisdiction interpreting the scope of pollution liability
coverage provisions. See Acuity v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 861 N.W.2d 533, 546
(Wis. 2015) (citing URS Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 979 N.Y.S.2d 506
(N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2014) as “one of the few cases interpreting a pollution liability
policy”). Moreover, most of the cases that have interpreted pollution liability
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 30 of 35 policies have done so under their jurisdictions’ respective versions of the socalled “situational approach,” which our Supreme Court has rejected. 19
Nonetheless, many of these cases express a common insight that remains
relevant here, which is that the same logic that renders pollution exclusions
ambiguous also applies to pollution liability policies. See London Bridge Resort
LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 505 F. Supp. 3d 956, 959 (D. Ariz. 2020) (“Although
the public policy concerns for exclusion clauses are slightly different than for
coverage policies, the idea that an overly broad definition of pollution could go
beyond what is ‘reasonably expected by the insured’ and create absurd results
applies to coverage policies too.” (quoting Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 13 P.3d 785, 792 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), reconsideration denied, review denied));
URS Corp., 979 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (“Given the close identity between the
traditional pollution exclusion provision and [a] pollution coverage provision, it
would be logical to conclude that the two clauses share the same purpose and
19
As summarized by Flexdar,
Courts and commentators identify essentially two main views when it comes to interpreting
[pollution] exclusions, namely: a “literal” approach and a “situational” approach. See Apana v.
TIG Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 679, 682-83 (9th Cir.2009). . . . Jurisdictions employing a “literal” view
of the absolute pollution exclusion generally hold the exclusion to be unambiguous in all
circumstances. Where a substance is acting in any manner as an “irritant or contaminant,”
damage caused thereby is excluded from coverage. . . .
Jurisdictions applying a more “situational” approach look to factual context and typically
uphold the exclusion only in cases of “traditional” environmental contamination. . . . While
this framework may be more palatable than the literal view, it can still be problematic because
the concept of what is a “traditional” environmental contaminant may vary over time and has
no inherent defining characteristics. . . .
Indiana has gone in a different direction . . . [and] held that the insurer can (and should) specify
what falls within its pollution exclusion.
964 N.E.2d at 850-51 (footnote omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 31 of 35
are complementary, with one meant to fill the gap in coverage created by the
other.”).
[34] URS Corporation’s analysis is particularly instructive on this point. There, an
insurance company issued a contractors pollution liability (CPL) policy that
“explicitly noted that it did not provide [CGL] coverage . . . .” URS Corp., 979
N.Y.S.2d at 508. The CPL policy defined “pollution condition” using language
similar to the typical CGL pollution exclusion. Id. at 507-08. After a fire
erupted at a building where the contractor was working, several firefighters and
the estates of several others who responded sued to recover damages related to
the inhalation of toxic smoke. Id. at 508-09. The insured sought a declaratory
judgment that the smoke was a pollution condition covered by the CPL policy.
Id. at 507-08. Noting the lack of case law construing pollution coverage
extensions, the court looked to cases “interpreting the pollution exclusion in
CGL policies.” Id. at 510. Finding a “close identity between the traditional
pollution exclusion provision and” the CPL policy, the court concluded the
CPL policy was “meant to fill the gap in coverage created by the” pollution
exclusion. Id. And since New York’s precedents had found CGL pollution
exclusions bar coverage only for “broadly dispersed environmental pollution[,]”
the court held “an allegation of injury from some sort of poisonous material is
not enough to qualify for [pollution] coverage . . . .” Id. at 510-11 (quoting
Cont’l Cas. Co., 609 N.E.2d at 513).
[35] Though Indiana’s treatment of CGL pollution exclusions is quite different from
that of New York, we are similarly persuaded that pollution liability policies
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 32 of 35
should be construed in light of our state’s pollution exclusion precedents. Not
only is there a close identity between the exclusion and extension at issue here,
but the TPPL part of the Policy incorporates the same operative language as the
CGL Total Pollution Exclusion. And to read the TPPL part literally, as Crum
& Forster asks us to do, would effectively render the CGL policy part a nullity
by operation of the Multiple Coverages Limitation, as a literal reading would
enable Crum & Forster to classify any claim involving a “chemical” as
pollution. Accordingly, to avoid rendering the CGL part a nullity, Crum &
Forster could have (and should have) “specif[ied] what falls within its
pollution” provisions. Flexdar, 964 N.E.2d at 851. Because Crum & Forster
did not do so, it cannot rely on the TPPL coverage part to deny CGL coverage
for the Parsons’ claims.
[36] Moreover, we find wisdom in the observation made by other jurisdictions that it
would produce absurd results to “reflexively” characterize claims as pollution
“simply because they involve a ‘discharge, dispersal, release or escape’ of an
‘irritant or contaminant.’” W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 999
(Mass. 1997) (quoting Am. State Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 78 (Ill.
1997)); see also Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d
703, 719 (Wash. 1994) (the use of the terms “discharge, dispersal, release[,] or
escape . . . carry the connotation of the issuance of a substance from a state of
containment” (quoting Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 480 N.W.2d
368, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied), clarified on denial of
reconsideration; Northville Indus. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 679
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 33 of 35
N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (N.Y. 1997) (recognizing “damages attributable to the
discharge or release of a pollutant into the environment” as “the basic
requirement for application of the pollution coverage exclusion”). Here,
providing CGL coverage for the Parsons’ products liability action naturally
flows from the fact that while methanol was present in Ethanol Extraction, it
had not escaped a state of containment and was therefore not a pollution
condition for purposes of qualifying for pollution liability coverage. Moreover,
the fact that the Policy’s common terms did not define PCOH coverage as
applicable in the TPPL context suggests the TPPL part was not intended to
apply to products liability claims like the Parsons’.
[37] In sum, no part of the manufacture or sale of Ethanol Extraction involved the
discharge, release, etc. of methanol. Methanol was present in the finished
product not because an otherwise pure batch of ethanol was contaminated, but
because Zeedyk mislabeled industrial alcohol as safe for human consumption.
Even though Zeedyk produced, marketed, and sold a product that contained
methanol, under these circumstances an ordinary insured would expect the
resulting claims to be covered under the CGL part of the Policy. See Allgood v.
Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. 2005) (“Policy terms are
interpreted from the perspective of an ordinary policyholder of average
intelligence[.]” (quoting Burkett v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 737 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000)). Accordingly, the TPPL part of the Policy is inapplicable to the
Parsons’ claims, and the Multiple Coverages Limitation does not displace CGL
coverage.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 34 of 35
Conclusion
[38] For these reasons, we conclude that as a matter of law, the Parsons’ claims are
covered by the CGL part of the Policy, and there is no concurrent coverage
under the TPPL part that would trigger application of the Multiple Coverages
Limitation. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with
instructions for it to deny Crum & Forster’s motion for summary judgment and
grant the Parsons’ cross-motion.
[39] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Robert W. Johnson
Travis N. Jensen
Janet M. Wallace
Michael D. Devor
Johnson Jensen LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Crystal G. Rowe
Jacob W. Zigenfus
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
New Albany, Indiana
James J. Hickey
Kennedys Law, LLP
Chicago, Illinois
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-2307 June 22, 2026 Page 35 of 35