E-FILED
CNMI SUPREME COURT
E-filed: Jun 30 2026 05:29PM
Clerk Review: Jun 30 2026 05:29PM
Filing ID: 79907563
Case No.: 2024-SCC-0023-CIV
Judy Aldan
IN THE
Supreme Court
OF THE
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
CONRAD M. SABLAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
COMMONWEALTH UTILITIES CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Supreme Court No. 2024-SCC-0023-CIV
SLIP OPINION
Cite as: 2026 MP 5
Decided June 30, 2026
CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ROBERTO C. NARAJA
Superior Court No. 15-0175-CV
Presiding Judge Joseph N. Camacho, Presiding
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
CASTRO, C.J.:
¶1 Conrad M. Sablan (“Conrad”) appeals, and the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (“CUC”) cross-appeals, the Superior Court’s decisions in this
inverse condemnation case arising from the construction and operation of the Maui IV Water Tank and Pump Station (“Maui IV facility”) on the Sablan’s
family land. The Superior Court found a compensable physical taking and
awarded Conrad approximately $2.1 million in compensation and prejudgment
interest. We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND with specific
instructions on valuation methodology.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In 1980, the Marianas Public Land Corporation conveyed by quitclaim deed Tract 22654, a 20,672-square-meter parcel in Sadog Tasi, Saipan, to Vicente S. Sablan (“Vicente”). The tract included a reserved right-of-way along its western edge. This right-of-way ran between a small triangular section and the larger remainder of the property.
¶3 Vicente died in August 1988, and his estate was promptly administered in probate. In May 1990, the Superior Court issued a decree distributing undivided interests in a portion of Tract 22654 to his widow, Maria Sablan, and their sons, Conrad, Tito Sablan, and Vicente M. Sablan.
¶4 In 1991, CUC, in coordination with the Commonwealth government,
entered the property and began constructing the Maui IV facility for a public water project. Construction concluded on March 31, 1992. A one-million-gallon concrete tank, pump house, and chain-link fence occupy approximately 1,029
square meters of the western section of the tract. The chain link fence blocked public access through Laguna Drive to the triangular section of the property but the property could still be accessed from the larger section of the property by going around the Maui IV facility.
¶5 Conrad visited the completed facility in 1992 and observed the tank and fence. At that time no survey had been conducted to determine whether the
structure lay within the boundaries of the 1991 co-owners’ land or on an adjacent public right-of-way. No compensation was ever offered or paid.
¶6 In 2013, Conrad commissioned Takai & Associates to conduct an as-built survey and subdivide the property to establish separate ownership boundaries among the heirs. The survey established the Maui IV facility occupied a portion of the 1991 co-owners’ land. The survey divided Tract 22654 into four parcels:
• Tract 22654-1 (small triangular parcel along the western edge);
• Tract 22654-R1, later subdivided;
• Tract 22654-2; and
• Tract 22654-3.
¶7 In November 2013, Maria, Tito, and Vicente M. Sablan executed a Deed of Conveyance and a later Confirmation Deed transferring their interests in Tract 22654-1 and Tract 22654-R1 to Conrad. The deeds conveyed “all rights, title, and
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
interests” in those parcels. App. at 1337–38. The confirmation deed additionally conveyed all “claims” in the properties as well. Id. at 1339–40. In January 2014, Tract 22654-R1 was further divided into Tract 22654-R2, which contained the Maui IV facility, and Tract 22654-4. The two lots at issue in this appeal are Tract 22654-1 and Tract 22654-R2.
¶8 In October 2015, Conrad sued CUC and the Commonwealth for inverse
condemnation, trespass, and unjust enrichment. He claimed the 1991
construction and continued operation of the Maui IV facility permanently
occupied his land without compensation and that the chain-link fence blocked his only access route to Tract 22654-1, rendering it landlocked. Conrad later
dismissed his trespass claim.
¶9 The defendants denied liability on multiple grounds. CUC argued (1) the claim was time-barred under the statute of limitations, (2) it could not be held liable for inverse condemnation because it lacked statutory eminent domain
authority, and (3) any compensation owed belonged to the four co-owners who held the property at the time of the 1991 taking, not to Conrad alone. The
Commonwealth joined those positions. As an affirmative defense, CUC also
argued it gained title to the land through adverse possession.
¶ 10 The trial court tried the case in two phases. The first phase, addressing
whether a taking had occurred, was heard over multiple sessions between August
2019 and June 2020. On June 17, 2020, the court issued its Order After Trial
closing the first phase on liability while reserving the issue of prejudgment
interest for further proceedings. In September 2022, the court issued its First
Order, holding that the government's occupation of Tract 22654 constituted a
compensable physical taking under Article XIII, Section 2 of the NMI
Constitution. The court further held that the statute of limitations does not bar
inverse condemnation actions, that CUC could be held liable despite lacking
eminent domain authority, and that the right to compensation vested in the four
co-owners at the time of the 1991 taking. The court also found that Tract 22654-1 was not taken, because the parcel only became landlocked due to the 2013
subdivision rather than through any government action. The court rejected CUC’s
adverse possession defense.
¶ 11 The second phase addressed compensation. Conrad’s appraiser, valued the
occupied parcel at $367,000 using the sales-comparison method applied to Tract
22654-R2 as if it had existed in 1991 as a standalone parcel. CUC’s appraiser
testified that the correct approach for a partial taking was the before-and-after
method applied to the entire 1991 tract, though he acknowledged the salescomparison method would be appropriate if the entire parcel had been taken. The
court adopted Conrad’s appraiser’s valuation using the sales-comparison
methodology.
¶ 12 Conrad’s financial expert proposed a prejudgment interest rate of 8.6674
percent calibrated to Conrad’s personal investor profile. The Commonwealth
proposed the Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Index rate of 5.341 percent. The
court rejected Campbell’s rate as methodologically unreliable because it was
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
tailored to Conrad’s individual circumstances and instead adopted the Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Index rate. The court entered final judgment awarding
Conrad approximately $2,106,366.97 in compensation and prejudgment interest. ¶ 13 Conrad appealed, arguing that the Superior Court erred by: (1) rejecting
his expert’s higher prejudgment interest rate of 8.6674 percent; (2) holding the
1991 co-owners retained ownership interests in the compensation award despite
their 2013 conveyances of all rights, title, interests, and claims to him; and (3)
finding no compensable taking of Tract 22654-1 when the government’s fence
blocked his only access route to that parcel.
¶ 14 CUC cross-appealed, contending the Superior Court erred in: (1) holding:
the statute of limitations does not apply to inverse condemnation claims; (2)
holding CUC can be liable for inverse condemnation despite lacking statutory
eminent domain authority; (3) abusing its discretion by reopening the evidentiary
record sua sponte after the parties had rested; and (4) adopting Sablan’s expert’s
sales-comparison valuation methodology. The Commonwealth joins CUC’s
position on the merits but has not filed a separate cross-appeal.
II. JURISDICTION
¶ 15 The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. 1 CMC § 3102(a); NMI
CONST. art. IV, § 3.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 16 This appeal presents seven issues, each subject to the following standard
of review:
1. Whether the statute of limitations bars the inverse condemnation claim,
which presents a question of statutory and constitutional interpretation
reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Kapileo, 2026 MP 2 ¶ 12.
2. Whether CUC is subject to inverse condemnation liability under Article
XIII of the NMI Constitution, a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting additional
proceedings following the liability phase of trial. See Ito v. Macro Energy,
Inc., 4 NMI 46, 61 (1993) (holding the trial court’s control over timing of
trial is reviewed on abuse of discretion); Olopai v. Fitial, 3 NMI 101, 108
(1992) (describing reopening a case as within the discretion of the trial
court).
4. Whether a taking occurred as to Tract 22654-1, a mixed question of law
and fact. The trial court’s factual findings regarding the condition of the
property at the time of the taking are reviewed for clear error. See Santos
v. Santos, 2000 MP 9 ¶ 3 (holding a trial court’s findings of fact in a mixed
question of law and fact are “still reviewed for clear error”). The legal
conclusion that a taking occurred is reviewed de novo. Castro v. Castro,
2009 MP 8 ¶ 11.
5. Whether Conrad was solely entitled to just compensation, a question of
law reviewed de novo. Id.; Isla Dev. Prop. v. Jang, 2017 MP 13 ¶ 6.
6. Whether the prejudgment interest rate was calculated correctly, a mixed
question of fact and law. Estate of Muna v. Commonwealth, 2007 MP 16
¶ 7. The rule of law used to determine the rate is reviewed de novo, and
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
the determination of a reasonable rate of interest is a factual finding
reviewed for clear error. Id.
7. Whether the proper valuation methodology was applied to the taking, a
question of law reviewed de novo. See id.
IV. DISCUSSION
¶ 17 We affirm the decisions on five of the issues but find reversable error with
regards to whether Conrad has the sole right to compensation for the taking and
whether the proper valuation methodology was used.
A. The Inverse Condemnation Claim Was Filed Within the Statute of
Limitations
¶ 18 The trial court concluded that statutes of limitation categorically do not
apply to inverse condemnation claims because neither the Fifth Amendment nor
Article XIII of the NMI Constitution contains express limitations language. We
disagree with that reasoning. Constitutional claims are not exempt from ordinary
procedural rules. Nevertheless, we affirm the denial of CUC’s statute of
limitations defense because Conrad’s claim was filed within the applicable
limitations period.
1. Inverse Condemnation Claims Are Subject to Statute of Limitation
¶ 19 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Article XIII, Section 2 of
the NMI Constitution guarantee private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V; NMI CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
But a cause of action originating from the Constitution does not eliminate the
legislature’s authority to place procedural limits on when that right must be
asserted.
¶ 20 The Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment is subject to the statute of
limitations. In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court enforced a six-year statute of limitations applicable to takings
claims in the Court of Federal Claims even though the government had
effectively waived the defense. 552 U.S. 130, 133–35 (2008). The decision
explained some statutes of limitations serve broader systemic purposes beyond
protecting defendants from stale claims, including defining the scope of a
governmental waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 133–34.
¶ 21 With regards to the claim under the NMI Constitution, we have previously
addressed a similar argument in the due process context. Estate of Rogolifoi v.
Estate of Rogolifoi, 2024 MP 4 ¶ 41. We found the 7 CMC § 2502(a)(2) statute
of limitations to bar a due process challenge to a decades-old Trust Territory title
determination, emphasizing that “[t]he statute of limitations provides no
exceptions to its enforcement.” Id.
¶ 22 Persuasive state authority likewise treats inverse condemnation claims as
subject to ordinary statutes of limitations. In DW Aina Le‘a Development, LLC v.
State, the Hawaii Supreme Court applied a six-year statute of limitations to a
regulatory takings claim brought directly under the Hawaii Constitution. 477 P.3d
836, 847 (Haw. 2020). The Takings Clause created a directly enforceable right
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
and the claim therefore arose directly from the constitution rather than from statute. Id. at 843–45. Even so, the court concluded the constitutional source of the claim did not exempt it from legislatively imposed filing deadlines. Id. at 846–47.
¶ 23 We therefore hold inverse condemnation claims in the Commonwealth are
subject to the applicable statute of limitations. Neither the constitutional source
of the right nor the nature of the remedy creates a categorical exemption from
legislatively imposed deadlines. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
2. Conrad’s Claim Accrued in 2013 and Was Timely Filed
¶ 24 The land was taken in 1991 when CUC began building the Maui IV
facility. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 189 (2019) (recognizing claim
may be brought immediately upon taking); Estate of Muna, 2007 MP 16 ¶ 17
(determining valuation from “actual time of the physical taking as well as the
time of payment for the taking”). However, this does not resolve the question of
when Conrad’s claim accrued. This Court has not previously articulated an
accrual standard for inverse condemnation claims.
¶ 25 Federal takings jurisprudence provides a useful framework. A takings
claim accrues when “all events which fix the government's alleged liability have
occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.”
Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hopland
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
In the specific physical-taking context, accrual requires that two conditions be
satisfied: the scope of the occupation must be fixed and ascertainable, and the
plaintiff must have known or reasonably should have known that the occupation
extended onto his property. Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). Both conditions serve the same underlying purpose of ensuring that a
landowner is not required to file suit before he can reasonably know what has
been taken and whether it affects his land. We adopt that standard here.
¶ 26 Whether a landowner knew or reasonably should have known that a
government occupation extended onto his property is a factual question that
varies with the circumstances of each case. Boling, 220 F.3d at 1373. For
example, determining whether the government’s actions caused erosion to effect
a taking requires an inquiry into the physical characteristics of the land, the nature
and visibility of the government's occupation, and the information reasonably
available to the landowner at the relevant time. See id. (“[T]he fact-finder should
take into account the uncertainties of the terrain, the difficulty in determining the
location of the government's easement, and the irregular progress of erosion”). ¶ 27 CUC argues the claim accrued in 1992 because Conrad admittedly knew
the Maui IV facility existed when construction concluded. See Cattellus Dev.
Corp v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 399, 406–07 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (discussing how
this rule applies when the invasion is obvious, ascertainable, and permanent). But
awareness of a nearby public project is not equivalent to knowledge that the
project encroaches onto one's own parcel. CUC's argument conflates knowledge
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
of the government's physical presence in the area with knowledge that the
occupation extended onto Conrad’s land.
¶ 28 In the Commonwealth, parcel boundaries are often not ascertainable
through visual observation alone. Many CNMI parcels received title
determinations without actual boundary surveys, leaving precise boundary lines
unresolved on the ground. 1 Even where surveys existed, they often described
adjacent parcels or right-of-way corridors rather than the landowner's parcel
itself, leaving its precise boundaries unresolved until a dedicated survey was
commissioned. See Aguon v. Marianas Pub. Land Corp., 2001 MP 4 ¶¶ 7–10
(showing boundary discrepancy in Commonwealth homestead property was only
discovered after landowner commissioned a survey decades after receiving title). ¶ 29 No dedicated boundary survey of Tract 22654 existed before 2013. The
only pre-2013 survey involving the area surrounding Tract 22654 was a February
1990 Meridian Land Surveying Parceling Plat of adjacent public right-of-way
tracts 21709 and 21710, prepared for the Marianas Public Land Corporation,
rather than as a boundary survey of Tract 22654 itself. The plat depicted Tract
22654 only as a reference parcel and predated construction of the Maui IV facility
entirely. No document showing both the boundaries of Tract 22654 and the tank’s
footprint in relation to those boundaries existed until the 2013 Takai as-built
survey, which marked the first recorded identification of the government’s
taking.
¶ 30 Further compounding this problem is the Commonwealth’s pattern of
taking land without notice and refusing to pay landowners. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lot No. 218-5 R/W, 2016 MP 17 ¶¶ 11–16 (describing failure
to appropriate land claims as an “ongoing failure to fulfill a constitutional
mandate”). The right to just compensation is based on “a principle of fairness and
not a technical rule of procedure.” U.S. v. Dickenson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947).
Under these conditions, imputing notice imposes an additional burden on
1
The 1979 Determination of Ownership for Tract 22654 was issued based on a 1976
general parcel recording plat rather than a dedicated boundary survey establishing the
tract’s exact lines on the ground. The boundaries of Tract 22654 and the location of the
tank’s footprint in relation to those boundaries were not established until the 2013 Takai
as-built survey. This reflects a broader feature of Commonwealth land records. The
CNMI Division of Land Registration and Survey was created with the mission of
surveying “pre-war properties to which the Trust Territory government issued title
determination of ownership without actual surveys.” Division of Land Registration and
Survey, DEP’T OF LANDS & NAT. RES., https://dlnr.cnmi.gov/land-registration-andsurvey.html. This program reflects the longstanding reality that many Commonwealth
parcels received legal title before their exact physical boundaries were ever surveyed
on the ground. See also Estate of Taisacan v. Hattori, 4 NMI 26, 28 nn.1–2 (1993)
(noting that Trust Territory title determinations described land only as “more or less” a
certain size and “subject to survey,” requiring formal survey methodology to resolve
disputed boundary locations).
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
landowners adjacent to public works for a future benefit that is difficult to quantify financially.
¶ 31 A landowner's awareness of a nearby government structure therefore does
not establish knowledge that the structure crosses his property line. In the
Commonwealth, that determination often cannot reasonably be made without a
formal survey or some other form o actual notice.
¶ 32 The record establishes that both accrual conditions were satisfied no
earlier than October 2013. Construction of the Maui IV facility concluded by
March 31, 1992, satisfying the first condition by fixing the scope of the
occupation. Order I at 4. The second condition was not satisfied until October
2013, when surveyor Jesus D.L.G. Takai completed an as-built survey plat
showing the tank and surrounding fence encroached onto Tract 22654. Order I at
6; Order II at 2–3; Supp. App. 1421. Conrad testified to knowing the tank existed
in 1992, but not knowing it crossed his property line before the 2013 survey. Tr.
54:11–25. The trial court found Conrad “was aware of the water tank and fences
sometime after their construction, but was not aware they were on his land until
the October 2013 As-Built survey.” Supp. App. 1421.
¶ 33 Because the claim accrued in 2013, Conrad’s 2015 complaint was timely
under either 7 CMC § 2505 or 7 CMC § 2502(a)(2). We need not decide which
limitations period applies. The trial court's categorical conclusion that no statute
of limitations applies to inverse condemnation claims was erroneous, but its
ultimate determination that Conrad’s claim was timely is affirmed under the
correct legal standard for accrual.
B. CUC Is Subject to Inverse Condemnation Liability
¶ 34 Article XIII, Section 1 of the NMI Constitution vests the power of eminent
domain in the Commonwealth. Article XIII, Section 2 provides that private
property may not be taken without just compensation. CUC argues these
provisions must be read together to mean only entities expressly possessing
eminent domain authority can be constitutionally required to pay compensation,
relying on In re Estate of Roberto, 2004 MP 7, and Castro, 2009 MP 8. We reject
that reading. The constitutional duty to provide just compensation arises from the
taking itself, not from the particular allocation of statutory authority.
¶ 35 CUC reads Roberto and Castro too broadly. In Roberto, we held that courts
“lack the power of eminent domain” and are “simply incapable of ‘taking’
property” when reallocating estate assets among private heirs. 2004 MP 7 ¶ 7. In
Castro, we found that a deprivation caused by a temporary restraining order does
not undergo a takings analysis because “the judiciary generally lacks the eminent
domain powers reserved for the other branches.” 2009 MP 8 ¶ 13.
¶ 36 Roberto and Castro addressed a narrow institutional question: whether the
judiciary, in the exercise of its adjudicative function over private disputes, can
effect a compensable taking. Neither case considered the liability of a
governmental entity when it affirmatively occupies private property to construct
and operate public infrastructure. A court adjudicating competing private claims
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
does not appropriate property for public use. CUC, by contrast, participated in the planning, construction, and continued operation of a public water facility that physically occupies private land for a public purpose.
¶ 37 The constitutional duty to provide just compensation arises from the act of
taking private property for public use, not from the formal possession of eminent
domain authority. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314–16 (1987). When the government physically
appropriates or occupies private land for a public purpose, the constitutional
obligation to compensate attaches to the occupation itself, regardless of whether
formal condemnation procedures were invoked. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
594 U.S. 139, 147–48 (2021). Were it otherwise, the government could avoid
constitutional accountability simply by carrying out public projects through
entities to which it has delegated operational authority while withholding formal
eminent domain power.
¶ 38 Federal authority confirms this principle. In Fountain v. Metro. Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., the Eleventh Circuit found unacceptable a theory would
permit “the state . . . escap[ing] liability under the just compensation clause by
taking property through agencies without statutory powers of eminent domain.”
678 F.2d 1038, 1044 (11th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit held in Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency that governments cannot
avoid the strictures of the Constitution “through the expedient of delegating
regulatory powers, but not the power of eminent domain, to independent
government entities that would then be free to zone away all use of private
property without fear of liability.” 911 F.2d 1331, 1341–42 (9th Cir. 1990). CUC
argues this principle is limited to the regulatory-takings context in which TahoeSierra arose. We disagree. This constitutional principle applies with equal force
to the entity physically occupying private land rather than merely regulating it.
The constitutional obligation to compensate does not turn on which branch of
government acts or how statutory authority is distributed.
¶ 39 The Legislature created CUC as a public corporation within the
Commonwealth government to develop and operate public utility infrastructure.
4 CMC § 8121(a), 8122. Acting under the CNMI's Capital Improvements
Program, CUC selected the site on Tract 22654, broke ground in March or April
1991, and completed the Maui IV facility by mid-1992, funded through federal
grants channeled through the CNMI Office of the Governor and Legislature. App.
1425; Tr. 818–19. Where a governmental entity physically occupies private land
to carry out such a purpose, inverse condemnation supplies the mechanism
through which the constitutional guarantee of just compensation is enforced. The
absence of formal eminent domain authority does not alter the constitutional
character of the occupation.
¶ 40 The deprivation of use is clear in this case. The absence of formal eminent
domain authority does not alter the constitutional character of CUC’s occupation.
The trial court correctly concluded that CUC is subject to inverse condemnation
liability.
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
C. Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Bifurcating Trial
¶ 41 This case proceeded in separate liability and damages phases. By June 15
2020, the first part of the bench trial concluded. In this first section, the parties
had completed presentation of evidence on liability and submitted proposed
findings and conclusions directed to those issues. A September 23, 2022 order
resolved liability and addressed all the affirmative defenses and explicitly
reserved issues, relating to valuation, ownership, and just compensation to a
separate hearing. The second part of the bench trial held on January 31, 2023 and
March 8, 2024 pertained to these remaining issues. An order and judgment issued
on November 8, 2024 resolved the issues of how much money was owed and to
whom.
¶ 42 The trial court's decision to receive additional evidence more than two
years after the parties rested on liability and submitted proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law raises two questions: whether a reopening of the record
occurred at all, and if so, whether the court abused its discretion by ordering it.
See Ito., 4 NMI at 61 (stating the trial court has “inherent power to police its
docket” through the “timing of trials”).
¶ 43 The first question resolves the second. A reopening presupposes a closed
record, and that is not what occurred here. See, e.g., Olapai 3 NMI at 104
(describing a reopening of the case “after the trial concluded”). Because the
damages phase had not yet commenced, the evidentiary record on those issues
remained open. Submission of proposed findings did not convert an incomplete
bifurcated proceeding into a final, closed record. Nor does the fact that the court
identified gaps in the damages evidence and directed further proceedings on them
establish impropriety. A court that perceives an incomplete record and acts to
complete it exercises precisely the kind of inherent authority that permits case
management orders of all kinds. See Ito, 4 NMI at 61.
¶ 44 Even assuming the September 2022 order functioned as a reopening, the
trial court still possessed authority to proceed in that manner. Olopai, 3 NMI at
108–09. Rather than imposing categorical procedural requirements, Olopai
examined the surrounding circumstances, including the scope of the additional
evidence, the timing of the request, the length of the supplemental testimony, and
the usefulness of the evidence to the court. Id. The Court upheld the trial judge’s
decision because the defendants “were not prejudiced” by the additional
proceedings. Id. at 109. That reasoning is consistent with Ninth Circuit practice.
See United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding
reopening to admit photograph of defendant and truck where defendant failed to
request a continuance to recall the witness for cross-examination and therefore
demonstrated no concrete prejudice).
¶ 45 As prejudice to the opposing party is the dispositive inquiry under Olopai,
then the same standard logically applies whether the court acts on a motion or on
its own initiative. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the same conclusion,
seeing “no meaningful distinction between the oft-cited scenario of reopening a
record on a parties' motion and sua sponte, as discussed herein, as long as in both
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
scenarios there is no prejudice to either party and, accordingly, justice is served.” Commonwealth v. Safka, 141 A.3d 1239, 1251 (Pa. 2016).
¶ 46 The September 2022 order presents no abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion requires prejudice to one side through surprise or inadequate
opportunity to make their argument. See Pritchett v. United States, 351 A. 3d 14,
19 (D.C. 2026) (discussing factors for an abuse of discretion in the criminal
context). The order directed further proceedings on unresolved damages issues.
Both sides participated fully, cross-examining witnesses, introducing evidence,
and submitting additional briefing. That falls well short of establishing prejudice.
The record reflects ordinary judicial management of unresolved compensation
issues, not advocacy for either party. Ito, 4 NMI at 61.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding No Taking of Tract 22654-1
¶ 47 Conrad argues the Maui IV chain-link fence was a taking of Tract 22654-1 because it blocked access from Laguna Drive through Tracts 21710-R/W and
21709-R/W to Parcel W-10, which fronts the triangular lot. According to Conrad,
the fence rendered the parcel permanently landlocked and economically
unusable. The record does not support that theory.
¶ 48 A compensable taking occurs when the government physically occupies
private property or deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of a
defined parcel. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434–35; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). The government never physically occupied Tract 22654-1. Conrad’s claim instead rests on the contention that the fence eliminated all
practical access to the parcel. See Carillion Realty Corp. v. State, 158 Misc. 2d
810, 812 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1993) (discussing how denying access to remainder can
be a taking). But when the fence was constructed, the area that would later
become Tract 22654-1 remained part of a single undivided tract co-owned
collectively.
¶ 49 The trial court found access to that area remained available at the time of
construction by traversing the interior of the larger Tract 22654. Order II at 14,
App. 66. This is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. See Santos, 2000 MP
9 ¶ 3. The record supports that finding. Conrad himself testified that before the
2013 subdivision, access to the triangular area remained available through what
later became Tract 22654-R1. See App. 1298–99 (conceding he could access land
if he went through easement). A Land Claims Investigator with the Department
of Public Lands likewise testified the area could still be reached from Laguna
Drive by crossing the unified parent tract. App. 968. The finding of access is not
clearly erroneous.
¶ 50 The loss of access occurred years later, when the 1991 co-owners
subdivided Tract 22654 into separate parcels and transferred those parcels among
themselves without reserving any internal easement connecting the newly created
Tract 22654-1 to Laguna Drive. The trial court expressly found that the
landlocked condition resulted from the family’s own subdivision decisions rather
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
than from the government’s earlier construction of the fence. App. 76. The record supports that conclusion.
¶ 51 Takings claims require a causal connection between the challenged
government action and the alleged deprivation of property rights. Esplanade
Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Carillion Realty Corp., 158 Misc. 2d at 813 (holding a landowner cannot recover
for a parcel becoming landlocked after rejecting the government’s offer of an
easement). That causal connection is absent here. Access to the area that became
Tract 22654-1 remained available through the co-owner’s own land for more than
two decades after the fence was constructed. Their later decision to subdivide the
property without preserving internal access easements created the landlocked
condition now challenged. Because the alleged deprivation resulted from private
subdivision decisions rather than government action, no compensable taking of
Tract 22654-1 occurred.
E. The Superior Court Erred in Finding That Compensation Is Shared Among
the Four 1991 Co-Owners
¶ 52 The next question is whether the compensation must be shared among the
four 1991 co-owners. As discussed above, the claim accrued in 2013 when the
taking became ascertainable to the landowners. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1358; see also
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (holding an inverse
condemnation claim based on a regulatory taking accrues when ripe). Once
vested, that right is personal to the owner and does not automatically pass with a
later conveyance of the land itself. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (stating when
“the fact and extent of taking are known . . .. as a general rule” no compensation
will be paid to subsequent purchasers); Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271,
284 (1939); Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 232 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Minn.
1975) (“This right has the status of property, is personal to the owner, and does
not run with the land if he should subsequently transfer it without an assignment
of such right.”).
¶ 53 An exception exists where the original owner did not consent to the taking
and specifically assigns the compensation right to the current property right.
Snow v. Town of Calumet Okla., 512 P.3d 369, 372 (Okla. 2022) (citing Drabek
v. City of Norman, 946 P.2d 658, 662 (Okla. 1996)); see also Argier v. Nevada
Power Co., 952 P.2d 1390, 1392 (Nev. 1998) (discussing a contract of sale
transferring the right of compensation as an exception to the general rule). ¶ 54 To determine whether the exception is applicable we must look to the 2013
Confirmation Deed. When interpreting a contract such as a deed, the primary
concern is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the
instrument. Saipan Achugao Resort Members Ass’n v. Wan Jin Yoon, 2011 MP
12 ¶ 15; see Benavente v. Marianas Pub. Land Corp., 2000 MP 13 ¶ 37 (looking
to contract law cases for guidance on interpreting a deed) The language of a deed
which is “plain, certain, and unambiguous” should be given its plain
construction. Benavente, 2000 MP 13 ¶ 37. When ambiguity remains, we may
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
look outside the four corners of the agreement. Northern Marianas Hous. Corp. v. BankPacific, Ltd., 2021 MP 7 ¶ 14.
¶ 55 The 2013 Deed of Conveyance and the later Confirmation Deed both
conveyed to Conrad not only ownership of Tracts 22654-R2 and 22654-1, but
also “all rights, title, and interests” in the parcels. App. at 1337–40. The Confirmation Deed indicates it was filed simply to fix a typo in the original deed but includes additional language not present in the original deed. It transfers “claims” in the parcels in one section of the deed along with the original “all rights, title and interests.” Id. at 1339–40. Claim is a “broad and comprehensive term” including title and ownership. Sherman v. Sherman, 122 N.E. 439, 443
(S.D. 1909).
¶ 56 There is an ambiguity from the inclusion of “claim.” The Confirmation
Deed was filed to fix an error with the lot number of the property but also seems
to grant an additional broad interest in the property. The other language in the
Confirmation Deed does not resolve this ambiguity. Interest is broad and refers
“both generically to include varying aggregates of rights, privilege, powers and
immunities and distributively to mean any one of them.” Restatement (First) of
Property § 5.
¶ 57 A right is “a legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that
the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given act.” Restatement (First) of
Property § 1. As an inverse condemnation claim is a legally enforceable claim
against the government to be paid money, it is a right. NMI CONST. art. XIII. To
determine exactly what claims, rights, title and interests were conveyed, we will
need to look outside the four corners of the document. Northern Marianas Hous.
Corp., 2021 MP 7 ¶ 14. While typically the right is personal when it accrues and
would not be transferred with the property absent an explicit mention, the
surrounding context around the transfer makes clear the parties’ intent.
¶ 58 The 1991 co-owners were subdividing the property and the survey was
done for this purpose. This survey revealed an interest in the property they were
previously unaware of, the inverse condemnation claim. See Drabek, 946 P.2d at
662 (holding claim will not accrue to original owner when unaware of use of
property). The claim was present in the parcels until 2013 when the subdivision
made the co-owners ascertain its existence. Alerted to the unknown taking, the
co-owners then subdivided all their interests in the land shortly later in November
2013.
¶ 59 This subdivision is not analogous to where a third-party paid a market
price that accounted for the decrease in value. See Maslonka v. Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1 of Pend Orielle County, 533 P.3d 400, 406 (Wash. 2023) (stating “no
damages should be awarded” to such a purchaser). A closer analogy is when there
is a pipe hidden in the property that is unknown to the owner at the time of taking:
in such instance, any subsequent purchaser would not receive a reduced price on
the property and the takings claim runs with the land until it accrues. Cox Enters.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 550 P.2d 1324, 1326 (Okla. 1976). Here, the survey
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
done for the subdivision dug up the hidden taking and gave the subdividers the
knowledge. They then proceeded with their original intent to subdivide the
property within the same year. They clarified that they intended to convey all the
rights, title, interests, and claims that they discovered through the survey. ¶ 60 The instrument indicates the owners’ intent to convey to Conrad the
inverse condemnation interest related to the taking on his land. We fulfill that
intent today. The trial court erred in requiring compensation be paid to the other
1991 co-owners. 2
F. The Superior Court Did Not Clearly Err in Adopting the Moody's Aaa
Prejudgment Interest Rate
¶ 61 Prejudgment interest in a takings case is a constitutional component of just
compensation. Est. of Muna, 2007 MP 16 ¶¶ 14–15. Its purpose is to place the
owner in as good a pecuniary position as if payment of just compensation had
coincided with the taking. Lot No. 353 New G, 2015 MP 6 ¶ 15. To achieve that
objective, courts apply the prudent investor rule, which asks what rate of return
a reasonably prudent investor would have earned by investing the compensation
proceeds during the prejudgment period while preserving principal as well as the
current value of the property. Est. of Muna, 2007 MP 16 ¶ 19. The appropriate
rate is a factual determination grounded in the evidentiary record. Lot No. 353
New G, 2015 MP 6 ¶ 31.
¶ 62 Conrad argues the trial court was required to accept his financial expert’s
proposed rate of 8.6674 percent because his expert testimony was unrebutted.
That argument misunderstands both the role of the trial court and the nature of
the prudent investor standard. Under NMI Rule of Evidence 702, the trial court
serves as a gatekeeper with broad discretion to determine whether expert
testimony rests on a reliable methodology and will assist the trier of fact,
regardless of whether the opposing party presents competing expert evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Lisua, 2024 MP 11 ¶¶ 17, 19–20 (reviewing criteria for
evaluating expert testimony without referencing to evidence of the opposing
party). The United States Supreme Court has likewise explained that the
gatekeeping obligation exists independently of whether contrary expert
testimony is offered. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
592–97 (1993) (establishing criteria for evaluating expert testimony without
reference to evidence presented by the opposing party). The expert testimony was
not immune from scrutiny simply because it was unrebutted. The trial court
remained obligated to determine whether his methodology satisfied the prudent
investor rule.
¶ 63 The prudent investor rule is an objective standard. It asks what a
hypothetical reasonable investor would have earned, not what a particular
2
This analysis does not impact the discussion of the rate to be paid as the 1991 co-owners
could not retroactively alter the just compensation owed. See Est. of Muna v.
Commonwealth, 2007 MP 16 ¶ 17; Commonwealth v. Lot No. 353 New G, 2015 MP 6
¶ 15.
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
plaintiff’s individualized investment strategy might have produced. The trial
court identified deficiencies in the expert’s analysis supporting its conclusion that
his methodology did not reliably measure that objective benchmark. The
portfolio was constructed around Conrad’s personal characteristics, including his
age, risk tolerance, and financial circumstances in 1991, when he was twentyseven with a long investment horizon. The expert also acknowledged that the
portfolio would have differed had the other 1991 co-owners been considered.
Because the compensation right vested in multiple owners at the time of the
taking, not Conrad alone, a model anchored to his individualized financial profile
applied a subjective framework inconsistent with the prudent investor rule. On
this record, the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting Conrad’s proposed rate. ¶ 64 The trial court adopted the Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Index, using
Conrad’s compounding methodology and a prejudgment period extending from
April 1991 through October 2024. Applying those rates to the trial court’s
principal valuation of $367,000 produced a total compensation figure of
$2,106,366.97 and a compound annual growth rate of 5.341 percent. See Order
II at 20, App. 72.
¶ 65 Conrad argues the trial court should have ended the calculation period in
January 2023, the endpoint used in his expert’s report, rather than October 2024.
But prejudgment interest runs from the date of taking through the date of
judgment, not merely through the date selected by an expert witness for purposes
of calculation. The trial court therefore properly extended the calculation through
October 2024 to account for the full period of delay.
¶ 66 Conrad further argues the trial court could not rely on the Moody’s Aaa
Corporate Bond Index without supporting expert testimony. We disagree. The
Moody’s index was introduced into evidence in this case, and the trial court relied
on the same dataset used by the Commonwealth in calculating its own proposed
prejudgment interest rate. This dataset is published by the Federal Reserve as an
economic indicator. 3 The trial court therefore did not require expert testimony
merely to consider or rely upon the published rates themselves.
3
The Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Index was published by the Federal Reserve in its
official H.15 Selected Interest Rates release until October 11, 2016 when it was
discontinued as they were publicly available through other means. Statistical Release,
Fed. Rsrv., Discountuance of Several Rates on October 11, 2016 (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/current/h15.pdf. The rate continues to be
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corp. Bond
Yield, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA. We take
judicial notice of the fact of this publication’s public availability as it is not subject to
reasonable dispute and can be accurately and readily determined by sources that cannot
be reasonably questioned. NMI R. EVID. 201(b); see In re Est. of Yana, 2014 MP 1 ¶ 19
(stating it is permissible to take judicial notice to “indicate what was in the public realm
at the time”).
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
¶ 67 The trial court selected a conservative market-based benchmark tied to
long-term, high-grade corporate bonds after concluding that Conrad’s expert’s
proposed rate rested on speculative assumptions tied to his individualized
investment profile. That determination finds substantial support in federal
takings jurisprudence, which this Court can look to for guidance in applying the
constitutional requirement of just compensation. See Commonwealth v. Lot No.
353 New G, 2015 MP 6 ¶ 24 (noting argument on interest rate determination had
already been rejected by the United States Court of Federal Claims). The Court
of Federal Claims has repeatedly approved use of the Moody’s Aaa rate as a
reasonable benchmark under the prudent investor rule. Jackson v. United States,
155 Fed. Cl. 689, 720 (2021); Tech. College of the Low Country v. United States,
147 Fed. Cl. 364, 368–70 (2020); Sears v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 6, 27
(2017).
¶ 68 The prudent investor rule does not require courts to select the highest
return a reasonable investor could have achieved. It requires a rate reasonably
reflecting the return of a prudent investor while preserving principal over time.
The Moody’s Aaa rate satisfies that standard. It is a market-based benchmark
supported by both the evidentiary record and persuasive federal authority. The
rate selected by the trial court was therefore supportable on the record before it.
G. Valuation Methodology
¶ 69 We turn finally to CUC’s cross-appeal concerning valuation methodology.
CUC argues the trial court applied the wrong framework in calculating just
compensation for the 1991 taking. Specifically, CUC contends the court
improperly valued the taking based on a later-created subdivision parcel rather
than the parent tract as it existed at the time of the government’s occupation. We
agree and remand for recalculation of just compensation under the proper
valuation methodology.
1. The Superior Court Erred in Applying the Sales-Comparison Method to a
Post-Taking Subdivided Parcel
¶ 70 The constitutional requirement of just compensation is anchored to the
date of taking. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 189 (2019). Compensation
must therefore be measured by the fair market value of the property at the time
the government physically occupied it, not at some earlier or later date. Danforth
v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939) (“compensation is due at the time of
taking”). Once the taking occurs, the boundaries of the affected property are fixed
for purposes of valuation. Subsequent subdivisions, conveyances, or physical
changes to the land do not alter the legal baseline from which just compensation
is calculated. See Est. of Muna, 2007 MP 16 ¶¶ 17–19; 2 CMC § 4712.
¶ 71 When CUC entered Tract 22654 in 1991 and constructed the Maui IV
facility and surrounding fence, the property consisted of a single undivided tract
jointly owned by the four 1991 co-owners. After removing the preexisting rightsof-way, Tract No. 21710 and Parcel W-10, Tract No. 22654 contained
approximately 15,441 square meters. See App. 1317 (distributing this amount to
the heirs in 1990). The parent tract, as it existed in 1991, supplies the proper unit
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
of analysis. The later subdivisions creating Tracts 22654-1, 22654-R1, 22654-R2, and 22654-4 did not occur until more than twenty years after the taking and do not redefine the property interest affected by the government’s occupation. ¶ 72 The evidence further established that the Maui IV facility occupied only a
limited portion of the original tract. Survey testimony placed the tank, pump
house, and fenced area at approximately 1,029 square meters, the current 22654-R2. Tr. 184:5–10, App. 1245. The remainder of the tract continued to exist
outside the physical footprint of the facility. A partial taking of this kind is
ordinarily valued using the before-and-after method, which measures the
difference between the fair market value of the parent tract immediately before
the taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately afterward. See
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (holding landowner “entitled to
be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken”).
CUC’s appraiser testified the before-and-after method was appropriate under the
circumstances, and Conrad’s appraiser agreed that the method would apply if the
taking were partial rather than whole. See Order I at 9, App. 24.
¶ 73 The flaw in Conrad’s appraisal was the decision to value Tract 22654-R2
as a separate parcel entirely taken by the government. Tract 22654-R2 did not
come into existence until 2014, more than two decades after construction of the
Maui IV facility. By treating the later-created subdivision parcel as the relevant
property interest, the appraisal departed from the date-of-taking rule in two
respects. It employed the wrong unit of analysis and valued the taking as though
the government had acquired an entire discrete parcel rather than physically
occupying only part of a larger tract.
¶ 74 Conrad’s appraiser further acknowledged he appraised Tract 22654-R2
under client-imposed assumptions, including the assumption that the entire
parcel had been taken and should be valued as vacant land. Tr. 655:2–24, App.
1344. Those assumptions did not correspond to the property interest existing at
the time of the taking. The government did not acquire a vacant subdivided parcel
in fee simple. It permanently occupied approximately 1,029 square meters of a
larger tract. Because the appraisal valued a later-created subdivision parcel rather
than the parent tract as it existed in 1991, it did not reliably measure the loss
attributable to the government’s occupation. See Dow, 357 U.S. at 20–22. The
trial court therefore erred in adopting Conrad’s appraisal as the measure of just
compensation.
2. Instructions on Remand
¶ 75 We therefore vacate the compensation award and remand for recalculation
of just compensation under the proper valuation framework. On remand, the trial
court shall make a factual finding of the value of Tract 22654 as it existed at the
time of the 1991 taking, after accounting for the preexisting right-of-way
deductions reflected in the record. The relevant valuation date remains March 31,
1991.
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
¶ 76 The trial court shall apply the before-and-after method to determine the
difference between the fair market value of the parent tract immediately before
the government’s occupation and the fair market value of the remainder
immediately afterward, taking into account the permanent occupation of
approximately 1,029 square meters by the Maui IV facility. The court’s prior
finding, affirmed in this opinion, that no separate taking of Tract 22654-1
occurred remains undisturbed. The valuation on remand is therefore limited to
the partial occupation of the parent tract by the Maui IV facility. The parties may
present updated appraisal evidence consistent with the valuation principles set
forth in this opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
¶ 77 We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. We AFFIRM
the trial court’s rulings that:
a. CUC is not entitled to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds because
Conrad’s inverse condemnation claim accrued in 2013;
b. CUC may be subject to inverse condemnation liability under Article XIII
notwithstanding its lack of independent eminent domain authority;
c. Further proceedings following the liability phase of trial were
permissible;
d. No taking of Tract 22654-1 occurred; and
e. Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Index provided an appropriate prejudgment
interest rate.
¶ 78 We REVERSE the trial court’s decision distributing the compensation
award to the 1991 co-owners and hold that Conrad alone is entitled to the award.
We further REVERSE the trial court’s application of the sales-comparison
valuation methodology and conclude that the before-and-after method must be
applied.
¶ 79 We VACATE the compensation award and REMAND for recalculation of
just compensation under the before-and-after method, applied to Tract 22654 as
it existed at the time of the 1991 taking.
SO ORDERED this 30th day of June, 2026.
/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice
/s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice
Sablan v. CUC, 2026 MP 5
/s/
ROBERTO C. NARAJA
Associate Justice
COUNSEL
Brien Sers Nicholas, Saipan, MP, attorney for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Conrad M. Sablan
J. Robert Glass Jr., Saipan, MP, attorney for Appellee Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Kathryn B. Fuller & Colin M. Thompson, Saipan, MP, attorneys for Appellee/CrossAppellant Commonwealth Utilities Corporation
NOTICE
This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it remains subject to revision or withdrawal. If any discrepancies arise between this slip opinion and the opinion ultimately certified for publication, the certified opinion will control. Readers are requested to bring any errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Supreme Court at P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950; telephone (670) 236–9715; or e-mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.
E-FILED
CNMI SUPREME COURT
E-filed: Jun 30 2026 05:29PM
Clerk Review: Jun 30 2026 05:29PM
Filing ID: 79907563
Case No.: 2024-SCC-0023-CIV
Judy Aldan
IN THE
Supreme Court
OF THE
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
CONRAD M. SABLAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
COMMONWEALTH UTILITIES CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Supreme Court No. 2024-SCC-0023-CIV
Superior Court Civil Action No. 25-0175
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Conrad M. Sablan appealed the trial court’s order and judgment awarding him $2,106,366.97 in compensation and prejudgment interest. Defendant-Appellee, CrossAppellant Commonwealth Utilities Corporation cross-appealed the order and judgment. For the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, the Court AFFIRMS in part, REVERSES in part and REMANDS for further proceedings.
ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2026.
/s/
JUDY ALDAN
Clerk of the Supreme Court