UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATION et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 26-1169 (JDB)
v.
DONALD TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
The American Historical Association and American Oversight have brought suit against a
bevy of federal defendants, alleging violations of the Presidential Records Act (PRA). To preserve
the status quo during the litigation, plaintiffs initially sought a preliminary injunction. This Court
granted that relief last month. Since then, the government has appealed the Court’s ruling to the
D.C. Circuit. Before this Court now is the government’s motion to stay further proceedings in the
case pending resolution of its appeal. Plaintiffs oppose a stay. But plaintiffs are minimally harmed
by a stay because the status quo requires the government to comply with the PRA, whereas not
granting a stay may lead to intrusive discovery into sensitive executive branch offices. Moreover,
the outcome of the direct appeal will at least narrow the disputed issues if not resolve the case
altogether. Accordingly, the Court finds that a stay is warranted.
Background
The statutory and factual background is set out in detail in this Court’s opinion granting a
preliminary injunction and will not be repeated at length here. See Am. Hist. Ass’n v. Trump, Civ.
A. Nos. 26-1169 & 26-1402, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 1412395, at *1-4 (D.D.C. May 20,
2026). In brief, this suit arises from a Department of Justice opinion that the PRA is
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unconstitutional and White House Counsel’s subsequent memorandum setting out new guidance
on dealing with presidential records that, in plaintiffs’ view (and now the Court’s), deviates from
the PRA’s requirements. See id.
Because plaintiffs have standing and a cause of action, the PRA is likely constitutional,
plaintiffs risk irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, and the balance of equities and public
interest tip in their favor, the Court entered a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo
during the pendency of this litigation. See id. at 4-28. In other words, the government must comply
with the PRA until and unless it obtains relief on appeal or the Court rules in the government’s
favor on the merits.
The government now seeks a stay of merits proceedings before this Court pending
resolution of its appeal, arguing that a stay will advance judicial economy and not prejudice
plaintiffs. Mot. to Stay 1, Dkt. 31.1 Plaintiffs oppose, contending that they wish to raise new
claims that would not be addressed by the appeal and that they would be significantly harmed by
delay because they might not be able to obtain relief by the end of the current presidential
administration. Opp’n 1, Dkt. 34.
Discussion
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Clinton
v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (reaffirming district courts’ “broad discretion” to stay under
Landis). And a stay may be warranted even if another proceeding “may not settle every question
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“[A]n appeal from an interlocutory order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the underlying action on the merits.” Escobar v. DHS, Civ. A. No. 25-3417, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 1256234, at *18 (D.D.C. May 7, 2026) (collecting cases).
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of fact and law” if “in all likelihood it will settle many and simplify them all.” Landis, 299 U.S.
at 256. Conversely, a court “abuses its discretion in ordering a stay ‘of indefinite duration in the
absence of a pressing need.’” Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 731-32
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255)). And “if there is even a fair possibility that
the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else,” then the movant for a stay “must
make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” Landis, 299 U.S.
at 255.
In deciding whether to issue a stay, courts consider (1) the harm to the nonmoving party
from a stay, (2) the harm to the moving party from not issuing a stay, and (3) judicial economy.
Nat’l PFAS Contamination Coal. v. EPA, Civ. A. No. 22-132, 2023 WL 22078, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan.
3, 2023) (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ross, 419 F. Supp. 3d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2019));
OCA—Asian Pac. Am. Advocs. v. Rubio, Civ. A. No. 25-287, 2025 WL 1393153, at *1 (D.D.C.
May 14, 2025) (same).
I. Harm to Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs argue that they would be substantially prejudiced by a stay because the stay will
be lengthy and may prevent them from obtaining final judgment before the end of this presidential
administration. Opp’n 7-12. As plaintiffs note, briefing in the D.C. Circuit is set to close in
September 2026 and oral argument will be scheduled as soon as possible thereafter, so a decision
likely will not issue until 2027. Id. at 3, 7. Any Supreme Court proceedings could then delay
resolution of the appeal until June 2028, leaving only half a year of this administration left in which
to seek relief. Id. at 7. Fair enough. However, the fact that the Supreme Court might grant
certiorari underscores the value of waiting for its authoritative opinion on this weighty
constitutional issue. And in the event that it denies certiorari—or certiorari is not sought—the case
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may be back before this Court in six to nine months from now. See, e.g., Make the Road N.Y. v.
Mullin, No. 25-5320, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1792978 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2026) (issuing opinion
six months after oral argument in expedited appeal); Talbott v. United States, 176 F.4th 720 (D.C.
Cir. 2026) (issuing opinion four months after oral argument in appeal from preliminary injunction).
More importantly, plaintiffs prevailed at the preliminary injunction stage. As a result, they
are minimally harmed by delay because the government must comply with the PRA during the
pendency of its appeal. Plaintiffs resist this conclusion because they now wish to seek injunctive
relief regarding the disposal of records at the end of this administration (i.e., in late 2028 or January
2029) and to amend their complaint to sue the President in his personal capacity and other
defendants about records the President retained from his first administration. Opp’n 8-12. But the
Court already ruled that plaintiffs had failed so far to establish injury as to the National Archives
and Records Administration—which takes responsibility for presidential records after an
administration—because there is no indication that NARA has changed its formerly PRAcompliant policies. Am. Hist. Ass’n, 2026 WL 1412395, at *9. If NARA changes its policies,
plaintiffs may seek to lift any stay. And the Court also notes that alleged mishandling of documents
retained from the President’s first administration has been the subject of extensive civil litigation
and criminal investigation for over four years. See, e.g., Leopold v. FBI, Civ. A. No. 22-1921,
2025 WL 445183 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2025) (recounting factual background and addressing request
for those records under Freedom of Information Act). The Court therefore finds limited harm to
plaintiffs from waiting to amend their complaint to pursue claims related to those documents.2
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The parties also dispute whether plaintiffs could file a separate lawsuit to bring claims relating to those documents or whether such a challenge would be barred by the claim-splitting doctrine for being related to the “same nucleus of facts.” Contrast Mot. 14-15, and Reply 5-6, Dkt. 35, with Opp’n 10-11. In the event that they could file a new lawsuit for those claims, the harm to plaintiffs from a stay in this proceeding would be even less.
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II. Harm to the Government
Plaintiffs contend that the government has failed to carry its burden to show it would be
harmed by the absence of a stay. Opp’n 4-6. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the mere fact
of having to expend resources to defend against a lawsuit is not enough to warrant a stay, especially
for a well-resourced litigant such as the government. See, e.g., Nat’l PFAS, 2023 WL 22078, at
*4 (citing cases). However, this litigation presents weighty and sensitive issues of alleged burdens
imposed on the President’s and Vice President’s offices. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C.,
542 U.S. 367, 381-82, 391-92 (2004).
Although the Court ruled that a preliminary injunction was warranted, it is another matter
to proceed with the merits when that may entail intrusive discovery into core executive offices.
Plaintiffs respond that such concerns are premature because they have not yet sought discovery,
Opp’n 5, but they also express intent to “probe” defendants’ factual assertions “through
development of the record,” id. at 11, suggesting that they would seek such discovery. And the
government’s burden to establish harm is also relatively more limited because the Court found
minimal harm to the plaintiffs from issuing a stay. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (requiring a
showing of “clear hardship” if there is a “fair possibility” of prejudice to the non-moving party
from a stay). It has carried that burden here.
III. Judicial Economy
Plaintiffs lastly argue that a stay would not be in the interest of judicial economy because
they do not propose “relitigation of issues that the Court addressed in its preliminary injunction
decision.” Opp’n 12. The Court disagrees. Even if plaintiffs do not press claims that the Court
found unlikely to succeed, or focus on either claims that were not squarely addressed in the
preliminary injunction decision or that are new, id., the same issues of standing, cause of action,
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the merits, and the scope of relief will recur. Appellate guidance on those issues will narrow the
scope of the case if not resolve it entirely. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 256.
Moreover, following any amended complaint the government is entitled to argue in a
motion to dismiss—and the Court would therefore likely need to resolve anew—many of the same
arguments from the preliminary injunction posture. And additional complexities would then
emerge from possible discovery into sensitive executive branch offices as well as parsing the line
between presidential action in a personal versus official capacity over two non-consecutive terms
in office, the latter of which is ongoing.
Finally, and as plaintiffs concede, the litigants in the parallel case that the Court
consolidated for purposes of the preliminary injunction opinion have jointly proposed a stay.
Opp’n 13; see also Joint Status Report, Freedom of the Press Found. v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 26-1402 (D.D.C. June 4, 2026), Dkt. 20. Although the plaintiffs here are free to take a different view,
the lack of dispute there is illuminating. These plaintiffs argue that they are pressing more claims
against a broader set of defendants, but the fact that their approach is less focused does not suggest
judicial economy will be furthered by denying a stay.
Conclusion
In sum, plaintiffs will be minimally harmed by a stay because they obtained a preliminary
injunction and so the status quo favors them, granting a stay will avoid potentially unnecessary
discovery into sensitive executive branch offices, and the proceedings on direct appeal will narrow
the scope of issues in dispute. Accordingly, the Court finds in its discretion that a stay is warranted.
***
Upon consideration of [31] the government’s motion to stay and the entire record herein,
it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the case is
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STAYED until the end of the expiration date to petition for certiorari following a decision by the
D.C. Circuit in Case No. 26-5185 or, if a party petitions for certiorari, then the date of denial of
certiorari or the Supreme Court’s final disposition of the case. The stay shall not encompass the
preliminary injunction itself or any litigation regarding compliance or enforcement therewith. SO
ORDERED.
/s/
JOHN D. BATES
United States District Judge
Date: June 30, 2026
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