United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-1745
ODETTE LÓPEZ COLLAZO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
MARITZA FONT ORTIZ; VERANIA CRESPO CRUZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WILFREDO RUIZ-FELICIANO; LUIS A. VÉLEZ; NANCY LABOY;
MUNICIPALITY OF MARICAO,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Thompson and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
Israel Roldán-González for appellant.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Emil J. Rodríguez-Escudero
and M.L. & R.E. Law Firm were on brief, for appellees.
June 30, 2026
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. In 2020, the Popular Democratic
Party ("PDP") candidate defeated the New Progressive Party ("NPP")
incumbent in the Maricao, Puerto Rico, mayoral election. Following
the change in administration, the new PDP mayor, Wilfredo
Ruiz-Feliciano ("Ruiz-Feliciano"), did not reappoint NPP member
Odette López Collazo ("López Collazo") to the position of Internal
Auditor -- a position she had held under the NPP mayor since 1994.
As relevant here, López Collazo filed suit against Ruiz-Feliciano,
claiming that his decision was based solely on her affiliation
with the NPP and constituted political discrimination in violation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court
rejected her arguments and granted summary judgment for
Ruiz-Feliciano, concluding that First Amendment protections
against political discrimination did not apply to a decision not
to hire. And that because the Internal Auditor position was
classified as a trust position under Puerto Rico law, the new mayor
could hire and fire at will. We now vacate and remand.
I. Background
In reviewing the district court's decision to grant
summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable
to López Collazo and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.
See Cruz-Cedeño v. Vega-Moral, 150 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2025).
- 2 -A.
López Collazo has always been affiliated with the NPP,
though the extent of her political activity has been limited to
voting in primary elections, general elections, and plebiscites.
She began working for the Municipality of Maricao (the
"Municipality") in 1993, which is when former NPP Mayor Gilberto
Pérez-Valentín ("Pérez-Valentín") took office. The following
year, Pérez-Valentín appointed her to the position of Internal
Auditor -- at that time, a trust position1 under Puerto Rico law.2
López Collazo was reappointed to that position every election year
and held it until 2020. That year, PDP candidate Ruiz-Feliciano
won the mayoral election, and López Collazo's appointment expired.
Ruiz-Feliciano took office in January 2021.
With the Internal Auditor position vacant, and
Ruiz-Feliciano holding the sole authority to fill it, López Collazo
offered her services to the new mayor. He declined. As López
Collazo recounted in her deposition:
I spoke with the mayor. I told him that I was
available, because by that date he didn't have
an [I]nternal [A]uditor. He indicated to me
that he needed somebody worth of his trust
that belonged to the governing party at that
1A "trust" position is an appointed role based on political
or personal confidence, as distinguished from career positions
filled through merit-based civil-service processes.
2As of October 14, 2022, Puerto Rico Act No. 92-2022
proscribes the position of Internal Auditor from being a trust
position. Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 21, § 7154.
- 3 -point, which was the [PDP]. I mentioned to
him I needed my liquidation of sick leave and
vacation. A month had gone by already and
still those liquidations had not been
performed for me.
B.
López Collazo sued Ruiz-Feliciano, Finance Director Luis
Vélez, and Accounting Clerk Nancy Laboy, in their official and
personal capacities, as well as the Municipality (collectively,
"Defendants") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She claimed that
Ruiz-Feliciano discriminated against her by declining to renew her
appointment as Internal Auditor solely because of her NPP
affiliation, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
She further claimed that Vélez and Laboy did not pay out her
vacation and sick leave balances "to discriminate and harass her
because [of] her political affiliation." Two other plaintiffs
affiliated with the NPP -- Maritza Font Ortiz and Verania Crespo
Cruz -- joined the suit, asserting their own political
discrimination claims based on alleged reductions in workload and
harassment. Their claims are not before us now.
Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary
judgment on all of López Collazo's claims. López Collazo conceded
to summary judgment for her claims against Laboy but otherwise
opposed the motion. The court granted the Defendants' motion as
to Laboy and Ruiz-Feliciano but left López Collazo's claims against
Vélez and the Municipality unaddressed.
- 4 -López Collazo moved for reconsideration of the grant of
summary judgment for Ruiz-Feliciano, but the district court denied
her motion. She then sought entry of a partial final judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) so that she could
appeal the summary judgment rulings while the remaining
plaintiffs' claims were litigated in district court. The court
granted her request and she timely appealed.
After docketing the appeal, we retained jurisdiction but
remanded and directed the district court to provide a statement of
reasons for the Rule 54(b) certification. See, e.g., Quinn v.
City of Bos., 325 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[I]f a district
court wishes to enter a partial final judgment on the ground that
there is no just reason for delay, it should not only make that
explicit determination but should also make specific findings and
set forth its reasoning."). The district court then explained
that López Collazo's claims against Laboy and Ruiz-Feliciano were
fully resolved and were factually and legally distinct from those
of the remaining plaintiffs. But it did not address how her
resolved claims against Laboy and Ruiz-Feliciano sufficiently
differed from her pending claims against the remaining
defendants -- Vélez and the Municipality. Cf. Credit Francais
Int'l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1996)
(noting that, in the Rule 54(b) context, district courts must
carefully consider the interrelationship between dismissed and
- 5 -pending claims to prevent piecemeal appeals with common issues of
law or fact).
Hence, we entered a second order directing the parties
to address whether the district court had sufficiently complied
with Rule 54(b). At argument, López Collazo represented that she
would move to dismiss her pending claims to cure any finality
issues. She did so, and the district court granted her motion to
dismiss with prejudice. The sole issue before us now is López
Collazo's claim that Ruiz-Feliciano violated her First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to hire her on account of
her political affiliation.
II. Discussion
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. U.S. Fire Ins. v. Peterson's Oil Serv., Inc., 155 F.4th
22, 28 (1st Cir. 2025). We will affirm only "if there are no
genuine disputes of material fact and the district court's
conclusions are correct as a matter of law." Id. (citing
Lionbridge Techs., LLC v. Valley Forge Ins., 53 F.4th 711, 718
(1st Cir. 2022)).
A.
First, we lay out the legal principles at play in this
appeal. "The First Amendment protects public employees from
adverse action due to their political affiliation, unless
political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
- 6 -position." Méndez-Aponte v. Bonilla, 645 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir.
2011). When a government employer violates that First Amendment
right, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the vehicle through which an
aggrieved individual may seek redress. Rodríguez-Reyes v.
Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). To prevail on
a § 1983 claim for political discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that (1) "the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political
affiliations," (2) "the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's
affiliation," (3) "an adverse employment action occurred," and
(4) "political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor
for the adverse employment action." Méndez-Aponte, 645 F.3d at
64-65 (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13
(1st Cir. 2011)).
After a plaintiff establishes a political discrimination
claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to "establish either a
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action or that
plaintiff held a '[trust] position,' for which party affiliation
constitutes 'an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved.'" Ruiz-Casillas v.
Camacho-Morales, 415 F.3d 127, 131 (1st Cir. 2005) (first citing
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
287 (1977); and then quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518
(1980)). Only the latter defense is at issue here.
- 7 -With these principles in mind, we turn to the dispute in
this case. The district court granted summary judgment for
Ruiz-Feliciano primarily on the ground that López Collazo failed
to establish the third element of a political discrimination
claim -- that Ruiz-Feliciano's refusal to hire her constituted an
"adverse employment action." In its reasoning, the court further
suggested that Ruiz‑Feliciano was entitled to consider political
affiliation in his decision because the Internal Auditor position
was a trust position under Puerto Rico law and, therefore, the
position is of free selection and removal. We review each ground
in turn, ultimately reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the
district court.
1.
In deciding that López Collazo failed to establish the
third element of a political discrimination claim, the district
court reasoned that a failure to hire could not constitute an
adverse employment action under the First Amendment.3 Our
precedent, however, dictates otherwise.
Under the First Amendment, an "'[a]dverse employment
action' includes . . . a government entity's refusal to . . . hire
3 The district court relied on Title VII doctrine to reach
its conclusion. But the First Amendment's adverse-action standard
is broader than that under Title VII, see, e.g., Barton v. Clancy,
632 F.3d 9, 29 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Rivera–Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2004)), and is the appropriate framework
here.
- 8 -an employee." Morales-Tañon v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d
15, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990)). The First Amendment's political
discrimination bar also protects "those who fail to receive a new
appointment" to a position they previously held. Cheveras Pacheco
v. Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[The First
Amendment] do[es] not distinguish between employees
discharged . . . and those who fail to receive a new
appointment."); see also Peterson v. Dean, 777 F.3d 334, 341 n.2
(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72) ("This principle
extends . . . to the failure to reappoint an employee upon the
expiration of a term of office . . . ."). After all, any other
result would seriously undermine the constitutional protections
against political discrimination in public employment "because
local governments could pass laws providing that the jobs of
nonpolicymaking employees extend only from election to election,
and that the new officeholder is entitled to make all new
appointments." Id.
Here, López Collazo introduced evidence that she had
previously served as Internal Auditor, that her appointment
expired, and that she affirmatively offered her services to the
new mayor -- who denied her appointment because of her political
affiliation with the NPP. Whether characterized as a failure to
hire or a failure to reappoint, her claim falls within the scope
- 9 -of First Amendment protections.4 Thus, the district court's
conclusion that she had not established an adverse employment
action was legally flawed.
2.
We turn to the district court's suggestion that
Ruiz-Feliciano could permissibly consider political affiliation in
appointing the Internal Auditor. This conclusion relied solely on
Puerto Rico law's classification of the Internal Auditor as a
"trust" position. That too was error.
Whether an individual's political affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for a particular public office is not
resolved by merely looking to the position's legislative
classification. It is a legal question for the court,
Méndez-Aponte 645 F.3d at 65, resolved through a two-step inquiry,
Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2004). First, the
court should ask "whether the governmental unit decides 'issues
where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their
implementation.'" Ruiz-Casillas, 415 F.3d at 132 (quoting Jiménez
Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986)
(en banc)). If it does, the analysis proceeds to the second step,
4Ruiz-Feliciano attacks a strawman when he argues that, while
he was allowed to appoint López Collazo, "he was under no
obligation to do so." López Collazo does not claim she was
entitled to the position -- she claims that Ruiz‑Feliciano could
not refuse to appoint her solely because of her political
affiliation with the NPP.
- 10 -which "examine[s] the particular responsibilities of the position
to determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to
confidential information, a communicator, or some other office
holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally
appropriate requirement." Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242.
Because this inquiry is fact-specific, the court must "weigh all
relevant factors and make a common sense judgment in light of the
fundamental purpose to be served." Id.
Relevant factors typically include the plaintiff's
actual job description -- "the best, and sometimes [a]
dispositive, source for determining the position's inherent
functions." O'Connell v. Marrero-Recio, 724 F.3d 117, 127 (1st
Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Roldán-Plumey v.
Cerezo-Suárez, 115 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1997)). Also pertinent
are "the extent to which the position involves supervision and
control over others" and "the influence of the position over
programs and policy initiatives." Galloza, 389 F.3d at 29.
Legislative classification of the position "may be entitled to
some weight," but is not dispositive. See id. The district court
did not undertake that analysis in this case and instead premised
the determination that López Collazo could be dismissed because of
political affiliation solely on the legislative classification of
the Internal Auditor position as a trust position. Under our
- 11 -precedent, this constitutes error. We thus turn to that analysis
now.
Step one is easily satisfied here -- a municipality's
functions obviously involve decisionmaking on issues where there
is room for political disagreement on goals or their
implementation. This case therefore turns on the second step,
which, as we noted, entails a fact-specific inquiry.
It is not the first time we have considered whether the
position of municipal Internal Auditor in Puerto Rico is one for
which political affiliation is an appropriate consideration. In
Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1989), we
examined the Internal Auditor position of another Puerto Rican
municipality. The duties there included inspecting financial
records, verifying compliance, reporting irregularities, auditing
past transactions, and submitting reports to the mayor on the
results of audits.5 Id. at 17. We held that these duties were
all "technical" functions that entailed no meaningful discretion
or policymaking judgment. Id.; see also Cruz-Baez v.
Negron-Irizarry, 360 F. Supp. 2d 326, 359 & n.17 (D.P.R. 2005)
(concluding that the Internal Auditor of the municipality of San
Germán with identical responsibilities "merely enforces procedural
The Internal Auditor's job description was not admitted into
5
evidence in Cordero, so we relied on the plaintiff's direct
testimony about his responsibilities when deciding that case. 867
F.2d at 17.
- 12 -rules, ordinances, laws, and resolutions enacted by the
[Comptroller] of Puerto Rico, the Municipal Assembly, and/or
Legislature."). We reasoned that the auditor could not correct
errors, direct the functions of any administrative unit, or set
the municipality's fiscal priorities; those responsibilities
belonged to the Finance Director, whom we recognized as the
relevant political appointee. Id. at 17-18. Thus, we stated in
Cordero that, despite that position having an advisory function,
it was "a technocrat, as the title implies, and nothing more."
Cordero, 867 F.2d at 17-18. Ruiz-Feliciano does not identify any
features of the Internal Auditor position that López Collazo held
that are distinctive of the position at issue in Cordero. Thus,
we see no basis for affirming on a ground independent of the one
on which the district court relied.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the district court's order granting
summary judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
- 13 -