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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-12787
KEITH EDWARDS,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Jerry Blasingame, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OFFICER J. GRUBBS,
#6416,
Defendant-Appellant,
CITY OF ATLANTA,
ATLANTA POLICE DEPT.,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
No. 24-12925
KEITH EDWARDS,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Jerry Blasingame, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OFFICER J. GRUBBS,
#6416,
THE CITY OF ATLANTA,
Defendants-Appellees,
ATLANTA POLICE DEPT.,
Defendant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 3
Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, District Judge. *
JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
We substitute the opinion which follows in place of our
prior opinion, reported as Edwards v. Grubbs, 169 F.4th 1261 (11th
Cir. 2026).
These consolidated appeals involve a single use-of-force incident in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 10, 2018. On that fateful day,
City of Atlanta Police Officer Jon Grubbs pulled his taser’s trigger,
hit Jerry Blasingame in the back, and sent him barreling down a
steep embankment that led to a metal utility box on a concrete platform at the bottom. Mr. Blasingame suffered severe injuries when
he hit the box and platform, and his guardian sued Officer Grubbs
and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force. The
jury found against Officer Grubbs and the City and awarded significant compensatory and punitive damages. The district court
granted the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and reduced the award of punitive damages against Officer Grubbs.
We confront a number of issues on appeal, including qualified immunity, municipal liability, and the constitutional limits on
punitive damage awards. Based on our review of the record, and
with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in all respects.
* Honorable Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge for
the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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I
A
Around 2:30 p.m. on July 10, 2018, Officer Grubbs and his
partner patrolled the streets of Atlanta, Georgia, near an on-ramp
to Interstate 20. Traffic was heavy, as it so often is, and the two
officers observed Mr. Blasingame—a 65-year-old homeless man—
on the side of the roadway reaching into a vehicle and receiving
money from the driver. Officer Grubbs’ partner parked the police
cruiser in the nearby gore. Officer Grubbs then exited the cruiser
to confront Mr. Blasingame.
When Mr. Blasingame saw Officer Grubbs, he ran. Officer
Grubbs crossed two lanes of traffic and chased Mr. Blasingame on
the shoulder of the road. Officer Grubbs ordered Mr. Blasingame
to stop, but he continued to flee.
As Officer Grubbs drew closer, Mr. Blasingame crossed over
a roadside guardrail. Mr. Blasingame, who was unarmed, did not
cause Officer Grubbs to be in imminent fear, and did not say anything to Officer Grubbs during this chase.
Beyond the guardrail, Mr. Blasingame made his way towards an opening in the brush with a steep decline and the highway
below. Without verbal warning, Officer Grubbs drew and deployed his taser in dart mode, hitting Mr. Blasingame in the back.
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This caused Mr. Blasingame to fall down the steep embankment
where he hit his head on the concrete platform of a utility box.1
Emergency medical services estimated the embankment to
be 30 feet long. The distance between the point of impact on the
utility box and the guardrail was approximately 23 feet and 9
inches. The angle of the decline was approximately 30 to 40 degrees, as displayed in these photographs and diagrams of the scene:
D.E. 211-31 at 4.
1 The entire chase had taken approximately 45 seconds.
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D.E. 211-31 at 9.
2
2 This diagram was created with generative artificial intelligence.
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EMS transported Mr. Blasingame to Grady Hospital in critical condition. He suffered, among other injuries, traumatic brain
damage, and became quadriplegic due to a spinal injury.
Nearly a month later, on August 9, 2018, Officer Grubbs visited Mr. Blasingame—who was still at Grady Hospital—to give
him a citation for two misdemeanor offenses: (1) pedestrian solicitation on a roadway in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97; and (2) obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-4-6.
The chase and tasing of Mr. Blasingame was not recorded
because Officer Grubbs’ body-worn camera was in “buffering
mode” from 1:48 p.m. to 2:36 p.m. Buffering mode records for up
to two minutes at a time and then erases the footage. At 2:36 p.m.,
Officer Grubbs’ body-worn camera was turned off. 3
The City of Atlanta performed an audit on the use of bodyworn cameras by its police officers from November of 2017
through May of 2018. The audit found that officers assigned bodyworn cameras captured footage for only 33% of dispatch calls despite a policy that officers shall record when arriving at the scene
of a call.
3 Mr. Edwards’ experts opined that Officer Grubbs turned off his body-worn
camera intentionally. Officer Grubbs reactivated his body-worn camera once
he was at the bottom of the embankment, with Mr. Blasingame unconscious,
but by then the footage had been erased.
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B
Keith Edwards, Mr. Blasingame’s guardian and conservator,
brought this suit against Officer Grubbs and the City of Atlanta,
asserting three claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against Officer Grubbs and the
City; (2) a state-law assault and battery claim against Officer
Grubbs; and (3) a state-law respondeat superior claim against the
City. The district court granted an unopposed partial summary
judgment motion on the respondeat superior claim. The court
then entered a “stipulated order for voluntarily dismissal” of the
assault and battery claim. Before trial on the § 1983 claims, Officer
Grubbs did not move to dismiss or seek summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds.
In August of 2022, the parties proceeded to an eight-day trial
on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. At the close of
the defendants’ case, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ Rule
50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds. The jury returned a verdict totaling $100 million in
favor of Mr. Edwards: $60 million against the City and $40 million
against Officer Grubbs. The $40 million award against Officer
Grubbs consisted of $20 million in compensatory damages and $20
million in punitive damages.
Post-trial, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ renewed
Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The
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court, however, granted Officer Grubbs’ motion for remittitur and
reduced the punitive damages award against him to $1 million.
The district court granted the City’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and overturned the jury’s verdict
against the City. The court ruled that Mr. Edwards did not prove
that the City’s policies, customs, or practices were the moving
force behind Officer Grubbs’ unconstitutional conduct. The court
denied Mr. Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion for medical expenses and
denied, without prejudice, his motion for attorney’s fees. On September 7, 2023, Mr. Blasingame passed away.
II
Officer Grubbs appeals the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity in his Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law
and his motion for reconsideration. Mr. Edwards appeals the district court’s grant of the City’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as
a matter of law regarding municipal liability, the reduction of the
punitive damages award against Officer Grubbs, the denial of his
Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and the denial of his
motion for attorney’s fees.
We first consider the district court’s denial of judgment as a
matter of law to Officer Grubbs based on qualified immunity. Officer Grubbs contends that the court improperly denied him the
protections of qualified immunity because, in his view, he did not
violate Mr. Blasingame’s clearly established Fourth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force.
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A
“The denial of qualified immunity is a question of law we
review de novo.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1246 n.1
(11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “We also review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion.” Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v.
Airport Mini Mall, Ltd. Liab. Co., 932 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted).
“Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the facts
and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such
that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “We consider all the evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (quotation omitted). See also Bailey v. Swindell, 89
F.4th 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (“In determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity following a jury
verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party [who] prevailed at trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B
Mr. Edwards asserts that Officer Grubbs did not mention
qualified immunity until the middle of trial and thus has “waived”
its protections. See Br. for Appellee at 30. “Although jurists often
use the words interchangeably, forfeiture is the failure to make the
timely assertion of a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
458 n.13 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 11
adopted) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
So the question is whether Officer Grubbs forfeited the qualified
immunity defense by not raising it before trial.
Although “qualified immunity questions should be resolved
at the earliest possible stage of a litigation[,]” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (emphasis added), it is not a jurisdictional defense that must be raised sua sponte. See Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 373 (2001). “Qualified immunity,” in other words, “is
an affirmative defense that may be waived.” Bogle v. McClure, 332
F.3d 1347, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). For example,
it “must be pled, and if it is not, it is deemed waived.” Skrtich v.
Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1991)). Here, Officer Grubbs pled qualified immunity as a defense in his answer but did not move to dismiss or for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Ordinarily, “[a] defendant can forfeit an affirmative defense
by failing to raise it, and ‘an affirmative defense, once forfeited, is
excluded from the case.’” Patel v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 967 F.3d
1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463,
470 (2012)) (alterations adopted). For qualified immunity, “a defendant is entitled to have any evidentiary disputes upon which the
qualified immunity defense turns decided by the jury so that the
court can apply the jury’s factual determinations to the law and enter a post-trial decision on the defense.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d
1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). “When the case goes to trial, the
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jury itself decides the issues of historical fact that are determinative
of the qualified immunity defense, but the jury does not apply the
law relating to qualified immunity to those historical facts it finds;
that is the court’s duty.” Id. (citations omitted).
Special interrogatories can be used when there are issues of
fact that may affect a qualified immunity defense. See Simmons v.
Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir. 2018). In this case, Officer
Grubbs did not request any special interrogatories, and the verdict
form asked the jury only one threshold question: “Do you find
from a preponderance of the evidence [ ] [t]hat Jerry Blasingame
was subjected to excessive or unreasonable force by Defendant Officer Jon Grubbs?” D.E. 163 at 1.
After Mr. Edwards rested his case, Officer Grubbs moved for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), arguing that he was
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court declined to grant
Officer Grubbs qualified immunity at that time; the court then denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the
defendants’ case. Officer Grubbs later renewed his motion pursuant to Rule 50(b). The court again rejected Officer Grubbs’ qualified immunity defense and denied the motion.
We reject Mr. Edwards’ contention that Officer Grubbs forfeited his qualified immunity defense. We do so because qualified
immunity—which is both an immunity from suit and a defense to
liability—can be raised for the first time at trial (assuming, of
course, that it has been properly pled). See, e.g., Cygnar v. City of
Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 842 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989); Spann v. Rainey, 987
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F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993); White v. Bibb Cnty., 28 F. Supp. 2d
1374, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 1998). Cf. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1317 (“Defendants who are not successful with their qualified immunity defense
before trial can re-assert it at the end of the plaintiff’s case in a Rule
50(a) motion.”) (citations omitted).
C
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary functions from civil liability
when their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “To be eligible for qualified
immunity, a government official must first establish that he was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful act occurred.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480
(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002)). Mr. Edwards does not dispute that Officer Grubbs was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he discharged his taser. See Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir.
2019) (police officers act within their discretionary authority when
they are “on duty . . . conducting arrest and investigative functions”).
The burden therefore shifts to Mr. Edwards to establish that
qualified immunity does not apply. See Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480. He
can do this by proving (1) a violation of a constitutional right
(2) that “was clearly established at the time of [Officer Grubbs’]
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alleged misconduct.” Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317,
1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Edwards “must satisfy both prongs of the analysis to overcome a defense of qualified immunity.” Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480.
1
The Fourth Amendment forbids the use of excessive force
to apprehend a suspect. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 699 (11th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Amendment’s
objective reasonableness standard governs whether a law enforcement officer’s use of force during an arrest or a seizure was excessive. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–
22 (1968)).
Because this inquiry is an objective one, “the question is
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). We have distilled the evaluation of an officer’s use of force
into six factors:
(1) the severity of the suspect’s crime, (2) whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat of harm to others,
(3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or
trying to flee, (4) the need for the use of force, (5) the
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relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used, and (6) how much injury was
inflicted.
Wade v. Daniels, 36 F.4th 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Mobley
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam)).
If the force was lethal, “that is, force that an officer knows to
create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily
harm[,] . . . we must also consider whether the officer” had “‘probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others or that he has committed
a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm” and whether the officer gave “some warning about
the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Bradley v. Benton, 10
F.4th 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). See also Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12 (“[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause
to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.”).
The use of a taser is not per se deadly force. We have said,
however, that “tasing a person who is at an elevated height may
come with a substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death.” Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1241 (“join[ing] many other courts” to consider the
issue). When a suspect is in a vulnerable and dangerous elevated
position, the use of a taser in dart mode becomes equivalent to
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deadly force because it “has the capacity to completely incapacitate
[the] individual.” Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 2020).
That is because a taser’s “electrical impulse instantly overrides the
victim’s central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles throughout the body, rendering the target limp and helpless.” Bryan v.
McPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 824 (9th Cir. 2010). Accord Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1273 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a taser
“uses propelled wire to conduct energy to a remote target, thereby
controlling and overriding the body’s central nervous system”).
Here Mr. Blasingame was at the top of a 30-foot decline with
a slope of 30 to 40 degrees and with dangers—a highway and a concrete structure—below. And he was running down a steep embankment when Officer Grubbs tased him in the back. Although
Officer Grubbs argues that a reasonable officer could not see the
steep embankment and danger from his perspective, this assertion
is contrary to other evidence adduced at trial.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Edwards, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation. See
Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2007).
Officer Grubbs did not have “probable cause to believe that
[Mr. Blasingame] committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” Garner, 471 U.S. at
11. The evidence at trial at most established that Mr. Blasingame
committed the misdemeanor offense of panhandling. See O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-97(b).
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Second, Mr. Blasingame was not an immediate threat to Officer Grubbs or his partner. Mr. Blasingame may have posed a
threat to the drivers on the highway, and might have put himself
in danger had he run onto the highway, but he did not do so. See
Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (considering the extent to which the suspect poses a threat to himself
or herself under the second factor). The evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Blasingame remained on the side of the road before
and during the interaction with the officers. He did not act erratically or run into the road at any point.
Importantly, Officer Grubbs testified that he never saw a
weapon on Mr. Blasingame. And he acknowledged that Mr.
Blasingame never threatened him nor put him in “imminent fear”
of his life. See D.E. 197 at 56, 62. Officer Grubbs does not and cannot
argue that he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Blasingame
posed “a threat of serious physical harm” to him or his partner. See
Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1240.
Officer Grubbs did testify that Mr. Blasingame made a
“swinging-type motion” towards him, without making contact. See
D.E. 197 at 59:1–61:8. But the jury was not required to believe Officer Grubbs on this point, even if his testimony was uncontroverted. See, e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945); Tyler v. Beto,
391 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1968). In reviewing the denial of judgment as a matter of law, we assume that the jury resolved all conflicts and credibility determinations, and drew all inferences, in Mr.
Edwards’ favor. See Bailey, 89 F.4th at 1329. And a “factfinder can
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use a witness’[ ] noncredible testimony as corroborating substantive evidence against the witness’[ ] interests, regardless of whether
the case arises in the civil or criminal context.” Silva v. Dos Santos,
68 F.4th 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2023).
Third, the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Blasingame ran
away from the officers. Although Mr. Blasingame fled, he was
never given a chance to finally comply before force was used. Officer Grubbs admitted that he never provided any verbal warning
before deploying his taser.
Fourth, we acknowledge that some use of force was necessary, as Mr. Blasingame showed no signs of ending the chase. See
D.E. 197 at 77 (Officer Grubbs testified that he “deployed the Taser
to terminate the pursuit [and] to prevent [Mr. Blasingame] from
entering the highway”). But this factor does not weigh heavily in
Officer Grubbs’ favor because the force was more than minimal.
Fifth, the relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used tilts significantly in Mr. Edwards’ favor. The
amount of force used by an officer “must be reasonably proportionate to the need for that force.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. When a
non-dangerous and unarmed suspect takes flight, deadly force is
disproportionate. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Various of our cases
reflect this principle. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243 (using “this level
of force to stop an unarmed man who was not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing on foot . . . is excessive”); Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Using deadly
force, without warning, on an unarmed, retreating suspect is
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excessive.”); Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2003)
(deadly force may not be used when the only “danger presented by
[the suspects’] continued flight was the risk of an accident during
the pursuit”).
Sixth, and finally, the injuries inflicted were severe. Mr.
Blasingame’s skull was crushed, and he was rendered quadriplegic.
Due to his spinal cord injury, Mr. Blasingame could not move anything below his neck.
Considering and weighing these factors, we conclude that a
reasonable jury could find that Officer Grubbs violated Mr.
Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force. Therefore, the first qualified immunity prong is satisfied.
2
“Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s
conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law
with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the
constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle
within the Constitution, statute, or case law that
clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was
clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.
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Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025)
(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under
the third method, a general constitutional rule may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the
very action in question has not previously been held unlawful.” Id.
(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted and alterations adopted).
Understanding that we cannot operate at a high level of generality, see Mullinex v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), the question here is
whether it was clearly established in July of 2018 that an officer
could not fire a taser at an unarmed panhandling suspect feeling on
foot who had not threatened anyone, was not a danger, and was in
a vulnerable position—i.e., running down a steep embankment
leading to a highway—that created a danger of death or serious
bodily harm. We answer that question affirmatively.
In Bradley, we denied qualified immunity to an officer who
in 2015 tased a non-dangerous and unarmed fleeing suspect on an
elevated surface, under similar circumstances—the suspect was
atop an eight-foot wall when shot. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243–44.
We held that the law was clearly established in two ways. First, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Garner provided the officer with notice because it was a “materially similar precedent.” Id. at 1243. Second, even “absent a case directly on point,” the use of force “was
obviously unconstitutional.” Id. at 1244. Here we conclude, as we
did in Bradley, that Garner provided notice to Officer Grubbs that
his tasing of Mr. Blasingame under the circumstances constituted
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excessive force. We therefore do not address the “obvious clarity”
method.
Our discussion in Bradley about Garner providing notice applies here, so we quote that discussion in full:
[In Garner,] the Supreme Court held that a police officer used excessive force when he shot an unarmed
burglary suspect to stop him from fleeing on foot. See
Garner, 471 U.S. at 21. The . . . Court has cautioned us
against relying on the holding of Garner to the extent
that holding is “cast at a high level of generality.”
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). But we
are concerned with Garner’s analogous facts, not Garner’s high-level holding. Garner clearly established
that an officer cannot use deadly force to stop an unarmed man who is not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing on foot. That is precisely
what happened in Garner and that is precisely what
happened in this case. Accordingly, Garner put Officer
[Grubbs] on notice that he could not use deadly force
to stop [Mr. Blasingame] from running away on foot.
To be sure, there is one factual distinction between
this case and Garner. In Garner, the officer shot the suspect with a gun. Here, Officer [Grubbs] shot [Mr.
Blasingame] with a taser. But that is a distinction
without a difference. As explained above, taking the
facts in the light most favorable to [Mr. Edwards],
[Officer Grubbs] used deadly force when he shot [Mr.
Blasingame on a steep embankment] with a taser.
That is, he used force that he knew would “create a
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily
harm.” He used this level of force to stop an unarmed
man who was not suspected of committing a violent
crime from fleeing on foot. Garner establishes that this
level of force is excessive in that circumstance.
Id. at 1243 (citations omitted).
Officer Grubbs asserts that the wall in Bradley is so different
in kind from the embankment here that Bradley cannot apply. We
disagree. First, Officer Grubbs’ characterization of the terrain as a
“grassy hill,” Br. for Appellant at 30, is not determinative. What
matters is that the embankment had a slope of 30 to 40 degrees and
a drop of about 24 feet from the point of impact. Second, the characterization ignores that Mr. Blasingame was running with his back
to Officer Grubbs when he was hit, and had no opportunity to prepare himself for a fall.4
We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
to Officer Grubbs and uphold the liability verdict against him. 5
4 We acknowledge that in Stewart v. Garcia, 139 F.4th 698, 707 (8th Cir. 2025),
the Eighth Circuit held that a suspect’s right to be free from the use of deadly
force (a taser) while on an eight-or-nine-foot fence was not clearly established
in April of 2018. Stewart, however, is inconsistent with our decision in Bradley,
139 F.4th at 707–08.
5 Officer Grubbs also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration
of the denial of his Rule 50(b) motion asserting qualified immunity. Because
the denial of qualified immunity to Officer Grubbs was correct, the district
court did not err in denying his motion for reconsideration.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 23
III
Now to the City of Atlanta. Mr. Edwards challenges the district court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law to the City on his
municipal liability claim under § 1983.
We review a district court’s entry of judgment as a matter
of law de novo. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 38 F.4th
1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2022). We apply the same standards as the
district court, meaning “we consider all the evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d
578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989)).
“Our task is to determine whether the evidence was ‘legally
sufficient’ to support the jury’s verdict.” Taxinet Corp. v. Leon, 114
F.4th 1212, 1223 (11th Cir. 2024) (first citing Rule 50(b), and then
citing McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241,
1254 (11th Cir. 2016)). “This standard is heavily weighted in favor
of preserving the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 1223 (quoting Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir.
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a court,
and we must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party
that the jury is not required to believe.” Id. (quoting Cleveland v.
Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
Ultimately, “we will ‘disturb the jury’s verdict only when there is
no material conflict’ as to the evidence and where no reasonable
juror could agree to the verdict.” Id. (quoting Brown, 38 F.4th at
1323).
A
A plaintiff may sue a municipality directly under § 1983
when one of its policies, customs, or practices causes a constitutional injury. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). “The policy may be a governmental ‘custom’ which has
not received formal approval through the official decisionmaking
channel.” Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986). “A
custom is a practice so settled and permanent that it takes on the
force of law.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).
A plaintiff like Mr. Edwards must demonstrate “that the
municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.” Barnett v.
Macarthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
The “municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs
a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691. This is because “the language of § 1983, read against the
background of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion
that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused
a constitutional tort.” Id. Put differently, a local government “will
be liable under [§] 1983 only for acts for which the local
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 25
government is actually responsible.” Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d
1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Turquitt v. Jefferson
Cnty., 137 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The Monell claim here hinges on the City’s purported failure
to enforce its body-worn camera policy. A failure to train or supervise must “reflect[ ] a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). “To establish a deliberate or conscious choice or such deliberate indifference,
a plaintiff must present some evidence that the municipality knew
of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v.
City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir 1998).
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 62 (2011). But “a single constitutional violation may result
in municipal liability when there is ‘sufficient independent proof
that the moving force of the violation was a municipal policy or
custom.’” Vineyard v. Cnty. of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir.
1993) (quoting Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1504 n.10
(11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
B
Mr. Edwards contends that the district court erred by concluding that there was insufficient evidence to show that “any policies and procedures relating to [body-worn cameras] caused the
constitutional violation at issue.” D.E. 177 at 21. Mr. Edwards also
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26 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
faults the court for undermining his “novel” theory that the failure
to enforce the body-worn camera policy could cause excessive
force violations.
In this case, there was no evidence of a pattern of similar
constitutional violations (i.e., uses of excessive force) driven by the
failure of City police officers to use or activate their body-worn
cameras. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.
Edwards, the evidence showed that the body-worn cameras of the
City’s officers were used only 33% of the time on dispatch calls.
The evidence also demonstrated that officers were not frequently
disciplined for failing to adhere to the body-worn camera policy.
Accepting that evidence, the missing causal link is that fostering an
environment where body-worn cameras are not properly used,
without more, does not indicate that the City fostered an environment where officers disabled the cameras to use excessive force and
get away with it. In other words, the failure to present evidence of
similar constitutional violations by officers who were not disciplined for noncompliance with the body-worn camera policy is fatal to the argument that the City acted with deliberate indifference
to ignore unrecorded use-of-force incidents. See Gold, 151 F.3d at
1351.
One of Mr. Edwards’ experts opined that the use of bodyworn cameras generally prevents excessive force. That opinion,
however, is too far attenuated to show that the City acted with deliberate indifference. Reviewing the expert testimony and the audit
on which the expert relied, there is no connection between the 66%
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 27
of dispatch calls that were not recorded and any use-of-force incidents that took place during the same time frame analyzed by the
audit. Further, the data showed that “[l]ess than 1% (1,480) of the
491,753 videos uploaded between November 2016 and May 2018
were categorized as use of force incidents.” D.E. 211-30 at 22. In
the City’s random sample of 150 videos, only one use-of-force incident was miscategorized. Without more, Mr. Edwards’ expert testimony about general policing trends does not amount to deliberate indifference about a culture of body-worn camera misuse and a
corresponding culture of excessive force. See Gold, 151 F.3d at 1351.
The single constitutional violation here also does not give
rise to Monell liability. There is not “sufficient independent proof
that the moving force of the violation was a municipal policy or
custom.” Vineyard, 990 F.2d at 1212. There is no evidence that Officer Grubbs turned off his body-worn camera that day because he
planned to use excessive force and knew or believed that he would
not be disciplined for the failure to document his actions. Moreover, there was no evidence of a previous incident where Officer
Grubbs failed to use his body-worn camera to hide an excessive use
of force—putting the City on notice that he was inadequately
trained or supervised. Finally, although its action was delayed, the
City disciplined Officer Grubbs for the failure to activate his bodyworn camera on the day in question.
The evidence, when viewed in totality and in the light most
favorable to Mr. Edwards, does not reflect a deliberate or conscious
choice by the City to allow excessive force violations by failing to
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28 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
discipline officers for deactivated body-worn cameras. We affirm
the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the City.
IV
We next consider the district court’s reduction of the punitive damages award as to Officer Grubbs. “We review de novo the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award, deferring to the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” Kerrivan v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 953 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing
Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2007)).
The three guideposts from BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), inform our review of a punitive damage
award for constitutional excessiveness. See Johansen v. Combustion
Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999).
“First, we consider the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.” Cote v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 985 F.3d 840,
847 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Action Marine, Inc., 481 F.3d at 1318).
We have said that “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct is essentially a judgment about facts.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at
1335. “Such judgments are properly the role of the district court[.]”
Id. “If a district court’s finding regarding the defendant’s degree of
reprehensibility is not supported by the record or is contrary to the
evidence, it is ‘clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
“Second, we look at the ratio of the punitive damages award
to the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Cote, 985
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 29
F.3d at 847. We have described the ratio as a “historical fact.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1334. So we “accept [the district court’s] finding
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id.
“Third, we look at the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil [and criminal] penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Cote, 985 F.3d at 847. As to this guidepost, “the selection of the most appropriate point of comparison—
actual fine imposed [or] the maximum possible penalty or penalties
in similar cases—is an issue of law.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1334.
We “determine de novo whether the punitive damage award
is constitutionally excessive when measured by these guideposts.”
Id. at 1335. “[T]he essential legal issue is whether the relevant facts
of this case, as indicated by the various BMW factors, constitutionally support the punitive damage award, i.e., do these facts indicate
that [the defendant] had adequate notice that its conduct might
subject it to this punitive damage award[?]” Id. The end goal of the
guideposts is to calculate “the maximum the Constitution permits”
in each case. See id. at 1339.
A
Mr. Edwards argues that Officer Grubbs’ motion for remittitur was untimely, and therefore the district court procedurally
erred by considering it.
As a prefatory matter, Officer Grubbs brought his motion
under Rule 59(e), or in the alternative, under Rule 60(b)(6). Mr. Edwards argues that the motion should be treated as a Rule 50 motion
or a Rule 59 motion, both of which carry a 28-day deadline
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30 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
following the entry of judgment. See Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b), 59(b). We
agree with him on this point and construe the motion as a Rule 50
motion because “a court proceeds under Rule 50, not Rule 59, in
the entry of judgment for a constitutionally reduced award.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1331.
Rule 50(b) provides as follows:
No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or
if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a
verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59.
On September 22, 2022, the district court entered its post-trial judgment. In April of 2023, both sides appealed. On February 15, 2024,
we dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction with this explanation:
We do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, however, because there is no final judgment. Final judgment generally requires that the district court resolve
“conclusively the substance of all claims, rights, and
liabilities of all parties to an action.” Sanchez v. Disc.
Rock & Sand, Inc., 84 F.4th 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2023)
(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). And Rule 41
“provides only for the dismissal of an entire action,”
not a single claim. Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141,
1143 (11th Cir. 2023). So the district court’s Rule 41
dismissal of only Count II is invalid, and “a final judgment was never rendered.” Id. We DISMISS
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 31
Grubbs’[ ] and Edwards’[ ] appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
Edwards v. Grubbs, No. 22-13261, 2024 WL 630999, at *1 (11th Cir.
Feb. 15, 2024).
On remand, the district court entered final judgment on
May 2, 2024, based on an amended complaint dismissing the statelaw assault and battery claim. The court ordered the parties to file
any post-judgment motions within 14 days, and Officer Grubbs
met this deadline. Because there was no final judgment rendered
at the time of the first appeal, and because the text of Rule 50(b)
begins the clock “after the entry of the judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(b), Officer Grubbs’ motion was timely. See Weatherly v. Ala. State
Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that “Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(b) require the motion to be
filed within 28 days after the entry of final judgment”) (emphasis
added).
B
Mr. Edwards, who seeks reinstatement of the full $20 million punitive damages award, contends that the district court misapplied all three BMW guideposts: (1) the reprehensibility of Officer
Grubbs’ conduct; (2) the ratio of the punitive damages award to the
compensatory damages; and (3) the differential between comparable criminal or civil penalties. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).
The third guidepost is “accorded less weight than the first two[.]”
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32 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
Cote, 985 F.3d at 850. Officer Grubbs does not address the three
guideposts in his brief.
1
“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 46–
47 (1983) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).
The Supreme Court has instructed courts to determine the
reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 576–77). “The existence of any one of
these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient
to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them
renders any award suspect.” Id.
The district court found that Officer Grubbs’ conduct was
reprehensible but not overly egregious. See D.E. 270 at 26–27. This
finding—to which we owe deference—is supported by the record.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 33
See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1335. In considering the degree of reprehensibility, “we will not second guess the judge who sat through
the trial, heard the testimony, observed the witnesses and had the
‘unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the living courtroom context’ while we have only the ‘cold paper record.’” Id.
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., 518 U.S. 415, 437 (1996)).
The evidence and testimony at trial revealed that Officer
Grubbs tased Mr. Blasingame in the back, without warning, and
sent him plummeting down the embankment. The harm to Mr.
Blasingame was physical, and he suffered traumatic brain damage
and quadriplegia.
There is also evidence, however, that this constitutional violation was isolated and not motivated by intentional malice towards Mr. Blasingame. Officer Grubbs was trying to apprehend
Mr. Blasingame, and the entire chase and use of force lasted less
than one minute. In addition, Officer Grubbs did not try to cover
up what he had just done. Instead, he called for an ambulance and
notified his supervisor of the use of force. Nonetheless, as the district court found, Officer Grubbs’ conduct evinced a reckless indifference to the rights of others. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 46–47.
The district court’s findings underlying the reprehensibility
guidepost were not erroneous. Officer Grubbs’ conduct, though
reprehensible, was not so egregious as to support a $20 million
award.
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34 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
2
Next, we take up the ratio between the punitive damages
and the compensatory damages. “[F]ew awards exceeding a singledigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
The Supreme Court “has indicated that a ratio greater than 4:1 between punitive and compensatory damages will likely be close to
the line of constitutional impropriety.” Williams v. First Advantage
LNS Screening Sols., Inc., 947 F.3d 735, 750 (11th Cir. 2020). Nevertheless, there is not “a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages
award cannot exceed.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. “If the ratio of
actual to punitive damages is too great, it is an indication that the
defendant did not have adequate notice that its conduct might subject it to an award of this size.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1336 (citing
BMW, 517 U.S. at 574).
Mr. Edwards argues that we should consider the jury’s original verdict of $80 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages, leaving him with a presumptively constitutional ratio. But our Monell ruling renders the jury’s $60 million
award against the City legally invalid. See United States v. De La
Mata, 535 F.3d 1267, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Where a judgment
is vacated or set aside by a valid order or judgment, it is entirely
destroyed and the rights of the parties are left as though no such
judgment had ever been entered.”) (quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments
§ 357 (2008)).
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 35
We discern no clear error in the district court’s conclusion
that the proper ratio under this guidepost is 1:1—$20 million in
compensatory damages to $20 million in punitive damages. See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1334 (stating that the ratio is a “historical fact”
which we must accept “unless it is clearly erroneous”). And we
agree with the court that “the ratio of compensatory and punitive
damages in this case must necessarily account for the high compensatory award.” D.E. 270 at 29.
The 1:1 ratio is not presumptively unconstitutional: “When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Cf.
Cote, 985 F.3d at 849 (characterizing this statement from State Farm
as dicta and explaining that the precise award in each case must be
based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct
and the harm to the plaintiff).
Admittedly, it is “[n]ot eas[y]” to determine whether the disparity between punitive damages and compensatory damages is
“too great.” Williams, 947 F.3d at 754. But we agree with other
courts which have explained that “the ratio without the amount
‘tells us little of value.’” Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d
1071, 1089 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 103
(2d Cir. 2012)). On this record, we conclude that the 1:1 ratio is
neutral given that we know of no courts that have reduced a punitive damages award below such a ratio. Cf. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata
Consultancy Servs., 980 F.3d 1117, 1145 (7th Cir. 2020) (“In sum,
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36 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
considering the factors together, we conclude that the maximum
permissible award of punitive damages in this case is $140 million—a 1:1 ratio relative to the compensatory award.”).
3
Finally, we compare the punitive damages award to potential civil or criminal penalties for Officer Grubbs’ conduct. See
BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. The appropriate point of comparison is the
actual maximum fine or penalty imposed by statute. See Johansen,
170 F.3d at 1334. In some of our decisions, we have also looked to
see whether decisions in similar cases have set the outer bounds of
punitive damages. See, e.g., Cote, 985 F.3d at 849; Kemp v. AT&T,
393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Whether a defendant had constitutionally adequate notice
that his conduct might result in a particular damage award depends
in large part upon the available civil and criminal penalties the state
provides for such conduct.” Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1337. Mr. Edwards does not address the district court’s reliance on the $250,000
damages cap for Georgia tort actions and the identical $250,000
limit for federal criminal fines for a conviction for deprivation of
rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. See O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(b)(3). These statutory comparators weigh in favor of reducing the $20 million punitive damages award significantly.
In defending the $20 million punitive damages award, Mr.
Edwards points to several cases, including Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, 463
F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2006) (upholding a total award of $1 million in
punitive damages to two plaintiffs in an excessive physical force
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 37
case ($250,000 against each of four defendants)), and Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 751–53, 756–78 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding an award of $27.5 million in punitive damages against two
defendants in a brutal beating case ($15 million against one officer
and $12.5 million against the other)). Assuming that we can use
awards in similar cases for comparison purposes, see Faulk v. Dimerco Express USA Corp., 172 F.4th 844, 865 (11th Cir. 2026) (explaining that the third guidepost looks to “legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue”) (citation
omitted), Mr. Edwards’ cases do not carry the day.
First, the punitive damages award in Casillas-Diaz paled in
comparison to the $20 million in punitive damages here. That is so
even when the award is adjusted for inflation. 6
Second, the degree of reprehensibility and the ratio make
Dieter distinguishable in material ways. See 395 F.3d at 751. In that
case, a prisoner died after the two officers severely beat him, left
him to die, and attempted to cover their actions up. See id. at 751–
53. Even this award against each officer was less than the $20 million here against a single officer, and the total award was less than
the compensatory damages of $29 million. See id. at 756–78.
6 Adjusting the award in this excessive force case for inflation still leaves the
award well below $20 million; $1 million in 2006 is equivalent to approximately $1.6 million in 2026, see Casillas-Diaz, 463 F.3d at 80. See U.S. Dep’t of
Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., CPI Inflation Calculator (last accessed May 13, 2026),
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
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38 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
Mr. Edwards also identifies Reeves v. Town of Cottageville, No.
2:12-cv-02765 (D.S.C. 2014), and S.T. v. Isbell, No. 2:09-cv-616-MHT
(M.D. Ala. 2010), as apt comparators. We disagree. Reeves was a
§ 1983 excessive force case where a Town of Cottageville police officer confronted and killed the Town’s former mayor. See Reeves,
No. 2:12-cv-02765, D.E. 1-1 at 6–7. The jury awarded the plaintiff
$60 million in punitive damages against the Town. See id. at D.E.
163 at 2. The parties settled while the motion to reduce the award
was pending. See id. at D.E. 205. Isbell was a § 1983 case in which an
Alabama law enforcement officer and a girls’ softball coach for a
municipal entity subjected the plaintiff, a minor, to years of sexual
abuse. See Isbell, No. 2:09-cv-616, D.E. 1; D.E. 45. The district court
entered default judgment on liability against the officer and held a
trial on the issue of damages. See id. at D.E. 36; D.E. 47. The jury
awarded the plaintiff $10 million in punitive damages. See id. at
D.E. 51. The officer never challenged this award.
Neither of these cases resulted in a judicial opinion analyzing
or upholding the constitutionality of the punitive damages awards.
Thus, they are of little persuasive value.
In sum, the last BMW guidepost weighs in favor of concluding that Officer Grubbs did not have constitutionally adequate notice that his conduct may result in a $20 million punitive damages
award against him. Some meaningful reduction is warranted. See
Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1337.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 39
4
The three BMW guideposts lead us to affirm the district
court’s reduction of the $20 million punitive damage award. The
guideposts indicate that some award of punitive damages is appropriate and constitutional, but $20 million exceeds the bounds of
due process. The degree of reprehensibility—not overly egregious
behavior—and the size of comparable penalties and awards will
not permit such an award here.
The difficulty, we candidly admit, is trying to figure out the
maximum amount of punitive damages that a jury could have constitutionally awarded on this record. Why, for example, shouldn’t
the reduced award be $2 million or $5 million instead of $1 million?
The district court explained that a $1 million punitive damages
award would “serve[ ] the purposes of punitive damages” without
“surpassing ‘the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause.’” D.E. 270 at 36 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 568). Maybe the
district court was right, but it is not intuitively clear to us that $1
million is the constitutionally maximum award. Fortunately, we
need not try to figure out ourselves whether a punitive damages
award of $2 million or higher would have been constitutionally
permissible. On appeal, Mr. Edwards has taken an all-or-nothing
approach; he contends that no reduction was appropriate based on
the BMW guideposts because the $20 million award is constitutional, and he does not suggest any alternative lower figure. And
Officer Grubbs does not address whether a different figure (such as
$250,000, his alternative request below) would be constitutional.
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40 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the
principle of party presentation.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590
U.S. 371, 375 (2020). This principle requires that “we rely on the
parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role
of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” See id. (quoting
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)). In other words,
“courts ‘call balls and strikes’; they don’t get a turn at bat.” Clark v.
Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (quoting Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590
U.S. 595, 599 (2020)). In the absence of adversarial briefing, we decline to weigh the potential constitutionality of awards between $1
million and $20 million. Accordingly, we affirm the reduction of
the punitive damages award to $1 million.
V
We next consider the denial of Mr. Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. “We review the denial of a motion
for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion.” Howell v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 730 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2013). Mr. Edwards argues that the district court erred by concluding that the City was not statutorily responsible for Mr.
Blasingame’s medical bills and denying his motion for relief from
judgment on his claim under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2.
In Georgia, § 42-5-2 proscribes the responsibilities of governmental units over inmates in custody. It states that “it shall be the
responsibility of the [governmental entity] to bear the costs of any
reasonable and necessary emergency medical and hospital care
which is provided to any inmate. . . .” § 42-5-2(b). As a matter of
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 41
state law, Georgia courts have generally recognized a claim for a
breach of the statutory duty to provide medical care under § 42-5-2—without stating that such claims require another statutory right
of action—but have continually held that such claims must overcome sovereign immunity and ante litem notice requirements to
proceed. See, e.g., Howard v. City of Columbus, 521 S.E.2d 51, 58 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1999); Bd. of Regents v. Putnam Cnty., 506 S.E.2d 923, 924
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Graham v. Cobb Cnty., 730 S.E.2d 439, 443 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2012).
Mr. Edwards argues that § 42-5-2 applies to this action, but
in his brief, he does not address the district court’s two reasons for
denying his Rule 60(b) motion. First, the court ruled that a claim
for medical expenses under § 42-5-2 must be pled to give “the defendant fair notice,” and Mr. Edwards did not raise the statute until
the summary judgment stage. See D.E. 219 at 13–14 (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Second, and alternatively, the court ruled that Mr. Edwards had “not carried his
burden to show that sovereign immunity has been waived.” Id. at
14.
An “argument that has not been briefed before the court is
deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.” Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
Mr. Edwards addresses neither his delay in failing to raise the statute until the summary judgment stage nor the sovereign immunity
issue. We see no reason to resurrect this matter under Access Now
because Mr. Edwards has abandoned any argument that the
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42 Opinion of the Court 24-12787
reasons the district court provided for denying Rule 60(b) relief
were in error. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (where an initial brief “fails to clearly raise any
challenge to the alternative holdings,” and “treats those holdings as
though they do not exist,” the argument that the holdings were
error is abandoned, and affirmance is in order).
VI
Finally, we consider the denial of Mr. Edwards’ motion for
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) as premature. “Our review of the district court’s denial of [§] 1988 attorney’s fees is limited to determining whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Solomon v. City of Gainesville, 796 F.2d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1981)).
The district court deferred its ruling on the attorney’s fees
“until the appeal has been completed.” D.E. 219 at 6. “If an appeal
on the merits of the case is taken, the court may rule on the claim
for fees, may defer ruling on the motion, or may deny the motion
without prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1993
Amendment. Nothing in Rule 54 or § 1988 requires the district
court to order fees to the prevailing party before an appeal on the
merits is resolved. We therefore conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in deferring its calculation of reasonable fees
and denying Mr. Edwards’ motion without prejudice.
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24-12787 Opinion of the Court 43
VII
We affirm the judgment against Officer Grubbs, as modified
by the reduction of the punitive damages award to $1 million. We
also affirm the district court’s Rule 50(b) judgment in favor of the
City of Atlanta. We further conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in deferring its ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees.
We do not reach whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying the Rule 60(b) motion because Mr. Edwards has abandoned any challenge to the court’s reasons.
AFFIRMED.
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24-12787 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 1
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the Court’s decision that denies Officer Grubbs qualified immunity on the claim
that he violated Mr. Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment rights. The
Court’s rejection of Officer Grubbs’ qualified-immunity defense
rests on two necessary premises: (1) that he used unconstitutionally
excessive force when he tased Mr. Blasingame; and (2) that in doing
so he violated “clearly established” law. The Court may or may not
be right about the former—it’s a close call, as the Court’s own analysis reflects—but it is, in my view, wrong about the latter.
With respect to the “clearly established”-ness of the governing law, it’s important to focus on exactly what the Court does—
and doesn’t—say. The Court notably does not say that the six
(nine?) factors that inform its excessive-force analysis, see Maj. Op.
at 14–19 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)), so definitively
favor Mr. Blasingame that any reasonable policeman in Officer
Grubbs’ position would have known that his conduct violated the
Fourth Amendment. And with good reason. As an initial matter,
it’s pretty unrealistic to think that a law enforcement officer responding in the heat of the moment should be charged with working his way through a multi-part balancing test before deciding
whether to deploy his taser. Moreover, and in any event, as the
Court’s own merits assessment demonstrates, the excessive-force
factors here don’t point uniformly (and certainly not decisively) in
a single direction. For instance, the Court essentially acknowledges
that Mr. Blasingame was “trying to flee” law enforcement when
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2 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 24-12787
Officer Grubbs tased him. See Wade v. Daniels, 36 F.4th 1318, 1325
(11th Cir. 2022); Maj. Op. at 18. So too, the Court concedes that
there was a “need for the use of force,” Wade, 36 F.4th at 1325, as
Mr. Blasingame “showed no signs of ending the chase,” and rejoins
only that this factor doesn’t “weigh heavily” in Officer Grubbs’ favor, Maj. Op. at 18. And while some of the excessive-force factors
clearly support Mr. Blasingame—perhaps most notably, that he was
not suspected of committing a serious or dangerous crime, see id.
at 16—others do so only marginally. For example, with respect to
the “relationship between the need for force and the amount of
force used,” the Court can bring itself to say only that it “tilts” in
Mr. Blasingame’s direction. Id. at 18.
The point is clear enough, and the Court seems to get it:
Having “consider[ed] and weigh[ed]” the manifold excessive-force
factors in evaluating the merits of Mr. Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment claim, the most that can be said is that “a reasonable jury
could find” that Officer Grubbs violated the Constitution, see id. at
19—not that any reasonable officer would necessarily have come to
the same conclusion.
How, then, if not by crunching the factors, does the Court
get over the “clearly established” hump? By analogizing this case
to Bradley v. Benton, in which we held that an officer’s conduct was
“obviously unconstitutional even absent a case directly on point.”
10 F.4th 1232, 1244 (11th Cir. 2021). Basically, the Court seems to
say, because the excessive-force factors sufficed to defeat qualified
immunity in Bradley, then they must do so here, as well. Indeed,
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24-12787 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 3
the Court deems Bradley so closely on point that it simply blockquotes the panel’s analysis there, swapping in the names of the protagonists from our case. See Maj. Op. at 21–22 (repeatedly substituting Officer “[Grubbs]” for Officer “Benton” and “[Blasingame]”
for “Robinson”).
Respectfully, the Court’s reliance on Bradley is doubly misplaced. As an initial matter, the panel’s decision there post-dates
the events underlying this case by several years. And it is hornbook
law that in order to defeat qualified immunity, the law must be
clearly established “at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Mobley
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352–53 (quoting
Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2013)). To be fair,
the Court purports to be relying on Tennessee v. Garner, which was
decided in 1985. See Maj. Op. at 20–21. But as already explained,
the Court conspicuously doesn’t (and couldn’t) reach its conclusion
by reference to Garner’s facts or analysis. Instead, it trains its focus
exclusively on the details of Bradley and endeavors to explain why
the two cases are materially indistinguishable. See id. at 22. In so
doing, I fear the Court verges dangerously close to finding the law
clearly established based on then-nonexistent precedent.
Moreover, and in any event, the analogy to Bradley just
doesn’t hold up. It’s true, as the Court says, that Bradley, like this
case, involved the “tas[ing] [of ] a non-dangerous and unarmed fleeing suspect.” Maj. Op. at 20. But in a crucial respect, the cases are
very different: The suspect in Bradley wasn’t on a slope when he
was tased, he was perched atop an 8-foot ledge. See 10 F.4th at 1240.
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4 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 24-12787
Accordingly, we emphasized there, he was in a particularly “precarious position,” with nothing but air between him and the concrete
below. Id. Any jolt, we explained, would lead him to “los[e] his
balance” and “fall from atop the wall.” Id. at 1241. And that is
presumably why the pertinent department policy in that case instructed that a taser should never be used when “the risk of falling”
itself “would likely result in death”—as, for example, when the suspect was “on a roof or next to a swimming pool.” Id.
Whether framed in terms of physics, trigonometry, or plain
old common sense, the circumstances here are just different. Taking a look at the photos referenced in the Court’s opinion, we see
a grassy hill overgrown with vegetation. See Maj. Op. at 5–6 (citing
D.E. 211-31 at 4, 9). The angle of descent is 30–40°, not the 90° at
issue in Bradley. Accordingly, to be clear, this case did not involve a
24-foot “drop,” as that term is ordinarily understood. Contra Maj.
Op. at 22. Rather, it involved, at most, a very short drop, from a
standing to a prone position, followed by a 24-foot downhill tumble.
One needn’t be a scientist—parsing the interactions between gravity, inertia, friction, etc.—to appreciate the difference between
knocking someone off a high wall and causing him to roll down a
hill.
In the end, the Court says the controlling question is
whether “the wall in Bradley is so different in kind from the embankment here that Bradley cannot apply.” Maj. Op. at 22. I disagree. The question for qualified-immunity purposes isn’t whether
“Bradley cannot apply” but, rather, whether it is clear beyond
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24-12787 NEWSOM, J., Dissenting 5
peradventure that Bradley—or, more accurately, its case-specific adjudication of the excessive-force factors—does apply. I think there
are compelling reasons, both temporal and substantive, to conclude that Bradley isn’t nearly the silver bullet the Court believes.
* * *
Bottom line: This is a classic gray-area case—the very sort
in which qualified immunity has (for good or ill) historically protected officers’ split-second judgments. The situation that Officer
Grubbs encountered was “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 90 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
When Mr. Blasingame saw Officer Grubbs approaching, he fled
along the shoulder of a highway, ignored orders to stop, hopped
over a metal guardrail, and entered an overgrown area that, after a
short upward slope, descended at what we now know was a 30° to
40° pitch toward another road. Faced with those circumstances—
perhaps most notably, the fact Mr. Blasingame was running in the
direction of a busy highway—Officer Grubbs decided to deploy his
taser. Was he right to do so? Maybe not. But the “maybe” there
does all the necessary work. The point is that Officer Grubbs
wasn’t obviously, indisputably wrong to use the taser. And that is
conclusive.