Appellate Case: 25-5027 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 30, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-5027
CAMERON LYNN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 4:24-CR-00076-GKF-1)
Michael L. Burke, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant - Appellant.
Steven J. Briden, Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma (Clinton J. Johnson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before BACHARACH, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Cameron Lynn was convicted by a jury of various
offenses in Indian country including first-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151, 1153, and 1111 (Count One); assault with a dangerous weapon with intent
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to do bodily harm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153, and 113(a)(3) (Count
Two); carrying, using, brandishing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation
to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count Three);
and assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153,
and 113(a)(6) (Count Four). He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder
count and 120 months each on the other counts, with Counts One, Two and Four to
run concurrently, and Count Three to run consecutively to the other counts, resulting
in a sentence of life plus ten years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in (1) admitting a screenshot
from a tribal database showing Mr. Lynn’s tribal membership and blood quantum; (2)
adding certain language to the self-defense instruction; and (3) denying his request to
instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reject the first
two claims of error but agree with the third, so we remand with instructions to vacate
Mr. Lynn’s murder conviction and conduct further proceedings.
Background
On the evening of February 23, 2024, Mr. Lynn was staying at a homeless
camp in Tulsa, Oklahoma with his brother, Jason Lynn, his then-romantic partner,
Cara Campbell, and James “Cowboy” Ervin, Jr.; the group was using narcotics. I R.
538, 541–42, 545–46, 577–80. At some point that night, Mr. Lynn went to a nearby
encampment where Teresa Burke, Alcides “Junior” Monroig, and Jesse Walthers
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were sleeping in tents. Id. at 546–47, 584–85, 710–14, 717–20. About a month
before, Jason had gotten into a verbal confrontation with Ms. Burke after he had
come by her camp asking for drugs; Ms. Burke yelled at him and threatened to “beat”
and “jump” him. Id. at 604–08, 721–22.
Mr. Walthers asked who was outside; Mr. Lynn claimed to be Jason. Id. at
720–21. Mr. Lynn told the group he wanted his belongings back, claiming they had
been stolen; Mr. Walthers told him they did not have his belongings and asked Mr.
Lynn to leave. Id. at 723. Mr. Lynn continued asking where his belongings were and
mentioned he had a gun. Id. at 723–24. In response to that statement, Ms. Burke told
Mr. Walthers to shine a flashlight on Mr. Lynn, which he did. Id. at 724–25. Mr.
Lynn then told Mr. Walthers he would leave if he turned the flashlight off. Id. at
726.
Once Mr. Walthers turned off the flashlight, Mr. Lynn fired multiple shots at
the tents; one shot hit Mr. Monroig in the chest, killing him, while the other hit Ms.
Burke in the torso, injuring her. Id. at 726–33, 774–80. Ms. Burke later identified
the shooter as Mr. Lynn. Id. at 734–38. Mr. Lynn ran back to his encampment and
told Mr. Ervin and his brother Jason that the individuals at the other encampment had
been aggressive and that a “white guy” or “white dude” had shot at him first. Id. at
550–51, 593, 612. According to Ms. Burke, none of her group had a gun or anything
that looked like a gun, or told or indicated to Mr. Lynn that any of them had a gun.
Id. at 726, 738–39.
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Police soon arrived on the scene and identified five shell casings outside the
tents and more than five bullet holes in them. Id. at 490, 532–35, 946–47, 952. They
did not find any firearms inside the tents or the immediate surrounding area. Id. at
866–67. However, they later recovered a black Glock 19 from another individual to
whom Ms. Campbell had sold the gun in exchange for narcotics. Id. at 630, 678–80,
693. Ballistics testing matched the gun to the shell casings found at the scene. Id. at
873–75. According to Jason, Mr. Lynn owned a black Glock 19 pistol. Id. at 580–
81.
Mr. Lynn’s trial lasted three days; the government called fourteen witnesses,
including his brother Jason, Mr. Ervin, Ms. Burke, and law enforcement officers,
while the defense only called two witnesses — the case agent and an expert witness
who testified to the effects of using narcotics. Id. at 435–36, 664–65, 900–01. Mr.
Walthers did not testify because the government was unable to locate him. Id. at
925–27.
Before closing arguments, the court instructed the jury on self-defense,
imperfect self-defense, first-degree murder, and on three lesser-included homicide
offenses: second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary
manslaughter. Id. at 1071–72, 1139–50.
At closing, defense counsel did not contest that Mr. Lynn was the shooter. Id.
at 1086. Instead, counsel presented two theories: first, that Mr. Lynn acted in selfdefense because Mr. Walthers had a gun and shot first, and second, based on
testimony from witnesses that it was not uncommon to hear random gunshots in the
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area, that Mr. Lynn heard such shots and mistakenly believed that he was in danger,
thereby acting in imperfect self-defense. Id. at 1086–91.
Discussion
Mr. Lynn first argues that the district court erred when it admitted Exhibit 59,
a screenshot from a tribal database showing Mr. Lynn’s tribal affiliation and blood
quantum, thereby failing to prove Indian status and requiring reversal on all counts.
Aplt. Br. at 10–11. Next, he contends that the court erred by improperly instructing
the jury on perfect self-defense, also requiring reversal on all counts. 1 Id. at 11.
Finally, he asserts that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the
government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt,
justifying reversal on Count One, his conviction for first-degree murder. Id. at 12.
We address each of these claims in turn.
A. Admissibility of Exhibit 59.
Mr. Lynn’s first claim pertains to the admission of Exhibit 59, a screenshot
from the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma’s tribal enrollment database showing Mr.
Lynn’s tribal affiliation and blood quantum. Id. at 12–20. He contends that the
screenshot was improper hearsay and its admission violated the Confrontation
1
Indian status is an essential element of Counts One, Two and Four, and perfect self-defense is a complete defense to the same. Aplt. Br. at 10; I R. 1142–49, 1152, 1157. Because Count Three tied Mr. Lynn’s use of a firearm to Count Two, Mr. Lynn argues that reversal on Counts One, Two, and Four necessarily requires reversal on Count Three. Aplt. Br. at 10 & n.5.
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Clause, and that the error was not harmless because the government was otherwise
unable to prove Mr. Lynn’s Indian status, an essential element of Counts One, Two,
and Four, beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Before assessing Mr. Lynn’s arguments,
we briefly discuss the substantive requirements to prove Indian status under federal
law and their relevance to this appeal.
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, and 1153, “Indian status is an essential
element” and a “jurisdictional predicate” to Counts One, Two, and Four. United
States v. Harper, 118 F.4th 1288, 1296 (10th Cir. 2024). We have adopted a two-part
test for determining Indian status: “the government must prove that the defendant (1)
has some Indian blood; and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or by the federal
government” at the time of the offense. United States v. Hatley, 153 F.4th 1112,
1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). One way of proving a defendant’s
Indian status “is to adduce a tribal document containing such information.” United
States v. Wood, 109 F.4th 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2024). Because such documents
ordinarily contain hearsay, or out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted therein — the defendant’s Indian status — the government must show
that they fall under an applicable exception to the bar on hearsay. Hatley, 153 F.4th
at 1124.
At trial, the government sought to prove Mr. Lynn’s Indian status through (1)
Exhibit 59 and (2) the testimony of Mr. Lynn’s brother, Jason. Exhibit 59 includes a
photo of Mr. Lynn and identifies him as a member of the Choctaw Nation of
Oklahoma, that he was enrolled in the tribe on September 20, 2001, that his blood
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quantum was 63/126, and that he was issued a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood
(CDIB) on February 14, 1991. Aplt. Br. at A-1. A CDIB identifies an individual’s
blood quantum and is issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. I R. 811–12; Hatley,
153 F.4th at 1123. The record does not indicate when the information was entered or
who entered it. Aplt. Br. at A-1. The government introduced Exhibit 59 through the
testimony of Erica Tomlinson, a program coordinator and supervisor at the tribal
enrollment department of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma. I R. 793–94, 798. Over
defense counsel’s objections, the court admitted Exhibit 59 under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6). Id. at 798, 847–48.
With that information in mind, we turn first to Mr. Lynn’s hearsay claim
before addressing his Confrontation Clause claim.
1. Business Records Exception.
Mr. Lynn first claims that the court improperly admitted Exhibit 59 under Rule
803(6). The district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, while its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is reviewed de
novo. Harper, 118 F.4th at 1295. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court bases
its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law, or if the
decision manifests a clear error of judgment. Hatley, 153 F.4th at 1120. We afford
district courts broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence. United
States v. Merritt, 961 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2020). Our review of a court’s
rulings on hearsay is “especially deferential” because they are “particularly fact and
case specific.” Harper, 118 F.4th at 1295–96 (citation modified).
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Rule 803(6), the business records exception, permits the admission of records
that would otherwise be hearsay if they are records of a regularly conducted activity.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); Hatley, 153 F.4th at 1124. To be admissible, the proponent
must show that the record
(1) was prepared in the normal course of business, (2) was prepared at or
near the time of the events recorded, (3) is based on the personal
knowledge of the entrant or of a person who had a business duty to
transmit the information to the entrant, and (4) indicates the sources,
methods and circumstances by which the record was made trustworthy.
Hatley, 153 F.4th at 1124 (citation modified); see Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)–(C). Even
if those requirements are met, the record will not be admitted if the opposing party
“show[s] that the source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(E). The
proponent may meet the requirements of Rule 803(6) through the testimony of the
record’s custodian or another qualified witness with personal knowledge of the
record’s contents. Hatley, 153 F.4th at 1124; Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D). The personal
knowledge requirement “is not difficult to meet.” Hatley, 153 F.4th at 1124 (citation
modified).
Ms. Tomlinson testified she did not know who made the record and when it
was entered. Accordingly, Mr. Lynn argues that the government did not prove that
the record was made at or near the time of the events it recorded and that it was made
by someone with knowledge of that information. Aplt. Br. at 16–17. He also
reminds us that Mr. Lynn’s CDIB card was apparently issued in 1991 but his tribal
enrollment record was only created in 2001; accordingly, he argues that the tribal
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record could not have been created “at or near to the time” his CDIB was issued. Id.
at 17. But he misapprehends Rule 803(6)’s requirements.
The proponent of a business record need not produce the creator of the record.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Staudinger, 797 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1986). Nor is it
necessary for the foundational witness to have firsthand knowledge of the content of
the record, who prepared the record, or the preparation of the specific record itself.
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 781 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Kim,
809 F. App’x 527, 540 (10th Cir. 2020). Instead, it is enough that the witness
demonstrates that he or she has sufficient knowledge of the recordkeeping
requirements for the produced record. Kim, 809 F. App’x at 540; accord McCormick
on Evidence § 292 (9th ed. 2025). Requiring anything more would undermine the
purpose of the business records rule. See United States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 1985). That
is because the exception relies on the “high degree of reliability” of business records
since “businesses have incentives to keep accurate records.” Harper, 118 F.4th at
1299 (citation modified). Such records “are accurate because the information is part
of a regularly conducted activity, kept by those trained in the habits of precision, and
customarily checked for correctness, and because of the accuracy demanded in the
conduct of the [organization’s] business.” Id. (citation modified).
Ms. Tomlinson had sufficient personal knowledge supporting the district
court’s admission of Exhibit 59 under the business records exception. At trial, Ms.
Tomlinson testified that she had worked for the Choctaw Nation’s tribal enrollment
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department since 2016 and supervised a team “that process[es] CDIBs and tribal
memberships.” I R. 793, 808–09. She explained the process of enrolling in the
Choctaw Nation, beginning with the applicant applying for a CDIB card with the
tribe; once the tribe reviews and processes that application, it is sent to the BIA for
final approval. Id. at 793–94. The BIA then issues a CDIB identifying the
applicant’s blood quantum; if the applicant has applied for tribal membership, the
tribe processes and approves that application as well. Id. at 794–95. The tribe
independently verifies the applicant’s blood quantum and Choctaw heritage by
confirming direct descendancy from a member on the Dawes Roll through the
provision of supporting documents, such as a birth certificate. 2 Id. at 794–95, 807.
The tribe keeps hard copies of applications and related documents in a secure
physical vault as well as in an online database. Id. at 795–96, 803, 805–07. The
tribe maintains and uses the database in its regular course of business to verify tribal
enrollment, with access to it limited to BIA officials and members of the tribe’s
enrollment department. Id. at 796–97, 806–07. She also explained that the process
of reviewing applications and entering information into the database is part of her
regular job responsibilities. Id. at 836–42.
Ms. Tomlinson further testified that she was unaware of any changes since
1980 to the general procedure for verifying tribal enrollment. Id. at 840–41. She
also testified that she was unaware of any changes to the BIA’s procedure for issuing
2
Ms. Tomlinson testified that there is no minimum threshold of Choctaw blood required for enrollment in the Choctaw Nation. I R. 795.
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CDIBs since 1979. Id. at 813–14. And she said that she took the screenshot of Mr.
Lynn’s entry herself and that it was created before the beginning of the litigation by
the person who entered the information into the database. Id. at 797–98. It is true
that she did not know who reviewed Mr. Lynn’s information or when exactly that
information was entered into the database, and that she could not speak to the
specific procedures by which the information would have been transferred from hard
copies to the computer between 1991 and 2001, when Mr. Lynn’s tribal enrollment
record would have presumably been created. Id. at 814–16. But those arguments go
to weight rather than admissibility. 3 See Kim, 809 F. App’x at 541–42. The court’s
determination that the screenshot was admissible only meant that the jury could
consider it when “find[ing] facts or draw[ing] factual inferences[.]” Ellis v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206, 1223 n.7 (10th Cir. 2025). The court’s ruling did
“not control” how the jury was to view the screenshot. Id. That, as the court
instructed, was the sole province of the jury. 4 See I R. 1117.
3
In his reply brief, Mr. Lynn argues that Ms. Tomlinson’s testimony about the Choctaw Nation’s recordkeeping procedures cover only the period of her employment, from 2016 to 2024, and therefore that the government did not produce a witness who had “knowledge of the procedure under which the records were created.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 337–38 (7th Cir. 1998)). Putting aside any waiver issues, as we have explained, Ms. Tomlinson testified that to her knowledge, the tribe’s general procedure for approving enrollment has not changed since 1980.
4
At oral argument, Mr. Lynn asserted that, rather than introducing the screenshot, the government could have produced Mr. Lynn’s CDIB, ostensibly resolving any issues of reliability because CDIBs are self-authenticating. Oral Arg. at 12:33–14:18, 14:57–15:30. But authenticity and reliability are two distinct concepts, and satisfying the authenticity requirement does not mean that a record that
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Mr. Lynn cites United States v. Harper, 118 F.4th 1288 (10th Cir. 2024), and
United States v. Wood, 109 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024), Aplt. Br. at 17, but neither
case supports his position. In Harper, we determined that a letter produced by a tribe
confirming that the defendant had a CDIB and was a tribal member did not meet Rule
803(6)’s requirements because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and lacked
the guarantees of trustworthiness that come with business records. 118 F.4th at
1297–1300. And in Wood, we addressed whether the government had met Rule
902’s requirements for self-authenticating documents. 109 F.4th at 1263–65. Mr.
Lynn has not shown that Exhibit 59 was prepared in anticipation of litigation or
otherwise lacks guarantees of trustworthiness. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(E). Nor has he
challenged its authenticity.
Based on Ms. Tomlinson’s testimony, we conclude that the government
established that Exhibit 59 meets 803(6)’s requirements and that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting it. As stated by counsel, “[T]he question is not
was there more that could have been done; it’s whether the process [for admission
was] satisfied.” I R. 827. It was.
is otherwise hearsay is admissible absent an applicable exception. Hatley, 153 F.4th at 1124; United States v. Thomas, No. 99-1334, 2000 WL 912610, at *4 (10th Cir. July 7, 2000); Fed. R. Evid. 901 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (“[C]ompliance with requirements of authentication . . . by no means assures admission of an item into evidence, as other bars, hearsay for example, may remain.”).
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2. Confrontation Clause.
Mr. Lynn also argues that Exhibit 59 violated the Confrontation Clause. Aplt.
Br. at 18–19. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause “prohibits admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” United States v. Draine, 26 F.4th 1178, 1194 (10th Cir. 2022)
(citation modified). We review claims of Confrontation Clause violations de novo.
Id.
Mr. Lynn’s principal contention is that the CDIB information in Exhibit 59
was double hearsay, as it was prepared by the BIA rather than the tribe, so he was not
entitled to cross examination on that information. Aplt. Br. at 18–19. We disagree. 5
“Double hearsay in the context of a business record exists when the record is
prepared by an employee with information supplied by another person.” United
States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1065 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Any
such information must ordinarily fall into its own hearsay exception to be admissible.
United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 787 (10th Cir. 2008). But we recognize an
As an initial matter, we question whether Mr. Lynn properly preserved his
5
Confrontation Clause claim. At trial, he objected to Exhibit 59’s admission under Rule 803(6), on Sixth Amendment and Confrontation Clause grounds, and under “other” evidentiary rules “that would apply[.]” I R. 808, 832–33, 847–48. But the record does not suggest he “specifically and clearly apprise[d] the district court” of his double hearsay objection. United States v. Paycer, 154 F.4th 1261, 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 2025) (finding the defendant’s “simple” hearsay objection did not preserve his double hearsay claim). But we need not decide the preservation issue because we find no error.
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exception to this rule: “information provided by an outsider that is included in a
business record may come in under the business records exception if the business
entity has adequate verification or other assurance of accuracy of the information
provided by the outside person.” Blechman, 657 F.3d at 1066 (citation modified).
To “demonstrate this guarantee of trustworthiness,” the proponent may provide “(1)
proof that the business has a policy of verifying the accuracy of information provided
by someone outside the business; or (2) proof that the business possesses a sufficient
self-interest in the accuracy of the record to justify an inference of trustworthiness.”
Id. (citation modified).
We see no reason to doubt that the tribe verified Mr. Lynn’s CDIB information
given that the tribe first reviews and processes CDIB applications before sending
them to the BIA, that the CDIB information comes directly from the BIA, and that
the tribe verifies blood quantum. And because a CDIB is required for enrollment in
the Choctaw Nation, I R. 794, we find that the tribe has more than enough interest in
ensuring the accuracy of that information, see Blechman, 657 F.3d at 1066.
Mr. Lynn relies on United States v. Gwathney, 465 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2006),
for support. Aplt. Br. at 18. There, we held the district court erred in admitting a
response by Western Union to a government subpoena as a business record of the
government because the government did not prepare the document. Gwathney, 465
F.3d at 1141–42. But we reached that conclusion because we found that Western
Union’s legal obligation to comply with the terms of the subpoena could not
overcome the fact that the government had not shown that the response was a
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business record of Western Union or otherwise fell into another applicable hearsay
exception. Id. But here, unlike in Gwathney, the government did not seek to admit
an entirely separate record from another organization (i.e., the CDIB itself), but
rather the tribe’s record that includes information from the CDIB. That a record
includes or relies in part on information from an outside source does not render that
information inadmissible hearsay if that source was “also under a business duty
indicating reliability.” Ary, 518 F.3d at 787. As Ms. Tomlinson stated, the BIA
relies on information provided by the tribe before issuing a CDIB, as the tribe
reviews and processes CDIB applications before sending them to the BIA for final
approval. Moreover, the BIA is undoubtedly “under a business duty to provide
accurate information” to the tribe given that it relies on CDIB information from the
BIA for enrollment. Ary, 518 F.3d at 787. We see no evidence that the “link in the
trustworthiness chain was broken.” Id. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Lynn’s argument
that the information pertaining to his CDIB in Exhibit 59 was double hearsay.
While records may be admissible under the business records exception, they
may still violate the Confrontation Clause if they are testimonial — that is, if the
record in question is one “that a reasonable person in the position of the declarant
would objectively foresee might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a
crime.” United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 679 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation
modified). A key consideration is whether the business record “was created for the
administration of an entity’s affairs or for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact at trial.” Id. Mr. Lynn does not argue that the CDIB information, let alone
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Exhibit 59, was testimonial in nature. Ms. Tomlinson testified that the record itself
was not prepared in anticipation of litigation, and we see no evidence to the contrary.
Therefore, we conclude that it was not testimonial and that its admission did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. 6
B. Instructional Errors.
Mr. Lynn also asserts two instructional errors pertaining to the self-defense
and imperfect self-defense instructions given at trial. We review jury instructions de
novo, considering them in the context of the entire trial to determine whether they
correctly stated the governing law and gave the jury an accurate understanding of the
relevant legal standards and factual issues. United States v. Woodmore, 127 F.4th
193, 209 (10th Cir. 2025). Thus, we must determine whether the district court
abused its discretion in crafting a particular instruction and giving or refusing to give
an instruction. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court’s decision is
“arbitrary, capricious or whimsical or falls outside the bounds of permissible choice
in the circumstances.” Id. (citation modified).
We afford trial judges “substantial latitude and discretion in tailoring and
formulating the instructions” and they need not be flawless “so long as they are
6
We also question the relevance of the issuance and date of issuance of Mr. Lynn’s CDIB to his Indian status. It is the government’s burden to prove that Mr. Lynn was a member of a federally recognized tribe and had some Indian blood, not that he had a CDIB. See Harper, 118 F.4th at 1296. Exhibit 59 provides evidence of both of those facts. Moreover, as Ms. Tomlinson explained, the tribe independently verifies an applicant’s Choctaw ancestry by tracing his or her lineage to someone on the Dawes Roll. But we need not address any issues of harmlessness because we conclude there was no error.
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correct statements of law and fairly and adequately cover the issues presented.”
United States v. Wofford, 169 F.4th 1020, 1024 (10th Cir. 2026) (citation modified).
Ultimately, then, the standard of review for instructional challenges is whether the
jury, when considering the instructions as a whole, was misled. Id. Therefore, we
will not reverse unless “we have substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided.”
Id. (citation modified).
“A defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for
which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.”
United States v. Britt, 79 F.4th 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). We
impose this undemanding burden so as “to ensure the jury is appropriately equipped
to resolve the underlying factual questions raised by the evidence at trial.” United
States v. Brown, 128 F.4th 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2025). Once a defendant properly
raises a defense, including self-defense and imperfect self-defense, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of that defense. United States v.
Maryboy, 138 F.4th 1274, 1290 (10th Cir. 2025); accord Tenth Cir. Crim. Pattern
Jury Instr. §§ 1.28 cmt., 1.28.2 cmt. (2026). “Otherwise, the [g]overnment is
exempted from its obligation under the Due Process Clause to prove the defendant
guilty . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maryboy, 138 F.4th at 1290 (citation
modified).
We subject preserved instructional errors to harmless error review, meaning
the government must show that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial
rights to justify affirmance. United States v. Kirby, 161 F.4th 1208, 1213–14 (10th
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Cir. 2025); United States v. McGirt, 71 F.4th 755, 760 (10th Cir. 2023); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(a). In other words, the government must show that the error did not
substantially influence the outcome of the trial or leave us with grave doubts about its
outcome. Kirby, 161 F.4th at 1214. For constitutional errors, the government must
prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1213. For nonconstitutional
errors, it must prove harmlessness by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
1. Self-Defense Instruction.
Mr. Lynn’s second claim of error involves the court’s instructions on selfdefense. Self-defense, or perfect self-defense, applies if the defendant “reasonably
believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, thus
necessitating an in-kind response.” United States v. Toledo, 739 F.3d 562, 567 (10th
Cir. 2014).
Before trial, Mr. Lynn proposed giving the jury a self-defense instruction. I R.
264. Relevant here, that proposed instruction stated: “Self-defense only requires the
defendant’s reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary, not that he exercise a
duty to retreat or recognize the unavailability of reasonable alternatives.” Id. This
language was taken verbatim from our decisions in United States v. Hicks, 116 F.4th
1109, 1118 (10th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Toledo, 739 F.3d 562, 568 (10th
Cir. 2014). The court added the quoted language, with stylistic modifications, to
what would become the final instruction. I R. 1139 (Instruction No. 21). Over
defense counsel’s objections, it added a third sentence, using language from Hicks:
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Self-defense only requires the defendant’s reasonable belief that deadly
force was necessary. A defendant has no duty to retreat or recognize the
unavailability of reasonable alternatives. However, you may consider the
defendant’s ability or opportunity to retreat as a factor in assessing
whether his use of deadly force was reasonably necessary to defend
himself under the circumstances.
Id. at 1061–68, 1139 (emphasis added); see Hicks, 116 F.4th at 1118.
On appeal, Mr. Lynn argues that the district court abused its discretion by
adding the third sentence to the instruction. 7 Aplt. Br. at 11. But he does not claim
that the instruction misstated the law on self-defense. Id. Indeed, he could not, as it
parrots almost exactly what we have explained self-defense requires. Hicks, 116
F.4th at 1118. Instead, Mr. Lynn asserts that “[t]he issue of ‘a duty to retreat’ never
arose in Mr. Lynn’s trial.” Aplt. Br. at 28. He therefore contends that the addition of
the third sentence was error because the instructions were not sufficiently tailored to
the “‘peculiar facts and legal issues’ presented in [his] case.” Id. at 25 (quoting
Hicks, 116 F.4th at 1121).
But Mr. Lynn ignores the fact that the court is under an obligation to
“correctly instruct the jury on the law.” Zia Shadows, L.L.C. v. City of Las Cruces,
829 F.3d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir. 2016). Had the court included only the second
sentence, without the third, it would have given the jury an inaccurate understanding
of the law on self-defense. Mr. Lynn cannot ask the court to give the jury an
7
The government argues that Mr. Lynn waived this claim of error because he failed to preserve it, and because he invited the alleged error. Aplee. Br. at 25–29. We assume without deciding that the issue was not waived because, as we conclude here, there was no error.
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incomplete picture of the law by requesting it instruct on a potentially favorable point
of law but not an unfavorable one.
Mr. Lynn cites to Hicks and Toledo, but neither case can save his argument.
In each case, the district court failed to instruct the jury on self-defense when the
“peculiar facts and legal issues” raised in each case merited such an instruction.
Hicks, 116 F.4th at 1121 (citation modified); accord Toledo, 739 F.3d at 567–68.
Mr. Lynn’s claim of error is different — here, the district court elected to give a selfdefense instruction, so our determination is whether the court properly gave that
instruction. We find it did.
We see no indication that the jury was misled by the instruction. And given
the trial court’s obligation to instruct the jury on the correct law and our deferential
standard of review, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in adding the
third sentence.
2. Imperfect Self-Defense Instruction.
Mr. Lynn’s third and final claim of error pertains to the court’s imperfect selfdefense instructions. We begin with a discussion of the relevant law before
recounting the instructions themselves and then analyzing whether reversible error
occurred.
a. Relevant Law.
Imperfect self-defense is closely related to but distinct from perfect selfdefense. “In both the perfect and imperfect self-defense contexts, the defendant must
possess the subjective belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great
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bodily harm.” Britt, 79 F.4th at 1286 (citation modified). In other words, the
defendant must have an actual belief that (1) he faced imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm and (2) the force he used was necessary to prevent death or such
harm. See United States v. Walker, 130 F.4th 802, 807 (10th Cir. 2025), cert. denied,
146 S. Ct. 277 (2025) (mem.); accord Tenth Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. § 1.28.2.
But unlike imperfect self-defense, perfect self-defense requires that the defendant’s
beliefs also be objectively reasonable. Britt, 79 F.4th at 1287.
Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to first-degree and second-degree
murder; if the jury finds it applies, the defendant is entitled to a complete acquittal.
Id. at 1286; Maryboy, 138 F.4th at 1278. Imperfect self-defense, however, is only a
“mitigating defense[.]” Walker, 130 F.4th at 807. Therefore, “if a jury finds it
applies, the defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, rather than murder.”
United States v. Rainford, 161 F.4th 648, 669 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
That is so because imperfect self-defense negates first- and second-degree murder’s
malice element. See Brown, 128 F.4th at 1366; Britt, 79 F.4th at 1287 n.2; Tenth
Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. § 1.28.2.
b. The Jury Instructions.
While Mr. Lynn proposed a perfect self-defense instruction, I R. 264, the
record does not indicate that he proposed or tendered an imperfect self-defense
instruction, id. at 237–82; see Aplee. Br. at 9. Despite the apparent lack of a request
for such an instruction, the court included one. I R. 916.
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Because the court elected to give an imperfect self-defense instruction, Mr.
Lynn requested that the jury be instructed (as an element of the homicide offenses)
that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not
done in imperfect self-defense. Id. The court rejected his request to avoid confusing
the jury, stating that separate instructions on involuntary manslaughter and imperfect
self-defense were sufficient and would be “simpler.” Id. at 917. Defense counsel
later renewed that request, which the court again rejected. Id. at 1068.
Before closing arguments, the court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense
(Instruction No. 21), intoxication (Instruction No. 22), Count One of the indictment
(Instruction No. 23), first-degree murder (Instruction No. 24), the lesser-included
offenses of second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary
manslaughter (Instruction Nos. 25–27), and then on imperfect self-defense
(Instruction No. 28). Id. at 1072–73, 1139–50. The first-degree murder, seconddegree murder, and voluntary manslaughter instructions each included perfect selfdefense as an essential element that the government had to disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 1142–47. None of those instructions made any mention of
imperfect self-defense.
As for involuntary manslaughter, the court told the jury it must determine
whether Mr. Lynn was guilty of the charge if it found him not guilty of or could not
agree on a verdict as to the greater-included homicide offenses. Id. at 1148. The
involuntary manslaughter instruction also stated:
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Involuntary Manslaughter in Indian Country makes it a crime to
unlawfully kill a human being without malice while committing a lawful
act in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection,
which act might produce death. . . .
A person may commit a lawful act in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution and circumspection, if he acts in “imperfect” self defense.
Id. at 1148–49. The imperfect self-defense instruction stated:
A person acts in “imperfect” self-defense if he subjectively believed, at
the time he acted, that his actions were necessary for the defense of
himself against the immediate use of unlawful force to prevent death or
great bodily harm, but his belief was objectively unreasonable.
The difference between self-defense and imperfect self-defense is
whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable. A person whose belief in
the need for self-defense was reasonable has acted in self-defense. A
person whose belief was unreasonable has acted in imperfect selfdefense.
A defendant who acts in imperfect self-defense commits involuntary
manslaughter.
Id. at 1150. None of these instructions explicitly told the jury that the government
bore the burden of proving that the homicide was not done in imperfect self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the verdict form made no mention of
imperfect self-defense; instead, it instructed the jury to address the next lesserincluded homicide offense if it found Mr. Lynn not guilty of, or could not agree on,
the greater-included offense(s). Id. at 1163–64.
c. Reversible Error.
On appeal, Mr. Lynn argues that the court erred when it overruled defense
counsel’s request to include imperfect self-defense as an essential element of the
charged homicide offenses that the government must disprove beyond a reasonable
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doubt, requiring reversal of his conviction for first-degree murder. Aplt. Br. at 31–
32.
Our recent decision in United States v. Maryboy, 138 F.4th 1274 (10th Cir.
2025), is instructive. There, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder;
the court determined that perfect and imperfect self-defense instructions were
warranted. See Maryboy, 138 F.4th at 1280. To streamline the instructions, the
court revised the parties’ proposed instructions, but in doing so, it included only a
portion of the imperfect self-defense instruction as part of the involuntary
manslaughter instruction. Id. at 1290. Crucially, it failed to instruct the jury “that
the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] had not
acted in imperfect self-defense.” Id. Reviewing for plain error, we determined that
the court committed clear and obvious error by and through this omission because
“the government was not held to its burden under the Due Process Clause” to prove
the absence of imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1292–93.
We see little distinction between this case and Maryboy; if anything, the error
here is manifest and counsel took care to preserve the issue, thus it is unnecessary to
address plain error. Although the court in this case gave a separate imperfect selfdefense instruction, neither the involuntary manslaughter instruction nor the
imperfect self-defense instruction told the jury that the government must disprove
imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the murder instructions
were devoid of any mention of imperfect self-defense, so the instructions did not
clearly advise the jury that it was a defense to murder. Maryboy, 138 F.4th at 1293.
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It was only after the jury heard the self-defense, first-degree murder, second-degree
murder, and voluntary manslaughter instructions that it heard any mention of
imperfect self-defense. And it was only told to consider involuntary manslaughter if
it found Mr. Lynn not guilty of the greater-included homicide charges. Therefore,
here, as in Maryboy, “[t]he very structure of the [instructions] precluded the jury
from considering the effect of [imperfect self-defense] on the murder count” and
improperly relieved the government of its burden to disprove imperfect self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 Id. (citation modified).
We are unpersuaded by the government’s arguments that there was no error. It
first asserts the jury was not misled when considering the instructions as a whole.
Aplee. Br. at 38–39. It points to the facts that the court properly distinguished
between perfect and imperfect self-defense; that it told the jury that if it found Mr.
Lynn acted in perfect self-defense it must find him not guilty, while if it found he
acted in imperfect self-defense, he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter; and that
each of the three greater-included homicide charge instructions told the jury that it
must “exclude [perfect] self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt before [it] could
convict.” Id. But none of these instructions can remedy what is missing: informing
the jury that the government had to disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a
8
We recognize that we decided Maryboy after Mr. Lynn’s trial, but Maryboy relied upon United States v. Lofton, 776 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 1985). In any event, we apply the law at the time we decide the appeal. See Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Venjohn, 104 F.4th 179, 186 (10th Cir. 2024) (obviousness of plain error determined at the time of the appeal).
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reasonable doubt. Nor do we believe that a lay jury could have deduced that
imperfect self-defense was a defense to murder based on the lesser-included offense
instructions. That is particularly so given the order in which the court instructed the
jury — on perfect self-defense, then on the elements of the four possible homicide
offenses, then on involuntary manslaughter, and then on imperfect self-defense.
Contrary to the government’s assertion, we have serious doubts that the jury was
adequately instructed on the relevant law when considering the instructions as a
whole. 9 Wofford, 169 F.4th at 1024.
The government also tries to distinguish the instant appeal from Maryboy
because here “the district court did give a standalone imperfect self-defense
instruction.” Aplee. Br. at 40. But our holding in Maryboy was not that imperfect
self-defense must be given as a separate instruction from involuntary manslaughter,
but that the court is obligated to instruct the jury that the government must disprove
imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. So this is a distinction without a
difference.
9
Although Mr. Lynn does not argue so on appeal, and although our pattern instructions in effect at the time of trial did not have separate instructions on imperfect self-defense, we think that the language of the given instruction itself is wanting for other reasons. For example, the instruction does not define what it means for the defendant to have a “subjective” belief that force was necessary. Compare I R. 1150, with Tenth Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. § 1.28.2 (defining “actual belief”). Further, while it clarifies that the difference between perfect and imperfect self-defense “is whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable[,]” it is not clear from the context what exactly this “belief” is. I R. 1150. The lack of clarity in the instruction is compounded by the fact that the jury did not hear the imperfect selfdefense instruction immediately after the perfect self-defense instruction, making it difficult to discern the pertinent distinctions between them.
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But finding error is not enough to warrant reversal — we must still affirm if
the government proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Britt, 79
F.4th at 1292. To support its claim of harmlessness, the government argues that the
jury would have found Mr. Lynn guilty based on the overwhelming evidence of Mr.
Lynn’s premeditation and the purported lack of any evidence pointing to imperfect
self-defense, as well as the jury’s guilty verdict on first-degree murder, which it
claims was a rejection of any claim of self-defense. See Aplee. Br. at 41–44. It
primarily relies on United States v. Sago, 74 F.4th 1152 (10th Cir. 2023), for support.
Granted, the likelihood of a different outcome may be diminished when a jury finds
premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sago, 74 F.4th at 1162–63; Maryboy,
138 F.4th at 1294–95; Rainford, 161 F.4th at 667–69. But a finding of premeditation
cannot satisfy the government’s burden to establish harmlessness in this case.
Nor do we find persuasive the government’s argument that the error was
harmless because the case against Mr. Lynn was strong. As we stated in United
States v. Britt, 79 F.4th 1280 (10th Cir. 2023), concluding the error was harmless
would require concluding “as a matter of law[] that no reasonable juror could find
that [Mr. Lynn] did not subjectively believe that he was in imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm[.]” 79 F.4th at 1293. To do so, however, “would be directly
contrary to the district court’s ruling at trial.” Id. After all, the district court
determined that an imperfect self-defense instruction was warranted. Therefore, it
“necessarily concluded as a matter of law that reasonable jurors could find that [Mr.
Lynn] had [a] subjective belief” that he faced imminent danger of death or great
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bodily harm and that the force he used was necessary to prevent death or great bodily
harm. Id.; Tenth Cir. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. § 1.28.2.
As Britt makes clear, the strength of the evidence against Mr. Lynn does not
carry the day as to harmlessness because the district court already determined that
Mr. Lynn had met the low evidentiary showing needed to give an imperfect selfdefense instruction. See Britt, 79 F.4th at 1293. Finding harmlessness on that basis
would thus be contrary to the district court’s legal conclusion that there was
sufficient evidence to warrant giving such an instruction. And given that the
government does not claim that it was error for the district court to give the
instruction, affirming based on harmlessness would put us in the fraught position of
deciding an issue that is not before us on appeal. See Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001); United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1112
n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, the record indicates that Mr. Lynn met the low burden of
production required. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Mr. Lynn’s brother
and Mr. Ervin that Mr. Lynn claimed, after the shooting, that a “white guy” or “white
dude” shot at him first. I R. 593, 612. While the police only identified five shell
casings, Jason testified that he heard up to twelve shots, and there were more than
five bullet holes in the tents. Id. at 588, 946–47. Witnesses also testified that it was
not unusual to hear shots in the area. Id. at 505–06, 611. When determining
sufficiency of the evidence in support of an instruction on a defense, we must accept
the testimony most favorable to the defendant, Britt, 79 F.4th at 1291, and “weak and
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contradicted” evidence “can still be a basis for [such] an instruction[,]” Rainford, 161
F.4th at 670 (citation modified). Therefore, the district court erred and the
government has not proven harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to admit
Exhibit 59 and its overruling Mr. Lynn’s objection to the perfect self-defense
instruction, and accordingly AFFIRM his convictions on Counts Two, Three, and
Four. However, because we find non-harmless error with the imperfect self-defense
instruction, we REMAND to the district court with instructions to VACATE Mr.
Lynn’s conviction on Count One only and conduct further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
29