Supreme Court
No. 2025-202-Appeal.
(PC 21-2609)
Rahim Caldwell :
v. :
George Pearson et al. :
ORDER
Rahim Caldwell (Mr. Caldwell or plaintiff) appeals from an order of the
Superior Court dismissing his second amended complaint against George Pearson,
Andrew Scanlon, and Jeffrey Brunelle (together, defendants), and further prohibiting
Mr. Caldwell from seeking leave to amend his second amended complaint. This
case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to
appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily
decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing
the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may decide this
case without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm
the order of the Superior Court.
Mr. Caldwell filed a complaint against defendants in April 2021, asserting
constitutional violations allegedly stemming from an April 30, 2018 encounter,
which occurred in the library at Rhode Island College. That complaint was the
-1-subject of defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, which was granted in
May 2021 following a hearing. In the order granting defendants’ motion, the trial
justice provided Mr. Caldwell with a detailed list of instructions to assist him in
making his future pleadings comply with the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure. Mr. Caldwell thereafter filed his first amended complaint asserting
fifteen counts of alleged state and federal constitutional violations by defendants.1
In late June 2021, defendants answered generally denying the allegations. Following
further proceedings not relevant to this appeal, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
Mr. Caldwell’s first amended complaint. In their motion, defendants argued that
Mr. Caldwell’s first amended complaint lacked “specific factual allegations” to
which defendants could respond and was “devoid of any claim for relief * * *.”
Following a hearing, a justice of the Superior Court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss Mr. Caldwell’s state constitutional claims with prejudice and granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Caldwell’s federal constitutional claims with
1
In addition to the first amended complaint, Mr. Caldwell filed a separate document entitled “Demand,” which contained the following two sentences: “DEMAND: The amount is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the court. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: The amount is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the court.”
-2-leave to amend. Mr. Caldwell then filed the complaint at issue in the instant appeal,
his second amended complaint.2
In his second amended complaint, Mr. Caldwell asserted that defendants
deprived him of his rights under the United States Constitution when they called
“Providence police to the scene for plaintiff [exercising] constitutional rights while
engaged in student activism boycotting campus security services.” Mr. Caldwell
asserted nine counts of constitutional violations stemming from the above-described
interaction with defendants. Mr. Caldwell’s second amended complaint did not
contain a prayer for relief.
The defendants answered Mr. Caldwell’s complaint, generally denied the
allegations therein, and later filed a motion to dismiss. In their memorandum in
support of their motion to dismiss, defendants argued that Mr. Caldwell’s complaint
failed to state a claim for relief and further argued that Mr. Caldwell should not be
permitted to amend his complaint because he had been provided with opportunities
to do so and his pleadings had not improved. Mr. Caldwell filed an objection
refuting that defendants had met their burden under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Caldwell further requested that he be given the
2
In addition to the second amended complaint, Mr. Caldwell again filed a separate document entitled “Demand,” which stated only: “The demand is an amount satisfactory for the jurisdiction of the court.”
-3-“opportunity to amend any part of the complaint which the court finds is inadequate
* * *.”
The defendants’ motion was heard before a justice of the Superior Court on
May 13, 2025. The plaintiff did not appear at that hearing, and defendants rested on
their papers. The trial justice thereafter granted defendants’ motion to dismiss after
finding that Mr. Caldwell’s complaint did not adequately state “the claims of relief
Mr. Caldwell [was] asking from the [c]ourt” nor did the complaint include a
“specific injury Mr. Caldwell sustained or any injury caused by defendants’ actions.”
The trial justice found that Mr. Caldwell’s complaint thus failed to provide
defendants with notice of the specific claims on which he was asserting an
entitlement to relief and that, therefore, “it [was] not clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Caldwell would be entitled to any relief from defendants * * *.” Finally,
the trial justice denied Mr. Caldwell’s request for leave to amend his second
amended complaint because Mr. Caldwell had been provided multiple opportunities
to amend his complaint since 2021 but his subsequent filings did not “refine his
claims to meet the standards the [c]ourt requires of litigants.” The trial justice
thereafter granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal on June 2, 2025.
In reviewing a trial justice’s decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court applies
the same standard applied by the trial justice. See Fuller Mill Realty, LLC v. Rhode
-4-Island Department of Revenue Division of Taxation, 313 A.3d 377, 381 (R.I. 2024).
Our review is limited to the four corners of the complaint from which we assume the
facts and allegations to be true, and we “view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Id. A motion to dismiss should be granted when it is determined “beyond
a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any
conceivable set of facts.” Id. (quoting Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education, 176 A.3d 472, 476 (R.I. 2018)).
After careful consideration of the record and the arguments of the parties, we
affirm the trial justice’s decision to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss, which was
predicated upon Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)
states, in relevant part, that a pleading that “sets forth a claim for relief” shall contain
(1) “[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief” and (2) “[a] demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Super. R.
Civ. P. 8(a). Those pleading requirements do not require a plaintiff to “include the
ultimate facts that must be proven in order to succeed on the complaint or to set out
the precise legal theory upon which his or her claim is based.” North Farm Home
Owners Association, Inc. v. Bristol County Water Authority, 315 A.3d 933, 945 (R.I.
2024) (quoting Gardner v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 953 (R.I. 2005)). Instead, under
our liberal pleading standard, the drafter of a complaint need only provide “some
degree of clarity as to what is alleged [because] due process considerations are
-5-implicated * * *.” Id. (quoting Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880
A.2d 821, 824 (R.I. 2005)). In order to satisfy due process standards, a complaint
must “give the opposing party fair and adequate notice of the type of claim being
asserted.” Id. (quoting Hyatt, 880 A.2d at 824).
Here, plaintiff’s complaint fails to provide defendants with sufficient notice
of the specific constitutional injury that he claims he suffered. See North Farm Home
Owners Association, Inc., 315 A.3d at 945. Rather, the second amended complaint
conclusorily asserted: a deprivation of rights under the United States Constitution;
an allegation of unauthorized practice of law against an individual (Lieutenant David
Henry), who is not a named defendant; and nine counts of constitutional violations.
Taking the allegations in the second amended complaint as true, plaintiff alleges that
defendants violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by stalking
him in the Rhode Island College library, asking him questions which he refused to
answer, and eventually calling the Providence police. But those general statements
of alleged constitutional violations fail to state a legally cognizable claim for relief
because he has not articulated how defendants’ conduct caused him any
constitutional injury. As the trial justice correctly observed, plaintiff’s complaint
fails to assert “any injury caused by defendants’ actions.” We conclude that plaintiff
has failed to identify in what way his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were cognizably interfered with by defendants’ actions, and that he has therefore
-6-failed to articulate an injury which would entitle him to relief from these defendants
under any set of facts.
We also affirm the trial justice’s decision denying plaintiff’s request to amend
his second amended complaint. This Court reviews a trial justice’s decision to grant
or deny a party’s motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. Lomastro v. Iacovelli,
56 A.3d 92, 94 (R.I. 2012). A trial justice abuses their discretion in denying a party
leave to amend a complaint “only when the justice fails to provide any justification
for denying the motion to amend or forgoes a hearing on the motion altogether.”
Degasparre v. Fay Servicing, LLC, 288 A.3d 146, 157 (R.I. 2023). A motion may
be denied for “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed * * *.” Lomastro, 56 A.3d at 95 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962)).
The trial justice denied the plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint because
he found that “Mr. Caldwell filed his original complaint in April of 2021 and was
given multiple opportunities by this [c]ourt to refine his claims to meet the standards
the [c]ourt requires of litigants.” However, because “the [c]ourt has already given
an opportunity for plaintiff to do so * * * the [c]ourt will not grant leave to amend
at this time.” We do not find that the trial justice abused his discretion in so deciding.
Rather, the basis for his denial—that the plaintiff had already been granted leave to
amend his complaint but failed to accord his pleadings with the rules—is one of the
-7-reasons that this Court has determined is a justifiable basis for a trial justice to deny
a party’s request to amend. See Lomastro, 56 A.3d at 95. Moreover, the trial justice
provided the plaintiff with a forum to argue his request to amend his complaint
during the hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but the plaintiff chose not
to appear. See Degasparre, 288 A.3d at 157 (warning trial justices not to forgo a
hearing on a motion to dismiss). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice gave
the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard and ample chance to clarify his request for
relief, to no avail. Therefore, we affirm the trial justice’s decision denying the
plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint.
We accordingly affirm the order of the Superior Court granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Caldwell’s second amended complaint and
denying leave to amend. The papers may be returned to that tribunal.
Entered as an Order of this Court this ___ day of June, 2026.
By Order,
Clerk
-8-STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
ORDER COVER SHEET
Title of Case Rahim Caldwell v. George Pearson et al.
No. 2025-202-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 21-2609)
Date Order Filed June 30, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and
Justices
Flaherty (ret.), JJ.
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Christopher K. Smith
For Plaintiff:
Rahim Caldwell, pro se
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants:
Mylene L. Cathcart, Esq.
SU-CMS-02B (revised November 2022)