(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE
ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–621. Argued December 9, 2025—Decided June 30, 2026
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) restricts a political party’s
spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates. 52
U. S. C. §30116(d). In 2001, this Court upheld those coordinatedexpenditure limits as consistent with the First Amendment. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm., 533 U. S. 431 (Colorado II ). Petitioners—a group of candidates and political party committees—challenged FECA’s politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits under the First Amendment, arguing that Colorado II is no longer good law. In light of Colorado II,
the en banc U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected petitioners’ First Amendment challenge. This Court granted certiorari. Held: FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Pp. 6–26.
(a) The Court has jurisdiction under Article III. At the outset of the litigation, at least one of the plaintiffs—then-candidate for Senate JD Vance—undisputedly had standing. Vice President Vance still maintains an active “Statement of Candidacy” on file with the FEC indicating his intent to run for Senate in 2028, as well as a campaign committee that has raised money for a Senate race, establishing that this dispute is justiciable. Pp. 5–6.
(b) The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” This Court has determined that political parties—as well as candidates, private individuals, and outside groups—may make unlimited independent expenditures during political campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39–59 (per curiam). This case concerns FECA’s limits on spending by political 2 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Syllabus
parties in coordination with candidates. Pp. 6–21.
(1) FECA limits political-party coordinated expenditures. FECA’s
limits impair the party’s traditional forms of communication such as
advertisements; preclude parties from amplifying the voice of their adherents; impose additional monetary costs and burdens on political
parties; and inflict a “stifling effect on the ability of the party to do
what it exists to do.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 630 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.). Pp. 7–8.
(2) Statutory limits on contributions to candidates or parties are
subject to “closely drawn” scrutiny. McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 197 (plurality opinion). To satisfy that standard, a regulation may not be “disproportionate” and must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to its asserted goal. Id., at 199, 218, 220;
Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 306.
The Court must assess: (i) the Government’s asserted interests in imposing the limits at issue and (ii) the fit between the limits and the
Government’s asserted interests. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199.; see
also Cruz, 596 U. S., at 305. The political-party coordinated-expenditure limits fail to satisfy the closely drawn test. Pp. 8–10.
(3) To analyze FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures, the Court must first assess the asserted governmental interests
justifying those limits. The Court’s precedents recognize only one constitutionally permissible government objective for campaign finance
restrictions: “preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 206–207. And “Congress may target only a
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” Id., at 207. Particularly relevant here, this Court has recognized the risk of quid pro
quo corruption or its appearance when a donor’s contributions to a political party are earmarked—that is, “are directed, in some manner, to
a candidate or officeholder.” Id., at 211 (quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, the First Amendment question in this case boils down to
whether FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures are
permissible in order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates through earmarked contributions to parties.
In Colorado II, this Court said that they were. 533 U. S., at 462–463.
But Colorado II applied deferential scrutiny to Congress’s politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits. Id., at 463, n. 26, 465. Since
Colorado II, however, the Court has emphasized that under the closely
drawn test, judicial review must be “rigorous.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S.,
at 197. Under that more demanding standard, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are
not proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored given the other
less-speech-restrictive tools available to the Government to prevent
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Syllabus
circumvention—in particular, earmarking and disclosure laws.
With respect to earmarking laws: FECA treats an individual’s contributions to a party that are “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit” to a federal candidate “as
contributions from such person to such candidate”—and thus subject
to the limits on contributions to candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(a)(8).
In McCutcheon, the Court explained that such earmarking rules constitute a targeted and constitutionally permissible way for the Government to prohibit circumvention of the base limits on contributions to
candidates. 572 U. S., at 222–223. As JUSTICE THOMAS has explained:
“Vigilant enforcement” of the earmarking rules is a more “precise response” by the Government to any “circumvention concerns.” Colorado
II, 533 U. S., at 481 (dissenting opinion).
With respect to disclosure laws: FECA requires that political parties
and candidates publicly disclose both the contributions they receive
and their spending on campaign activities, including on coordinated
expenditures. §30104(b). As the Court emphasized in McCutcheon,
disclosure has become a much stronger anti-circumvention tool over
time because of “modern technology,” especially the Internet. 572
U. S., at 224.
Importantly, it is the combination of the base contribution limits
plus the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements together
that serve the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here—without unduly restricting core political party speech. Given the meaningful prophylactic measures available to combat quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance, the Court concludes that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits at issue here are “disproportionate” and are
not “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” for the circumvention interest.
Id., at 199, 218, 220 (quotation marks omitted); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306.
Pp. 10–21.
(c) Amicus and intervenors contend that the Court should adhere to
Colorado II as a matter of stare decisis, but Colorado II ’s reasoning
has been rejected by the Court’s more recent precedents and is no
longer good law. To the extent that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now overruled. Pp. 21–26.
117 F. 4th 389, reversed and remanded.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–621
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 30, 2026]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Ratified in 1791, the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.” As relevant here, the Federal Election Campaign
Act, known as FECA, limits a political party’s campaign
spending. Those spending limits necessarily abridge
political parties’ freedom of speech: Because “virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society
requires the expenditure of money,” a “restriction on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 19 (1976)
(per curiam).
Applying the First Amendment, this Court has long ruled
that a political party possesses a right to make unlimited
independent expenditures during a campaign—that is,
expenditures without coordinating with a candidate. See
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
2 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 613–616, 618 (1996)
(Colorado I) (controlling opinion of Breyer, J.).
But FECA still limits a political party’s coordinated
expenditures. As the name implies, a political party’s
coordinated expenditures are the party’s expenditures on,
for example, advertisements produced or distributed in
consultation with a candidate’s campaign. The primary
current justification for those limits is to prevent
circumvention—that is, to prevent a donor from
circumventing the statutory limits on contributions to
candidates by making a large contribution to a party that
the party then uses to support a particular candidate.
Some 25 years ago in a case known as Colorado II, this
Court—over the dissent of JUSTICE THOMAS for four
Justices—upheld FECA’s limits on political-party
coordinated expenditures. See Federal Election Comm’n v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S.
431 (2001). But recently, a group of candidates and political
committees filed a new lawsuit and argued that Colorado II
is no longer good law (or should be overruled). They point
to: the significant changes in this Court’s First Amendment
campaign finance jurisprudence since 2001; the
enhancements in the other tools available to the
Government to prevent circumvention of the contribution
limits, especially earmarking and disclosure laws; and the
diminished relative power of political parties as compared
to outside groups over the last 25 years, which has
undermined a key premise of Colorado II. See McCutcheon
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185 (2014); Federal
Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289
(2022); see also SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Comm’n,
599 F. 3d 686 (CADC 2010) (en banc).
In light of the doctrinal and factual changes since 2001,
the United States agrees with plaintiffs that Colorado II no
longer retains vitality. So the Government does not defend
the constitutionality of the political-party coordinatedCite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Opinion of the Court
expenditure limits. We likewise agree with plaintiffs and
now hold that FECA’s limits on political parties’
coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment.
I
FECA restricts a political party’s coordinated
expenditures—that is, a political party’s spending on
campaign activities in coordination with candidates. 52
U. S. C. §30116(d).1 The current political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits vary by State and by office
sought. The national committee of a political party may
spend from $130,600 to $4,071,800 in coordination with an
individual Senate candidate and from $65,300 to $130,600
in coordination with an individual House candidate. 91
Fed. Reg. 10393–10394 (2026). In the most recent
Presidential election, the national committee of a political
party could spend $32,392,200 in coordination with a
Presidential candidate. 89 Fed. Reg. 5536 (2024).2
In 2001, this Court upheld the political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits as consistent with the First
Amendment. Nearly a generation later, in 2022, the
National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National
Republican Congressional Committee, then-candidate for
Senate JD Vance, and then-Representative Steve Chabot
1 FEC regulations define a coordinated expenditure as money spent “in
cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate.” 11 CFR §109.20(a) (2025); see also 52 U. S. C. §30101(17) (defining “independent expenditure” as “an expenditure by a person—(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate”).
2 There are six authorized national party committees for the two major
political parties: the Republican National Committee, the Democratic National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National
Republican Congressional Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. See 11 CFR §§110.1(c)(2), 110.2(c)(2), 110.3(b)(2).
4 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
sued the Federal Election Commission and its
Commissioners. They claimed that the political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First
Amendment. Plaintiffs argued that political parties
possess a First Amendment right to spend money as they
see fit on political advertising and other campaign
activities—and to do so in coordination with the parties’
candidates.
The en banc U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
rejected plaintiffs’ challenge and upheld FECA’s politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits, applying this Court’s
2001 decision in Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431,
commonly referred to as Colorado II. But in a series of
insightful opinions, a majority of the judges on the Court of
Appeals questioned that precedent in light of more recent
First Amendment decisions of this Court—particularly
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185
(2014), and Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for
Senate, 596 U. S. 289 (2022). See 117 F. 4th 389, 395 (CA6
2024) (en banc) (Sutton, C. J.); id., at 401 (Thapar, J.,
concurring); id., at 407 (Bush, J., concurring); id., at 447
(Readler, J., dissenting).
This Court granted certiorari to review whether, in the
wake of McCutcheon, Cruz, and other more recent decisions
of this Court, the statutory limits on a political party’s
coordinated expenditures remain consistent with the First
Amendment. 606 U. S. 931 (2025). In this Court, the
United States agrees with plaintiffs that FECA’s limits on
political-party coordinated expenditures are no longer
constitutional. The Democratic National Committee, the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee are
intervenors and argue that the limits are still
constitutional. In light of the Government’s position, the
Court appointed Roman Martinez as amicus curiae to
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
Opinion of the Court
defend the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and the
constitutionality of the political-party coordinatedexpenditure limits. He has ably discharged his
responsibilities.
II
Before addressing the merits, we must ensure our
jurisdiction under Article III. At the outset of the litigation, at least one of the plaintiffs—then-candidate for Senate JD
Vance—undisputedly had standing to challenge the law’s
restriction on coordinated expenditures. But amicus and
intervenors contend that the case is now moot.
First, as amicus and intervenors see things, the Vice
President no longer faces a credible threat of enforcement
if his campaign coordinates with a political party that
makes coordinated expenditures above the statutory limits.
That is because the Executive Branch has concluded that
the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are
unconstitutional; as a result, the Federal Election
Commission presumably will no longer enforce the limits.
Cf. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 159
(2014).
But FECA also provides for private suits in certain
circumstances if the FEC fails to act. 52 U. S. C. §§30109(a)(1), (a)(8)(A), (a)(8)(C). And the threat of private enforcement is sufficiently credible that this dispute “is still very much alive.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 173
(2013).
Second, amicus and intervenors assert that the case is
moot because Vice President Vance is no longer a candidate
for office. Although then-Senator Vance may once have
planned to run as a candidate for re-election to the Senate
in 2028, amicus and intervenors say that the now-Vice
President has no “concrete and definite plans to run for any
specific federal office” in the future, so FECA’s political6 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
party coordinated-expenditure limits will not apply to him.
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 13.
The Court need not speculate about Vice President
Vance’s future runs for office, however, because the Vice
President still maintains an active “Statement of
Candidacy” on file with the FEC indicating his intent to run
for Senate in 2028, as well as a principal campaign
committee (JD Vance for Senate) that has raised money for
a Senate race. The statement of candidacy and the extant
campaign committee cannot be ignored for justiciability
purposes, and they establish that the case is not moot.
We therefore turn to the First Amendment issue.
III
We begin with First Amendment fundamentals. The text
of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The
First Amendment embodies “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 629 (1996) (Colorado I) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)
(quotation marks omitted).
The First Amendment’s protection of free speech has its
“fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.” Federal Election
Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 302 (2022)
(quotation marks omitted). With respect to campaignrelated spending, the “central holding in Buckley v. Valeo is
that spending money on one’s own speech must be
permitted.” Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 627 (opinion of
Kennedy, J.) (citation omitted). For that reason, this Court
has determined that political parties—as well as
candidates, private individuals, and outside groups—may
make unlimited independent expenditures during political
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
Opinion of the Court
campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39–59 (1976)
(per curiam); Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 616 (opinion of
Breyer, J.).
The question here concerns FECA’s limits on spending by
political parties in coordination with candidates. For
example, a political party may spend money to produce and
place a television advertisement in support of a candidate
after consulting with the candidate’s campaign about the
content, timing, or placement of the advertisement.
A
In tension with the text of the First Amendment, FECA
limits political-party coordinated expenditures and thus
restricts political parties’ speech in support of their own
candidates during political campaigns. To understand the
severity of the First Amendment problem caused by that
restriction, one must first appreciate the important and
traditional role of political parties during campaigns.
Political parties articulate policy positions and platforms;
select candidates through a primary or caucus process; and
then support the election of those candidates in general
election campaigns. Because a political party’s “success or
failure depends in large part on whether its candidates get
elected,” it is “natural for a party and its candidate to work together and consult with one another during the course of
the election.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 469
(2001) (Colorado II) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Indeed, as
Justice Kennedy described, it “would be impractical and
imprudent, to say the least, for a party to support its own
candidates without some form of ‘cooperation’ or
‘consultation.’ ” Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 630. After all,
“candidates are necessary to make the party’s message
known and effective, and vice versa.” Id., at 629.
In a campaign, the coordination between party and
candidate may encompass the what, when, where, how, and
8 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
to whom of political activities and communications. What
policy positions should the party and candidate adopt and
emphasize? When and where should the party and
candidate run campaign ads? What is the best content for
party ads? For candidate ads? For candidate and surrogate
speeches? Which voters should the party and candidate
target? How best to use social media? How can the party
and candidate avoid duplication of effort? How can the
party and candidate best get out the vote? The list goes on.
In light of those day-to-day activities, parties and
candidates have traditionally coordinated during
campaigns. That coordination has formed “the essence of
our Nation’s party system of government.” Colorado II, 533
U. S., at 477 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). For nearly 200 years
after the ratification of the First Amendment, parties could
spend freely to support their candidates during campaigns
and could do so in coordination with the candidates.
Notably, no one suggests “that these elections were not
functional or that they were marred by corruption.” Id., at
473 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
But the modern congressional limits on political-party
coordinated expenditures restrict that coordination and the
party’s speech. The limits impair the party’s traditional
forms of communication such as advertisements; preclude
parties from amplifying the voice of their adherents; impose
additional monetary costs and burdens on political parties;
and inflict a “stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.” Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 630 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.); see also Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 469–471
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).
B
As a matter of text and history, therefore, the restriction
on political-party coordinated expenditures would appear to
violate the First Amendment. But the Court’s precedents—
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
Opinion of the Court
particularly Colorado II in 2001—cloud the issue and
require additional and more nuanced analysis.
This Court’s precedents start with the basic precept that
when “the Government restricts speech, the Government
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its
actions.” McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572
U. S. 185, 210 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quotation marks
omitted).3 Restrictions on campaign expenditures for
political speech are permitted only in the exceedingly rare
circumstances where they promote a compelling interest
and are the “least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest.” Id., at 197.
The Court has held that statutory limits on contributions
to candidates or parties—as distinct from limits on
expenditures—are subject to “closely drawn” scrutiny, a
nominally “lesser but still rigorous standard of review.”
Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). The Government must
demonstrate “a sufficiently important interest” and employ
means “closely drawn” to that interest. Ibid. (quotation
marks omitted).
In recent cases such as McCutcheon and Cruz, the Court
has stressed that, in order to satisfy closely drawn scrutiny, a regulation may not be “disproportionate” and must be
“necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to its asserted goal.
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199 (law must avoid
“unnecessary” abridgment of speech to survive “rigorous”
review (quotation marks omitted)); id., at 218 (law must be
“narrowly tailored” to meet the objective (quotation marks
omitted)); id., at 220 (law cannot be “disproportionate to the Government’s interest”); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306 (law must
be “necessary for the interest it seeks to protect”).
3 In McCutcheon, THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote the controlling opinion for
four Justices. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). JUSTICE THOMAS concurred in the judgment on broader grounds.
10 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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Opinion of the Court
But the question of which test to apply here is ultimately
academic. Regardless of “whether we apply strict scrutiny
or Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ test, we must assess” (i) the
Government’s asserted interests in imposing the limits at
issue and (ii) the fit between the limits and the
Government’s asserted interests. McCutcheon, 572 U. S.,
at 199; see also Cruz, 596 U. S., at 305. And because, as we
will explain, the political-party coordinated-expenditure
limits fail to satisfy even the closely drawn test, we need
not dwell on any subtle differences between the two tests.
C
To analyze FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated
expenditures, we must assess the asserted governmental
interests for that infringement on the freedom of speech of
political parties.
Four potential governmental interests have been
identified to justify the political-party coordinatedexpenditure limits. We will address each in turn.
First, in 1974, Congress enacted the political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits for the “purpose of reducing
what it saw as wasteful and excessive campaign spending.”
Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 618 (opinion of Breyer, J.). But we
need not linger on that governmental interest because no
one actually invokes or defends it here. Nor could they.
Such an interest is a flatly impermissible basis for
restricting speech. This Court has consistently held that
Congress may not restrict campaign-related spending
simply to “reduce the amount of money in politics.” Cruz,
596 U. S., at 305; see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 57.
Congress may not dictate how much political speech is too
much or how much spending on speech is too much. Nor
may Congress restrict campaign spending so as to level the
electoral playing field, or to enhance or diminish the
relative influence of certain groups or views. Cruz, 596
U. S., at 305. The “concept that government may restrict
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
Opinion of the Court
the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48–49.
In short, Congress’s original justification for the limits on
political-party coordinated expenditures is entirely
inadequate under the First Amendment. Cf. Kennedy v.
Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 543, n. 8 (2022)
(“Government justifications for interfering with First
Amendment rights” must not be “hypothesized or invented
post hoc in response to litigation” (quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
Second, some might suggest that the Government
possesses an interest in preventing a political party (as
distinct from donors) from exercising undue influence on its
candidates. But amicus and intervenors do not try to justify
the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits on that
basis. For good reason. Such a theory does not “make any
sense” given the thoroughly intertwined relationship of
parties and their candidates. 117 F. 4th 389, 402 (CA6
2024) (en banc) (Thapar, J., concurring). As JUSTICE
THOMAS has succinctly explained, any influence a political
party exerts over its candidates and officials “is not
corruption”—it is “successful advocacy of ideas in the
political marketplace and representative government in a
party system.” Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 646 (opinion
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
Third, in 2001 in Colorado II, the Court justified the
political-party coordinated-expenditure limits in part on a
new donor-centric theory—namely, that the limits curb a
donor’s “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and
the appearance of such influence.” 533 U. S., at 441; see
also McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 240 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that Colorado II upheld the limits as a means of
preventing “undue influence by wealthy donors” (quotation
marks omitted)).
12 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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Opinion of the Court
But in subsequent cases, particularly McCutcheon and
Cruz, this Court has squarely rejected undue influence as a
permissible basis for the Government to regulate campaign
finances and limit political speech. In those more recent
cases, the Court has spoken clearly and definitively:
Congress may not restrict spending because of “the
possibility that” political parties, individuals, or outside
groups that spend “large sums may garner influence over
or access to elected officials.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 208 (quotation marks omitted). Nor may they do so “to limit the
appearance of mere influence or access.” Ibid. Speech
regulations may not target “general gratitude.” Id., at 192.
The Court has reasoned that “[i]ngratiation and access . . .
are not corruption,” but instead “embody a central feature
of democracy—that constituents support candidates who
share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are
elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.”
Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).
The Court now recognizes “only one legitimate
governmental interest for restricting campaign finances:
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id.,
at 206–207. Moreover, “Congress may target only a specific
type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” Id., at 207.
And quid pro quo corruption in turn is something specific—
contributions in exchange for official action. “That Latin
phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money. The hallmark of corruption is the financial
quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” Id., at 192
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although the “line between quid pro quo corruption and
general influence may seem vague at times,” “the
distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic
First Amendment rights.” Id., at 209. In drawing that
distinction, “the First Amendment requires us to err on the
side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing
it.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).
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In short, under the Court’s more recent First Amendment
precedents, the Government’s desire to prevent or reduce
influence, ingratiation, gratitude, access, or the like for
those who spend in support of, or contribute to, political
parties or candidates is not a constitutionally permissible
objective for campaign finance restrictions. Therefore, the
political-party coordinated-expenditure limits can no longer
be justified on that basis.
Fourth, the Colorado II decision also rested on an anticircumvention rationale. The anti-circumvention theory
goes like this: An individual donor who wants to engage in
quid pro quo corruption—that is, donate to a candidate in
exchange for official action by that candidate when in
office—might give a candidate’s political party large
contributions above the existing limits on contributions to
candidates. And the party might then spend that money in
coordination with the candidate in order to support that
candidate’s campaign.
Colorado II concluded that the political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits help prevent such
circumvention of the contribution limits. 533 U. S., at 457.
But this Court has since retreated from that rationale.
As the Court later emphasized in McCutcheon, that kind of
purported circumvention is one significant step removed
from actual quid pro quo corruption—that is, from a donor’s
contribution to a candidate in exchange for official action.
That is because the donor gives money to a political party,
not to the candidate. That distinction is significant:
McCutcheon recognized that there “is not the same risk of
quid pro quo corruption . . . when money flows through
independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor
contributes to a candidate directly.” 572 U. S., at 210. After the donor has contributed to the party, the party is legally
and practically free to use the funds as it sees fit—
presumably supporting the candidates who have the best
chance of success, are locked in the closest races, or align
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the most with the party, among other possibilities. The
party need not spend the money on the candidate of the
donor’s choice.
It is of course true that parties and their candidates often
work closely together, as detailed above. That is the nature
of political parties and campaigns. But their interests are
not identical. The party’s interests are broader and more
dispersed. Often, the party will simultaneously focus on
numerous candidates, policy proposals, ballot initiatives,
get-out-the-vote activities, advertising efforts, and the
like—not simply the campaign of one candidate. If the
donor’s contributions to a political party are “subsequently
rerouted to a particular candidate, such action occurs at the
initial recipient’s discretion”—namely, the political party’s, “not the donor’s.” Id., at 211. “As a consequence, the chain
of attribution grows longer, and any credit must be shared
among the various actors along the way.” Ibid.
Amicus and intervenors respond that the political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits remain necessary to
prevent circumvention because a donor might specifically
direct or require the party to use the donor’s monetary
contribution to the party in order to support a particular
candidate—a practice referred to as “earmarking.”
That is a serious argument. This Court has recognized
the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when
a donor’s contributions are earmarked—that is, “are
directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.”
Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, plaintiffs do not
dispute that the Government possesses a constitutionally
sufficient interest in restricting earmarking of funds over
the contribution limits. Brief for Petitioners 21–24; Tr. of
Oral Arg. 37.
So the First Amendment question in this case ultimately
boils down to: Whether FECA’s limits on political-party
coordinated expenditures are permissible in order to
prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to
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candidates via large contributions to parties that are
earmarked (i.e., directed) to a candidate?
In Colorado II, this Court said that the limits were
permissible. 533 U. S., at 462–465. Plaintiffs counter that
there have been substantial changes since 2001 in the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and in the other
less-speech-restrictive tools available to the Government to
prevent circumvention via earmarking, including
earmarking and disclosure laws. And in light of those
developments, plaintiffs say that the political-party
coordinated-expenditure limits are now unconstitutional.
To begin, Colorado II applied deferential scrutiny to
Congress’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits
as a means to prevent circumvention. The Court’s opinion
made no mention of “narrow tailoring” and never suggested
that the restriction must be considered “necessary” and not
“disproportionate” for the anti-circumvention interest. On
the contrary, the Court stated, for example, that Congress
was “entitled to its choice” among alternatives and that the
Court would not “throw out” the limits for “unskillful
tailoring.” Id., at 463, n. 26, 465.
Since Colorado II, the Court has sung a much different
tune. The Court has emphasized that, even under the
closely drawn test, judicial review must be “rigorous.”
Restrictions on campaign finance cannot be “disproportionate” and must be “necessary” and “narrowly
tailored” to serve the Government’s asserted interest.
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199 (law must avoid
“unnecessary” abridgment of speech to survive “rigorous”
review (quotation marks omitted)); id., at 218 (law must be
“narrowly tailored” to meet the objective (quotation marks
omitted)); id., at 220 (law cannot be “disproportionate to the Government’s interest”); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306 (law must
be “necessary for the interest it seeks to protect”).
Under those more demanding standards, plaintiffs say
that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are
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not proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored given
the other less-speech-restrictive tools available to the
Government to prevent circumvention—in particular,
earmarking and disclosure laws.
We therefore need to dig more deeply into the specifics of
earmarking and disclosure laws.
With respect to earmarking laws: FECA treats an
individual’s contributions to a party that are “in any way
earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary
or conduit” to a federal candidate “as contributions from
such person to such candidate”—and thus subject to the
limits on contributions to candidates. 52 U. S. C.
§30116(a)(8). By regulation, the FEC defines earmarking
as any “designation, instruction, or encumbrance” directing
funds to support a candidate. 11 CFR §110.6(b)(1) (2025).
In McCutcheon, the Court explained that such
earmarking rules constitute a targeted and constitutionally
permissible way for the Government to prohibit
circumvention of the base limits on contributions to
candidates. 572 U. S., at 222–223. Indeed, it is difficult to
conjure up realistic scenarios where a donor could
circumvent the base limits on contributions to candidates
via earmarking in a way that does not also violate those
earmarking regulations. See id., at 223.4
With respect to disclosure laws: FECA requires that
political parties and candidates publicly disclose both the
contributions they receive and their spending on campaign
activities, including on coordinated expenditures.
§30104(b). As the Court emphasized in McCutcheon,
disclosure has become a much stronger anti-circumvention
tool over time because “modern technology” provides a
“particularly effective means of arming the voting public
with information.” Id., at 224. “Today, given the Internet,
4 Also, the federal criminal bribery laws directly prohibit quid pro quo
exchanges of contributions for official action. E.g., 18 U. S. C. §201.
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disclosure offers much more robust protections against
corruption” than it once did. Ibid. “Because massive
quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a
mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible” when
the Court decided earlier cases—including Colorado II. 572
U. S., at 224. Indeed, McCutcheon’s observations on that
point are even more true today than they were in 2014
given continued technological advances.
That transparency matters both factually and legally.
Factually, as the Court has explained, disclosure can “deter
actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light
of publicity.” Id., at 223 (quotation marks omitted).
Disclosure can help trigger investigations of whether a
donor and party have violated earmarking laws. Legally,
the Court in McCutcheon stressed that “disclosure often
represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on
certain types or quantities of speech.” Ibid.
To all of that, amicus and intervenors retort that the
earmarking and disclosure rules, while useful, are not
adequate to prevent circumvention of the base contribution
limits. But especially given the significant First
Amendment rights at stake here, those counterarguments
are ultimately unpersuasive.
As for earmarking rules, amicus and intervenors contend
that they leave a gap “where a donor simply expects that
his donation will go to a particular candidate, without
actively directing his funds.” Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae 43. But under this Court’s current
precedents, a mere expectation or hope does not itself
equate to circumvention or rise to the level of quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance, especially given a donor’s lack
of control over the funds once contributed to the party.
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210–211. The possibility that a
political party might act in accordance with a contributor’s
expectations or hopes—or is even likely to do so—is not
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enough to override the First Amendment and justify limits
on political party speech.
Amicus and intervenors also assert that the earmarking
rules are often toothless because “violations are essentially
impossible to discover and prove.” Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae 44. But there is no good reason
to think that the Government cannot detect a donor who
tries to make a disguised large contribution to a particular
candidate by funneling it through a contribution to a party.
See Reply Brief for Federal Respondents 18–19. Especially
given the companion disclosure requirements, those kinds
of contributions will be easy enough for the Government to
identify and, if warranted, investigate as possible
earmarks.
Moreover, to the extent that amicus and intervenors are
suggesting that earmarking rules go unenforced or underenforced, that problem primarily is one of sufficient
investigative resources and enforcement priorities by the
Executive Branch. But a purported lack of Government
(Executive) enforcement of campaign finance restrictions is
not an excuse for the Government (Congress and the
Executive) to turn around and enact legislation that would
broadly suppress speech and sweep aside the First
Amendment. As JUSTICE THOMAS explained: “Vigilant
enforcement” of the earmarking rules is a more “precise
response” by the Government to any “circumvention
concerns.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 481 (dissenting
opinion).
For those reasons, McCutcheon relied on the earmarking
rule in explaining why the aggregate contribution limits at
issue there were unnecessary to prevent circumvention.
572 U. S., at 201–202, 210–212, 215, 222–223. So too here.
With regard to the disclosure rules, amicus and
intervenors question whether they are a sufficient
substitute for political-party coordinated-expenditure
limits. But as McCutcheon outlined, modern technology
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has evolved such that “disclosure now offers a particularly
effective means of arming the voting public with
information.” Id., at 224.
Importantly, disclosure does not stand on its own.
Rather, the combination of the base contribution limits plus
the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements
together serve the Government’s anti-circumvention
interests here—without unduly restricting core political
party speech.
In response to amicus’s and intervenors’ arguments that
the combination—namely, the base limits on contributions
to candidates, the earmarking rules, and disclosure
requirements—is still not adequate to prevent
circumvention, the current record in the States does not
demonstrate a sufficient risk of quid pro quo corruption
from political-party coordinated expenditures. In the
campaign finance context, this Court has often looked to the
experience of the States. Id., at 209–210, n. 7; Cruz, 596
U. S., at 307. When States do not impose a particular
campaign-finance restriction, the absence of evidence of
resulting quid pro quo corruption is a strong sign that the
concern is too speculative to support such a restriction at
the federal level. On that issue, as Chief Judge Sutton
recounted in the Sixth Circuit, a majority of the States
“largely give parties free rein to make coordinated
expenditures on behalf of their state-level nominees.” 117
F. 4th, at 396 (quotation marks omitted). Yet “no evidence
of corruption” via circumvention “has materialized.” Ibid.
That record in the States weakens any claim that federal
political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are a
proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored means for
addressing circumvention. In a case involving attempted
restrictions on speech, the absence of evidence matters. See
Cruz, 596 U. S., at 307. Speculation does not suffice to
justify suppression of political speech: The Court has
“never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a
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First Amendment burden.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210
(quotation marks omitted).
The base limits on contributions to candidates serve as
an initial prophylaxis against quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance in this context—after all, most contributions to
candidates are not given in exchange for some official
action. Id., at 221. The earmarking rules constitute a
second prophylaxis. The disclosure requirements supply a
third prophylaxis. So prophylaxis upon prophylaxis upon
prophylaxis already serve to prevent quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance.
The political-party coordinated-expenditure limits at
issue here would operate as a fourth line of defense. Such
a “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach requires that we
be particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law’s fit.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). But the fourth prophylaxis
imposes a severe and direct restriction on free speech and
infringes fundamental First Amendment values.
Otherwise stated, the restriction on political-party
coordinated expenditures is “disproportionate” and is not
“necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to the Government’s
interest in preventing circumvention of the base
contribution limits. Id., at 199, 218, 220 (quotation marks
omitted); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306.
On that last point, it is worth briefly focusing on the term
“disproportionate” from McCutcheon. In this campaign
finance context, determining how much regulation is
enough to serve the Government’s asserted interest is not a
scientific exercise. But in light of the First Amendment
free-speech rights at stake, courts must be particularly
vigilant. Courts cannot simply say, “what’s the harm in
allowing just one more regulation” when that regulation
would limit freedom of speech. On the contrary, courts
must preserve and protect the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Framers. Necessary, narrowly tailored,
and disproportionate may be technical legal terms, but they
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help ensure that courts appropriately respect the bedrock
First Amendment principles at stake.
To sum up: In light of the other meaningful prophylactic
measures available to the Government, and given the
severe infringement on First Amendment-protected
political speech that ensues from limiting a political party’s spending in support of its candidates, we conclude that the
political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are
“disproportionate” and are not “necessary” and “narrowly
tailored” for the circumvention interest it seeks to protect.
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199, 218, 220 (quotation marks
omitted); Cruz, 596 U. S., at 306.5
IV
Notwithstanding all of the above, amicus and intervenors
contend that we should adhere to Colorado II as a matter
of stare decisis.
Colorado II, however, is akin to a three-legged stool
where all three legs have already been knocked out—here,
by post-Colorado II cases. In like circumstances, the Court
sometimes has simply described similarly hollowed-out
5 In 2014, Congress amended the political-party coordinatedexpenditure limits to exempt certain categories of political-party spending. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, 128 Stat. 2772–2773. The law now imposes no limit on the amount that a political party may spend in coordination with candidates on election recounts, post-election-day contests, and other election-related legal proceedings. 52 U. S. C. §§30116(a)(9), (d)(5). And the law raised to $20 million the limit on how much a party may spend in coordination with its candidates on a Presidential nominating convention. Ibid.
We need not and do not rely on those statutory changes as a basis for our decision today, but those carveouts further illustrate that Congress is not pursuing an anti-corruption or anti-circumvention rationale with the current political-party coordinated-expenditure limits. It is hard to understand how corruption concerns could justify limits on spending on candidate advertising while allowing spending on a candidate’s legal fees. After all, to a candidate, there is no particular difference between coordinated spending on messaging or coordinated spending on lawyers. 22 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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precedents as “so undermined” by subsequent developments that they are “no longer good law” and
“retai[n ] no vitality.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 217– 218 (1997); Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U. S. 329, 342 (2019)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Kennedy v. Bremerton
School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 534 (2022) (recognizing that
“this Court long ago abandoned” a precedent and treating
it as already overruled). The Court has not hesitated to
reject adherence to a “doctrinal dinosaur or legal last-manstanding.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S.
446, 458 (2015). That description is apt for Colorado II.
Nonetheless, we will proceed to apply the ordinary stare
decisis factors.
The Court has often stated that stare decisis promotes the
“evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827
(1991). But stare decisis is not an “inexorable command.”
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 105 (2020) (quotation
marks omitted). And it is “at its weakest when we interpret
the Constitution.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). As
Justice Brandeis wrote and remains true: In “cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.” Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406–407 (1932)
(dissenting opinion).
When conducting the stare decisis inquiry, the Court has
sometimes broadly phrased the issue as whether a “special
justification” for overruling exists. See Ramos, 590 U. S.,
at 120, n. 3 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part). The Court
decides whether to overrule a constitutional precedent by
considering the egregiousness of the precedent’s error, the
jurisprudential and real-world effects of the decision, and
any cognizable reliance interests. Id., at 105–106 (opinion
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of the Court); id., at 120–123 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).
A prior decision may have been “egregiously wrong when
decided” or “may be unmasked as egregiously wrong based
on later legal or factual understandings or developments.”
Id., at 122.
Starting here with the asserted egregiousness of the
error: In Colorado II, JUSTICE THOMAS dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy. He explained that “the ordinary means for a
party to provide support is to make coordinated
expenditures.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 469
(2001). He added “that parties and candidates have shared
interests, that it is natural for them to work together, and
that breaking the connection between parties and their
candidates inhibits the promotion of the party’s message.”
Id., at 473. JUSTICE THOMAS further noted that the Court
had “never upheld an expenditure limitation against
political parties.” Id., at 475. And critically, he reasoned
that there “are better tailored alternatives for addressing”
the Government’s interests, including earmarking rules
that prohibit contributions to parties that are earmarked to
support particular candidates. Id., at 481. “Instead of
broadly restricting political parties’ speech, the
Government should have pursued better-tailored
alternatives for combating the alleged corruption.” Id., at
482.
JUSTICE THOMAS’s Colorado II dissent was persuasive in
2001 and has since been amply vindicated by this Court’s
subsequent precedents. To briefly reiterate some of those
post-2001 developments:
The Court no longer employs Colorado II’s watered-down
scrutiny that allowed “unskillful tailoring” in the First
Amendment campaign-finance context. 533 U. S., at 463,
n. 26. The Court now applies a stricter form of scrutiny: A
statutory restriction may not be “disproportionate” and
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must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to the asserted
interest. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572
U. S. 185, 199, 218, 220 (2014) (quotation marks omitted);
Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S.
289, 306 (2022).
The Court, moreover, has repudiated the undue influence
rationale relied on in Colorado II. See McCutcheon, 572
U. S., at 207–208. And after Colorado II, this Court has
identified earmarking and disclosure laws as sufficient to
prevent circumvention. See 572 U. S., at 221–224.
Still further, Colorado II’s description of the relationship
between political parties and candidates has not held up.
Colorado II stated that parties are not “in a unique
position” to candidates. 533 U. S., at 455. But as the Court
subsequently recognized, only parties “select slates of
candidates,” and “party affiliation is the primary way by
which voters identify candidates.” McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 188 (2003). Political parties
therefore do occupy a unique position with “a special
relationship and unity of interest” with candidates. Id., at
145.
Turning to the effects of Colorado II: That decision rested
in part on an apparent concern that political parties
otherwise could exercise outsized influence in political
campaigns and elections—in particular that parties “act as
agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce
obligated officeholders.” 533 U. S., at 452. Colorado II
opined that “parties’ capacity to concentrate power to elect
is the very capacity that apparently opens them to
exploitation as channels for circumventing contribution
and coordinated spending limits binding on other political
players.” Id., at 455.
But since 2001, political parties’ relative power has
substantially diminished in comparison to outside groups.
Colorado II contributed in part to that shift: The politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits impose a “stifling
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effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 630 (1996) (Colorado I)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.); see R. Pildes, Romanticizing
Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of
American Government, 124 Yale L. J. 804, 838–839 (2014).
Meanwhile, donors can and do send their funds to Super
PACs and other outside groups that have a First
Amendment right to receive and spend unlimited money to
support their independent political speech. See SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Comm’n, 599 F. 3d 686
(CADC 2010) (en banc); see also Emily’s List v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 581 F. 3d 1 (CADC 2009). In the 2024
election cycle, PACs raised over $15.7 billion, as compared
to $2.7 billion by political parties. Federal Election
Comm’n, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign
Activity of the 2023–2024 Election Cycle Press Release
(Apr. 23, 2025).
To uphold the political-party coordinated-expenditure
limits here could therefore help consign political parties to
continued second-tier status as compared to outside groups.
Weakened political parties distort the political system. And
in the views of many, the relatively diminished political
parties have ushered in increased political polarization and
fragmentation. For that reason, many who generally
support campaign finance restrictions have called for
elimination of the political-party coordinated-expenditure
limits. See R. Pildes & B. Bauer, Election Law Blog: The
Supreme Court, the Political Parties, and the SuperPacs
(June 24, 2025) (“[E]ven many in the political reform
community support an end to the limits” on political-party
coordinated expenditures).
Finally as to reliance: The reliance of outside groups on
a precedent that has helped them gain an unwarranted and
unfair advantage over competitor political parties in the
political process is not the kind of reliance interest that
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commands adherence to an egregiously wrong precedent.
More speech is generally better than less speech.
The bottom line: Colorado II’s reasoning has been
rejected by subsequent cases and is no longer good law in
light of the Court’s more recent precedents. To the extent
that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now
overruled.6
V
In response to the thoughtful dissent, two main points:
First, debates over the First Amendment and campaign
finance have arisen often over the last 50 years. We
recognize that at least two of the dissenters have not agreed
with some of the Court’s decisions in that area. See, e.g.,
Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S.
289, 314 (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting); McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 232 (2014) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,
558 U. S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Today, we have endeavored to
follow the principles laid down in the Court’s decisions. In
doing so, moreover, we have concluded that Colorado II is
(in our view) an outlier that is not consistent with those
precedents. See 533 U. S. 431 (2001).
The dissent focuses, in particular, on the operations of
joint fundraising committees—the apparent concern being
that a donor could write a large check to a joint committee
that would then be funneled to the candidate. See post, at
7–12, 15–18 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). But McCutcheon
rejected a similar circumvention argument, and its
6 To be clear, the Court’s decision does not address the statutory limits
on coordinated expenditures by outside groups. As the Government explained at oral argument, political parties possess an especially strong First Amendment interest in working together with their candidates and making expenditures on political speech in coordination with their candidates. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 65–66.
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reasoning applies here as well. In McCutcheon, the Court
explained that “a joint fundraising committee is simply a
mechanism for individual committees to raise funds
collectively, not to circumvent base limits or earmarking
rules.” 572 U. S., at 215. Any agreement between the donor
and the committee to direct funds to a particular candidate
“would trigger the earmarking provision.” Ibid. So “this
circumvention scenario could not succeed without
assuming” that the joint committee “would engage in a
transparent violation of the earmarking rules” and that it
“would not be caught” if it did. Ibid.
Second, although the dissent raises concerns about
money in political campaigns and about this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, the core disagreement between
the Court and the dissent is legally quite narrow, albeit
practically significant. See post, at 5 (opinion of KAGAN, J.) (“Our difference concerns only—though this is no small
‘only’—whether the Government’s strong interest in
preventing circumvention of the base limits also justifies
the coordinated-expenditure caps at issue here”).
The Court and the dissent agree that the Government
possesses an important interest in preventing
circumvention of the base contribution limits. The Court
concludes, as noted above, that the combination of the
statutory base limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure
requirements are sufficient to prevent circumvention of the
base limits. The dissent believes that, in addition to those
three statutory requirements, the statute’s coordinatedexpenditure limits are also necessary to prevent
circumvention. As we stated above, that is a serious
argument. But we ultimately and respectfully do not agree
with the dissent on that point for the reasons already set
forth at length in this opinion.
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* * *
The intervenors proclaim that the “Framers were
famously suspicious of parties.” Brief for IntervenorRespondents 28. But the Framers were even more
famously suspicious of government suppression of political
speech.
Recall again the words of the First Amendment:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.” The Constitution’s text matters. Contrary to that
text, the political-party coordinated-expenditure
limitations directly abridge the freedom of speech of
political parties.
History also matters. For nearly 200 years after the
ratification of the First Amendment, parties could spend on
campaigns in coordination with candidates. Parties and
candidates could work cooperatively toward their common
goal of advancing policies and winning elections to
implement those policies. Again, no one suggests “that
these elections were not functional or that they were
marred by corruption.” Federal Election Comm’n v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S.
431, 473 (2001) (Colorado II) (THOMAS, J., dissenting)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
So too, precedent matters. This Court’s more recent
decisions in cases such as McCutcheon and Cruz (as distinct
from Colorado II) demonstrate that the First Amendment
proscribes disproportionate regulations such as FECA’s
limits on political-party coordinated expenditures. See
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 218
(2014); Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596
U. S. 289, 306–307 (2022).
In short, constitutional text, history, and precedent
establish that the political-party coordinated-expenditure
limits violate the First Amendment.
Importantly, by holding FECA’s political-party
coordinated-expenditure restrictions unconstitutional, the
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 29
Opinion of the Court
Court’s decision today treats all political parties equally. It will allow all political parties—including the DNC and RNC
and the respective Senate and House campaign
committees, as well as other parties and party
committees—to participate more freely and compete more
fully in the political process, and to coordinate more closely with their candidates. Whether the Democratic party, the
Republican party, or other parties, all political parties and
candidates going forward can compete equally under the
same rules regarding coordinated expenditures and can
structure their fundraising, spending, and political speech
on a level playing field as they see fit within the law.
We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
KAGAN, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–621
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 30, 2026]
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
For over half a century, a federal statute has guarded
against actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption in our
political system by limiting the amount of money a donor
can contribute to a candidate. The law’s theory is simple: A
candidate may be induced to trade official acts for campaign
contributions—and the bigger the contribution, the
stronger both the candidate’s temptation and the public’s
suspicion.
The same statute also prevents circumvention of the contribution limits by capping political parties’ “coordinated
expenditures” with candidates. When a party makes such
a coordinated expenditure, it essentially pays the candidate’s bills—stepping up to fund something the candidate
would otherwise have to. Without limits on those expenditures, a candidate could ask a donor to make a substantial
contribution to the party so as to finance his own campaign
expenses. It would then be as though the candidate contribution limits did not exist: The donor could give far more to
the party than to the candidate directly, understanding
that the money would be passed through to the candidate.
And with that evasion of contribution limits, all the old opportunities for quid pro quo deals would come back into
2 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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KAGAN, J., dissenting
play. So Congress, sensibly enough, limited parties’ coordinated expenditures. By thus preventing circumvention of
the basic contribution limits, Congress protected those limits’ capacity to suppress corruption.
But today, the Court rewrites the rules, to allow circumvention of the contribution limits. The majority invalidates
Congress’s restriction of coordinated expenditures, thus enabling a party to serve as an alternative checking account
for a campaign. As a result, a donor will be able to give a
party as much as half a million dollars (as compared to the
$7,000 he can give directly to the candidate) to cover the
candidate’s bills. And the candidate can seek just such a
donation. So the Court ushers back in the same opportunities for quid pro quo corruption that the contribution limits
were meant to check.
Contra the majority, nothing in the First Amendment
mandates that outcome—as indeed this Court has held before. The First Amendment permits campaign finance restrictions that are narrowly tailored to protect against quid
pro quo corruption and its appearance. Caps on a party’s
coordinated expenditures pass that test with flying colors.
The caps prevent easy circumvention of contribution limits;
and so the former, as much as the latter, are needed to avert
corrupt deals between candidates and their supporters.
That is not my personal theory. It is (now was) the Court’s.
Twenty-five years ago, in a case called Colorado II, the
Court considered—and rejected—the same arguments it
finds irresistible today. See Federal Election Comm’n v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S.
431 (2001). The majority must overrule Colorado II to arrive at its outcome—so, once again, disregards and disrespects the core legal principle of stare decisis. But there is a yet more important point here for the American political
system: that the majority, also again, jettisons a rule
needed to protect our democracy’s integrity. With respect,
I dissent.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
KAGAN, J., dissenting
I
A
Soon after the 1972 presidential elections, Congress set
out to strengthen the Federal Election Campaign Act in response to recent revelations of quid pro quo corruption.
One apparent exchange of campaign contributions for a
public-policy favor loomed especially large. As told by the
Senate Watergate Committee, the deal involved price supports for milk, worth many millions of dollars to the Nation’s dairy industry. See Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Rep. No. 93–
981, pp. 623, 680 (1974). Originally, the Nixon administration had decided, after lengthy deliberation, not to increase
the subsidies. See id., at 622, 633. But following a meeting
with industry leaders, the President had a change of heart.
He told his top aides to convey to the dairymen the “need to
reaffirm their $2 million pledge” to his campaign “as a condition for the public announcement of [a milk subsidy] increase.” Id., at 648, 682; see also id., at 642–643 (describing the milk producers’ subsequent “middle-of-the-night rendezvous” to arrange for immediate “commitments of substantial financial contributions”). “The dairymen agreed,
the announcement was made,” and “the promised contributions began to flow.” Id., at 682. When Congress resolved,
a few years later, to amend the campaign finance laws, its
“primary purpose” was to prevent such “quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.” McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 197 (2014) (plurality opinion).
The object was to shut down the “opportunities for abuse”
associated with big campaign donations. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam).
At the heart of the 1974 reforms were so-called “base limits”—caps on the maximum amount any donor can give to a
candidate’s campaign. The idea behind those limits is
clear-cut. In a world where campaigning for office is expensive, candidates need financial contributions—and the
4 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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KAGAN, J., dissenting
bigger, the better. To get large contributions, they may be
willing to return public-policy concessions—a decision or a
vote on some matter of governance. And even when that
does not occur, the public can see that it might—that the
incentives and opportunities are there for buying and selling policy outcomes. So Congress set strict base limits to
protect both “the integrity of ” and public “confidence in” our “system of representative Government.” Id., at 26–27. In
1974, the limit was $1,000 per election. See id., at 26. Today, that limit is $3,500—or $7,000 if you count the primary
and general elections together. See FEC, Contribution
Limits for 2025–2026 (Jan. 30, 2025) (https://perma.cc/
57Q5-PYKG).
This Court has long recognized that those base limits
comply with the First Amendment. Preventing quid pro
quo corruption and its appearance is an important—indeed,
a “compelling”—government interest. McCutcheon, 572
U. S., at 199; see Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25–27. And the base
limits are “closely drawn” to further that interest. Id., at
25. They “focus[ ] precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions,” while leaving supporters of candidates free to engage in other political activity (including
small donations). Id., at 28. The limits thus target the “aspect” of political life most capable of creating “the actuality and potential for corruption.” Ibid.
And to protect the base limits from easy evasion, the
Court has recognized, further regulations may also be permissible. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 222–223;
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 171–
173 (2003); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46–47. Again, the idea is
straightforward. If a donor can circumvent the base limits
through some type of routing mechanism, the limits will
lose all their efficacy: They will become unable to prevent
actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption. So to the extent that a campaign finance law is appropriately “tailored
to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
KAGAN, J., dissenting
of the base limits,” it will satisfy constitutional scrutiny.
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 218. Today’s majority reaffirms
that point. See ante, at 27. For example, it describes “earmarking rules” (of which more later) as a “constitutionally
permissible way for the Government to prohibit circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates.” Ante, at 16 (citing McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 222–223). Our difference concerns only—though this is no small “only”—
whether the Government’s strong interest in preventing
circumvention of the base limits also justifies the coordinated-expenditure caps at issue here.
B
The anti-circumvention principle just noted should resolve this case in favor of the caps’ constitutionality. A contribution limit of $7,000 will do no good if a donor can use a political party as a conduit to give the candidate hundreds
of thousands more. Congress sought to prevent that kind
of evasion through the limits on a party’s coordinated expenditures; and those limits are well-tailored to the statutory mission. That is all the First Amendment demands—
which is why this Court upheld the same restriction against
the same challenge 25 years ago in Colorado II.1
Consider first the varied forms a coordinated expenditure
may take. The majority offers one example, which is least
harmful to its cause but not the standard fare. A party, it
1 Contrary to the majority’s framing, see ante, at 14–15, the question
here (which, to repeat, we have answered before) is not whether the caps on a party’s coordinated expenditures are permissible to “prevent circumvention of the base limits” via contributions to a party that are “earmarked (i.e., directed) to a candidate.” The question, instead, is whether the caps are permissible to prevent circumvention of the base limits by any means. It is the circumvention of the base limits that is the focus of the constitutional inquiry, regardless of the means by which that takes place. And as I will discuss later, the means by which donors can use parties to circumvent base limits (absent the caps) need not rely on earmarking at all. See infra, at 15–17.
6 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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KAGAN, J., dissenting
says, might wish to “spend money to produce and place a
television advertisement in support of a candidate after
consulting with the candidate’s campaign about the content, timing, or placement of the advertisement.” Ante, at
7. So it might—and in such a case the ad seems not terribly
far removed from a party’s independent speech on behalf of
a candidate, which of course cannot be limited. See ante, at
6–7. That is why the majority uses the example as its lead
case. More typical, though, is what happened here: The
candidate’s campaign, on its own, produced a political advertisement, and sent the party the invoice after the fact.
The party responded, “Received. Will process”—making
clear that it is less a collaborative speaker than a simple
piggy bank. 1 App. 202–203; 2 id., at 481. And yet a third
kind of party-coordinated expenditure does not involve advertising or other speech at all. A candidate, for example,
might forward the bill from his pollster; or the rent or electricity bill for campaign headquarters; or the catering bill
for a campaign event. So the political party is just helping
the candidate pay any of his financial obligations. That is
why Colorado II recognized that a party’s coordinated expenditures, like those from individuals or non-party groups,
can be “virtually indistinguishable” from direct contributions to a candidate. 533 U. S., at 444–445; see id., at 467
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the point).
Because coordinated expenditures are “as useful to the
candidate as cash,” Congress has long recognized that, unless regulated, they will undermine contribution limits. Id.,
at 446 (majority opinion). Consider the matter first with
respect to individual and non-party group donors (the latter
meaning corporate and interest groups). There is no point
to the $7,000 base limit if a deep-pocketed donor can spend
hundreds of thousands more to pay for campaign expenses.
So the campaign finance law treats coordinated expenditures by such donors as contributions—meaning, subject to
the normal base limits. See 52 U. S. C. §30116(a)(7)(B).
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
KAGAN, J., dissenting
And this Court long ago upheld that rule, explaining that it
“prevent[s] attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised
contributions.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47. (The majority today does not touch that holding, see ante, at 26, n. 6, but a
person attending to this Court’s recent campaign finance
decisions might reasonably beware.) Now turn to party-coordinated expenditures, where the rule is somewhat different because the problem is. The majority is right that cooperation between a party and its candidates is a generally
fine thing. See ante, at 11. The issue arises when—and
only when—the party functions as a funnel through which
individuals and non-party groups can finance candidates,
because then the party-mediated payments may give rise to
the same corruption concerns as the donors’ own payments
would. So Congress provided parties with some, but strictly
limited, capacity to make expenditures coordinated with
their candidates. As the majority describes, the caps range
from $65,300 for most House candidates to around $32 million for a presidential candidate. See ante, at 3; §30116(d).
In Congress’s view, anything more—and surely a regime
with no limits—would introduce too much danger of quid
pro quo deals between donors and candidates.
To begin to see why Congress was right, it’s essential to
take a look under the hood of modern fundraising (something the majority never does). Let’s imagine a candidate—
call him John Smith—running for President and seeking to
raise as much money as he can.2 Recall that under the
2 Although I use a presidential candidate as an example, everything
about the mechanism I am about to describe holds true for House and Senate candidates as well. Candidates for lower office can—and do— take advantage of this same fundraising tool. See Brief for Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 28–29. Of course, fundraising in campaigns for lower offices, as a practical matter, involves smaller dollar amounts than in presidential campaigns. But because a dollar goes further in a campaign for lower office, a donor can also secure a quid pro 8 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
KAGAN, J., dissenting
current base limits, an individual donor can give Smith’s
campaign at most $7,000 for the primary and general elections. See supra, at 4. But Smith can potentially get much
more out of that donor by raising money alongside his
party—meaning both its national and state committees. To
do so, he forms what is known as a “joint fundraising committee”—named, let’s say, the John Smith Victory Fund—
consisting of his own campaign committee, the national
party committee (the RNC or DNC), and party committees
from each of the 50 States (or close to it). Under the base
limits applying to parties, a national committee can accept
$44,300 from an individual donor, and a state committee
can accept $10,000. See FEC, Contribution Limits for
2025–2026. The great advantage of a joint fundraising committee is that it can collect contributions on behalf of all 52 of its component committees via a single payment: The donor writes one check to the John Smith Victory Fund for the
total amount he can contribute to all the committees. The
numbers add up. Fifty times $10,000 (the state committee
cap) is $500,000. And when the permitted contributions to
the national committee ($44,300) and Smith’s own campaign committee ($7,000) are added in, a single donor can
cut a check to the John Smith Victory Fund for over
$550,000 ($551,300, to be precise).
The lion’s share of that money typically gets pooled
within short order in the national party committee’s coffers.
It takes a couple of steps. First, the John Smith Victory
Fund parcels the money out to its member committees, in
accordance with the contribution limits. That means the
national party gets $44,300, and the state parties each get
$10,000. But then most state parties quickly transfer their
$10,000 payment to the national party, sometimes the same
quo with less money. So the potential for corruption is, generally speaking, the same.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
KAGAN, J., dissenting
day.3 See §30116(a)(4) (authorizing unlimited transfers between state and national committees of a political party).
The upshot is that most of a big donor’s $550,000 check to
the John Smith Victory Fund soon ends up in the national
party committee’s hands. Then the key question becomes:
What can the party do with that money?
Before today, the answer was: Many things, but very little to pay John Smith’s campaign bills. Campaign finance
law limits to a bare minimum ($5,000 per election) the
amount a party can simply give to a candidate, so direct
transfers are not an option. See §30116(a)(2). Similarly,
the caps on coordinated expenditures are set so low in comparison with a campaign’s total expenses as to make that
spending stream inconsequential. See supra, at 7; Brief for
Federal Respondents 21 (noting, for example, that partycoordinated expenditures in House races have never exceeded 1% of total campaign spending). That means the
overwhelming majority of the contributions the John Smith
Victory Fund collects—again, before today’s decision—will
go to party spending that only incidentally (even if meaningfully) benefits the candidate. The money may be spent,
for example, on improving get-out-the-vote operations; covering the party’s administrative costs; or supporting down——————
3 See, e.g., Levine, Soft Money Is Back (“[S]tate Republican parties
transferred nearly every dollar they received from the Trump Victory Committee to the RNC”); K. Vogel & I. Arnsdorf, Clinton Fundraising Leaves Little for State Parties, Politico, May 2, 2016 (The vast majority of the millions that the Hillary Victory Fund gave state parties was “quickly transferred to the DNC, usually within a day or two”); K. EversHillstrom, Trump Raised Record Money for State Parties, Then His RNC Took It Back, OpenSecrets, Feb. 24, 2021 (“On Oct. 15, the Alaska Republican Party received nearly $2.7 million from Trump Victory. The same day, it transferred the exact same sum back to the RNC”); ibid. (“The Nebraska Democratic Party transferred $4.3 million to the DNC on Oct. 22, one day after it received the exact same total from the Biden Victory Fund”); ibid. (“Dozens of state parties in deep red or blue states employed the exact same strategy”).
10 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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ballot candidates. Or else the money may be spent on independently produced advertisements. But what the money
is not helpful for is funding John Smith’s own campaign activities, of whatever kind.
Today, that constraint disappears. With no limits on coordinated expenditures, the party can serve as the candidate’s checking account. It can pay for everything John
Smith (or any other candidate) needs—advertising of
course, but also more prosaic things like catering, rent, and
utilities. See supra, at 5–6. So the party can take any or
every one of those $550,000 checks it receives from the John
Smith Victory Fund—which, recall, the Fund has received
from an individual or a corporate or interest group—and
convert the money (in full) into a direct benefit for the candidate. What is supposed to be just the sum of an individual
or group’s capped donations to 51 separate party committees instead goes in a single straight shot to John Smith,
the candidate. And then that can happen again and again
and again.
It does not take much imagination to see how that scheme
circumvents the contribution limit for a candidate, and
raises the risk of both actual and apparent quid pro quo
corruption. On a formal level, all base limits are complied
with—$7,000 to the candidate, $10,000 each to state party
committees, and $44,300 to the national one. Except that
in the real world, the candidate can get all the money for
his own campaign. So an ostensibly capped contribution of
$7,000 becomes . . . a $550,000 contribution (again,
$551,300 to be precise) to John Smith. And of course everyone knows this. The candidate recognizes both what the
$550,000 contribution will do for him and where it originally came from. The donor understands the main points
too. His measly $7,000 was not likely to have bought from
the candidate anything of consequence. But $550,000 is a
whole different story. And even if John Smith and all his
wealthy donors remain scrupulously above board, the
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
KAGAN, J., dissenting
public can see all the opportunities and incentives in the
system for political corruption. At least apparent quid pro
quos will be perceived all around. In short, as the political
party becomes the conduit for oversized donations to a candidate, the constraints on actual and apparent corruption
once offered by the base limits effectively disappear.
None of this is a new insight. (Indeed, to call it even an
old insight is to understate its obviousness.) Some 25 years
ago, this Court in Colorado II upheld limits on a party’s coordinated expenditures against a First Amendment challenge identical to the one presented here. 533 U. S., at 465.
And the Court did so on exactly the grounds I have laid out
above—because “unlimited coordinated spending by a party
raises the risk of corruption (and its appearance) through
circumvention of valid contribution limits.” Id., at 456. In
so holding, the Court recognized the strong role parties play
in politics, and reaffirmed its holding that a party’s independent expenditures could not constitutionally be limited.
See id., at 444. But the Court drew a sharp line between
those expenditures and a party’s coordinated ones, based on
their value to the candidate’s campaign. “[A] party’s coordinated expenditure,” we explained, was functionally the
same as “a direct party contribution to the candidate.” Id.,
at 464. And because that was so, “a party’s right of unlimited coordinated spending would attract increased contributions to parties” as a way for a donor to pass on funds to a
potential office-holder. Ibid. With that predictable outcome, base “contribution limits would be eroded.” Id., at
457. And as those limits became more fictitious than real,
the danger would grow of donors and candidates striking
“quid pro quo agreements.” Id., at 441.
The only real-world change that has happened since then
is that the danger is now still larger. That is because, put
simply, this Court has ensured that the numbers are still
bigger. For years, campaign finance law imposed “aggregate limits” on the amount a donor could give to federal
12 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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candidates and party committees in a two-year election cycle. In 2013-2014, for example, that limit was $123,200—
far below the $551,300 payment described above. But in
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, this Court (true
to form) invalidated the aggregate limit. 572 U. S., at 193.
It is because of that change that a single donor, working
through a joint fundraising committee, can now route as
much as $551,300 to a single candidate. See supra, at 8. To
permit that to happen, candidates from both parties have
sought to make their joint committees as large as possible
(a development the McCutcheon majority dismissed and the
McCutcheon dissent foretold, see 572 U. S., at 214, 216; id.,
at 247–248 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).4 And with that structure in place, a donor now has at hand a mechanism to funnel to a candidate about 80 times what the base limits say
should be the maximum. More than ever, then, caps on a
party’s coordinated expenditures are needed to stop quid
pro quo corruption.
4 The McCutcheon majority described as “divorced from reality”—and
“foreclose[d]” by “experience and common sense”—the scenario of “a donor giv[ing] a $500,000 check to a joint fundraising committee composed of a candidate, a national party committee, and most of the party’s state party committees.” 572 U. S., at 214, 216. Tell that to candidate Kamala Harris, who had a joint fundraising committee (the Harris Victory Fund) consisting of her own campaign, the DNC, and 50 state party committees. Or to candidate Donald Trump, whose joint fundraising committee (the Trump 47 Committee, Inc.) included his own campaign, the RNC, and 48 state party committees. (He was missing Hawaii and Vermont.) As reflected in the FEC’s online database, www.fec.gov/data, each of their joint fundraising committees received checks from multiple donors maxing out their party contributions, which after a pair of transfers wound up at the DNC or RNC. See supra, at 9, n. 3; FEC, Contributions to Harris Victory Fund (https://perma.cc/K8GB-WWGY); FEC, Disbursements of Harris Victory Fund (https://perma.cc/H3V4-DJVQ); FEC, Receipts of DNC (https://perma.cc/T93L-WVA7); FEC, Contributions to Trump 47 Committee, Inc. (https://perma.cc/R9CE-43QU); FEC, Disbursements of Trump 47 Committee, Inc. (https://perma.cc/2SSA-6XA4); FEC, Receipts of RNC (https://perma.cc/49P8-9BSN).
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13
KAGAN, J., dissenting
II
To overturn a precedent like Colorado II, this Court used
to insist that a “special justification,” above and beyond
simple error, is needed. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014). Stare decisis,
after all, “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). It also encourages judicial humility, which is all too often in short supply. Yet the majority could hardly be more dismissive of the “special justification” requirement for overruling precedent. See ante, at 22.
The majority would much rather explain why it thinks settled law is wrong than go to the trouble of establishing what
it should—an unusual need to start all over.
So today’s supposed stare decisis analysis mainly just recounts why the majority, had it been the majority in 2001,
would have decided Colorado II differently. Almost to
flaunt the point, the analysis gives pride of place to JUSTICE THOMAS’s dissent in that case; if only the rest of the majority had been there to join him! See ante, at 23. Today’s
decision thus can join the parade of those recently overruling established law because of a new majority’s new outlook
on a consequential matter. Here, the subject is campaign
finance law. See also Citizens United v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 319 (2010) (overruling Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990);
overruling in part McConnell, 540 U. S., at 203–209);
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 202, 204 (overruling in part
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38); cf. Federal Election Comm’n v.
Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 313 (2022) (invalidating
52 U. S. C. §30116(j)); Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n,
554 U. S. 724, 744 (2008) (invalidating §30117). For those
who think there is too much of it in this country—for those
who would prefer even more money to be pumped even more
14 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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easily into politics despite the danger of corruption—this
overruling is for you.
The majority, to be sure, eventually proposes three
changed circumstances (two legal, one factual) to support
its holding—but none lives up to the billing. First, the majority contends that the Colorado II Court applied a standard of review more deferential than the one now used. See
ante, at 23. But that is not so: Colorado II used the standard recognized as appropriate for the last 50 years. It asked
“whether the restriction is ‘closely drawn’ to match what we
have recognized as the ‘sufficiently important’ government
interest in combating political corruption.” 533 U. S., at
456; see Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25 (same); McCutcheon, 572
U. S., at 197 (same). In fact, even today’s majority ends up
using that standard. See ante, at 10 (noting that the difference between it and some supposedly different test is “subtle” and in the end “academic”). Second, the majority faults
the Colorado II Court for recognizing “undue influence” as
a form of political corruption. See ante, at 11–12, 24. And
so it did, in a parenthetical in the opinion’s background section, but not in any way that matters here: The Court’s
holding was explicitly and exclusively based on the risk that
a party’s coordinated expenditures pose the “danger” that
money will be “given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 464.
And third, the asserted factual change: the majority laments that “political parties’ relative power has substantially diminished in comparison” to “Super PACs and other
outside groups” that can “receive and spend unlimited
money” on political campaigns. Ante, at 24–25; see ibid.
(“Colorado II contributed in part to that shift”). But surely, that one is rich. If one is overruling—or just reversing—
decisions on that ground, I can think of a couple of more
obvious ones—that is, the ones that created the modern Super PAC system, and thus the complained-of imbalance.
See Citizens United, 558 U. S. 310; SpeechNow.org v.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15
KAGAN, J., dissenting
Federal Election Comm’n, 599 F. 3d 686 (CADC 2010) (en
banc). In any event, the majority’s new equilibrium theory—overrule Colorado II to restore the parties’ proper role
in American politics—is, shall we say, seat-of-the-pants. I
suspect it will not be difficult in a decade or two to disprove the majority’s view that what has been standing in the way
of a fully functional party system is Colorado II.
But there is no need to belabor the majority’s failures respecting stare decisis because today’s decision is wrong even
if the Court were appropriately starting from scratch. The
challenge for the majority is to explain how to prevent circumvention of the base contribution limits without the limits on a party’s coordinated expenditures in place. The majority takes some time to get around to that undertaking; it
first wends its way through no less than three strawman
arguments. See ante, at 10–13; see, e.g., ante, at 10 (“[N]o
one actually invokes or defends” such an argument). And
one can see why the majority is stalling: Once it gets to the
crucial question, it has no satisfying account to offer. The
majority places all its hopes on two alternative “prophylactic measures”: earmarking rules and disclosure requirements. Ante, at 21. But those two measures alone are insufficient to the task. Without caps as well, they can be
thought enough only when taken with generous doses of either willful blindness or wishful thinking.
Start with earmarking rules—both what they apply to
and what they do not. As the majority explains, the law will
treat a contribution to a party as instead a contribution to
a candidate if the donor earmarks or otherwise directs the
money in that direction. See ante, at 16. So if a donor giving money to a party says “I want you to send this on to
John Smith,” that money will count as a contribution to
John Smith, and will be subject to the base limit of $7,000
for donations to candidates. (Of course, that means the donor can only earmark funds up to $7,000.) But suppose the
donor, with no such instruction, just sends a $550,000 check
16 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v.
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KAGAN, J., dissenting
to the John Smith Victory Fund I have described above?
That payment is, according to campaign finance law, all
well and good: None of it counts as an earmark. So the
mechanism I outlined above—the $550,00 is given to the
Victory Fund, then gets disbursed to state party committees, then gets pooled in the national party committee, then
is used to pay the candidate’s bills—is entirely unaffected
by earmarking rules. That means a donor, regardless of
those rules, can pay $550,000 to support the candidate’s
campaign (despite the $7,000 base limit)—with all the opportunities for political corruption that such outsized donations raise.5
Perhaps the majority thinks (I am guessing here, given
the majority’s unwillingness to deal in the specifics of campaign finance) that no quid pro quo can occur in the above
scenario because the $550,000 payment to the Victory Fund
is unaccompanied by directions to use the money for the
candidate. If so, that would be wrong. Suppose John Smith
says to a donor: “If you give money to my Victory Fund, I
will subsidize your latest venture” (or if John Smith were a
Congressman, “I will vote to subsidize the venture”). And
then the donor gives that money, without any earmark.
That is a quid pro quo, pure and simple: The donor is making a requested payment to the candidate’s joint fundraising committee in exchange for an official act. The donor
does not need to say any earmarking words. In fact, he does
not even need to understand the campaign finance plumbing that will eventually make the money available for
Smith’s own use. And if the majority then protests that a
5 That is why, as I noted earlier, “the means by which donors can use
parties to circumvent base limits (absent the caps) need not rely on earmarking at all.” See supra, at 5, n. 1. And it is why, as I also noted, the majority is wrong to frame the inquiry as whether the caps on a party’s coordinated expenditures prevent circumvention by earmarking, rather than circumvention through any (including non-earmarking) means. See ibid.
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 17
KAGAN, J., dissenting
candidate would not think that quid pro quo worthwhile because he could not be 100% certain that 100% of the money
would return to him, cf. ante, at 13–14, 17, that objection
would also be mistaken. Parties have substantial incentives to ensure that a candidate can use (and use directly)
most of the money he raises for his joint committee—not
least of which is getting a proficient fundraiser-candidate,
who has procured the money in the first place, elected to
office. Perhaps the party will take some amount off the top.
But in the ordinary case, nowhere near enough to bring a
$550,000 donation to anything like the $7,000 base limit.
Which means that earmarking rules will do nothing to prevent the circumvention of base limits—and the attendant
risk of corruption.6
Something I said before applies here too: None of this is
a new insight, even if the mechanics of campaign finance
are constantly evolving. See supra, at 11. Colorado II made
basically the same point about the limits of earmarking
rules, even before joint fundraising committees became so
6 The majority’s only response is that McCutcheon, in ruling on aggregate limits, “rejected a similar circumvention argument,” ante, at 26— but that claim way overreaches. McCutcheon did not, as the majority implies, find joint fundraising committees generally impervious to efforts to circumvent contribution limits. Instead, its discussion focused on a single hypothetical, offered by the District Court, about a circumvention scheme involving “illegal earmarking.” 572 U. S., at 215. In that example, the donor did more than write a check to the joint committee; he also directed the party committees first receiving the money to reroute it to the candidate. See ibid. McCutcheon responded that because such directions would run afoul of the earmarking regulations, party committees were unlikely to agree to such a “transparent violation” of those rules. 572 U. S., at 215. Possibly so (though McCutcheon is not otherwise known for the accuracy of its predictions, see supra, at 12, and n. 4). But as I have just explained, no such violations are needed to utilize joint fundraising committees as a mechanism for skirting base limits and making quid pro quo deals. See supra, at 16. Nothing in McCutcheon holds that such earmark-free schemes do not present a circumvention— and hence a corruption—problem all on their own.
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prominent. Those rules, the Court explained, can “reach
only the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions
through to candidates.” 533 U. S., at 462. To rely on them
is thus to ignore the “practical difficulty” of “combating circumvention under actual political conditions.” Ibid. Just
so. A Court serious about preventing that evasion, as Colorado II concluded (and as the Colorado II Court was),
would refuse to treat “the earmarking provision as the outer
limit of acceptable” regulation. Ibid.
The majority’s second prophylactic reed—disclosure requirements—is even weaker. Here, the majority heralds
the wonders of “modern technology,” which allows “massive
quantities of information [to] be accessed at the click of a
mouse.” Ante, at 16–17. But to what end exactly? It is good
that voters can learn of the size of contributions—including
substantial ones to fundraising committees. But that information does not reveal quid pro quo dealing, and so cannot
adequately deter it. That is why this Court in Buckley held
that although disclosure requirements were “salutary”
measures, they could not possibly take the place of contribution limits. 424 U. S., at 28; see ibid. (“[C]orruption [is] inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and
the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed”).
And if disclosure cannot take the place of contribution limits themselves, it also cannot substitute for the coordinatedexpenditure caps that protect those limits from circumvention. To count on disclosure to prevent corruption is as
much as to give up on the goal itself.
Which is, sad to say, what this Court does today. A quarter century ago, Colorado II recognized that a party’s coordinated expenditures, if left unrestricted, were “tailor-made
to undermine contribution limits.” 533 U. S., at 464. That
is even more true now than it was then. See supra, at 11–
12. Those expenditures enable parties to funnel to candidates oversized contributions—massively in excess of the
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 19
KAGAN, J., dissenting
$7,000 base limit. And with that pass-through mechanism
comes the danger of quid pro quo corruption—as if the base
limit itself were half a million dollars. Congress, consistent with the First Amendment, can hold the line at $7,000. And
so too, Congress can cap the coordinated payments capable
of obliterating that line. By holding otherwise, the majority
ushers in untold harm.
When this Court in McCutcheon invalidated aggregate
limits, Justice Breyer wrote in dissent: “[T]oday’s decision
eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a
remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of
democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.” 572 U. S., at 233. I’m not sure what to call a remnant of a remnant, but that is what the Court has left today.
And the result will be what Justice Breyer warned of: a legal regime increasingly unable to stop political corruption,
and thus to preserve our institutions’ democratic legitimacy.