UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LEONARD POE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-03086 (AHA)
v.
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Leonard Poe sues the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) and
a WMATA bus driver, for negligence that caused a bus door to close on his leg. WMATA moves
for summary judgment, arguing Poe cannot establish the applicable standard of care without expert
testimony, the incident cannot have occurred as alleged, and Poe cannot recover future medical
expenses. The court grants in part and denies in part WMATA’s motion for summary judgment.
I. Background 1
According to Poe, as he was boarding a bus in D.C., the bus door closed on his leg, and the
bus moved about 60 to 75 yards while his leg was still stuck in the door. ECF No. 21-6 at 3–6. Poe
sued WMATA, claiming it is responsible for the bus driver’s negligence and asserting the bus
driver “negligently failed to maintain control of [the] vehicle, operated [the] vehicle at an
unreasonable rate of speed for the conditions then existing, negligently failed to dedicate full time
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As required at this stage, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to Poe and draws all reasonable inferences in Poe’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
and attention to the operation of [the] vehicle, negligently disobeyed the vehicular laws and
regulations of the District of Columbia, and negligently closed the bus door on Mr. Poe’s left leg.”
ECF No. 13 ¶ 8. He alleges the negligence caused injuries and seeks damages for both past and
future medical expenses. Id. ¶¶ 9–10; ECF No. 21-2 ¶ 26.
WMATA moves for summary judgment, arguing that Poe cannot establish the standard of
care without expert testimony and cannot show there is a genuine and material issue as to whether
the bus driver closed the door on his leg and then drove the bus because WMATA’s expert
witness’s testimony forecloses Poe’s version of what happened. ECF No. 21. WMATA also argues
that Poe has not shown he needs future medical treatment. Id.
II. Discussion
The court concludes that Poe does not need an expert to establish the standard of care and
that he has raised a triable issue as to whether the incident occurred as alleged but that he has not
raised any triable issue about damages for future medical care.
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party shows “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In reviewing the record, the court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The party opposing summary
judgment must point to evidence that “a reasonable jury could credit in support of each essential
element of [his] claims.” Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The
moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the opposing party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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A. Poe Does Not Need Expert Testimony To Establish The Standard Of Care
WMATA argues Poe cannot show a prima facie case of negligence because he has not
provided expert testimony about the standard of care for operating a public transit bus. ECF No.
21-1 at 5–12. But, while there may be circumstances related to bus operation that need expert
testimony, it is not needed here, where the issue—closing the door while someone is still in the
doorway and then driving forward—can be decided based on common knowledge and everyday
experience. There is, of course, a dispute as to whether the bus driver closed the door on Poe’s leg
and drove while his leg was still stuck in the first place, and that is for the jury to resolve.
The parties appear to agree WMATA is directly liable for a bus driver’s negligence. See
D.C. Code § 9-1107.01(80) (“The Authority shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts and
those of its Directors, officers, employees and agent committed in the conduct of any proprietary
function, in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory.”). And the parties also appear to
agree that Poe’s negligence claim is governed by D.C. law, requiring him to show “(1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the
defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm.” Whiteru v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 25 F.4th 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Ferguson,
977 A.2d 375, 377 (D.C. 2009)); see Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 774 F.3d 33,
37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2014); ECF No. 21-1 at 4. A plaintiff’s failure to establish the standard of care is
“fatal to a negligence claim.” Briggs v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 841, 848
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
“Ordinarily, the applicable standard of care is the traditional reasonable person standard,
which the jury can ascertain without the aid of expert testimony.” Robinson, 774 F.3d at 39
(cleaned up). But a plaintiff must offer an expert to show the standard of care “if the subject in
question is so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken
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of the average layperson,” unless it is “‘within the realm of common knowledge and everyday
experience’ of the jurors.” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting District
of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 433 (D.C. 2000)).
Poe’s claim involves the kind of standard of care that the jury can ascertain from its own
experience, without an expert. According to Poe’s evidence, the bus driver closed the door on his
leg when he was entering the bus and then drove forward about 60 to 75 yards while his leg was
still stuck in the door. ECF No. 22-3 at 44–47. Poe has also offered evidence that he yelled at the
bus driver about his leg being stuck, but the bus driver didn’t do anything about it. Id. at 47–49,
51; see also ECF No. 22-5 at 30–31, 38. The critical questions here—whether it is reasonable to
close the door when someone is in the doorway or drive forward while someone’s leg is stuck in
the door—are the sort that jurors have an understanding of from their own experience driving cars
and riding buses. Montgomery v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 25-7044, 2026 WL 880250,
at *2 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (“A juror is likely to have driven a car before and therefore has
some understanding of the standard of care for driving buses” (cleaned up)); Walls v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., No. 19-cv-02623, 2021 WL 8875534, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2021) (holding
that an expert was “not required to establish the standard of care” where the plaintiff claimed that
“WMATA’s bus driver was negligent for completely shutting down the bus, and thereby disabling
a safety sensor, without checking that passengers were clear of the doors, which caused her arm to
become trapped in closed doors”).
WMATA says that Poe needs an expert because this case involves “bus operation,” but
that sweeps too broadly. ECF No. 21-1 at 8–9. To be sure, courts have required expert testimony
in cases involving motor vehicles where the standard of care at issue goes beyond the realm of
common experience. See Thomas v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 22-cv-3097, 2024 WL
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4103706, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024) (holding expert testimony was needed to establish the
standard of care for “how close a Metrobus driver must get to the curb for a disabled passenger to
safely disembark”); Bush v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 19-cv-930, 2020 WL 921419,
at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2020) (holding expert testimony was needed to show the standard of care
when deboarding a passenger from a paratransit van because the “added responsibility” of
transporting “passengers with disabilities or special needs” takes the “operations even further
outside the realm of common knowledge”). And WMATA may be correct that, without an expert,
Poe could not advance certain theories of negligence related to a bus door—for example, that
WMATA did not adequately maintain bus systems related to the door or that there were defects in
WMATA’s door sensors—that are “beyond the ken of the average layperson.” Godfrey, 559 F.3d
at 572 (citation omitted).
It is also true, as our circuit has observed, that “[t]he D.C. Court of Appeals has required
expert testimony in a number of cases that, on first blush, appear to be within the realm of common
knowledge.” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845. But, as the circuit has explained, “expert testimony is not
always necessary to prove negligence in the operation of public transit buses,” specifically because
“jurors likely have experience driving similar vehicles, such as cars.” Montgomery, 2026 WL
880250, at *2. Indeed, the circuit has suggested that an expert may not be necessary to show the
standard of care a bus driver must exercise concerning checking that passengers are secure before
leaving a bus stop. Robinson, 774 F.3d at 36–37, 39. The court expressed “serious[] doubt that
determining whether it is reasonable to start a motor vehicle without checking to make sure one’s
passengers are secure is outside ‘the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience’ of
average jurors.” Id. at 39 (quoting Godfrey, 559 F.3d at 572). The same is true if, as Poe claims,
the bus driver closed the door on Poe’s leg and then drove while his leg was still stuck in the
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doorway. Therefore, the court cannot grant summary judgment to WMATA simply because Poe
has not had an expert show the standard of care.
B. Poe Has Raised A Triable Issue As To Whether The Bus Driver Closed The Door
On His Leg And Then Drove The Bus
WMATA also argues there is no genuine and material dispute as to whether the bus driver
closed the door on Poe’s leg and drove the bus while his leg was stuck in the door. ECF No. 21-1
at 12–17. But Poe has pointed to evidence that “a reasonable jury could credit” in support of his
version of the facts. Grimes, 794 F.3d at 94. Poe testified in his deposition that the bus driver
closed the door on his leg as he was boarding the bus and then drove the bus for approximately 60
to 75 yards while his leg was still stuck in the door before stopping. ECF No. 22-3 at 44–47. Poe
also testified that he yelled at the driver while his leg was stuck, and the driver asked what he
wanted her to do, looked at him, and continued to drive. Id. at 47–51, 53–54. And a witness,
Chantrel Carter, testified that she was on the bus and heard Poe complaining that the door closed
on his leg. ECF No. 22-5 at 22–23, 31, 38. Poe also points to a record showing that he reported the
incident to WMATA the day after it occurred. See ECF No. 22-2; ECF No. 22-4 ¶ 7.
WMATA asks the court to conclude these events never happened, dismissing Poe’s
testimony as self-serving and insufficient to give rise to a factual dispute and dismissing Carter’s
testimony because she heard, but did not see, the incident, and her testimony has inconsistencies.
ECF No. 21-1 at 14–16; ECF No. 23 at 8–9. But while a party’s testimony “will usually, in some
sense, be ‘self-serving,’” parties, “like other fact witnesses, are legally competent to give material
testimony” and in many cases “are the key, or even sole, witnesses.” Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d
701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016). WMATA argues that Carter’s testimony lacks foundation and is
therefore inadmissible because Carter testified that she did not see the incident and did not hear
what was said between Poe and the bus driver, she provided a timeline inconsistent with Poe’s
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account, and there was no activity on Carter’s metro card on the day in question. ECF No. 21-1 at
15–16; ECF No. 23 at 8–9. But Carter testified that she was on the bus when the incident occurred
and heard Poe complaining that the door had closed on his leg, which is sufficient at this stage.
ECF No. 22-5 at 22–23, 31, 38; see Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199
F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that, at summary judgment, evidence is properly
considered if it is “capable of being converted into admissible evidence”); Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A
witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may
consist of the witness’s own testimony.”). And WMATA’s concerns about the inconsistencies in
Carter’s testimony sound in credibility, not admissibility—that is, they are issues for the jury to
decide. See Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge at summary judgment.” (citation omitted)).
WMATA also asks the court to conclude that Poe’s version of events never happened
because WMATA’s expert says it couldn’t have happened. ECF No. 21-1 at 12–15. According to
the expert, the bus’s electrical system architecture logic and operating code would not permit the
bus to move if the front doors could not close, and the bus maintenance records reveal no issues
with the system. ECF No. 21-13 ¶¶ 4–8. Because Poe has not offered any evidence that the bus
system malfunctioned or was overridden, WMATA says, he cannot show that the events he
testified about ever happened. ECF No. 21-1 at 17; ECF No. 23 at 7. But that too misunderstands
the court’s role at this stage. WMATA’s expert testimony may undermine Poe’s and his witness’s
accounts, but that does not mean the court can simply credit it in place of the jury. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in Poe’s favor, as the court must, a reasonable jury could conceivably find
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in Poe’s favor on the issue of whether the bus door closed on his leg and the bus drove while his
leg was stuck in the door. 2
C. Poe Has Not Shown A Triable Issue As To Damages For Future Medical Care
Although Poe has shown there is a genuine and material issue as to whether the incident
occurred as alleged, he has not shown a triable issue as to whether he may obtain damages for
future medical care.
To recover future damages caused by a tort, a plaintiff must show the future consequences
of the tort are “reasonably certain.” Wilson v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119
(D.C. Cir. 1982). “Unless there is nonspeculative evidence demonstrating that future suffering,
additional medical expense, and loss of income will occur, the question should not be submitted
to the jury.” Croley v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 690 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Curry v.
Giant Food Co. of D.C., 522 A.2d 1283, 1291 (D.C. 1987)).
WMATA argues Poe has not offered evidence that, if true, shows a reasonable certainty
that he will need future medical care, and the court agrees. See ECF No. 21-1 at 17–19. Poe’s own
medical expert, Dr. Evan Argintar, testified that Poe is “at maximum medical improvement and
requires no further medical treatment.” ECF No. 21-12 at 2; see ECF No. 22-7 at 5. While Dr.
2
WMATA argues Poe has admitted the facts in its statement of material facts by failing to rebut them in his own statement. ECF No. 23 at 2–4; see Local Civ. R. 7(h)(1). But WMATA’s statement of material facts does not say that the bus doors could not have closed on Poe’s leg. See ECF No. 21-2. Indeed, as described in the statement of material facts, WMATA’s expert testified only that the bus could not have driven while the door was closed on Poe’s leg, not that the door could not have closed on his leg in the first place. Id. ¶¶ 9–15; ECF No. 21-13 ¶¶ 4–7. In any event, the court exercises its discretion not to treat WMATA’s factual assertions as admitted. See Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that Local Civil Rule 7(h) “permits, but does not require,” courts to treat facts identified by the moving party in a statement of material facts as admitted where the nonmoving party does not controvert those facts in a statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion). While WMATA’s expert testimony may be used as a basis to undermine Poe’s testimony at trial, it is not a basis for overlooking his sworn testimony at summary judgment.
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Argintar also testified that Poe may experience some permanent discomfort in his leg, that does
not create a genuine and material dispute as to whether Poe needs future medical treatment—
especially next to Dr. Argintar’s specific testimony that Poe will not. See ECF No. 21-12 at 2; ECF
No. 22-7 at 5. Poe does not point to any evidence that could otherwise raise a genuine dispute on
the question and, to the contrary, appears to acknowledge that his expert’s testimony “may narrow
Plaintiff’s future-medical-damages theory,” leaving this as a case about “underlying liability” and
“past-damages.” ECF No. 22 at 9.
The court therefore grants WMATA summary judgment as to damages for future medical
care.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part WMATA’s motion for
summary judgment, ECF No. 21. WMATA is not entitled to summary judgment as to whether an
expert is needed to establish the standard of care and whether the incident occurred as alleged but
is entitled to summary judgment as to damages for future medical treatment.
AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: July 1, 2026
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