UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GRACE WYNTER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 26-00354 (AHA)
v.
BERNSTEIN MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Memorandum Opinion
Grace Wynter sues her landlord Bernstein Management Corporation (“BMC”), alleging
that lease terms requiring her to pay BMC’s attorney’s fees and court costs if they end up having
a legal dispute violates the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”). BMC moves to
dismiss the complaint, arguing that the existence of the lease terms alone does not create an Article
III injury and Wynter therefore lacks standing to sue in this court. The court agrees and remands
the case.
I. Background 1
In 2024, Wynter signed an apartment lease with BMC, which manages buildings across
D.C. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 6, 13. The lease has a term saying, “Tenant is liable for all attorneys’ fees
incurred by Landlord in enforcing this Lease,” and an addendum saying that if “it becomes
necessary for Landlord to take legal action against Tenant . . . Tenant agrees to pay any court costs
1
As required at the pleading stage, the court accepts the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Wynter’s favor. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
incurred by Landlord and all reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The addendum also allows
BMC to keep and apply the security deposit to “any outstanding late fees, attorney’s fees and court
costs as a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction may award.” Id. ¶ 19.
Wynter sued in D.C. Superior Court, asserting that her lease violates the CPPA. See id.
¶ 51. In particular, she alleges these lease terms violate a D.C. law that prohibits property owners
and their agents from “requiring that the tenant pay the owner’s court costs or legal fees” in a lease.
Id. ¶¶ 21–22 (quoting D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, § 304.4). According to Wynter, BMC has therefore
engaged in a trade practice “in violation of a law of the District” and unlawfully “represent[ed]
that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations . . . which are prohibited by
law.” Id. ¶¶ 23–29, 51 (quoting D.C. Code §§ 28-3904(e-1), 28-3905(k)(1)(A)). She sues on behalf
of a putative class of tenants who signed similar leases with BMC. Id. ¶ 40.
BMC removed the case to this court and now moves to dismiss, arguing that Wynter lacks
Article III standing, that this court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that the
complaint fails to state a claim. ECF Nos. 1, 3. 2
II. Discussion
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must show that the court has subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear their claim. See Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir.
2008). That includes pleading facts that demonstrate the plaintiff has standing to bring the asserted
claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “Setting ‘mere conclusory
statements’ aside, the complaint must contain ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,’ to
2
The complaint also challenged lease terms requiring Wynter to indemnify BMC for claims and damages arising from injuries that occur on the premises. See ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 30–38, 51. But Wynter has since “elected not to pursue” that claim. ECF No. 11 at 4 n.2.
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support an inference of standing ‘that is plausible on its face.’” Air Excursions LLC v. Yellen, 66
F.4th 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
BMC argues Wynter lacks standing to bring her claim because she has not plausibly alleged
an injury in fact. ECF No. 3-1 at 6–8. “To establish Article III standing, the plaintiff must have
‘suffered an injury in fact’ that ‘is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant’ and it
must be ‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.’” Banner Health v. Price, 867 F.3d 1323, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). An injury must be “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158
(2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To be “concrete,” an injury must be “real” rather than
“abstract”—that is, “it must actually exist.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016). And
“standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. at 341; see
Hancock v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 512–14 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs
failed to allege a concrete injury and therefore lacked standing to bring CPPA claim). So a plaintiff
cannot “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm.” Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 341.
Wynter has not plausibly alleged any concrete injury from the existence of lease terms that
make her responsible for BMC’s attorney’s fees and court costs if they have a legal dispute. Wynter
alleges that BMC “subjects” her to fee-shifting lease terms that are unlawful under the CPPA. See
ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 16–29. According to Wynter, the lease terms are “unfair, misleading, and
deceptive,” but labels aside, she does not allege any injury that flows from the unfair, misleading,
or deceptive terms. Id. ¶ 41; see Pope v. Yazam, Inc., No. 24-cv-03540, 2026 WL 877484, at *3
(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that being misled is a cognizable injury to
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support standing to bring a CPPA claim). She does not allege, for example, that BMC has tried to
enforce the challenged terms against her, possibly exposing her to expenses, or any facts from
which the court could plausibly infer that BMC is likely to do so in the future. Wynter therefore
alleges “only a bare violation of the requirements of D.C. law.” Hancock, 830 F.3d at 514.
Wynter argues that her claim has “a close analogue to historical suits in equity that sought
redress for contractual injuries.” ECF No. 11 at 6. It’s true that assessing whether an injury is
concrete includes assessing whether “the asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm
traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—such as physical
harm, monetary harm, or various intangible harms.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
417 (2021) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340–41). And contractual injuries, such as a breach of
contract, can satisfy that standard. See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 346 F.R.D. 1, 7, 10–11 (D.D.C.
2024) (holding that putative class members had standing to pursue their breach of contract claim
because “a breach of contract is itself a concrete injury” and “parties long have been able to sue in
Anglo-American courts based on an alleged contractual breach, regardless of whether they have
suffered actual damages as a result”). But Wynter has not alleged any breach or other contractual
injury, only the mere existence of fee-shifting terms in her lease. Wynter therefore lacks standing
to bring her claim in this court. 3
3
Wynter also argues that the challenged lease terms have a “coercive” effect because they expose her to potential monetary liability, citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). ECF No. 11 at 5–6. But MedImmune does not stand for that proposition. There, the Supreme Court held the petitioner had standing before any breach of the parties’ license agreement because the petitioner’s “self-avoidance of imminent injury” by making royalty payments was “coerced by threatened enforcement action”—as reflected in a letter from the respondent that the petitioner viewed as a “clear threat” to bring a potential patent infringement action that could expose the petitioner to treble damages, attorney’s fees, and an injunction barring the sale of a product accounting for over 80 percent of its revenue. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 121–22, 130, 137. Here, Wynter has not alleged that BMC has invoked the fee-shifting terms to require payment
4
Wynter correctly observes that when “a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
a case that has been removed from a state court, the district court must remand the case.” Republic
of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see ECF No. 11 at 9; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). The court therefore remands this
case to D.C. Superior Court. 4
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, BMC’s motion to dismiss is granted insofar as it argues this court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and denied insofar as it seeks dismissal. This case is remanded to D.C.
Superior Court for all further proceedings. A separate order accompanies this memorandum
opinion.
AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: July 1, 2026
from her, let alone that BMC has coerced payment with the threat of enforcement action. See ECF No. 1-1. Wynter therefore does not face the “dilemma” faced in MedImmune of whether to pay or risk enforcement action. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 129.
4
Wynter argues that if the court remands the case, it should award her attorney’s fees because she filed this case in D.C. Superior Court and BMC removed it to federal court, only to then promptly seek dismissal for lack of standing. ECF No. 11 at 10; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (authorizing “payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal” when a case is remanded). But the court cannot find BMC had no reasonable basis for removal simply because it asked the court to resolve whether Wynter has standing to pursue her claims. See Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005) (“Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”); Collier v. SP Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018) (declining to award attorney’s fees where the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of standing after removing the case to federal court).
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