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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. United States Postal Service

2026-07-01

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE

ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,

Plaintiff,

No. 20-cv-2295(EGS)

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (“NAACP”)

Motion to Enforce Compliance with the Settlement Agreement and

Court Order (“Mot.”), ECF No. 171. 1 Upon careful consideration of

NAACP’s motion, the opposition, the reply, the applicable law,

and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS NAACP’s

motion.

I. Background

A. Settlement Agreement

NAACP filed this lawsuit on August 20, 2020 against

Defendants the United States Postal Service and the then1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of the filed document.

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Postmaster General of the United States 2 in his official capacity

(collectively “USPS” or “Postal Service”) challenging various

changes the Postal Service made with respect to the delivery of

Election Mail shortly before the 2020 national election and in

the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the changes the

Postal Service implemented lead to significant and nationwide

mail delays, NAACP sued “to require the Postal Service to

suspend these changes, to restore prompt and reliable mail

delivery, and to ensure that mail-in ballots are accorded

priority status, as they have been in past years.” Compl., ECF

No. 1 ¶ 5. On October 10, 2020, the Court granted NAACP’s Motion

for Preliminary Injunction, ruling that NAACP was likely to

succeed on the merits of its claim that the Postal Service made

the changes without following the procedures required by law.

See Mem. Op., ECF No. 32 at 29-34.

In December 2021, the parties entered into a Settlement

Agreement (“Agreement”) regarding the Postal Service’s practices

for Election Mail, including those regarding mail-in ballots.

See Stipulation of Settlement & Proposed Order (“Stipulation”),

ECF No 170. The Court “retained jurisdiction to enforce

paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of the Settlement Agreement, subject to

2 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the current Postmaster General David Steiner is substituted as Defendant for the former Postmaster General Louis DeJoy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

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the relevant limitations set out in paragraphs 4.b, 5.b, 6.b,

and 10.” See id. ¶ 2; Minute Order (Dec. 20, 2021).

The parties stipulated that the Postal Service agreed “to

prioritize monitoring and timely delivery of election mail.”

Stipulation, ECF No. 170 at 1. The Agreement requires the Postal

Service to issue “National Guidance documents” for every

national election cycle through 2028 that “reflect the Postal

Service’s formal nationwide Election Mail practices and policies

for prioritizing the monitoring and timely delivery of Election

Mail.” Agreement, ECF No. 170 ¶¶ 1-2. Also under the Agreement,

the Postal Service “retains discretion over the . . .

substantive contents of” the National Guidance Documents, id. ¶

2; but those documents “will reflect the Postal Service’s good

faith efforts to prioritize monitoring and timely delivery of

Election Mail” consistent applicable statutory requirements,

regulations, and Postal Regulatory Commission orders, id. ¶ 3(b).

B. Executive Order 14399 and the Postal Service’s Proposed

Rule

On March 31, 2026, President Trump issued an Executive

Order (“EO”) designed to exert federal control over who in the

United States may be sent a mail-in or absentee ballot in

federal elections by the Postal Service. See Exec. Order No.

14399, Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in

Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 17125 (Mar. 31, 2026). Among

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other things, the EO directed the Postal Service to initiate a

rulemaking on mail-in and absentee ballots and directed that the

proposed rulemaking include certain provisions set forth in the

EO. Id. at 17126. 3 The EO directed that any final rule be issued

no later than 120 days from the date of the order or August 3,

2026. Id. at 17127.

Pursuant to the EO, the Postal Service issued a Proposed

Rule on June 2, 2026 that tracks the directives of the EO. See

Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 32915 (proposed

June 2, 2026) (to be codified at 39 C.F.R. pt. 111) (“Proposed

Rule”). Among the changes proposed are new envelope design and

review standards—specifically “the use of the official Election

Mail logo, automation compatibility, placement of a uniquely

serialized Intelligent Mail barcode (IMb) on each outbound and

return ballot envelope, and a mailpiece design review.” Id. at

32916. States would be required to “notify the Postal Service of

the individuals to whom they will be mailing a mail-in or

absentee ballot, along with the unique barcode applied to the

3 On June 24, 2026, the provision in the EO directing the Postal Service to initiate the rulemaking was declared "legally void" as ultra vires and an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers, among other things. See California v. Trump, No. 1:26-cv-11581-IT, 2026 WL 1826490, at *16 (D. Mass. June 25, 2026). Accordingly, that Court enjoined the Defendants in the case—other than the President—from implementing the provision as to the November 3, 2026 or any earlier federal election in the Plaintiff states. See id.

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outbound and return ballot mail envelope for [the] individual”

to enable the Postal Service to create a “Mail-In and Absentee

Participation List” for each state—the “State-Specific Mail-In

and Absentee Participation List” or “State-Specific

Participation Lists” which the Postal Service would then

“provide to each state’s chef election official.” Id. States

would be able to “add to or modify the list of enrollees until

the last day that ballots may be mailed out to individuals under

state law.” Id. The Postal Service would only mail ballots to

individuals who are on the State-Specific Participation Lists.

Id. This would be accomplished through a Postal Service

verification procedure: the Postal Service would only accept

ballots for mailing to voters if the Postal Service “confirm[s]

that a state submitted a list consistent with the conditions

laid out in the proposed rule, and that the outbound ballot

mail, and thus the blank ballot that could be returned by mail,

is destined to individuals on the list, by checking the

barcodes.” Id. Mailings that do not comply with the standards

would be returned to the ballot mailer, who can address the

error and then resubmit. Id. at 32918.

Under the Proposed Rule, “states would retain full control

over who would (or would not) be able to vote by mail in federal

elections in each state” and states would provide this

information to the Postal Service “via the Federal Ballot Mail

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Portal.” Id. at 32916. Users of the portal would be required to

“certify to the Postal Service that any mail-in or absentee

ballots their state’s authorized ballot mailers provide to the

Postal Service for mailing meet the standards.” Id. at 32918. If

a state does not make this certification, mailings from that

state would not be accepted and will be returned. Id. The

Proposed Rule does not apply to federal primary elections or

voting under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting

Act. Id.

The only way for an individual to be enrolled in the Postal

Service’s Mail-In and Absentee Participation List is to be

included on the list provided to the Postal Service through

these processes. Id. at 32916–18. The Postal Service would then

use the information to verify outbound federal ballot mail—that

is, ballots sent from election officials to voters—before

accepting them for mailing. Id. at 32918. Specifically, the

Postal Service would review whether the mailing complies with

new envelope standards and whether it matches the statesubmitted Mail-In and Absentee Participation List and associated

barcodes. Id. Noncompliant mailings would not be accepted and

transmitted; instead, they would be returned to state or local

election officials or vendors for correction before

resubmission. Id. If a state declines to certify a Mail-In and

Absentee Participation List, the Postal Service would not

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transmit any outbound federal ballot mail to that state’s

voters.

II. Analysis

A. The Proposed Rule Would Violate Paragraph 2 of the

Settlement Agreement

NAACP argues that the Proposed Rule would violate Paragraph

2 of the Agreement because the Postal Service “would refuse to

transmit mail-in ballots in states that did not use specific

envelopes with specific codes, and would refuse to deliver

ballots for voters not included on a state-specific Mail-In and

Absentee Participation List.” Mot., ECF No. 171 at 9 (citing

Proposed Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. at 32918). Furthermore, the Postal

Service would “not deliver[] Election Mail altogether for states

that do not use USPS’s preferred envelopes and barcodes.” Id.

(citing Proposed Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. at 32918). NAACP argues that

“there is a grave risk that USPS will fail to timely deliver

Election Mail for voters who, through no fault of their own, may

not be on the USPS’s new Mail-In and Absentee Participation

Lists because their state has not certified its List” Id. at 9-10 (citing Proposed Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. at 32918). NAACP also

points out that the List will contain inaccuracies, resulting in

voters failing to receive Election Mail. Id. at 10 (citing Ex.

B, Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. at 78:1–2, DSCC v. Trump, No. 1:26-cv7

1114-CJN (D.D.C. May 14, 2026) (government defendants conceding

that no list is “perfect”)).

The Postal Service responds that Paragraph 2 is merely “an

informational obligation for USPS to publicly post practices and

policies” and that the Court’s ability to enforce Paragraph 2 is

“limited to requiring USPS to continue to post on its website

the handbooks, regulations, and/or memoranda pertaining to

Election Mail”. Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 12. 4 The Postal Service

also argues that the Paragraph 2 provision stating that “[t]he

Postal Service retains discretion over the specific manner and

method of posting, as well as the substantive contents of any

such documents posted, as further clarified in paragraphs 3 and

10 of this Agreement” supports its position. Id. Finally, the

Postal Service argues that the Paragraph 6(b) provision stating

that “[t]he Stipulation will specify that nothing in this

Agreement requires the Postal Service to undertake any specific

4 The Court does not address the Postal Service’s argument that NAACP is trying to enforce Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, see Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 13-14; since NAACP seeks to enforce Paragraph 2, see Reply, ECF No. 177 at 8-9. The Court also does not address the Postal Service’s arguments about the benefits of the Proposed Rule’s envelopes and barcodes, see Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 15-16; since they are not being challenged in the motion. And the Court agrees with NAACP that the Postal Service’s assurance that it will continue to use Extraordinary Measures for “completed ballots,” id. at 16; does not address the issue since the Proposed Rule would allow the Postal Service to reject non-compliant ballots and so they would not be mailed in the first place.

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measure to prioritize monitoring and timely delivery of Election

Mail, or any specific measure with respect to the treatment of

Election Mail” similarly supports its position. Id. at 14.

The Postal Service’s arguments are without merit. First,

Paragraph 2 is not merely “an informational obligation.” Rather,

Paragraph 2 requires that “the Postal Service will post publicly

on its website copies of officially issued National Guidance

Documents related to Election Mail.” Agreement, ECF No. 170 ¶ 2.

The Agreement defines National Guidance Documents as “official

materials issued by Postal Service Headquarters that will

reflect the Postal Service’s formal nationwide Election Mail

practices and policies for prioritizing the monitoring and

timely delivery of Election Mail for the national election cycle

taking place every two years.” 5 Id. ¶ 1. The Postal Service

acknowledges that under the Proposed Rule, if a voter is not

enrolled on the “State-Specific Mail-In and Absentee

Participation List,” the voter will “not receive . . . mail-in

or absentee ballots.” Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 21. That is because

the Postal Service would refuse to accept “noncompliant

mailings”—that is, mailings where the individual does not appear

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The Agreement defines Election Mail as “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process—including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications, and polling place notifications.” Agreement, ECF No. 170 ¶ 1.

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on the Mail-In and Absentee Participation List. Opp’n, ECF No.

175 at 10. The Proposed Rule provides that where a state

declines or fails to certify a list the Postal Service requests,

it “will not transmit any outbound federal ballot mail to that

state’s voters.” Proposed Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. at 32918. The

Proposed Rule violates paragraph 2 of the Agreement because the

Postal Service cannot post documents reflecting “practices and

policies for prioritizing the monitoring and timely delivery of

Election Mail” if its policies provide that it will not accept

“noncompliant mailings” and therefore will not deliver mail-in

or absentee ballots to some voters, and if it will not mail

ballots to any voters in a state where the state “declines or

fails to certify a list.”

Second, the Paragraph 2 provision stating that “[t]he

Postal Service retains discretion over the specific manner and

method of posting, as well as the substantive contents of any

such documents posted, as further clarified in paragraphs 3 and

10 of this Agreement” does not give the Postal Service

discretion to disseminate “substantive contents” that are

inconsistent with the Agreement as a whole. “The cases are

legion establishing that where a contract affords discretion to

the government, ‘exercise of that discretion must be fair and

reasonable. . . .’” Hous. Auth. of Slidell v. United States, 149

Fed. Cl. 614, 637 (Fed. Cl. 2020) (quoting Everett Plywood Corp.

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v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082, 1090 (Ct. Cl. 1975)).

Accordingly, the “substantive contents” of the postings must be

consistent with its “practices and policies for prioritizing the

monitoring and timely delivery of Election Mail.”

Third, the Paragraph 6(b) provision stating that “[t]he

Stipulation will specify that nothing in this Agreement requires

the Postal Service to undertake any specific measure to

prioritize monitoring and timely delivery of Election Mail, or

any specific measure with respect to the treatment of Election

Mail” does not allow the Postal Service to put in place a policy

of refusing to accept and deliver certain ballots.

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the

Proposed Rule would violate Paragraph 2 of the Settlement

Agreement.

B. NAACP’s Motion is Ripe

The Postal Service advances several arguments in support of

its position that NAACP’s challenge to the Proposed Rule is not

ripe. For the reasons explained below, the Postal Service’s

arguments are without merit.

The Postal Service argues that NAACP’s challenge to the

Proposed Rule is not ripe because the Proposed Rule is without

legal effect, citing cases that stand for the undisputed

proposition that proposed rules are not final agency action

subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure

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Act (“APA”). See Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 15-16. But NAACP is not

seeking judicial review of agency action under the APA; it is

seeking to enforce Paragraph 2 of the Agreement and asks the

Court to declare that the standards and procedures set forth in

the Postal Service’s Proposed Rule would violate the Agreement

and to enjoin the Postal Service from implementing those

standards and procedures. See Proposed Order, ECF No. 171-7 at

1.

The Postal Service argues that the issue before the Court

is not ripe because the Court’s “intervention at this time would

merely result in an advisory opinion as to whether the Proposed

Rule is in keeping with the Agreement in violation of Article

III’s requirement that federal courts resolve only “‘cases’” and

“‘controversies.’” Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 15 (quoting U.S. Const.

art. III, § 2). But the Postal Service has not argued that NAACP

lacks standing to bring its motion. See generally Opp’n, ECF No.

175.

Prudential ripeness “is best seen in a twofold aspect,

requiring [the Court] to evaluate both the fitness of the issues

for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.” Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 149 (1967). But see Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus,

573 U.S. 149, 167 (2014) (questioning the “continuing vitality

of the prudential ripeness doctrine,” which appears to be in

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“tension with . . . the principle that a federal court's

obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is

virtually unflagging” (citation modified)). The Court concludes

that both factors weigh in favor of considering the merits of

NAACP’s motion.

As to fitness, the motion and opposition present legal

questions involving the interpretation of the Agreement and

whether the Proposed Rule would violate it. See, e.g., Sweeney

v. USPS, 159 F.3d 1342, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Interpretation

of a settlement agreement is a question of law . . . .”). That

the Proposed Rule is not final does not affect the Court’s

interpretation of the Agreement. Rather, the declaratory relief

NAACP seeks from the Court is appropriate in this situation. See

IAP Worldwide Servs., Inc. v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 57, 70

(Fed. Cl. 2022) (noting that “[t]he archetypal situation calling

for declaratory relief is a dispute over contract

interpretation”) (citation omitted)).

As to hardship, NAACP has plausibly suggested—and the

Postal Service has not disputed—that the Proposed Rule is

already having a “real impact on present day affairs.” Volvo N.

Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Pro. Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 64

(2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Among other things, the

Postal Service issued its 2026-2027 Official Election Mail Guide

in February 2026, see Reply, ECF No. 177 at 16; and the changes

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mandated in the Proposed Rule are “already causing confusion and

apprehension,” id. (citing evidence in California v. Trump, No.

1:26-cv-11581-IT (D. Mass. Apr. 23, 2026), Dkt. No. 105 where

stakeholders have attested to the harm to their interests being

caused by the Proposed Rule).

The Postal Service points to NAACP v. Trump to explain that

NAACP’s “ripeness problem” is based on a series of

contingencies: “any final rule that may (or may not) be

implemented has yet to be issued (if at all), and the guidance

documents that would have to be revised to reflect that rule (if

it is issued) need not be promulgated for nearly four months.”

Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 15-16 (citing NAACP v. Trump, No. 26-CV01114 (CJN), 2026 WL 1487833 at *10 (D.D.C. May 28, 2026)). But

the Postal Service has not explained—nor provided authority for—

why the Court cannot declare that the standards and procedures

set forth in the Proposed Rule would violate the Agreement and

enjoin the Postal Service from implementing the standards and

procedures. As explained above, declaratory relief is

appropriate in this situation. See IAP Worldwide Servs., Inc.,

160 Fed. Cl. at 70.

For all these reasons, NAACP’s challenge to the Proposed

Rule is ripe.

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C. NAACP Satisfied the Meet and Confer Requirement in

Paragraph 10 of the Agreement

Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provides that prior to filing

a motion for relief of a violation of paragraphs 2, 4, or 5 of

the Agreement, NAACP must “specify in writing to the Postal

Service the alleged violation” and must give “the Postal Service

at least five days’ notice to investigate the allegations.”

Agreement, ECF No. 170 ¶ 10. The Postal Service argues that the

Court is without jurisdiction to consider the motion because

NAACP did not comply with this requirement when it did not wait

at least five days after the Proposed Rule was published in the

Federal Register on June 2, 2026 before filing the instant

motion. See Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 16-17.

On April 2, 2026, the first business day after the EO was

issued and sixty-two days before filing the motion, NAACP wrote

to the Postal Service to inform it that the rulemaking directed

by the EO would cause it to violate the Agreement. Reply,

Exhibit A, ECF No. 177—1 at 7-8. The Postal Service acknowledged

receipt on the same day and not having received a response,

NAACP sent a follow up on April 8, 2026. Id. at 6-7. The Postal

Service responded on April 14, 2026, stating that paragraph 10

was not implicated because “[i]t is . . . premature to know what

final rule will emerge from the notice-and-comment process,

including how any such rule would implicate existing legal

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authorities.” Id. at 5. NAACP responded on April 16, 2026,

stating that “[a]s we understand it, the EO directs USPS to

initiate a rulemaking that would violate [its] commitments . . .

required under the Settlement Agreement. Under these

circumstances, we do not think the concerns set forth in our

April 2 email are premature.” Id. at 4. The Postal Service

acknowledged receipt the same day. Id. at 3. On June 2, 2026,

NAACP informed the Postal Service that it intended to file the

instant motion and asked the Postal Service to confirm its

opposition, which it did the same day. Id. at 2.

The Postal Service asserts that NAACP “cannot bootstrap

conferral about one issue (the Executive Order) into an adequate

conferral about the issue it actually challenges here, the

NPRM.” Opp’n, ECF No. 175 at 17. The Postal Service’s argument

is without merit. Sixty-two days before filing the motion, NAACP

wrote to the Postal Service to inform it that the rulemaking

directed by the EO would cause the Postal Service to violate the

Agreement and the Postal Service declined to substantively

engage with NAACP on the issue. The Proposed Rule was issued

pursuant to the EO and incorporates the requirements set forth

in the EO. Compare Proposed Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. 32915 (June 2,

2026) with Exec. Order, 91 Fed. Reg. 17125 (Mar. 31, 2026). For

all these reasons, NAACP complied with the meet and confer

requirement in the Agreement.

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D. The Postal Service’s Claim-Splitting Argument Is

Without Merit

Finally, the Postal Service relies on Zerilli v. Evening

News Association to argue that NAACP “is engaging in

impermissible claim splitting” because it should have brought

its motion as part of NAACP v. Trump, No. 26-1151. Opp’n, ECF

175 at 17-18. In Zerilli, the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit held that a plaintiff has “no right to

maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter

at the same time in the same court and against the same

defendant.” 628 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation

omitted). The Postal Service claims that NAACP meets the Zerilli

criteria for claim splitting because: (1) it is challenging the

EO that prompted the Proposed Rule in NAACP v. Trump and in the

instant motion; (2) both that case and the instant motion

challenge Section 3(b) of the EO; (3) both cases are in the same

court; and (4) both cases are against the same defendant. Opp’n,

ECF No. 175 at 18.

The Postal Service’s argument is without merit. “[C]laimsplitting prohibits duplicative litigation filed before

judgment.” Steele v. United States, 144 F.4th 316, 324 (D.C.

Cir. 2025). There is nothing duplicative about the instant case

and NAACP v. Trump. This case was filed on August 20, 2020,

alleging claims for (1) Non-statutory review of unlawful agency

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action for failure to follow the procedures required by 39

U.S.C. § 3661, (2) Non-statutory review of unlawful agency

action that is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with

39 U.S.C. § 101(e), (3) Mandamus to enforce 29 U.S.C. § 3991,

and (4) Mandamus to enforce 39 U.S.C. § 101(e). See Am. Compl.,

ECF No. 149. It was resolved with the Agreement and closed in

2021. The instant motion seeks relief based on the Proposed Rule

issued pursuant to the EO. By contrast, NAACP v. Trump was filed

nearly six years later on April 3, 2026, alleging claims for (1)

Ultra Vires Presidential Action, (2) Violation of Separation of

Powers—Unlawful Intrusion on Congressional Authority and

Violation of Federalism, (3) Violation of Separation of Powers—

Unlawful Intrusion on State Authority, (4) Constitutional Right

to Vote, (5) Violation of the Postal Service’s Statutory

Authority, and (6) Agency Action Contrary to the Privacy Act

arising out of the EO. That both involve the EO in some way does

not turn the claims into the same “subject matter.”

Furthermore, NAACP could not seek the relief requested in

the instant motion in a separate action: the enforcement of the

terms of the Agreement that resolved this case can only be

enforced through a motion filed in this case. See Garcia Ramirez

v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 812 F. Supp. 3d 86, 97 (D.D.C.

2025) (“District courts have the authority to enforce the terms

of their mandates.”) (citation omitted).

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For all these reasons, NAACP is not engaging in

impermissible claim splitting.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS NAACP’s Motion

to Enforce Compliance with the Settlement Agreement and Court

Order, ECF No. 171. An appropriate Order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

July 1, 2026

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