IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1024
Filed 1 July 2026
Pasquotank County, Nos. 24JT001027-690, 24JT001028-690, 24JT001029-690
In re:
D.A.S.,
E.D.S.,
U.J.R.S.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 29 July 2025 by Judge
Meader W. Harriss, III, in Pasquotank County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 2 June 2026.
Frank P. Hiner, IV, for petitioner-appellee Pasquotank County Department of
Social Services.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by NC GAL Appellate Counsel Matthew D.
Wunsche, for appellee guardian ad litem.
Jason Senges for respondent-appellant mother.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Respondent-Mother appeals from (1) the trial court’s order adjudicating her
minor children “Dahlia,” “Emmett,” and “Uma”1 neglected; and (2) its disposition
1 We adopt the pseudonyms to which the parties stipulated in order to protect the identities of
the juveniles. See N.C.R. App. P. 42(b).
IN RE: D.A.S., E.D.S., U.J.R.S.
Opinion of the Court
order terminating Respondent-Mother’s parental rights to the children.2 On appeal,
Respondent-Mother argues that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
the case. After careful review, we affirm.
I. Procedural Background
On 26 October 2022, Petitioner Pasquotank County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed petitions alleging that Dahlia, Emmett, and Uma were
“neglected juveniles” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). After a hearing, the
trial court entered an order on 7 February 2023 adjudicating the children neglected
and awarding custody to DSS.
In October 2024, DSS filed petitions to terminate Respondent-Mother’s
parental rights to Dahlia, Emmett, and Uma. DSS alleged the following grounds for
termination: 1) neglect, id. § 7B-1111(a)(1); 2) that Respondent-Mother had willfully
left the children in foster care or replacement outside the home for more than 12
months without showing reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that
led to their removal, id. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and 3) Respondent-Mother’s willful failure
to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children’s care, id. § 7B-1111(a)(3).
On 6 November 2024, the termination petitions came on for hearing in
Pasquotank County District Court. On 10 December 2024, the trial court entered a
preliminary order directing, inter alia, DSS to serve Dahlia’s putative father by
2 In the disposition order, the court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s putative and biological fathers. The fathers are not parties to this appeal.
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Opinion of the Court
publication in accordance with N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j1).
Following a continuance, the matter came on for hearing on 8 April 2025. On
29 July 2025, the trial court entered adjudication and disposition orders. The court
adjudicated the minor children neglected and concluded that grounds existed to
terminate Respondent-Mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111(a)(1)–(3). In its disposition order, the trial court determined that “it [wa]s in the
best interests of the minor children that the parental rights of . . . Respondent-Mother
be terminated” and terminated Respondent-Mother’s parental rights.
Respondent-Mother filed timely notice of appeal from the orders.
II. Discussion
Respondent-Mother contends that DSS “failed to comply” with N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1104(5) when it “did not attach a copy of a custody order proving [it] had
standing to file the petitions” and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to terminate Respondent-Mother’s parental rights. We disagree.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is “the power of the court to deal with the kind of
action in question.” In re N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. 722, 724, 760 S.E.2d 49, 52 (citation
omitted), disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 826, 763 S.E.2d 517 (2014). “Absent subjectmatter jurisdiction, a trial court cannot enter a legally valid order infringing upon a
parent’s constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child.” In
re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 101, 852 S.E.2d 1, 3–4 (2020). “When a court decides a matter
without the court’s having jurisdiction, then the whole proceeding is null and void,
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Opinion of the Court
i.e., as if it had never happened. Thus the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may
be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.” In re
J.H., 244 N.C. App. 255, 259, 780 S.E.2d 228, 233 (2015) (extraneity removed).
Whether “a trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law
that is reviewed de novo.” A.L.L., 376 N.C. at 101, 852 S.E.2d at 4. When conducting
de novo review, “this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the trial court.” In re T.N.G., 244 N.C. App. 398, 402, 781 S.E.2d
93, 97 (2015) (extraneity removed).
Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal. N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. at
733, 760 S.E.2d at 57. “[T]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to
show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707, 782 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2016) (extraneity
removed).
“A trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a petition to terminate parental
rights is conferred by [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 7B-1101” of our Juvenile Code. A.L.L., 376
N.C. at 104, 852 S.E.2d at 6. This section provides that “[t]he court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any petition or motion relating
to termination of parental rights to any juvenile who . . . is in the legal or actual
custody of a county department of social services . . . at the time” the petition or
motion is filed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101. However, before a court with general
jurisdiction may exercise jurisdiction, “there must be some appropriate application
invoking the judicial power of the court with respect to the matter in question.” In re
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Opinion of the Court
T.B., J.B., C.B., 177 N.C. App. 790, 791, 629 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2006) (citation omitted).
In order to invoke the judicial power of a court, the petitioner must have
standing. Standing to file a petition to terminate parental rights is addressed in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103. This section provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny county
department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed
child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of
competent jurisdiction” may file a petition to terminate parental rights. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3). To evidence proper standing, the termination petition must
provide, inter alia, “[t]he name and address of any person or agency to whom custody
of the juvenile has been given by a court of this or any other state”; in support of this
statement, “a copy of the custody order shall be attached to the petition or motion.”
Id. § 7B-1104(5).
Accordingly, “where DSS files a motion for termination of parental rights, the
trial court has subject[-]matter jurisdiction only if the record includes a copy of an
order, in effect when the petition is filed, that awards DSS custody of the child” or
where DSS’s failure to attach the custody order is remediated “by amendment of the
petition or later production of the order.” T.B., 177 N.C. App. at 793, 629 S.E.2d at
898.
In the instant case, the children were in DSS custody at the time of the filing
of the petitions. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether DSS’s attachment to the
petitions of the 15 May 2024 permanency planning order was sufficient to give DSS
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Opinion of the Court
standing to petition the court to terminate Respondent-Mother’s parental rights and
vest the court with subject-matter jurisdiction to do so.
Respondent-Mother contends, without citation to authority, that the 15 May
2024 permanency planning order does not constitute “a proper custody order” and
therefore, DSS did not have standing to file the termination petition. Yet there is no
dispute that, in the decretal portion of this order, the court expressly ordered that
“[l]egal custody of [Dahlia, Emmett, and Uma] shall remain with” DSS. Indeed, the
court could have instead modified its award of custody from DSS to another. Thus,
we conclude that the 15 May 2024 permanency planning order is a custody order for
purposes of standing to file a petition to terminate parental rights.
DSS filed the termination petitions in October 2024. At that time, the custody
order in effect was the 15 May 2024 permanency planning order in which the court
maintained custody of the children with DSS. Accordingly, DSS had standing to file
the termination petitions, and the court had jurisdiction to terminate RespondentMother’s parental rights.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication and
disposition orders.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge DILLON and Judge HAMPSON concur.
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