IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1130
Filed 1 July 2026
Randolph County, Nos. 22JA000231-750, 22JA000232-750
IN THE MATTER OF: G.A.D., M.L.D.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order of termination of parental rights
entered 11 June 2025 by Judge Darren Allen in Randolph County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2026.
Patricia M. Propheter for respondent-appellant mother.
Chrystal S. Kay for petitioner-appellee Randolph County Department of Social
Services.
A. Grant Simpkins for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
FREEMAN, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as
to G.A.D. (“Gloria”) and M.L.D. (“Melody”).1 On appeal, respondent-mother contends
that the trial court erred by failing to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25
U.S.C. §§ 1901–63) (“ICWA”). After careful review, we remand for further
proceedings to ensure compliance with ICWA.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
1 Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b), pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ identities.
IN RE: G.A.D., M.L.D.
Opinion of the Court
Respondent-mother and respondent-father are the biological parents of Gloria
and Melody. On 13 December 2022, Randolph County Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) filed juvenile petitions, alleging that Gloria and Melody were neglected and
dependent juveniles due to unstable housing and substance abuse. Gloria and
Melody were placed in DSS nonsecure custody on 14 December 2022.
On 15 December 2022, the trial court held a hearing to determine the need for
the continued non-secure custody of the minor children. Respondent-father, but not
respondent-mother, was present at the hearing. In its written order entered 10
January 2023, the trial court found the following:
The Court has considered the Indian Child Welfare Act . . .
as it applies to the minor children in this matter and finds
that such is not applicable.
[Respondent-father] identifies his race as white and the
race of his minor children as white.
[Respondent-father] states that neither he nor the minor
children are members or eligible for membership to a
Native American Tribe.
This order contained no inquiry on the record to respondent-mother as she was
not present at the hearing. The trial court ordered that the minor children remain
in DSS custody and established visitation plans for respondent-parents. It further
ordered that “[t]he parents shall inform [DSS] and the Court if they receive any
information that either they or the minor children are members or eligible for
membership to a Native American tribe.”
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Opinion of the Court
Five subsequent hearings to determine the need for the continued non-secure
custody of the minor children took place on 21 December 2022, 18–19 January 2023,
15 February 2023, 15 March 2023, and 12 April 2023. Respondent-parents were each
only present at one of the five hearings: respondent-father was present for the 21
December 2022 hearing and respondent-mother was present for the 18–19 January
2023 hearing via WebEx. In its subsequent written orders, the trial court ordered
that the children remain in DSS custody. In each order, the trial court stated that it
“ha[d] considered the Indian Child Welfare Act . . . as it applie[d] to the minor
children” and found it was not applicable. In each order, the court ordered that “[t]he
parents shall inform [DSS] and the Court if they receive any information that either
they or the minor children are members or eligible for membership to a Native
American tribe.”
On 18 May 2023, the trial court held an adjudication and disposition hearing,
and the children were adjudicated neglected and dependent. Respondent-mother was
present via WebEx. In its 9 June 2023 written order, the trial court made no findings
regarding ICWA.
The trial court held permanency planning hearings on 25 October 2023, 20
March 2024, 12 June 2024, and 19 December 2024. Respondent-father was present
for none of the hearings and respondent-mother was present via WebEx at only the
12 June 2024 hearing. In its subsequent written orders, the trial court made no
findings regarding ICWA. At each permanency planning hearing, the minor children
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Opinion of the Court
continued to be placed in DSS’s custody. In the initial hearings, the primary plan
was reunification and respondent-mother continued to be ordered to complete certain
activities to reunify with the minor children. During the last of these hearings, the
trial court found that respondent-mother had not made reasonable progress on her
tasks as required for reunification; thus, the court changed the minor children’s
primary plan from reunification to adoption.
On 10 February 2025, DSS moved the trial court to terminate parental rights
of respondent-parents as to Melody and Gloria. On 11 June 2025, the trial court held
a termination of parental rights hearing. Respondent-mother was not present for
this hearing. In its subsequent 17 July 2025 order, the trial court concluded that
grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of respondent-mother and
respondent-father under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)−(3), (7) (2025). Further, the trial
court determined that it was in the best interest of the minor children to terminate
parental rights. No factual findings were made regarding ICWA. The trial court
ordered that the parental rights of respondent-mother and respondent-father be
terminated with respect to both minor children. On 15 August 2025, respondentmother timely appealed the order.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review any order that terminates parental
rights. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(7) (2025).
III. Standard of Review
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Opinion of the Court
We review whether a trial court complied with ICWA requirements de novo.
In re L.Q., 298 N.C. App. 540, 546 (2025). “Under de novo review, this Court considers
the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgement for that of the trial court.”
Id. (cleaned up).
IV. Discussion
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court did not comply with ICWA
because it did not “inquire of [respondent-mother] . . . as to the possibility that Melody
and Gloria might indeed be Indian children.”
ICWA establishes “the minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian
children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes in order to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” In re A.P., 260 N.C. App. 540,
542–43 (2018) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012)).
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the
court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is
involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall
notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s
tribe . . . of the pending proceedings and of their right of
intervention.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2025).
Under ICWA, an Indian child is defined as “any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
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Opinion of the Court
tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2025). Federal regulations define child-custody
proceeding as follows:
Child-custody proceeding. (1) “Child-custody proceeding”
means and includes any action, other than an emergency
proceeding, that may culminate in one of the following
outcomes:
(i) Foster-care placement, which is any action removing an
Indian child from his or her parent or Indian custodian for
temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the
home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or
Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon
demand, but where parental rights have not been
terminated;
(ii) Termination of parental rights, which is any action
resulting in the termination of the parent-child
relationship;
(iii) Preadoptive placement, which is the temporary
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution
after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in
lieu of adoptive placement; or
(iv) Adoptive placement, which is the permanent
placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any
action resulting in a final decree of adoption.
(2) An action that may culminate in one of these four
outcomes is considered a separate child-custody proceeding
from an action that may culminate in a different one of
these four outcomes. There may be several child-custody
proceedings involving any given Indian child. Within each
child-custody proceeding, there may be several hearings. If
a child is placed in foster care or another out-of-home
placement as a result of a status offense, that status offense
proceeding is a child-custody proceeding.
25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2026).
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Opinion of the Court
Federal regulations state that our courts “must ask each participant in an
emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The inquiry
is made at the commencement of the proceeding and all responses should be on the
record.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2026); In re M.L.B., 377 N.C. 335, 340 (2021). Upon
conducting this required inquiry:
A court . . . has reason to know that a child involved in an
emergency or child-custody proceeding is an Indian child
if:
(1) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court
involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian
organization, or agency informs the court that the child is
an Indian child;
(2) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court
involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian
organization, or agency informs the court that it has
discovered information indicating that the child is an
Indian child;
(3) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the
court reason to know he or she is an Indian child;
(4) The court is informed that the domicile or residence of
the child, the child’s parent, or the child’s Indian custodian
is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village;
(5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a
ward of a Tribal court; or
(6) The court is informed that either parent or the child
possesses an identification card indicating membership in
an Indian Tribe.
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (2026).
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Opinion of the Court
The inquiry into whether a child is an Indian child under
ICWA is focused on only two circumstances: (1) Whether
the child is a citizen of a Tribe; or (2) whether the child's
parent is a citizen of the Tribe and the child is also eligible
for citizenship. The inquiry is not based on the race of the
child, but rather indications that the child and her parents
may have a political affiliation with a Tribe as defined in
25 U.S.C. § 1903.
In re M.L.B., 377 N.C. at 340 (cleaned up).
In In re C.C.G., our Supreme Court held no reversible error when the trial
court, in at least one hearing, inquired of all parties and none of the parties knew or
had reason to know the child is an Indian child as defined by ICWA. 380 N.C. 23, 31
(2022). There, “the trial court’s adjudication and disposition order . . . and order
transferring custody to DSS . . . both specifically state ‘[t]he [c]ourt inquired of the
parties and none of the parties know or have reason to know the child is an Indian
child. . . .’ ” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court determined that “the record before
[it] reflect[ed] that the trial court made the inquiry required by 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(a). . . .” Id.
However, when “the determination of whether there is reason to know that [a
minor child] is an Indian child cannot be made on the record before us, we remand to
the trial court.” In re A.L., 378 N.C. 396, 404 (2021). For example, in In re A.L., our
Supreme Court determined there was noncompliance with ICWA because “nothing
in the record reflect[ed] the trial court making this inquiry or the participants’
responses.” Id. at 403. There, the Court remanded and instructed the trial court on
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Opinion of the Court
remand:
[A]sk each participant . . . whether the participant knows
or has reason to know that [the child] is an Indian child”
on the record and receive the participants’ response on the
record. See 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a). If there is reason to
know that [the minor child] is an Indian child, the trial
court must comply with 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b) and conduct
a new hearing on termination of respondent’s parental
rights. . . . If there is not a reason to know that [the child]
is an Indian child, . . . then the trial court should enter an
order to this effect and the termination of respondent’s
parental rights order . . . remains undisturbed.
Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
Here, in multiple orders, the trial court “considered the Indian Child Welfare
Act . . . as it applie[d] to the minor children . . . and [found] that such is not
applicable.” Further, in its 10 January 2023 order, the trial court found that
respondent-father identified the race of himself and the minor children as white and
that neither he nor the minor children are members or eligible for membership to a
Native American Tribe. However, unlike In re C.C.G., the record does not reflect that
the trial court made this inquiry as to respondent-mother as required under 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(a). The record contains no information from respondent-mother identifying
her race, her minor children’s race, or her minor children’s membership to a Native
American Tribe. Thus, we cannot determine from the record on appeal whether there
was reason to know that an Indian child may be involved. In re A.L., 378 N.C. at 404;
see also In re M.L.B., 377 N.C. at 341 (reasoning that because “the trial court did not
comply with 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a), the trial court could not comply with 25 C.F.R.
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Opinion of the Court
§ 23.107(c) and could not determine whether it had reason to know [the child was] an
Indian child.”). But cf. In re C.C.G., 380 N.C. at 31 (holding no reversible error when
the record reflected that the trial court, in at least one hearing, specifically inquired
of all parties and none of the parties knew or had reason to know the child is an
Indian child as defined by ICWA).
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to ask respondent-mother on the
record whether she knows or has reason to know whether either Gloria or Melody
have membership or eligibility for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe.
In re A.L., 378 N.C. at 404. If after this inquiry, respondent-mother does not produce
evidence of Indian tribal membership as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), then the trial
court should enter an order to this effect and leave the termination of parental rights
order undisturbed. Id.
V. Conclusion
Because the record does not reflect that the trial court made an ICWA inquiry
as to respondent-mother, we remand to the trial court for compliance with ICWA.
REMANDED.
Judges GORE and MURRY concur.
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