IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1017
Filed 1 July 2026
Nash County, Nos. 19CR050664-630, 19CR050665-630, 19CR050666-630,
19CR050667-630, 19CR050668-630
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
GREGORY ARTHUR THOMPSON, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 30 July 2024 by Judge Timothy
W. Wilson in Nash County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May
2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Henry J. Gargan,
for the State.
Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by Vernetta Alston, for defendant-appellant.
GORE, Judge.
Defendant Gregory Arthur Thompson appeals the judgments convicting him of
multiple counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and uttering forged
instruments. Upon review of the briefs and the record, we discern no error.
I.
In 2017, defendant held a dealer’s license and began buying used cars for Triple
Star Auto (“TSA”). Defendant worked directly with TSA’s agent, Tony Ellis. TSA is
owned and operated by Joey Vick in South Carolina. Defendant and Ellis agreed
STATE V. THOMPSON
Opinion of the Court
defendant would buy used vehicles with TSA funds and TSA would re-sell the
vehicles. Ellis delivered personal checks from TSA to defendant to buy the specified
vehicle (included on the check memo line along with its partial VIN number). The
checks were made out to the dealerships in Wilson, North Carolina. Ellis testified no
other name was included on the checks.
Defendant and his mother, Irene Thompson, opened an account named
“Thompson Auto” at Providence Bank. Thirteen of the checks provided by TSA were
deposited into the Thompson Auto account and upon deposit included a slash mark
with “Thompson Auto” or “TA” written as an additional recipient. Additionally,
defendant never delivered these cars or their titles to TSA. Ultimately, defendant
received $61,000.00 in checks, and because TSA did not receive the vehicles or titles,
Ellis was required to pay the outstanding amount from his own pay to TSA.
Ellis sued Providence Bank for depositing the altered checks and received
$5,000.00 in a settlement. Ellis pressed charges against defendant, who was indicted
on 13 May 2019, for thirteen counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and
thirteen counts of uttering a forged instrument. At trial and over defendant’s
objections, the State introduced three checks, written by Thompson Auto and paid to
Southern States for a 2005 Subaru, that were returned for insufficient funds.
Separate charges for these checks were pending in Wake County at the time of trial.
The State also attempted to introduce related charges against defendant, but the trial
court granted defendant’s motion to exclude them.
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Opinion of the Court
The jury found defendant guilty on all charges and the trial court convicted
him and sentenced him to multiple consecutive terms of six to seventeen months
imprisonment, suspended for 60 months of supervised probation. Defendant was also
ordered to pay $53,150.00 in restitution. Defendant timely appealed.
II.
Defendant appeals of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b). Defendant seeks
review of the following: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence from
a pending charge under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403; (2) whether the trial court erred
by ordering defendant pay restitution in the amount of $53,150.00; (3) whether the
trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of obtaining
property by false pretenses; and (4) alternatively, whether the trial court plainly
erred with its jury instructions for obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant
preserved arguments one through three according to Rule 10 of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure but seeks plain error review for his fourth unpreserved
argument.
A.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence from another
pending criminal case in Wake County under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. We review
an evidentiary challenge to the trial court’s legal conclusion under the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence 404(b) de novo. State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130 (2012).
We review challenges to “the trial court’s Rule 403 determination for abuse of
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Opinion of the Court
discretion.” Id. We consider the trial court’s “careful consideration of the evidence”
and “handling of the process” to determine whether the trial court utilized its
discretion under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence 403. Id. at 133.
Under Rule 404(b), the State may not offer character evidence to prove the
defendant conformed to that character, but “evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or
accident.” State v. Martin, 191 N.C. App. 462, 466 (2008) (cleaned up). The trial court
also considers whether the evidence is similar to the present case and is within close
temporal proximity to “adequately safeguard against the improper introduction of
character evidence against the accused.” State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154
(2002). The evidence is “considered sufficiently similar if there are some unusual
facts present in both crimes that would indicate that the same person committed
them.” State v. Pabon, 380 N.C. 241, 259 (2022) (cleaned up). But the evidence does
not need to “rise to the level of the unique and bizarre.” Id. If the evidence is remote
in time from the case at hand, it typically has a weaker connection but may still be
admissible based upon “the specific facts of each case and the purpose underlying the
evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).
In the present case, the State published checks to the jury from a pending case
before the Superior Court, Wake County. Defendant argues the witness testimony
regarding the Wake County checks was not corroborative and was insufficiently
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Opinion of the Court
similar to the present case. The State argues it admitted the checks under Rule
404(b) to show knowledge, absence of mistake, intent, and a common plan or scheme
by demonstrating in both instances defendant was “trying to get something for
nothing.” The State argues the similarity between the present case and the Wake
County case is that defendant used money intended to buy a used vehicle for TSA for
his own purposes and that these events occurred within one year of one another.
The witness testimony tended to show defendant received another check from
Ellis on behalf of TSA to purchase a Subaru from Southern States in Wake County.
Defendant cashed the check and wrote three checks to Southern States that were all
returned for insufficient funds, despite obtaining sufficient funds from Ellis. Ellis
acquired the title and vehicle by driving to Southern States and discovering the title
and vehicle waiting for defendant. Ellis acquired the title and vehicle, but Southern
States could not cash the checks due to insufficient funds. Similarly, in the present
case, defendant was charged with cashing the checks into his own account and never
providing the title or vehicle to TSA. The trial court properly admitted these checks
under Rule 404(b).
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting these
checks under Rule 403. The trial court applied the balancing test under Rule 403 and
determined the probative value was higher than the danger of unfair prejudice. See
N.C.R. Evid. 403. The trial court granted the motion in limine to exclude other
convictions of misdemeanor worthless checks, common law forgery, and common law
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Opinion of the Court
uttering from Nash County and Wilson County. The trial court’s decision to exclude
certain evidence while allowing other evidence under Rule 404(b) demonstrated its
discretion. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
evidence from the Wake County case pursuant to Rule 403.
B.
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred by entering an order to pay
restitution to Ellis in the amount of $53,150.00 despite his settlement payment to
Providence Bank for $5,000.00. “We review de novo whether the restitution order
was supported by evidence adduced at trial or at sentencing.” State v. Wright, 212
N.C. App. 640, 645 (2011) (cleaned up). The record must support the amount of
restitution. Id. We will not overrule the trial court’s determined restitution amount
if there is some evidence to support it. Id.
Prior civil settlement agreements are not limitations upon the amount of
restitution allowed in a criminal proceeding. State v. Williams, 265 N.C. App. 657,
664 (2019). Such agreements “neither usurp the State’s ability to uphold criminal
statutes nor impede on the State’s distinct societal goals of the criminal justice
system.” Id. Section 15A-1343(d) provides the trial court with a “statutory right to
order restitution as a condition of probation to an aggrieved party.” Id. at 663; see
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(d) (2017).
In the present case, the trial court considered the evidence in the record and
determined defendant should pay $53,150.00 in restitution to Tony Ellis, TSA. The
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Opinion of the Court
trial court deducted $8,200.00 because there was documentation that defendant paid
TSA for repayment of a 2007 Chevrolet. The trial court considered defendant’s
request to also deduct $5,000.00 from the restitution amount due to a settlement
check from Providence Bank to Ellis. The trial court stated there was witness
testimony by Ellis that the settlement amount only paid for his attorney fees.
Because the restitution amount is supported by record evidence and because
precedent does not require consideration of civil settlements when setting restitution
for a criminal proceeding, we discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the
restitution sentence is upheld.
C.
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence. Specifically, defendant argues “person within the State” is
an essential element for the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses, and that
the State failed to bring evidence for this alleged element. Defendant relies upon this
Court’s dicta within State v. Pierce to support his argument. 279 N.C. App. 494, 501
(2021). We disagree.
The essential elements for the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses
have been stated and restated by our Courts for decades. See Pierce, 279 N.C. App.
at 499. Section 14-100, the statute defining this offense, has been amended multiple
times. The last amendment to section 14-100(a) that occurred prior to defendant’s
charges was during the General Assembly’s 1997 Session Laws. See The Current
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Opinion of the Court
Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 1997, ch. 443, § 19.25(l),
1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1344, 1777–78. Despite this amendment, the phrase defendant
highlights consistently remained within the statute. Pierce specifically states,
“presuming without deciding” and states it does not need to decide whether this
phrase is “an essential element.” 279 N.C. App. at 501.
In every case what is actually decided is the law applicable
to the particular facts; all other legal conclusions therein
are but obiter dicta. On the subject of obiter dicta, if the
statement in the opinion was superfluous and not needed
for the full determination of the case, it is not entitled to be
accounted a precedent, for the reason that it was rendered
without jurisdiction or at least extra-judicial.
Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 536–37 (1956) (cleaned up).
Our Supreme Court has defined the essential elements for the offense of
obtaining property by false pretenses numerous times. The essential elements are:
(1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which
is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which
one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another. State v. Parker, 354
N.C. 268, 283–84 (2001); see State v. Mostafavi, 370 N.C. 681, 685 (2018); State v.
Jones, 367 N.C. 299, 307 (2014); see also State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 242 (1980).
In each case, the statute considered by our Courts included the phrase defendant
highlights. We are bound by our high Court’s precedent and will not deviate by
relying upon dicta from this Court. See Martinez v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 258 N.C.
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Opinion of the Court
App. 466, 478 (2018) (cleaned up) (“This Court has no authority to reverse existing
Supreme Court precedent.”).
Accordingly, in line with precedent, there is no additional element beyond what
our Supreme Court already articulated. Therefore, the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
D.
Finally, defendant seeks plain error review of the jury instructions regarding
the jury charge for obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant again argues
the trial court improperly excluded the essential element “a person within the State.”
§ 14-100(a). Having discussed the elements of obtaining property by false pretenses
according to current precedent, we discern no plain error. The trial court read the
proper pattern jury instructions for the offense of obtaining property by false
pretenses.
III.
The trial court did not err by admitting certain checks under Rule 404(b) and
Rule 403. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered defendant to
pay $53,150.00 in restitution, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motions
to dismiss the charges of obtaining property by false pretenses. Finally, the trial
court did not plainly err in its jury charge for the offense of obtaining property by
false pretenses.
NO ERROR.
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Opinion of the Court
Chief Judge DILLON and Judge STADING concur.
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