IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1153
Filed 1 July 2026
New Hanover County, Nos. 20CR059455-640, 20CR059457-640, 21CR055591-640, 21CR056767-640
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
LAWRENCE VERLINE WILDER, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 September 2024 by Judge R.
Kent Harrell in Superior Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Court of Appeals
25 March 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lewis W.
Lamar, Jr., for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Katherine
Jane Allen, for defendant-appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
A jury found Defendant Lawrence Verline Wilder guilty of two counts of
communicating threats and two counts of intimidating a witness. At trial, Defendant
invoked his right to self-representation, and the trial court conducted the “thorough
inquiry” that North Carolina General Statute Section 15A-1242 requires. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1242 (2025). But Defendant refused to answer the court’s questions,
leaving it unable to confirm that he understood the consequences of representing
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Opinion of the Court
himself. So the court was not satisfied that he had “knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived [his] right to counsel.” State v. Lindsey, 271 N.C. App. 118, 126,
843 S.E.2d 322, 328 (2020) (citation omitted).
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed structural error
by denying his request to waive counsel and represent himself. See U.S. Const.
amends. VI, XIV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242. But because
he refused to answer the questions that would have shown a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver, the court could not make the determination Section 15A-1242
demands. And without it, the court had no basis to let Defendant represent himself.
We therefore hold that the trial court did not err, and that Defendant received a fair
trial, free of prejudicial error.
I. Background
Between December 2020 and December 2021, the State charged Defendant
with seven offenses: two counts of misdemeanor communicating threats and five
counts of felony intimidating a witness. The trial court dismissed one charge and the
jury returned verdicts on the remaining six after a trial in Superior Court, New
Hanover County, in September 2024. The State’s evidence tended to show that
Defendant was “generally menacing residents in [his] neighborhood” and, specifically,
that “he was intimidating individuals who were . . . prospective witnesses to court
matters.”
During pretrial motions, defense counsel told the trial judge he had spoken
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with Defendant earlier that day. Defendant, counsel reported, did not want counsel
“to represent him in this matter” and alleged that “he was drugged” the night before
“in the jail.” Counsel added that Defendant “said he does not have the capacity to go
forward due to the narcotics that were injected into his system.”1 Defendant then
interrupted:
All right. I have a right to choose my attorney and I’m not
indigent. So I don’t want to partake in this taxpayer fraud
because I can afford my attorney. And I also retain the
right to choose my attorney. And also the State has a
history of appointing counsel with conflict of interest. . . .
And I suspect that present attorney has conflict-appointed
counsel has conflict of interest too. I’ve also notified the
[c]ourt . . . when I was able to afford my attorney that I
wasn’t trying to perpetrate a fraud on the taxpayers that
I’m indigent when there is financial resources to retain
counsel. And if I’m not obstructed by the State, you know,
to contact either by phone or law-or mail or the law library
to retain counsel, then I could retain counsel. And for some
reason this [c]ourt has been denying my request to
withdraw counsel. And no counsel can file any kind of
appearance when there’s already a state-appointed
counsel. So I’ve lost valuable time to retain counsel.
Defendant continued, making various allegations about his treatment in jail—that
he was “getting injected with illegal drugs” and being “sexually assaulted.” He also
stated that he “would like to withdraw [defense counsel] from [his] representation.”
1 In June 2023, Defendant had a competency evaluation at Central Regional Hospital, where a doctor
concluded that he was “currently capable to proceed.” At a competency hearing, the trial court found that “[D]efendant is able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, comprehend his own situation in reference to those proceedings, and to assist in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner.” The court thus determined that Defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant did not challenge this determination on appeal.
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Defendant claimed he had contacted a private attorney to represent him. But the
trial judge pointed out that, had Defendant “retained that attorney, he would have
been present in the courtroom” to represent him. And he reminded Defendant that
defense counsel was “the seventh attorney that [had] been provided [to Defendant].”
The trial judge eventually asked Defendant whether he wanted to represent
himself or have his current attorney represent him. Defendant, after a few rambling
statements, answered: “I guess I’ll represent myself and file to Raleigh.” The judge
told Defendant that, to represent himself, “the Constitution requires” his waiver of
counsel be “a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.” He then conducted the
inquiry that Section 15A-1242 requires; we describe the judge’s inquiry further below.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (allowing a defendant to proceed pro se “only after the
trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant: (1) [h]as been
clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel; (2) [u]nderstands and
appreciates the consequences of this decision; and (3) [c]omprehends the nature of
the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments”).
The trial judge denied Defendant’s request to “discharge [defense counsel] as
the attorney of record” and proceed pro se. He cited two grounds: Defendant’s “lack
of compliance with the court’s directions” and his failure to answer “the questions
designed . . . to determine if his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.” Defendant kept arguing that the judge was “not respecting [his] choice
of attorney,” and he told the judge that he would raise the issue on appeal.
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On 26 September 2024, the jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of
communicating threats and two counts of intimidating a witness. It acquitted him of
two counts of intimidating a witness.
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under North Carolina General Statute Sections 7A27(b)(1) and 15A-1444(a). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2025) (“[A]ppeal lies of
right directly to the Court of Appeals . . . [f]rom any final judgment of a superior court.
. . .”); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a) (2025) (“A defendant who has entered a
plea of not guilty to a criminal charge and who has been found guilty of a crime is
entitled to appeal . . . when final judgment has been entered.”).
III. Discussion
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court committed
structural error by denying his request to waive counsel and represent himself. A
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const. amends. VI,
XIV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23. But he also “has a right to handle his own case without
interference by, or the assistance of, counsel forced upon him against his wishes.”
Lindsey, 271 N.C. App. at 126, 843 S.E.2d at 328 (citation omitted). The right to selfrepresentation safeguards the defendant’s “dignity and autonomy.” McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984). Before a defendant may exercise it, though,
the trial court must confirm that he (1) “clearly and unequivocally expressed a desire
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to proceed without counsel,” and (2) “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
the right to counsel.” Lindsey, 271 N.C. App. at 126, 843 S.E.2d at 328 (citation
omitted). “Absent such evidence, the court should not . . . permit[ ] [a defendant] to
proceed pro se.” State v. Graham, 76 N.C. App. 470, 475, 333 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1985).
A trial court satisfies the second prong “by fulfilling the mandates of [Section]
15A-1242.” State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530, 534, 838 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2020). That
provision states:
A defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in
the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only
after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is
satisfied that the defendant:
(1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the
assistance of counsel, including his right to the
assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;
(2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of
this decision; and
(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and
proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242. Our Supreme Court has held that the inquiry the statute
directs “fully satisfies the constitutional requirement that waiver of counsel must be
knowing and voluntary.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 355, 271 S.E.2d 252, 256
(1980).
This Court reviews de novo the denial of a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation. State v. Leyshon, 211 N.C. App. 511, 514, 710 S.E.2d 282, 286 (2011).
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That means we “consider[ ] the matter anew and freely substitute[] [our] own
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Glenn, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ 923
S.E.2d 850, 852 (2025) (citation omitted).
A. Invocation of Right to Self-representation
We start with whether Defendant “clearly and unequivocally invoked his right
to self-representation.” He argues that he “clearly informed the trial court that he
wanted to represent [him]self.” The State counters that Defendant’s “assertion . . .
was arguably not clear and unequivocal.”
“Without a clear and unequivocal request to waive representation and proceed
pro se, the trial court should not [ ] proceed[ ] with such assumption.” Lindsey, 271
N.C. App. at 126, 843 S.E.2d at 328 (citation omitted). “Statements of a desire not to
be represented by court-appointed counsel do not amount to expressions of an
intention to represent oneself.” State v. McCrowre, 312 N.C. 478, 480, 322 S.E.2d
775, 777 (1984) (citation omitted).
At trial, Defendant first asserted that he was not indigent, that he would hire
his own counsel, and that he did not want another court-appointed attorney. The
trial court pointed out that the private attorney Defendant claimed to have contacted
was not present and that Defendant had already had seven court-appointed
attorneys. Defendant often rambled and gave non-responsive answers; at one point
the court warned him that it would remove him from the courtroom if he kept
disrupting the proceedings. But in the end, after the court repeatedly pressed him to
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clarify his request, Defendant said, “I guess I’ll represent myself.” Read as a whole,
the colloquy—at least where Defendant answered the court’s questions—show that
he satisfied the first prong: he “clearly and unequivocally expressed a desire to
proceed without counsel.” Lindsey, 271 N.C. App. at 126, 843 S.E.2d at 328 (citation
omitted).
B. Sufficiency of Inquiry
Defendant contends that the trial court “failed to conduct the ‘thorough
inquiry’ required by [Section] 15A-1242 before denying [his] motion to represent
himself.” The State responds that the trial court “correctly denied” the request
because the court conducted “the necessary inquiry prescribed by” Section 15A-1242
but came away “unable to determine conclusively that [D]efendant’s request . . . was
made knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently.”
The “record must affirmatively show” that the judge conducted the inquiry
Section 15A-1242 requires. State v. Lamb, 103 N.C. App. 646, 648, 406 S.E.2d 654,
655 (1991) (citation omitted). To guide that inquiry, our Supreme Court in State v.
Moore set out fourteen questions a trial court may ask. 362 N.C. 319, 327–28, 661
S.E.2d 722, 727 (2008) (listing all fourteen). It need not ask them all, but they offer
“useful guidance for trial courts when discharging their responsibilities under” the
statute. Id. at 328, 661 S.E.2d at 727.
Here, the trial judge asked ten of the fourteen questions. He began by “clearly
advis[ing]” Defendant “of his right to the assistance of counsel.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
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§ 15A-1242(1). Defendant did not answer:
[The court]: All right. You understand you have the right
to be represented by a lawyer?
[Defendant]: I told you that during Black History Month,
[y]our [h]onor. Or - - excuse me - - Judge Jones. I told Judge
Jones that during Black History Month.
[The court]: You understand you - - you made a request that
a lawyer be appointed for you if you’re unable to hire a
lawyer. And I’ve appointed [defense counsel] and several
others to assist you in this case.
[Defendant]: When I couldn’t afford an attorney and they
had conflict of interest.
The judge then turned to the consequences of self-representation. He asked whether
Defendant understood that he would have to follow the Rules of Evidence, that the
court could not give him legal advice, and that the court would remain impartial. See
id. § 15A-1242(2). To each question, Defendant offered not an answer but a complaint
of his own:
[The court]: You understand that if you decide to represent
yourself, you must follow the same Rules of Evidence and
procedure that a lawyer appearing in this court would have
to follow?
[Defendant]: I’m going to object to these proceedings
because I’m feeling side effects from whatever they injected
me with at the jail. . . .
[The court]: I’m gonna ask you this question again. . . .Do
you understand that if you decide to represent yourself, you
must follow the same Rules of Evidence and procedure that
a lawyer appearing in this court must follow?
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[Defendant]: I understand that. But I also want to say that
the prosecutor has not released all the discovery.
[The court]: Do you understand that if you decide to
represent yourself, this [c]ourt will not give you legal
advice concerning defenses, jury instructions, or other legal
issues that may be raised in a trial?
[Defendant]: I have some pretrial motions that I want to
file that I couldn’t file because he was obstructing . . . .
[The court]: But you understand that I can’t give you legal
advice?
[Defendant]: I’m experiencing side effects from whatever
they’re force medicating with at the jail, [j]udge.
[The court]: You understand that the trial judge will act as
an impartial judge in this case . . . and the judge must treat
you just as he or she would any other lawyer?
[Defendant]: It’s a violation of Washington versus Harper
(sp), Sell (sp) versus United States, and Riggins (sp) versus
Nevada.
The judge pressed on, describing “the nature of [Defendant’s] charges” and “the range
of permissible punishments.” Id. § 15A-1242(3). Defendant said that he did not
understand the charges because he had not “been told exactly the facts of the case.”
He then interrupted the judge’s recitation of the offenses to ask repeatedly for the
victims’ names. And he dismissed the charges as “racially motivated, he-say-she-say,
crackhead accusations.”
Defendant’s responses to the court’s questions confirm that he did not
understand the consequences of representing himself. Asked whether he understood
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that he would have to follow the Rules of Evidence and that the court could not give
him legal advice, he answered with complaints about being medicated at the jail and
the State’s discovery—never with any sign that he grasped what he was giving up.
His refusal to answer the court’s questions also defeats his claim. Section 15A-1242
permits waiver “only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied”
that, among other things, the defendant “[u]nderstands and appreciates the
consequences of [the] decision.” Id. § 15A-1242(2) (emphasis added). The judge can
make that finding only if the defendant answers the questions that test his
comprehension. By refusing, Defendant left the court without that information—and
thus without the showing the statute demands. As the trial court put it, Defendant
“will not answer the questions designed . . . to determine if his waiver of counsel is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
Because the court could not make the findings Section 15A-1242 requires, it
“should not have permitted him to proceed pro se.” Graham, 76 N.C. App. at 475, 333
S.E.2d at 549. It did not. So we hold that the trial court did not err in denying
Defendant’s request to discharge his court-appointed counsel and represent himself.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Defendant received a fair trial, free of
prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
Judges HAMPSON and CARPENTER concur.
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