In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00019-CV
GABREL ARTHUR, Appellant
V.
LATODRA WILLIAMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 76th District Court
Camp County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-25-05285
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a special appearance in a partition
suit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Supp.). The trial court granted
LaTodra Williams’s motion for substituted service and signed an order allowing Williams to
leave a copy of the citation and petition with anyone over sixteen years old at Gabrel Arthur’s
residences. The filed returns of service stated that the process server attached the service to the
door of the dwelling at both addresses listed in the trial court’s substituted service order. Arthur
filed a special appearance challenging the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over him. The trial
court denied the special appearance on the basis that Arthur was properly served.
On appeal, Arthur challenges the trial court’s order denying his special appearance,
contending that the failure to strictly comply with the trial court’s order for substituted service
prevented the trial court from acquiring personal jurisdiction over him. Because a special
appearance cannot be used to challenge a defect in service and, even if we construe his filings as
a motion to quash, that motion operated as a general appearance, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying the special appearance.
I. Background
According to Williams’s petition, she and Arthur had been in a personal and business
relationship. They owned land together, and Williams loaned money to Arthur. When the
personal relationship fell apart, so did the business relationship. When Arthur declined to pay
back the loan to Williams, Williams brought a partition suit, hoping to sell her half of the land.
The petition set out addresses for Arthur in the cities of Mount Pleasant, Pittsburg, and
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Red Oak, Texas. Citation issued for each of the three addresses. A process server attempted to
serve Arthur in person at each of the three addresses (six different attempts on six different days
at the Mount Pleasant address, five different attempts on five different days at the Pittsburg
address, and seven different attempts on seven different days at the Red Oak address). Based on
an affidavit from the process server to that effect, Williams moved for substituted service. The
trial court granted that request, permitting service to be accomplished by leaving citation with the
petition attached with “anyone over sixteen years of age” at the Mount Pleasant address or the
Red Oak address.
Returns of service filed on October 9, 2025, reflect that the process server left citation
with the petition attached to the front doors of the Mount Pleasant and Red Oak locations.
On October 28, 2025, via a single instrument, Arthur filed a special appearance and a
motion to quash service. Arthur asserted that he lived at the Pittsburg location (which was
omitted from the order regarding substituted service but had not been omitted from the prior
attempts of personal service). Though asserting that the Pittsburg location was his “primary
residence,” Arthur nonetheless asserted that Williams had not been diligent in attempting service
before seeking substituted service.
On October 31, 2025, Williams responded. Among other things, Williams asked that
Arthur’s motion to quash be denied.
On November 24, 2025, Arthur responded. “[T]o narrow the issues before the [trial
court],” Arthur conceded his motion to quash and stated, in his view, “[t]he Special Appearance
remain[ed] the only matter properly before the [trial court].” Arthur denied ever being
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personally, served, and denied citation and petition were left at either his Mount Pleasant or Red
Oak properties. Arthur conceded that he did have actual notice of the suit, which he averred he
obtained “accidently” by “Googling” Williams’s name.
At the hearing on his special appearance, Arthur argued “[t]hat [the] service order was
exceeded because service did not strictly comply with Rule 106(b) . . . [and] Rule 107 [of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure], personal jurisdiction never attached.” See TEX. R. CIV. P.
106(b), 107. The trial court denied the special appearance, stating that Arthur “was properly
served in accordance with Rule 106.” Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of
law, and Arthur brings this interlocutory appeal.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“[W]e review a trial court’s decision on special appearances de novo.” Searcy v. Parex
Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tex. 2016). “When no findings of fact and conclusions of law are
made by the trial court, ‘we infer “all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by
the evidence.”’” Wilco Farmers v. Carter, 558 S.W.3d 197, 201–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2018, no pet.) (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.
2007)). “If the plaintiff meets its initial burden to plead allegations sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant to negate all jurisdictional bases alleged.” State v.
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 413 (Tex. 2023). Therefore, we will affirm the
trial court’s special appearance ruling on any legal theory supported by the record. LeBlanc v.
Kyle, 28 S.W.3d 99, 101–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); SITQ E.U., Inc. v. Reata
Rests., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); Dukatt v. Dukatt,
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355 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).
“[A] special appearance may be made by any party . . . for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such
party or property is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
120a(1) (emphasis added).
Defective service or defective process, or even an attempt to bring the defendant
before the court under the wrong statute does not authorize the use of the special
appearance. If the defendant attempts to make a special appearance to raise any
of these contentions, then his appearance is a general one[.]
Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting E. Wayne Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction: Article 2031(b), The Texas
Longarm Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42
TEX. L. REV. 279, 312–13 (1964)). “[A] mere challenge to the method of service fails as a
special appearance and constitutes a general appearance.” GFTA Trendanalysen B.G.A.
Herrdum GMBH & Co., K.G. v. Varme, 991 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
III. Analysis and Conclusion
Arthur’s complaints go to the manner of service on a Texan regarding a partition suit
over Texas property. Arthur’s complaints regarding the manner of service were properly the
subject of a motion to quash. Arthur abandoned his motion to quash. But he continued to urge
complaints about the manner of service via special appearance. Arthur makes no complaint that
he cannot be served at all because his ties to Texas are so weak that due process would not
permit a Texas court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Arthur’s complaints about the
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manner of service were not and are not the proper subject of a special appearance.
Consequently, his special appearance is considered a general appearance.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying the special appearance.1
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: April 27, 2026
Date Decided: June 26, 2026
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Arthur also filed a motion to clarify the status of his interlocutory appeal and for temporary relief. Because we have affirmed the trial court’s order denying the special appearance, we deny Arthur’s motion as moot.
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