Hallums v. Alston

majority opinion

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

02-JUL-2026

07:59 AM

Dkt. 81 OP

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

---oOo---DAVID LEONARD K. HALLUMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

PAUL ALSTON, in his individual capacity;

GALEN KÎKAHA CHEE, in his individual capacity,

Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

and

DOE PERSONS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS and PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;

ROE "NON-PROFIT" CORPORATIONS 1-10;

DOE UNINCORPORATED ORGANIZATIONS 1-10;

ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

(CASE NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

July 2, 2026

HIRAOKA AND GUIDRY, JJ., WITH LEONARD, PRESIDING JUDGE,

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J.

This appeal involves the Hawaii Public Expression

Protection Act (HPEPA), Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 634G.

David Leonard K. Hallums (a police officer and vice-president of

the labor union representing police officers) sued Paul Alston

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and Galen Kîkaha Chee (attorneys defending parties Hallums sued

in another lawsuit) over three letters Chee had written to the

Honolulu Police Department and its chief. Alston and Chee filed

a special motion to dismiss under HPEPA. The Circuit Court of

the First Circuit granted the motion and awarded Alston and Chee

attorney fees, but denied Alston and Chee's motion for sanctions

under Rule 11 of the Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP).1

Hallums appeals, and Alston and Chee cross-appeal, from

the Final Judgment. We hold that the circuit court did not err

by granting Alston and Chee's special motion to dismiss and

awarding them attorney fees. We also hold that the circuit court

acted outside its discretion by denying the Rule 11 motion

without sufficiently explaining its reasons. We affirm the Final

Judgment, but vacate the order denying the motion for Rule 11

sanctions and remand for post-judgment proceedings on the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In a letter dated May 4, 2022 to Robert Cavaco, then

president of the State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers

(SHOPO), Honolulu Police Department (HPD) interim chief Rade K.

Vanic wrote:

There is an understanding between the HPD and the previous

SHOPO administration that union officials who are performing

union-related work may be placed on special assignment and

remain on leave with pay status. However, this special

assignment does not extend to union-related business for

travel to conferences on the outer islands and the

continental United States.

Sergeant Hallums will be sent a notification letter

informing him that he was incorrectly placed on special

assignment and should have been deducted leave while away

from his work assignment to attend the two conferences.

The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided.

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Four weeks later, Hallums sued SHOPO and its board

members, officers (including Cavaco), employees, and others.2 He

was represented by attorney Bosko Petricevic. His complaint

alleged that the defendants conspired to illegally remove him

from his position as SHOPO's vice-president.

Alston and Chee defended SHOPO and most of the other

defendants against Hallums's lawsuit. By letter to HPD's

Professional Standards Office (PSO) dated July 15, 2022, Chee

wrote:

I represent the State of Hawai#i Organization of Police

Officers ("SHOPO") and am writing to inform you about

possible violations of Honolulu Police Department (the

"Department") policy and falsification or tampering with

government documents by David L. K. Hallums ("Hallums"). I

am hereby requesting that the department initiate a criminal

and/or administrative investigation into Hallums' request

and receipt of authorized release time off, also known as,

Special Assignment ("SA") leave to attend Mainland

conferences on behalf of SHOPO, once in 2018, and twice in

2019.

In a letter to PSO dated July 28, 2022, Chee wrote:

This letter is a follow up to our Complaint Regarding

David L. K. Hallums, dated July 15, 2022 (the "Complaint")

and is based on discussions with Detective Brandon Nakasone

("Nakasone") and Acting Lieutenant Micah Putnam ("Putnam")

regarding the Honolulu Police Department's ("HPD") refusal

to investigate in a criminal or administrative manner,

criminal misconduct by David L. K. Hallums ("Hallums").

After submitting the Complaint, Nakasone (on behalf of the

Criminal Investigation Section) and later, Putnam (on behalf

of the Administrative Investigation Section) informed me

that the Professional Standards Office ("PSO") is unable to

pursue the matter because the one year statute of

limitations prescribed in HPD Policy 5.01 has lapsed. That

position is clearly wrong. Because the reported misconduct

We take judicial notice of the documents filed in Hallums v. State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers, JIMS Case ID 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX. See Rule 201, Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Chapter 626, Hawaii Revised Statutes (2016).

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involves multiple crimes, PSO has the power to initiate

administrative investigations at any time within the

applicable limitations period prescribed in the penal code.

See HPD Policy 5.01.

(Footnote omitted.)

And in a letter to HPD's chief dated July 29, 2022,

Chee wrote:

We represent the State of Hawai#i Organization of Police

Officers ("SHOPO") in a litigation matter involving Officer

David L. K. Hallums. The purpose of this letter is to urge

the Honolulu Police Department ("HPD") to investigate

possible criminal violations by Officer David L. K. Hallums

("Hallums").

Hallums filed a second amended complaint on March 22,

2023. SHOPO answered and counterclaimed against Hallums for

breach of fiduciary duty. The counterclaim alleged that Hallums

violated SHOPO's and HPD's longstanding understanding and

practice of requiring SHOPO leaders who traveled to the

mainland to attend conferences for union business to do so

"on their own time" by improperly seeking and obtaining

authorized excused/release time off (with on-duty pay) from

the Honolulu Police department to attend mainland

conferences for SHOPO[.]

Within three weeks, Hallums moved for leave to file a

third amended complaint. He sought to add claims against Alston and Chee. The motion was heard on August 29, 2023. The trial

court stated:

With respect to the allegations specific to Mr. Alston

and Mr. Chee . . . it's too late to be adding new defendants

and new facts. [Hallums] can make those allegations in a

separate lawsuit if he truly wants to do so.

Hallums filed the lawsuit giving rise to this appeal

the same day. His amended complaint — factually based entirely

on Chee's letters to HPD and its chief — alleged causes of action

titled: (1) "Civil Conspiracy to Retaliate, Make False Criminal

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Allegations and Reports, Commmit [sic] Fraud and Defame";

(2) "Racketeering"; (3) "Defamation"; (4) "Negligent Infliction

of Emotional Distress"; (5) "Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress"; (6) "False Light"; and (7) "Malicious Defense and

Defense of Improper Purpose and Bad Faith Tort."

Alston and Chee filed a special motion to dismiss under

Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 634G-3(a). They also moved for

sanctions against Hallums and Petricevic under HRCP Rule 11. The

circuit court granted the motion to dismiss but denied the motion

for Rule 11 sanctions.

Alston and Chee moved for an award of attorney fees.

The circuit court granted the motion. The Final Judgment was

entered on April 16, 2024. This appeal and cross-appeal

followed.

II. POINTS OF ERROR

Hallums contends the circuit court erred by granting

Alston and Chee's special motion to dismiss and motion for

attorney fees.

Alston and Chee contend the circuit court erred by

denying their motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

HPEPA Special Motion to Dismiss

We review an order granting an HPEPA special motion to

dismiss de novo. "In ruling on a [special motion to dismiss]

under section 634G-3(a), the court shall consider the parties'

pleadings, the motion, any replies and responses to the motion,

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and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion

for summary judgment under the applicable Hawaii rules of civil

procedure." HRS § 634G-5 (Supp. 2022).

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Nozawa

v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, 142 Hawai#i 331, 338,

418 P.3d 1187, 1194 (2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when

the moving party shows that the material facts are uncontroverted

and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 342,

418 P.3d at 1198. Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the

party opposing summary judgment must "demonstrate specific facts,

as opposed to general allegations, that present a genuine issue

worthy of trial." Id.

Attorney Fees

We review an order granting attorney fees under the

abuse of discretion standard. Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1,

LLC, 156 Hawai#i 268, 272, 574 P.3d 288, 292 (2025). A court

abuses its discretion if it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason

or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the

substantial detriment of a party litigant. Id.

HRCP Rule 11 Sanctions

We review a ruling on a Rule 11 motion under the abuse

of discretion standard. Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106

Hawai#i 325, 331, 104 P.3d 912, 918 (2004).

IV. DISCUSSION

Effective June 17, 2022, HPEPA replaced the Citizen

Participation in Government Act, former HRS Chapter 634F. See

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2022 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 96, §§ 1, 3, 5, at 215, 218. The

legislature found:

to protect public participation at all levels of government,

the State should adopt the provisions of the model act

recommended by the Uniform Law Commission. By adopting the

Uniform Act provisions, the State will have an anti–SLAPP

[(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation)] law that

is among the best in the nation, with procedural protections

for all parties, and clearer instructions for the courts on

how to fairly and expeditiously dispose of SLAPP claims to

ensure citizens are protected from punitive SLAPP suits.

Id. § 1 at 216.

HRS § 634G-2 (Supp. 2022) establishes HPEPA's scope:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this

chapter shall apply to a cause of action asserted against a

person based on the person's:

(1) Communication in a legislative, executive,

judicial, administrative, or other governmental

proceeding;

(2) Communication on an issue under consideration or

review in a legislative, executive, judicial,

administrative, or other governmental

proceeding; or

(3) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of

the press, the right to assemble or petition, or

the right of association, guaranteed by the

United States Constitution or the Hawaii State

Constitution, on a matter of public concern.

(b) This chapter shall not apply to a cause of

action asserted:

(1) Against a governmental unit or an employee or

agent of a governmental unit acting or

purporting to act in an official capacity;

(2) By a governmental unit or an employee or agent

of a governmental unit acting in an official

capacity to enforce a law to protect against an

imminent threat to public health or safety; or

(3) Against a person primarily engaged in the

business of selling or leasing goods or services

if the cause of action arises out of a

communication related to the person's sale or

lease of the goods or services.

"Goods or services" does not include a dramatic,

literary, musical, political, journalistic, or

artistic work.

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"Governmental unit" means a public corporation

or government or governmental subdivision,

agency, or instrumentality.

"Person" means an individual, estate, trust,

partnership, business or nonprofit entity,

governmental unit, or other legal entity.

Hawai#i courts may use the official comments to the

Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (Unif. L. Comm'n 2020)

(UPEPA) to aid in interpreting HPEPA. See Mikelson v. United

Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 122 Hawai#i 393, 399, 227 P.3d 559, 565 (App.

2010) (using Uniform Arbitration Act official comments to

interpret Hawai#i Uniform Arbitration Act, HRS Chapter 658A).

A. The circuit court did not err by granting the

special motion to dismiss.

UPEPA recognizes that a SLAPP plaintiff's "purpose is

to ensnare their targets in costly litigation that chills society

from engaging in constitutionally protected activity." UPEPA

prefatory note at 1. HRS § 634G-3(a) (Supp. 2022) allows filing

"a special motion to dismiss the cause of action or part of the

cause of action" within sixty days after a party is served with a

pleading to which HPEPA applies. HRS § 634G-4 (Supp. 2022)

provides for an expedited hearing. The timely filing of a

special motion to dismiss stays all other proceedings in the

action. HRS § 634G-3(b)(1).

HRS § 634G-6 (Supp. 2022) establishes the procedure for

a special motion to dismiss:

(a) In ruling on a motion under section 634G-3(a), the

court shall dismiss with prejudice a cause of action or part

of a cause of action if:

(1) The moving party establishes under section

634G-2(a) that this chapter applies;

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(2) The responding party fails to establish under

section 634G-2(b) that this chapter does not

apply; and

(3) Either:

(A) The responding party fails to establish a

prima facie case as to each essential

element of the cause of action; or

(B) The moving party establishes that:

(i) The responding party failed to state

a cause of action upon which relief

can be granted; or

(ii) There is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on the cause of action or part

of the cause of action.

1. Alston and Chee established that

HPEPA applied.

Under HRS § 634G-6(a)(1) the moving party — the SLAPP

defendant — has the burden to establish that HPEPA applies for a

reason identified in HRS § 634G-2(a). See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 2.3

HPEPA applies to a cause of action asserted against a

person based on the person's exercise of the right to "petition,

. . . guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Hawaii

State Constitution, on a matter of public concern." HRS

§ 634G-2(a)(3). The First Amendment to the United States

Constitution guarantees "the right of the people . . . to

petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Article I,

section 4 of the Hawai#i Constitution similarly preserves the

right "to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

UPEPA § 7, comment 2 states, in part:

Section 7(a)(1) establishes "Phase One" of the motion's

procedure — applicability. In this phase, the party filing

the motion has the burden to establish the Act applies for

one of the reasons identified in Section 2(b).

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Hallums's causes of action against Alston and Chee were

based on Chee's letters to HPD and its chief. Each letter was

written on Chee's law firm's letterhead. The July 15, 2022 and

July 29, 2022 letters stated Chee represented SHOPO; the July 28,

2022 letter was "a follow up to" the July 15 letter. The letters

were thus written on SHOPO's behalf.

Interim chief Vanic's May 4, 2022 letter told SHOPO its

vice-president, Hallums, was not entitled to special assignment

leave with pay and "should have been deducted leave while away

from his work assignment to attend the two conferences." Through

Chee's July 15, 2022 letter, SHOPO asked HPD to initiate an

investigation into Hallums receiving special assignment leave

with pay to attend three Mainland conferences on its behalf (once

in 2018, twice in 2019). Chee's July 28, 2022 letter was a

follow-up after HPD indicated an inability to pursue the matter.

Chee's July 29, 2022 letter to HPD's chief asked HPD to

investigate possible criminal violations by Hallums.

HPD is a "governmental unit" within the meaning of HRS

§ 634G-2(c). Hallums's complaint and amended complaint asserted

claims against Alston and Chee based on their exercise, as

SHOPO's attorneys, of SHOPO's constitutional right to petition

HPD on a matter of public concern. HRS § 634G-2(a)(3). The

supreme court has recognized "the compelling public interest in

instances of police misconduct given the importance of public

oversight of law enforcement." Peer News LLC v. City & County of

Honolulu, 138 Hawai#i 53, 74, 376 P.3d 1, 22 (2016).

The public also has an interest "to gauge the police

department's responsiveness to specific instances of misconduct

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and assess whether the agency is accountable to itself

internally[.]" State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers

v. City & County of Honolulu, 149 Hawai#i 492, 516, 494 P.3d

1225, 1249 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). "The public's

interest extends to those investigating misconduct and those

accused of misconduct: the public should be assured that both the

activity of public employees suspected of wrongdoing and the

conduct of those public employees who investigate the suspects is

open to public scrutiny." Id. (cleaned up).

Hallums argues that "writing letters to [Hallums]'s

employer to get him falsely prosecuted and fired is not covered

by the SLAPP suit statute. There was no public participation

before a governmental body since such proceeding did not exist

here." Alston and Chee didn't have to show there was a

"governmental proceeding" under HRS § 634G-2(a)(1) or (2),

because they established that HRS § 634G-2(a)(3) applied — that

Hallums's claims against them were based on Chee's exercise, as

SHOPO's attorney, of SHOPO's right to petition the government on

a matter of public concern — and the subsections are alternative,

not cumulative.

Hallums relies on Perry v. Perez-Wendt, 129 Hawai#i 95,

294 P.3d 1081 (App. 2013). That case was decided under former

HRS Chapter 634F, based on the dictionary definition of

"testimony" — not "communication," which appears in HRS

§ 634G-2(a)(1) and (2). Id. at 100–01, 294 P.3d at 1086–87.

When the legislature repealed HRS Chapter 634F in 2022, it stated

that "courts have often declined to apply its procedural

protections due to its narrow and confusing provisions." 2022

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Haw. Sess. Laws Act 96, § 1 at 215. Perry does not apply here

because the statutory language on which that case was decided was

materially different from HRS § 634G-2.

Alston and Chee established that HPEPA applied.

2. Hallums did not establish that

HPEPA did not apply.

Even if the SLAPP defendant establishes HPEPA applies,

the plaintiff can still defeat a special motion to dismiss by

establishing one of the three exemptions under HRS § 634G-2(b).

See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 3.4

Hallums did not argue to the circuit court that any HRS

§ 634G-2(b) exemption applied, nor does he make the argument on

appeal.

3. Hallums failed to establish prima

facie viability for any of his

stated causes of action.

If the SLAPP plaintiff doesn't argue, or cannot

establish, that an HRS § 634G-2(b) exception to HPEPA applies, it

must show under HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(A) that the challenged causes

of action have "prima-facie viability." The plaintiff "has the

burden to show its case has merit by establishing a prima-facie

case as to each essential element of the cause of action being

challenged by the motion." UPEPA § 7 cmt. 4.

UPEPA § 7, comment 3 states, in part:

Section 7(a)(2) is also part of "Phase One" of the motion's

procedure. Even if the Act applies for one of the reasons

identified in Section 2(b), the Act may nevertheless not

apply if the party against whom the motion is filed can

establish the applicability of an exemption identified in

Section 2(c). A party seeking to establish the

applicability of an exemption bears the burden of proof on

that exemption.

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[A]ll a responding party must do to satisfy its burden under

Phase Two is produce evidence that, if believed, would

satisfy each element of the challenged cause of action. A

court may not weigh that evidence, but rather must take it

as true and determine whether it meets the elements of the

moved-upon cause of action. If the responding party cannot

establish a prima-facie case, then the motion must be

granted and the cause of action (or portion of the cause of

action) must be stricken or dismissed. If the responding

party does establish a prima-facie case, then (and only

then) the court moves to "Phase Three" of the motion's

procedure.

Id. (citation omitted).

HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(A) shows that HPEPA is not a

substantive defense; it provides an expedited procedure for

determining whether a SLAPP lawsuit has factual and legal merit

without requiring the defendant to expend time and resources

litigating — the objective of a SLAPP plaintiff. See UPEPA § 7

cmt. 4.5

If the SLAPP plaintiff's opposition memorandum and

evidence establish a prima facie case, the SLAPP defendant's

reply memorandum must show, under HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(B), that

(1) the challenged claim fails to state a cause of action upon

which relief can be granted;6 or (2) there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a

UPEPA § 7, comment 4 states, in part:

Anti-SLAPP laws do not insulate defendants from any

liability for claims arising from protected rights of

petition or speech. They only provide a procedure for

weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising

from protected activity.

(Cleaned up.)

Cf. HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) (dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").

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matter of law on the challenged cause of action or part of the

cause of action.7 See UPEPA § 7 cmt. 5.8

Hallums's amended complaint alleged seven causes of

action. His opposition memorandum did not cite legal authority

for, or list the essential elements of, any of them. He failed

to establish the legal viability for any of his causes of action.

Hallums's opposition was supported by his declaration,

and those of HPD corporal Don Faumuina, former SHOPO executive

director Tenari Maafala, and former SHOPO president Malcolm Lutu.

They described facts relevant to Hallums's lawsuit against SHOPO

for removing him from office. None mentioned Alston or Chee.

Nor did the memorandum explain how those facts established

elements of his claims against Alston and Chee.

4. The circuit court did not need to

conduct an HRS § 634G-6(a)(3)(B)

analysis.

Hallums's opposition memorandum discussed Alston and

Chee's assertion of the litigation privilege and the Noerr7

Cf. HRCP Rule 56 (summary judgment).

UPEPA § 7, comment 5 states, in part:

Even if a responding party makes a prima-facie showing under

Section 7(a)(3)(A), the moving party may still prevail if it

shows that the responding party failed to state a cause of

action upon which relief can be granted or that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law — in other words,

that the cause of action is not legally sound. . . .

. . . [B]y employing a legal-viability standard, the

Act recognizes that a SLAPP plaintiff can just as easily

harass a defendant with a legally nonviable claim as it can

with a factually nonviable one.

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Pennington doctrine.9 Those affirmative defenses only become

relevant if Hallums established, by evidence that could be

considered under HRCP Rule 56, prima facie cases for his stated

causes of action. Because he didn't, the circuit court did not

need to analyze whether Alston and Chee established that

Hallums's amended complaint failed to state a cause of action

upon which relief can be granted, or if there was no genuine

issue of material fact and Alston and Chee were entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on those affirmative defenses.

B. The circuit court did not err by awarding

attorney fees.

HRS § 634G-9 (Supp. 2022) provides:

On a motion under section 634G-3(a) the court

shall[10] award costs, reasonable attorney's fees,

and reasonable litigation expenses related to the

motion:

(1) To the moving party if the moving party

prevails on the motion; or

"In certain circumstances, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides counsel general immunity from statutory liability for their litigation activity based on the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances." Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 158 Hawai #i 39, 45 n.4, 583 P.3d 812, 818 n.4 (2026) (citing Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006)).

UPEPA § 10, comment 1 explains:

The mandatory nature of the relief provided for by this

section is integral to the uniformity of the Act. States

that do not impose a mandatory award upon dismissal of a

cause of action will become safe havens for abusive

litigants. Without the prospect of having to financially

reimburse a successful moving party, SLAPP plaintiffs will

be able to file their frivolous suits in such states with

impunity, knowing that, at worst, their claims will only be

dismissed. But because moving parties would be financially

responsible for the expense of obtaining that dismissal, the

effect of the abusive cause of action is nevertheless

achieved. The only way to assure a truly uniform

application of the Act is to require the award of attorney's

fees to successful moving parties.

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(2) To the responding party if the

responding party prevails on the motion

and the court finds that the motion was

frivolous or filed solely with intent to

delay the proceeding.

Because the circuit court correctly granted Alston and

Chee's special motion to dismiss, it did not abuse its discretion

by awarding them attorney fees under HRS § 634-9(1). Hallums

does not challenge the amount of the award.

C. The circuit court acted outside its

discretion by not sufficiently explaining why

it denied the motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

Petricevic signed Hallums's amended complaint. Under

HRCP Rule 11(b) (eff. Oct. 28, 2019), he certified

that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and

belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper

purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or

needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal

contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a

nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

(3) the allegations and other factual contentions

have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,

are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted

on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are

reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

The amended complaint alleged:

29. SHOPO's counsel Kikaha Chee made a notarized and

false complaint against [Hallums] in [sic] July 15, 2022,

thereby making himself and his law firm witnesses — at the

very least — in this case.

31. On July 28, 2022, SHOPO's counsels AGAIN sent a

letter to HPD's PSO office making knowingly false criminal

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allegations against [Hallums] and demanding that [Hallums]

be criminally investigated.

32. Then, amazingly enough, since they realized that

HPD's PSO's [sic] office will not take action against

[Hallums] and ONE DAY LATER, SHOPO's counsels AGAIN

retaliated against [Hallums]. On July 29, 2022, SHOPO's

counsels — presumably attempting to use Mr. Alston's

considerable political influence 1, AGAIN sent a letter to

HPD — this time to newly appointed HPD Chief Logan 2 — and

AGAIN making knowingly false criminal allegations against

[Hallums] and demanding that [Hallums] be criminally

investigated.

37. Upon information and belief, being hesitant to

put his name on this attempt, [Alston] conspired with and

instructed his young associate Defendant Chee to write 3

separate letters to HPD (2 letters to HPD PSO office and one

letter to HPD Chief Logan) all in July of 2022 where

Defendant Chee would defame [Hallums] to HPD by making false

criminal allegations about [Hallums] by way of Defendant

Chee submitting notarized complaint about [Hallums] to the

HPD making criminal allegations that both Defendant Alston

and Chee knew to be false and/or for which they had no

evidence.

42. All of the above-described conspiracy and

misconduct executed by Defendants Alston and Chee were

committed completely outside the scope of their employment

from their employer and outside the scope of their

employment from their clients that they represent in this

case since all of their actions were completely,

intentionally and outside of any and all applicable law,

ethical and professional standards.

(Emphasis in original.)

Alston and Chee's Rule 11 motion argued those

allegations were "utterly baseless," "barred under controlling

Hawai#i law," and "transparently a bad faith tactical maneuver to

unnecessarily delay and increase the costs of litigation and

deprive the SHOPO defendants of their choice of counsel in

Hallums v. SHOPO." Attached to the motion were copies of emails

from Petricevic that Alston and Chee claimed "threatened

litigation against" them.

Petricevic argued the Rule 11 motion was barred by res

judicata or collateral estoppel because the court presiding over

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Hallums's lawsuit against SHOPO had denied an HRCP Rule 11

motion; Hallums "did not do anything worthy of sanctions"; and

Alston and Chee "are misrepresenting facts regarding

[Petricevic's] threatening to sue" them.11

The motion was heard on December 5, 2023. The circuit

court stated:

Okay. Just so counsel knows, my inclination is I've

dismissed this case, right? So my inclination is not to

impose sanctions based on Rule 11 at this point.

After hearing brief arguments from counsel, the court

stated:

All right. I'll tell you this, Mr. Petricevic. It

was a very thin line. But I give you the benefit of the

doubt on this one. But at the appellate level, they treat

Rule 11 much more seriously. So all I can say is do what

you feel you gotta do, but I came close. I don't know what

the next level will do. Okay?

The order summarily denying the motion was entered on

December 20, 2023.

The determination of an HRCP Rule 11 motion "is fact

intensive, requiring specific findings regarding the nature of

the potentially sanctionable conduct and surrounding

circumstances." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Greenspon, 143

Hawai#i 237, 244, 428 P.3d 749, 756 (2018) (reviewing order

denying motion under Hawai#i District Court Rules of Civil

Procedure Rule 11). "In considering whether a complaint was

supported by fact and law 'to the best of the signer's knowledge,

Petricevic also argued, in circuit court, that the motion was untimely because the circuit court had previously granted Alston and Chee's HRS § 634G-6 motion to dismiss. He doesn't make the argument in his answering brief on the cross-appeal. We note that the argument lacked merit because Alston and Chee timely served the motion then filed it in compliance with HRCP Rule 11(c)(1)(A).

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information, and belief,' a court must make some assessment of

the signer's credibility." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496

U.S. 384, 402, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2459, 110 L. Ed. 2d. 359 (1990)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11).12 "Familiar with the issues

and litigants, the [trial] court is better situated than the

court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the

fact-dependent legal standard mandated by [federal] Rule 11."

Id.; In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, 76 Hawai#i 1, 15, 868 P.2d 419,

433 (1994) (agreeing that "the trial court 'is best acquainted

with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated

to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11's goal

of specific and general deterrence.'" (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496

U.S. at 404, 110 S. Ct. at 2460, 110 L. Ed. 2d. 359)).

Here, the circuit court did not announce or enter

findings of fact or conclusions of law, or otherwise explain why

it denied Rule 11 sanctions. A trial court "abuses its

discretion when it denies [federal Rule 11] sanctions with no

explanation, or with an explanation that is so conclusory that

the appellate court cannot review the substance of its

decision[.]" LaSalle Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. County of DuPage, 10

F.3d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also In

re Elaine Emma Short Revocable Living Tr., 147 Hawai#i 456, 465,

465 P.3d 903, 912 (2020) (stating that "when the lower court has

failed to issue the requisite findings of fact to enable

"Where we have patterned a rule of procedure after an equivalent rule within the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], interpretations of the rule by the federal courts are deemed to be highly persuasive in the reasoning of this court." Gold v. Harrison, 88 Hawai #i 94, 105, 962 P.2d 353, 364 (1998) (citing federal cases applying federal Rule 11).

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meaningful appellate review, it is not the function of the

appellate court to conduct its own evidentiary analysis").

As the dissent points out, the supreme court's preGreenspon Rule 11 cases applied the pre-2000 version of HRCP

Rule 11, which mandated imposition of sanctions upon the finding

of a violation. See Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai#i at 335,

104 P.3d at 922; Fujimoto v. Au, 95 Hawai#i 116, 122 n.2, 19 P.3d

699, 705 n.2 (2001); Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, 79

Hawai#i 452, 456, 903 P.2d 1273, 1277 (1995); Hawaiian Flour

Mills, 76 Hawai#i at 16, 868 P.2d at 434. Because sanctions were

mandated, it made sense for an appellate court to conduct its own

review of the record to determine whether (or not) Rule 11 had

been violated.

Under the current Rule 11(c), however, "the court may,

subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate

sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have

violated subdivision (b) of this Rule or are responsible for the

violation." (Emphasis added.) One of the conditions stated is

that the sanction "be limited to what is sufficient to deter

repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others

similarly situated." HRCP Rule 11(c)(2).

A party or attorney being sanctioned for violating

Rule 11 is entitled to know "with reasonable specificity, the

perceived misconduct" for which the sanction is being imposed,

and why. Short Tr., 147 Hawai#i at 466, 465 P.3d at 913 (quoting

Enos, 79 Hawai#i at 459, 903 P.2d at 1280).

A moving party whose Rule 11 motion is denied is

equally entitled to know, with reasonable specificity, why no

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violation was found or, if a violation was shown, why sanctions

were denied or why a sanction other than that requested was

imposed.13 That is especially so if the trial court determines

that Rule 11 was violated, but decides a sanction is not

warranted to serve Rule 11's goal of specific and general

deterrence.

And, under the current Rule 11, "permitting an

appellate court to scour the evidentiary record of a case for any

factual basis in the record to support a trial court's decision

. . . would also allow . . . an appellate court to affirm a trial

court's decision based on credibility determinations that were

never made by a trial court." Short Tr., 147 Hawai#i at 467, 465

P.3d at 914 (discussing right-result-wrong-reason holding in Poe

v. Haw. Lab. Rels. Bd., 87 Hawai#i 191, 197, 953 P.2d 569, 575

(1998)); Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402, 110 S. Ct. At 2459, 110

L. Ed. 2d. 359 ("In considering whether a complaint was supported

by fact and law 'to the best of the signer's knowledge,

information, and belief,' a court must make some assessment of

the signer's credibility."); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v.

State, 157 Hawai#i 150, 157, 575 P.3d 783, 790 (2025) (stating

that "[a]n appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent

upon the credibility of witnesses" (quoting Fisher v. Fisher, 111

Hawai#i 41, 46, 137 P.3d 355, 360 (2006))).

When the circuit court denied Alston and Chee's motion

for Rule 11 sanctions it told Petricevic, "It was a very thin

line. But I give you the benefit of the doubt on this one." The

We express no opinion whether Alston and Chee proved that Petricevic violated HRCP Rule 11, and this opinion should not be so construed.

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record doesn't show where the circuit court's very thin line was

drawn. Did the court find Petricevic did not violate Rule 11, or

did it find a violation but not believe sanctions were necessary

"to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by

others similarly situated" under HRCP Rule 11(c)(2)?

The dissent concludes the circuit court "did not abuse

its discretion in denying the Rule 11 Motion" and states "it is

clear on this record that the Circuit Court was giving counsel

the benefit of the doubt on whether the suit was filed for an

improper purpose[.]" But the motion also argued there was "no

legal basis for the claims" in the amended complaint, which

contained "material statements of fact that [Petricevic] knew

were false when made." See HRCP Rule 11(b)(2) & (3). As stated

above, the memorandum opposing the special motion to dismiss

failed to establish the viability of any of the claims in the

amended complaint. The memorandum opposing the Rule 11 motion

failed to show a legal basis for the claims or any facts

supporting them, and did not even try to justify the questionable

factual allegations in the amended complaint — for example, that

Alston's and Chee's "actions were committed outside the scope of

his employment from his employer" when each of Chee's letters was

written on his law firm's letterhead and stated he represented

SHOPO.

Whether a trial court grants in whole or in part or

denies an HRCP Rule 11 motion, the parties should be able to know

why and, on appeal, it should not fall on an appellate court to

scour the record and second-guess how the trial court applied its

discretion.

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The dissent also posits that "sanctions in the form of

the further relief sought in the Rule 11 Motion, an award of

attorney's fees, was unnecessary" because a fee award was

mandatory under HRS § 634G-9. Fees awardable under HRS § 634G-9

are those incurred on an HRS § 634G-3(a) special motion to

dismiss. Alston and Chee's Rule 11 motion sought fees incurred

on the Rule 11 motion. Although not at issue here, Rule 11 also

contemplates "directives of a nonmonetary nature, [or] an order

to pay a penalty into court," "to deter repetition of such

conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated."

HRCP Rule 11(c)(2).

We conclude that the circuit court acted outside its

discretion by denying Alston and Chee's motion for HRCP Rule 11

sanctions without sufficiently explaining its reasons to allow

meaningful and more efficient appellate review. We take judicial

notice that the judge who heard the motion has retired from the

bench. On remand, the previous denial of the motion shall not

constitute the law of the case. See HRCP Rule 63. A new judge

must rehear the motion and announce or enter findings of fact and

conclusions of law explaining the new decision.

V. CONCLUSION

The April 16, 2024 Final Judgment is affirmed. This

case is remanded to the circuit court for post-judgment

proceedings on Alston and Chee's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

On the briefs:

/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka

John-Anderson L. Meyer, Associate Judge

Claire Wong Black,

Wendy F. Hanakahi, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry for Defendants-Appellees/ Associate Judge

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Cross-Appellants

Paul Alston and

Galen Kîkaha Chee.

Bosko Petricevic,

for Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee

David Leonard K. Hallums.

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY LEONARD, J.

I concur with the Majority's analysis with respect to

the Hawai#i Public Expression Protection Act (HPEPA), Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 634G, including the award of attorney's fees pursuant to HRS § 634G-9 (Supp. 2022). However, I respectfully dissent from the Majority's conclusion that the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court)14 abused its discretion when it denied Defendants' Motion for Rule 11

Sanctions filed on November 14, 2023 (Rule 11 Motion), by Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants Paul Alston and Galen Kikaha Chee (Alston and Chee), because the Circuit Court did not announce or enter Findings of Fact (FOFs) and Conclusions of Law (COLs) explaining its reasons for denying the Rule 11 Motion.

I conclude that the Circuit Court did not abuse its

discretion here. My reasoning is primarily three-fold: (1) the rule itself contains no such mandate for orders denying

sanctions; (2) Hawai#i appellate courts have not previously imposed such a mandate for orders denying Rule 11 sanctions; and (3) the Circuit Court has wide discretion not to impose

sanctions, even for the relatively simple reasons that were articulated here, that Circuit Court was giving counsel "the benefit of the doubt on this one" and it had already decided to dismiss the case.

The Majority lays out the certifications an attorney or

self-represented party makes, pursuant to Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 11(b) (2019), when presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other document. HRCP Rule 11(c) provides the sanctions that a court may impose for a violation of HRCP Rule 11(b), including how such sanctions are initiated (HRCP Rule 11(c)(1)), the nature of permitted sanctions, including limitations on the imposition of sanctions (HRCP Rule 11(c)(2)), and a mandate applicable to the sanctioning court's order, when imposing sanctions (HRCP Rule 11(c)(3)).

The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided.

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HRCP Rule 11(c)(3) states:

(3) ORDER. When imposing sanctions, the court shall

describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of

this Rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.

In short, HRCP Rule 11(c)(3) plainly requires that when

a court imposes sanctions, it must describe the violative conduct and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. It contains no parallel requirement for an order denying a request for

sanctions. The text of HRCP Rule 11 does not provide a basis for concluding that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in entering an order denying Rule 11 sanctions without FOFs and COLs explaining the basis for the denial.

I have carefully considered the Hawai#i cases cited in

the Majority Opinion, as well as the precedent relied upon in those cases. First, the Hawai#i Supreme Court's opinion in Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Greenspon, 143 Hawai#i 237, 243, 428 P.3d 749, 755 (2018), states the well-established principle that "all aspects of an HRCP Rule 11 determination should be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard." (Cleaned up). Greenspon stated a framework for interpreting the district courts' counterpart to HRCP Rule 11:

Like HRCP Rule 11, DCRCP Rule 11 requires the

signatory to make reasonable inquiry into the facts of the

case to ensure that "the filed document [is] supported by

existing or discoverable evidence." Fujimoto v. Au, 95

Hawai#i 116, 151-53, 19 P.3d 699, 735-36 (2001). DCRCP Rule

11 also requires the signatory to certify that the filing

was not undertaken for an "improper purpose". The

determination of whether these requirements have been met is

fact intensive, requiring specific findings regarding the

nature of the potentially sanctionable conduct and

surrounding circumstances. See In re Hawaiian Flour Mills,

Inc., 76 Hawai#i 1, 15, 868 P.2d 419, 433 (1994); Enos v.

Pacific Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 79 Hawai #i 452, 459, 903

P.2d 1273, 1280 (1995). Additionally, a trial court's

position "on the front lines of litigation" affords it

insight into the practices of the local bar and the degree

to which sanctions would promote DCRCP Rule 11's goals of

general and specific deterrence. Hawaiian Flour Mills,

Inc., 76 Hawai#i at 15, 868 P.2d at 433 (citing Cooter &

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404, 110 S.Ct. 2447,

110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)); see also Gap v. Puna Geothermal

Venture, 106 Hawai#i 325, 341, 104 P.3d 912, 928 (2004)

(holding that the primary purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to

deter misconduct, not to shift the burden of fees). A trial

court's decision as to whether to impose sanctions is thus

"due a substantial degree of deference," Hawaiian Flour

Mills, Inc., 76 Hawai#i at 15, 868 P.2d at 433, and it will

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generally be upheld unless it "exceeds the bounds of reason,

all of the circumstances before it being considered." Gap,

106 Hawai#i at 339, 104 P.3d at 926 (quoting Enos v. Pac.

Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 79 Hawai#i 452, 459 n.7, 903

P.2d 1273, 1280 n.7 (1995)).

143 Hawai#i at 244-45, 428 P.3d at 756-57 (footnotes omitted).

Notwithstanding the recital of these general principles

from prior HRCP Rule 11 case law, the Greenspon court did not

reach the merits of a Rule 11 analysis, i.e., the granting or

denial of Rule 11 sanctions, or even the sufficiency of an order

determining whether or not sanctions should be imposed.15 Id. at

245, 428 P.3d at 757. That is because, although the Greenspon

court identified various considerations that the district court

would have needed to consider on reaching the substance of the

alleged Rule 11 violation, that issue was never reached.

Instead, the district court exercised its discretion by

determining that a final resolution of the issue of Rule 11

sanctions was premature. It denied the Rule 11 motion without

prejudice. Id. The supreme court concluded that the district

court "did not exceed the bounds of reason" in determining that a

ruling on sanctions was premature and that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 11 motion without

prejudice. Id.

Thus, Greenspon did not reach the issue of a

substantive Rule 11 decision. Rather, the supreme court held

that it was not an abuse of discretion to kick the can down the

I have taken judicial notice of the record on appeal in Greenspon. I note that the district court's July 23, 2014 order denying the request for Rule 11 sanctions without prejudice contains no FOFs or COLs. The order merely footnotes representations of counsel and the court's understanding of how the outcome of a closely-related circuit court matter might have a direct bearing on the case before the district court. For these reasons, the motion was denied without prejudice.

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road. Accordingly, I turn to the Hawai#i Supreme Court Rule 11

cases cataloged in Greenspon.

In Fujimoto, the HRCP Rule 11 issue was whether the

circuit court in that case erred in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on

the plaintiffs therein for failing to properly plead their

derivative action claims. 95 Hawai#i at 152, 19 P.3d at 735.

HRCP Rule 11 has been revised significantly since the 1996

version of the rule that was applicable in Fujimoto,16 including

the elimination of the mandatory sanctions upon finding a Rule 11

violation and the addition of the HRCP Rule 11(c)(3) requirement

that the court shall describe the violative conduct and explain

the basis for the sanction when imposing sanctions. See id. at

122 n.2, 152 n.21, 19 P.3d at 705 n.2, 735 n.21 & HRCP Rule

11(c)(3), supra.

Of note here, however, is the Fujimoto court's handling

of a circuit court order that did not include FOFs:

In the present matter, the circuit court did not enter

any findings describing perceived misconduct that justified

the imposition of sanctions.

Applicable to Fujimoto, prior to substantive revisions to HRCP Rule 11 in December of 1999, HRCP Rule 11 provided in pertinent part:

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a

certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or

other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,

and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well

grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good

faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal

of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any

improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary

delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation[.] If

a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of

this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own

initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a

represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which

may include an order to pay to the other party or parties

the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of

the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,

including a reasonable attorney's fee.

(Emphasis added to highlight mandatory nature of sanctions upon finding of violation under the old version of Rule 11).

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Although it is well-settled that an appellate

court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any

ground in the record which supports affirmance, we

believe that, in order to facilitate a meaningful and

more efficient appellate review, an order imposing

sanctions should set forth findings that describe,

with reasonable specificity, the perceived misconduct

(such as harassment or bad faith conduct), as well as

the appropriate sanctioning authority (e.g., HRCP Rule

11 or the court's inherent power). For purposes of

appellate review, a distinction must be made between

zealous advocacy and plain pettifoggery.

Whether sanctions are imposed pursuant to HRCP

Rule 11 or pursuant to the court's inherent powers,

the importance of specific findings that describe the

perceived misconduct and the sanctioning authority is

two-fold. First, as previously noted, it allows for

more meaningful appellate review as to whether the

trial court exercised its discretion in a reasoned and

principled fashion. Second, it assures the litigants,

and incidentally the judge as well, that the decision

was the product of thoughtful deliberation, and their

publication enhances the deterrent effect of the

ruling. The sanction order issued in this case,

however, does not contain specific findings;

therefore, we are compelled to review the entire

record for an abuse of discretion.

Enos v. Pacific Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 79 Hawai #i 452,

459, 903 P.2d 1273, 1280 (1995) [(cleaned up)].

Fujimoto, 95 Hawai#i at 153, 19 P.3d at 736 (emphasis added).

The supreme court then proceeded to examine the record

to determine whether or not the circuit court had abused its

discretion. Id. at 153-54, 19 P.3d at 736-37. The supreme court

did not conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion for failing to enter FOFs and COLs supporting the imposition of

sanctions.17 Thus, Fujimoto does not support the Majority's conclusion that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in this

case.

As highlighted in Fujimoto, Enos similarly involved a

sanctions order that did not contain FOFs. Enos, 79 Hawai#i at

459, 903 P.2d at 1280. Like in Fujimoto, in Enos, the supreme

Under the current version of HRCP Rule 11, because the circuit court in Fujimoto imposed sanctions, HRCP Rule 11(c)(3) would require that the court describe the violative conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.

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court reviewed the record carefully to conclude that the

imposition of sanctions in that case was not supported by the

record and, therefore, was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 459-60, 903 P.2d at 1280-81. Thus, Enos does not support the

Majority's conclusion that the Circuit Court abused its

discretion in this case.

In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc. involved, inter alia,

the review of an order denying HRCP Rule 11 sanctions in a tax

appeal case. 76 Hawai#i at 14-15, 868 P.2d at 432-33. The

supreme court began its Rule 11 analysis by determining the

applicable standard of review, establishing that all aspects of

an HRCP Rule 11 determination should be reviewed for abuse of

discretion and explaining why it adopted this standard. Id. at

15-16, 868 P.2d at 433-34. In the course of that explanation,

the supreme court focused on the fact-dependent nature of Rule 11

decisions as support for the unitary standard of review. Id. In

applying the standard to the tax appeal court's ruling that there

was no HRCP Rule 11 violation, the supreme court emphasized the

"clear, unambiguous, and mandatory" terms of the rule, as then

constituted. Id. at 16, 868 P.2d at 434. The supreme court then

proceeded to analyze the violative conduct in question, as it

appeared in the record and briefing, without any mention of the

tax appeal court's order denying sanctions (including whether or

not it contained FOFs and COLs in support of its determination).

Id. at 16-17, 868 P.2d at 434-35. Thus, In re Hawaiian Flour

Mills, Inc. does not support the Majority's conclusion that the

Circuit Court abused its discretion in this case.

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Gap also applied the pre-2000 version of HRCP Rule 11.

106 Hawai#i at 334-35, 104 P.3d at 921-22. The supreme court

conducted a detailed review of the allegedly sanctionable

conduct, determining that with respect to some conduct, there was

no abuse of discretion in levying Rule 11 sanctions, but with

respect to other conduct, the circuit court did abuse its

discretion in imposing sanctions. Id. at 338-41, 104 P.3d at

925-28. The focus of the court's HRCP Rule 11 discussion turned

to the purpose of sanctions and whether the nature and amount of

the sanctions imposed were appropriate. Id. The supreme court

did not touch upon whether the circuit court's order itself was

sufficiently detailed and/or explanatory with respect to the

decision to impose sanctions. Thus, Gap does not support the

Majority's conclusion that the Circuit Court abused its

discretion in this case.

In addition, the Majority relies on a federal case,

LaSalle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. County of DuPage, 10 F.3d 1333,

1338 (7th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that a trial court

abuses its discretion when it denies Rule 11 sanctions with no

explanation or an explanation that is too conclusory. LaSalle,

however, was decided in 1993 based on a version of Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 11 that appears to be the same as

the pre-2000 version of HRCP that was discussed in the Hawai#i

cases above.18 Id. at 1337-38. Thus, if the district court in

LaSalle had found a violation of FRCP Rule 11, sanctions were

mandated. Id. at 1338. The LaSalle court commented that it

LaSalle does not reference the year the applicable FRCP Rule 11 was adopted or set forth the full text of the rule.

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reviewed "a fully explained sanction decision" in that case. Id.

The detailed analysis present in the LaSalle district court's

order clearly aided the appellate court in concluding that there

was no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions. Id. at 1338-39.

The rationale in LaSalle is not unreasonable; however, the

Hawai#i Supreme Court proceeded in Fujimoto and Enos to conduct

its own analyses where the lower court orders lacked specific

findings. Thus, it seems incongruous to find an abuse of

discretion in this case based on LaSalle.

Moreover, the changes in both the federal and Hawaii's

Rule 11 since that time, which are discussed above, erode the

imperative expressed by LaSalle. As reflected in the Appendix to

Volume 28 of the United States Code Annotated, the Advisory

Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment to FRCP Rule 11, which

adopted the FRCP language subsequently adopted in HRCP Rule

11(c)(3), specifically reject the Majority's position that denial

of sanctions without "sufficiently explaining" its reasons is an

abuse of discretion, stating:

If the court imposes a sanction, it must, unless waived, indicate

its reasons in a written order or on the record; the court should

not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for

sanctions. Whether a violation has occurred and what sanctions,

if any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the

discretion of the trial court[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment

(accessed at 1993 Amendment 28 U.S.C.A. app. Fed R. Civ. P. 11

(West, Westlaw, including Amendments received through 6-1-2026),

Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendment) (emphasis added).19

It further appears that LaSalle reflects a minority view in the federal courts. See, e.g., Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d

continue...

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Absent clear Hawai#i precedent adopting the rationale

stated in LaSalle or the further modification of the current

version of HRCP Rule 11(c)(3) to mandate detailed descriptions

and explanations when Rule 11 sanctions are denied, I decline to

view LaSalle as applicable authority to conclude that the Circuit

Court abused its discretion in this case.20

Further, I conclude that the Circuit Court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 11 Motion. Under the

current version of HRCP Rule 11, the Circuit Court has wide

discretion not to impose sanctions, including for the reasons

that were articulated here.21 First, the Circuit Court indicated

that it was giving counsel "the benefit of the doubt on this

one." While a further explanation may have been helpful, it is

clear on this record that the Circuit Court was giving counsel

...continue

815, 826 (9th Cir. 2009); Gibson v. Solideal USA, Inc., 489 Fed.Appx. 24, 32 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Runfola & Assocs., Inc. v. Spectrum Reporting II, Inc., 88 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir. 1996); Burns v. Seaworld Parks & Ent., Inc., No. 24-2958, 2026 WL 637292 at *1 n.8 (3d Cir. Mar. 6, 2026) (citing Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 844 F.3d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 2016)); Perez v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2004); but see Armendariz v. Chowaiki, 683 F. App'x 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2017).

The Majority also points to In re Elaine Emma Short Rev. Living Tr., 147 Hawai#i 456, 465, 465 P.3d 903, 912 (2020), for the proposition that "when the lower court has failed to issue the requisite findings of fact to enable meaningful appellate review, it is not the function of the appellate court to conduct its own evidentiary analysis." I conclude that the case is inapposite. While the trend in many instances has clearly been for the Hawai#i appellate courts to decline to conduct a detailed record review when FOFs are lacking or deficient, that principle has not been previously applied to a denial of HRCP Rule 11 sanctions, as discussed herein, and Elaine Emma Short Tr. presents starkly different circumstances. There, the probate court modified the terms of a trust without stating on what basis the court found an ambiguity in the trust, or even whether such ambiguity formed the basis for the court's determination. Id. at 465, 465 P.3d at 912. The probate court gave no reason for its ruling and the record was unclear, so the supreme court concluded that it could not conduct a meaningful appellate review. Id. at 465-66, 465 P.3d at 912-13. This case is distinguishable.

The imposition of sanctions is no longer mandatory, even if an attorney's conduct is objectively found to have fallen short of the imperatives of HRCP Rule 11's certification requirement.

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

the benefit of the doubt on whether the suit was filed for an

improper purpose, notwithstanding its dismissal ruling in favor

of Alston and Chee.

The Circuit Court stated a further part of its

rationale for denying sanctions, that it had already dismissed

the case. As a remedy for the alleged HRCP Rule 11 violations,

the Rule 11 Motion asked the Circuit Court to strike the

complaint and first amended complaint. Clearly, that was no

longer necessary because the court had already dismissed the

case, as explained by the Circuit Court. In addition, although

not specifically mentioned at the hearing on the Rule 11 Motion,

at the prior hearing, on the motion to dismiss the case, the

Circuit Court denied the request for attorney's fees in the

motion to dismiss specifically "without prejudice" to defendants

seeking fees and costs pursuant to HRS § 634G-9. As set forth in

Section IV.B. of the Majority's opinion – with which I concur in

part – HRS § 634G-9's award of attorney's fees and costs is

mandatory if, as in this case, a moving party prevails on a HRS

§ 634G-3(a) special motion to dismiss. Thus, it appears that

sanctions in the form of the further relief sought in the Rule 11

Motion, an award of attorney's fees, was unnecessary.22 Under

these circumstances, and in light of the lack of clear Hawai#i

authority mandating FOFs and COLs in an order denying HRCP Rule

The Majority comments that further sanctions could have been imposed, but the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter, rather than to compensate or maximize punitive measures. See HRCP Rule 11(c)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment.

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

11 sanctions, I conclude that the Circuit Court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the Rule 11 Motion.23

Even if the Hawai#i Supreme Court were inclined to

apply a new standard in civil cases requiring a more detailed

explanation for denying Rule 11 sanctions, I would respectfully

suggest that they do so prospectively to avoid inequity. See

Winn v. Brady, 156 Hawai#i 119, 126, 570 P.3d 1086, 1093 (2025).24

For these reasons, I dissent from the Majority's

conclusion that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in

conjunction with its denial of the Rule 11 Motion. I would

affirm the April 16, 2024 Judgment in its entirety.

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard

Associate Judge

Finally, I note that pursuant to Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4), Alston and Chee's argument that the Circuit Court's ruling did not include a sufficiently detailed explanation should be disregarded, because their counsel did not bring this alleged error to the attention of the Circuit Court, notwithstanding a clear opportunity to do so. At the close of the hearing on the Rule 11 Motion, after the Circuit Court announced its ruling and its explanation, the court said: "So submit promptly [a] short form order denying the motion for sanctions. All right?" Plaintiff's counsel said: "Yes." Instead of seeking a further explanation or requesting specific findings, Alston and Chee's lawyer simply said: "Thank you, Your Honor." The circumstances of this case do not warrant a plain error review of the denial of Rule 11 sanctions.

Courts consider "(a) the purpose of the newly announced rule, (b) the extent of reliance . . . on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Winn, 156 Hawai#i at 126, 570 P.3d at 1093. Here, the purpose of a new standard would be to facilitate meaningful appellate review of the denial of an HRCP Rule 11 motion, notwithstanding that the rule does not expressly require an explication. That purpose would not be served by applying it in the instant case because, inter alia, the presiding Circuit Court judge has retired and a new judge cannot meaningfully recreate the former judge's impressions and credibility determinations on remand. Courts also weigh the degree to which the new rule would prejudice the parties. Id. at 127, 570 P.3d at 1094. Here, Petricevic would be prejudiced on remand for similar reasons, which would be inequitable. See In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc., 76 Hawai#i at 15, 868 P.2d at 433 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies to Rule 11 orders because the "inquiry is heavily fact-intensive, requiring careful consideration of the particular circumstances of each case, and involving questions of reasonableness, credibility and, often, motive").

Hallums v. Alston

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain