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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 24-CM-1016
JAKYRA PERRY, APPELLANT,
V.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2024-CMD-004895)
(John M. Campbell, Judge)
(Michael K. O’Keefe, Judge)
(Submitted January 22, 2026 Decided July 2, 2026)
Jalil D. Dozier was on the briefs for appellant.
Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, with whom Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, and Steven B. Snyder, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, DEAHL, Associate Judge, and GLICKMAN, Senior Judge.
DEAHL, Associate Judge: Jakyra Perry was charged with two counts of simple
assault based on her alleged participation in a group attack on the complainants,
Amari Walton and Akhayla Reynolds. At Perry’s trial, the government introduced a
2
video that showed a group of people beating up the two women, and it contended
that Perry was a visible member of the group and the principal instigator of the
attack. Walton testified, and after watching the video—which had been posted to
Instagram—she made an in-court identification of Perry as the person who initiated
the attack against her and Reynolds. Perry was convicted of both assaults and, in
addition to her jail sentence, she was directed to pay Walton over $6,000 in
restitution to cover Walton’s unpaid medical bills and lost wages stemming from the
attack.
On appeal, Perry challenges the admission of the Instagram video, Walton’s
in-court identification of her, and the court’s restitution order. We uphold the trial
court’s rulings and affirm Perry’s convictions.
I. Background
According to the government’s evidence at trial, Walton and Reynolds were
waiting for an Uber near the U Street Metro station late one night when they saw a
group of people in the area “fighting a girl.” They called out to the group to stop
fighting. A woman with blonde braids and grey leggings turned around and asked,
“you all want to bump for them?” Walton and Reynolds did not respond, but the
woman approached them and the rest of the group followed her. A man in the group
said something and, as Reynolds was responding, the woman with blonde braids
3
said, “don’t talk to my baby daddy.” The woman then punched Reynolds in the face,
“kind of [from] behind.” An unidentified attacker then hit Walton from behind and
knocked her out. As Walton regained consciousness, she could see people hitting
her and she started punching back. After a few minutes, the fight “died down.”
Walton and Reynolds then went to the hospital.
Walton spoke with police officers after the fight and described the woman
with blonde braids as one of her attackers. The next day, both Reynolds and Walton
were sent a video on Instagram that depicted the melee. Eight months later, Perry
was arrested and charged with two counts of simple assault against Walton and
Reynolds. Details of the police investigation that led to Perry’s arrest were not
introduced at trial, but she appears to have been identified through some Instagram
sleuthing. Law enforcement did not conduct any pre-arrest or pre-trial identification
procedures, such as a line up or photo array, to see if Walton or Reynolds could
positively identify Perry as one of their attackers.
After her arrest, Perry filed two pre-trial motions relevant to this appeal. First,
she moved to exclude the Instagram video, which she argued could not be
authenticated without a custodian of records for Instagram. Second, she moved to
preclude any in-court identification of her that was based on the Instagram video as
unreliable, arguing that allowing a witness to testify that “the person in front of them
4
is the same person in the video” was usurping the factfinder’s role. She argued that
the factfinder—the judge, in what was a bench trial—was in just as good a position
as Walton to say whether Perry was the woman depicted in the Instagram video, as
it appeared that Walton had no independent memory of what Perry looked like
except from what the video depicted. Therefore, in Perry’s view, the court could
“view the video footage and photographs and make its own determination” about
whether Perry was the attacker. The court denied both motions, explaining that the
video would need to be authenticated at trial and that an in-court identification would
be permissible if a witness “can testify in court that they know the person and what
the basis is for any knowledge.”
The main issue at trial, which took place a year after the attack, was whether
Perry was the woman with blonde braids who instigated and participated in the fight
with Walton and Reynolds. After Walton described the events of that night, the
government introduced the Instagram video. Walton testified that she recognized
herself in the video, that she was present while the events in the video took place,
and that the video depicted the events as she remembered them. Perry renewed her
objection that the video needed to be authenticated by an Instagram custodian of
records. The judge overruled the objection, reasoning that Walton had adequately
authenticated the video by testifying based on her firsthand knowledge that it
accurately depicted the events of that night. Walton explained what transpired in the
5
video as it was played in court and said she did not know anyone in the melee besides
Reynolds. The government then asked her if she saw anyone from the fight in the
courtroom. Walton identified Perry as one of her attackers and said that she
remembered Perry’s face.
Reynolds and the arresting officer also testified, but neither said anything of
much relevance to the central issue in the case—whether Perry was one of the people
who assaulted Walton and Reynolds. Reynolds could not recall many of the details
of the fight. She said she was hit from behind, did not see who hit her, and fell to the
ground where she was kicked, punched, and dragged. As for the arresting officer, he
testified that he executed an arrest warrant when taking Perry into custody, but that
he otherwise had no involvement with the investigation of the case.
After closing arguments, the court opined that the video clearly depicted
assaults, so the “only issue” was whether the government had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Perry was one of the assailants. Relying on Walton’s testimony
and in-court identification of Perry, the court found that Perry was the blonde woman
in the video who had committed assaults on both Walton and Reynolds and found
Perry guilty on both counts.
As part of her sentence, the court ordered Perry to pay $6,119.98 in restitution,
which the government proffered constituted Walton’s outstanding medical bills and
6
ten days of missed wages due to the assault. Defense counsel argued that this was “a
lot of money” and that the government had not presented any hospital bills or pay
stubs. The court stated that “whenever somebody is injured, if there are unpaid bills,
[they] should be paid for by the perpetrator.” The court directed the government to
share the hospital bills and pay stubs with Perry and told defense counsel that she
could raise any issues she had with the calculations thereafter. Defense counsel did
not raise any further objections to the government’s calculations after reviewing the
government’s supporting documents.
Perry now appeals her convictions and the restitution order.
II. Analysis
Perry raises three arguments on appeal. First, she argues that the Instagram
video should not have been admitted into evidence. Second, she argues that Walton’s
in-court identification should not have been permitted because it was suggestive and
unreliable. Third, she argues that, even if we affirm her convictions, the restitution
order was unsupported and should be vacated. We address each argument in turn.
A. The trial court did not err in admitting the Instagram video.
Perry argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the government to admit
the Instagram video because (1) it was not properly authenticated, (2) its admission
7
violated the best evidence rule, (3) it included multiple levels of hearsay, and (4) its
admission violated the Confrontation Clause. Perry raised only the first challenge in
the trial court, and we review that preserved claim of evidentiary error under the
abuse of discretion standard. 1 Becton v. United States, 348 A.3d 23, 34 (D.C. 2025).
We review the remaining unpreserved challenges for plain error. See (Tyrell)
Johnson v. United States, 232 A.3d 156, 161-62 (D.C. 2020).
Perry principally argues that the government “failed to present admissible
evidence to lay the foundation to authenticate the [Instagram] video at trial” and that
the video was therefore “legally irrelevant.” “Authenticity—whether an item of
evidence is genuinely what its proponent claims it is—is a component of relevance.”
Ransom v. United States, 322 A.3d 521, 527 (D.C. 2024) (quoting (Carlos) Johnson
v. United States, 290 A.3d 500, 509 (D.C. 2023)). All that a proponent of evidence
must show to authenticate it is a “reasonable possibility that the evidence is what it
purports to be.” Id. at 527-28 (quoting Johnson, 290 A.3d at 509). One way to
1
Contrary to Perry’s assertion that she preserved her “best evidence rule” objection by objecting to the authentication of the video evidence, a challenge to the authentication of evidence does not fairly include a best evidence rule objection. See Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. 2008) (“[O]bjections must be made with reasonable specificity; the [trial] judge must be fairly apprised as to the question on which he is being asked to rule.” (quoting Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C. 1992))).
8
authenticate video evidence is for a witness “who was present during the events
portrayed” to testify that “the video accurately portrays those events.” Id. at 528.
Walton’s testimony that she was in the video, present for the melee depicted
in it, and that it accurately portrayed that fight, was sufficient to authenticate the
Instagram video. Perry argues that Walton lacked knowledge about whether the
recording was accurate because she was hit from behind during the relevant events.
However, Walton testified that she saw the woman with blonde braids hit Reynolds
and, although she briefly lost consciousness, she later regained consciousness and
was able to see people hitting her. The trial court credited this testimony, we have
no basis to second guess it, and a witness need not have personal knowledge about
every frame of a video to authenticate it. Because Walton authenticated the video
through her testimony, it does not matter, contrary to Perry’s assertions, that Walton
did not create the video or that the video was blurry and apparently edited. See
Johnson, 290 A.3d at 513 (noting that appellant’s unsubstantiated objection that a
video introduced at trial had been doctored “did not undermine the trial judge’s
determination that the videos were sufficiently authenticated”).
9
We next review Perry’s unpreserved challenges for plain error. 2 She first
argues that admitting the Instagram video violated the best evidence rule, which
provides that “an original writing, recording, or photograph is [generally] required
in order to prove its content.” Callaham v. United States, 268 A.3d 833, 847 (D.C.
2022) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 1002). Nonetheless, “[a] duplicate is admissible to the
same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s
authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” Id. (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 1003). That is, unless Perry provides some basis to think that the
Instagram video was an “inaccurate reproduction[]” or an “insufficient duplicate[]”
of the original, the best evidence rule affords her no relief. See id. (holding that a
compilation of surveillance recordings did not violate the best evidence rule because
the defendant did not allege it was inaccurate or insufficient). Here, although the
video appears to have been edited, these alterations do not make the video
“inaccurate” or “insufficient” under Callaham. Perry does not suggest that the video
unfairly depicted the melee or omitted anything that might have been helpful or
material to her defense, and we thus see no error in the video’s admission.
2
Under plain error review, we will reverse the trial court’s ruling if the appellant shows “(1) there is error, (2) such error is ‘plain,’ meaning ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ by the time of appellate review; (3) the error affected appellant’s ‘substantial rights’; and (4) the error seriously affected ‘the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” Chew v. United States, 314 A.3d 80, 83 n.1 (D.C. 2024) (quoting In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 96 (D.C. 2013)).
10
Furthermore, Perry has made no showing that the original was actually available to
the government, which is generally a prerequisite to the best evidence rule’s
application. Fed. R. Evid. 1004.
Perry next argues that the Instagram video was inadmissible hearsay.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Holmon v.
District of Columbia, 202 A.3d 512, 517 n.5 (D.C. 2019) (quoting Little v. United
States, 613 A.2d 880, 882 (D.C. 1992)). And a “statement” includes “a person’s oral
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an
assertion.” Id. at 517 n.5 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)). The images in the video
footage are not themselves hearsay because they assert nothing, as is typically the
case with bare images. See Holmes v. United States, 92 A.3d 328, 331 (D.C. 2014)
(holding that a surveillance system does not assert anything). That said, a video can
certainly contain statements that are hearsay. See, e.g., McRoy v. United States, 106
A.3d 1051, 1058-59 (D.C. 2015) (recognizing that recording of a victim’s statements
during an interview contained hearsay). But the Instagram video in this case had no
audio, so that nothing was asserted within it and none of its contents are properly
categorized as hearsay.
11
Finally, Perry argues that her rights under the Confrontation Clause were
violated when the court admitted the Instagram video and the testimony from Walton
and Reynolds about the video, and the testimony from the officer who executed the
arrest warrant. She argues that the government was required to present testimony
from other witnesses, including the author of the Instagram post, the person who
took the original video, the people who sent the video to Walton and Reynolds, and
the officer who completed the arrest warrant affidavit.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of
defendants in criminal proceedings to “be confronted with the witnesses against”
them. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This is not a right to confront every person involved
in the government’s investigation of this case, or to question any person who handled
the pertinent evidence, as Perry seems to argue. Rather, it bars “admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unable
to testify, and the defendant . . . had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
Carrington v. District of Columbia, 77 A.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. 2013) (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004)). As we have explained, the
Instagram video did not include any statements, so its admission did not implicate
the Confrontation Clause. As for Walton and Reynolds, Perry had a full and fair
opportunity to cross-examine each of them, so the Confrontation Clause’s command
was satisfied as to them. The government did not introduce any statements from the
12
individuals who merely shot the video, or from those who relayed it to Walton and
Reynolds, so the Confrontation Clause did not require the government to produce
them as in-court witnesses. Similarly, the government did not introduce any
statements from the officer who completed the arrest warrant affidavit, so the officer
did not have to be produced for cross-examination either.
In sum, the Instagram video was properly admitted into evidence, and none of
Perry’s attacks on that ruling has merit.
B. The trial court did not err in permitting Walton to identify Perry in court.
Perry raises two challenges to Walton’s in-court identification: (1) that her
identification from video footage effectively usurped the role of the factfinder, who
was just as capable of comparing Perry to the video footage; and (2) that the
identification was suggestive and unreliable.
On the first point, a witness can generally testify to a matter if it is relevant
and there is sufficient evidence that they have personal knowledge about it.
Callaham, 268 A.3d at 848 & n.19 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 602). That testimony must
be “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not
13
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Id. at 848 n.20
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701).
As we have explained, the government introduced sufficient evidence that
Walton had personal knowledge of the events in the video. She had previously
identified the woman with blonde braids as her attacker to police officers and again
pointed her out in the video. Although Walton was hit on the head, she saw the group
of attackers initially, and again when she regained consciousness.
Contrary to Perry’s argument, Callaham does not compel a different result. In
that case, two detectives narrated the events of a video from which they had
identified a suspect at trial even though neither had personally witnessed the events
depicted. Callaham, 268 A.3d at 836. We said that the detectives could not establish
“personal knowledge” just by viewing the footage. Id. at 848. But here, unlike in
Callaham, Walton was there for the events in the video—her personal knowledge
stemmed from her presence in the melee, not her review of the video itself.
Perry next argues that Walton’s in-court identification of Perry was unduly
suggestive and unreliable because Perry was seated at the counsel table and “it was
obvious that she was being prosecuted for the alleged crimes.” This is a new
argument on appeal, which we review for plain error. See supra at note 2. Although
Perry argued before the trial court that Walton’s testimony was inadmissible lay
14
opinion testimony, she said nothing in her pre-trial motions or at trial about the
identification being suggestive, so this argument is unpreserved.
While in-court identification procedures may often be suggestive, we have
generally permitted them so long as they bear sufficient hallmarks of reliability.
Green v. United States, 580 A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. 1990). The trial court did not
plainly err in determining that this in-court identification was sufficiently reliable to
allow. Reliability is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, considering
“the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972); see also Morales v. United States, 248 A.3d 161, 176-81
(D.C. 2021) (applying the Biggers inquiry to a pre-trial identification). There were
several reasons for the judge to think Walton’s testimony was reliable, including her
previous identification of the woman with blonde braids as her attacker to police,
her identification of that woman in the video footage, and her testimony that she
remembered Perry’s face, hairstyle, and what she was wearing during the fight.
While we think a colorable argument could be made that this in-court identification
was too unreliable to permit, that is not plainly the case, so there was no reversible
error under the plain error standard of review.
15
C. The restitution order was not plainly erroneous.
Perry’s last argument is that the restitution order was erroneous for two
reasons. First, she argues that the court imposed restitution under a “uniform policy”
that the assailant should always pay outstanding medical bills, which she alleges was
a way of punishing her more harshly for not naming her accomplices. Second, she
argues that the restitution order was not supported by “adequate documentation” to
support the amount that she was ordered to pay. We consider those arguments in
turn.
The first argument is unpreserved, and we accordingly review it for plain
error. See Briscoe v. United States, 181 A.3d 651, 655 (D.C. 2018) (reviewing
unpreserved objections to sentencing decisions for plain error). A trial court has
“broad discretion in imposing a restitution order” provided there is a “factual basis”
in the record for the order. In re N.G., 9 A.3d 478, 482 (D.C. 2010) (citation omitted).
The court should consider several factors in determining whether to impose
restitution, including “the number of victims, the actual damage of each victim, [and]
the resources of the defendant.” D.C. Code § 16-711(b). The court weighed each of
those factors in this case. While the court further opined that assailants should always
pay the outstanding medical bills of their victims, that statement does not offend our
cases instructing that courts should not sentence defendants according to a “uniform
16
policy.” See Lindsay v. United States, 84 A.3d 50, 53 (D.C. 2014). Our cases mean
only that, when fashioning the particular sentence, courts should be mindful of the
particulars of each case, and the court was faithful to that principle here when it
fashioned a restitution order driven by the particular monetary losses that Walton
suffered as a result of her assault. See id. (requiring that “the defendant’s sentence
reflect[] an individuated judgment as to the balance of deterrence and rehabilitation
applicable in [his] case rather than a categorical approach” (quoting Thorne v. United
States, 46 A.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. 2012))). The court’s statement that offenders
should pay the medical bills of their victims is simply not the type of “uniform
policy” that our cases have rebuked—it is on par with saying that all violent felons
should serve some time incarcerated to repay their debt to society, which as a
baseline rule is perfectly appropriate.
Perry’s second argument about the adequacy of the support for the restitution
award was likewise not preserved for our review. After defense counsel raised some
concern about the lack of documentation for the restitution award in the trial court,
the court directed the government to share its documentation with defense counsel
and for the parties to inform the court if they were not on the same page about the
amount of Walton’s lost wages and outstanding hospital bills. After defense counsel
had an opportunity to review the government’s documentation, defense counsel did
not dispute $6,119.98 as the proper amount of restitution. Under the circumstances,
17
if defense counsel was dissatisfied with the documentation, she was required to
renew that challenge after her opportunity to review the supporting documents.
Because she did not do that, and on the record before us we cannot say that the
restitution award was plainly erroneous, 3 we reject this claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we uphold the trial court’s rulings and affirm
Perry’s convictions.
So ordered.
3
The government has an outstanding motion to supplement the appellate record with the documents substantiating the $6,119.98 restitution award. Because those documents were not a part of the trial record, and we have rejected Perry’s challenge to the restitution order in any event, we deny that motion.