Rel: July 2, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-0359
Mackenzie Mae Pike
v.
Clayton Yates
Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court
(DR-24-900034)
PER CURIAM.
Mackenzie Mae Pike ("the mother") appeals from a judgment of the
Randolph Circuit Court ("the circuit court") that, among other things,
determined Clayton Yates ("the father") to be the father of the parties'
minor child ("the child"), awarded the parties joint legal and joint
physical custody of the child, and ordered the father to pay the mother
CL-2025-0359
$193 per month in child support. The mother argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's child-custody award,
that the circuit court erred by not ordering retroactive child support, and
that the circuit court erred by failing to append the required childsupport forms to the judgment in compliance with Rule 32(E), Ala. R.
Jud. Admin. The mother's arguments pertaining to child custody and
retroactive child support are without merit, but we agree with the mother
that the circuit court erred by failing to append the required childsupport forms to the judgment. Therefore, we affirm the judgment as it
pertains to the issues of child custody and retroactive child support,
reverse the judgment as it pertains to the child-support award, and
remand the cause for the circuit court to enter a child-support award in
compliance with the requirements of Rule 32.
Factual and Procedural History
The mother and the father began a brief romantic relationship in
July 2023 when they were both 19 years old. The mother became
pregnant with the child shortly thereafter. The parties ended their
relationship in January 2024, and the mother gave birth to the child on
April 29, 2024.
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On May 9, 2024, the father filed a "verified petition for custody
determination," requesting, among other things, that the circuit court
order a paternity test to confirm that he is the biological father of the
child, award him "primary legal and physical custody" of the child, and
order the mother to pay him child support. That same day, the father
filed a "motion for pendente lite relief," requesting, among other things,
that the circuit court require the parties to submit to a paternity test as
soon as possible, award him "primary physical custody" of the child, and
order the mother to pay him child support. The mother filed an answer
on May 22, 2024, denying the material allegations of the father's petition
and pendente lite motion.
On that same day, May 22, 2024, the mother filed a "motion for
paternity test," stating that she consented to the father's request for a
paternity test, and a "counter petition for custody and child support." In
her "counter petition," the mother requested, among other things, that
the circuit court award her "sole legal and physical custody" of the child
and order the father to pay her child support. The father denied the
material allegations of the mother's "counter petition."
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On June 20, 2024, the circuit court ordered the parties to submit to
a paternity test. On July 16, 2024, the father renewed his pendente lite
motion and attached a copy of the paternity-test results as an exhibit.
The paternity-test results indicated that there was a 99.99% probability
that the father is the biological father of the child. On that same day, July
16, 2024, the mother filed a response to the father's renewed pendente
lite motion, requesting "legal and physical custody" of the child, "[c]hild
support," and limited, supervised visitation for the father.
On August 1, 2024, the parties submitted Form CS-41 and Form
CS-42 child-support forms as required by the Child Support Guidelines.
See Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. The circuit court entered a pendente
lite order that same day. Among other things, the pendente lite order
required the parties to share joint legal custody of the child, impliedly
awarded sole physical custody1 of the child to the mother, provided the
father with a graduated schedule for unsupervised visitation with the
child, and required the father to begin paying the mother $462 per month
in child support.
1See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-151(5) (defining "sole physical custody"
as: "One parent has sole physical custody and the other parent has rights
of visitation ….").
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The trial in the underlying matter took place on March 26, 2025.
The circuit court subsequently entered a "final order of paternity and
custody" on April 14, 2025.
The father timely filed a "motion to alter, amend or reconsider final
order" on April 22, 2025, requesting that the circuit court add a provision
requiring the Alabama Department of Vital Statistics to change the
child's last name from "Pike" to "Yates" and to add the father to the child's
birth certificate. The circuit court entered an "amended final order of
paternity and custody" on May 2, 2025 ("the judgment"), implicitly
granting the father's postjudgment motion. In the judgment, the circuit
court made specific findings of fact as to the issues of child custody and
child support, and it established a "2-2-3" custody schedule.2
The mother subsequently filed a "motion to alter, amend or vacate
or, in the alternative, motion for new trial," arguing that the judgment
was "not supported by the law or facts." On May 13, 2025, the same day
that the mother filed her postjudgment motion, the mother also initiated
this appeal by filing a Form ARAP-25 "docketing statement" and a Form
2Under a "2-2-3" custody schedule, a child spends two days with
Parent A, the next two days with Parent B, and then returns to Parent A
for the final three days of the week. The schedule alternates the following
week, beginning with the child spending two days with Parent B.
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ARAP-1A "transcript purchase order of appellant -- civil."3 Because the
circuit court had not yet ruled on the mother's postjudgment motion, the
mother's appeal was temporarily held in abeyance. See Rule 4(a)(5), Ala.
R. App. P.
The circuit court entered an order on May 19, 2025, setting the
mother's postjudgment motion for a hearing on May 28, 2025.4 The circuit
court entered an order denying the mother's postjudgment motion on
May 28, 2025; the mother's notice of appeal became effective at that time.
See Rule 4(a)(5).
3The docketing statement constituted a notice of appeal in
substance. See Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P. ("The notice of appeal shall
specify all parties taking the appeal and each adverse party against
whom the appeal is taken; shall designate the judgment, order, or part
thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is
taken."); see also Okafor v. State, 225 So. 3d 72, 79 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)
(holding that the appellant had filed a notice of appeal because "the
docketing statement that [the appellant had] filed contain[ed] all the
information required by Rule 3(c), [Ala. R. App. P.] …"), rev'd on other
grounds, 225 So. 3d 93 (Ala. 2016). Although not required to effectuate a
notice of appeal, this court " 'strongly encourage[s]' " the use of a Form
ARAP-1 -- i.e., " 'the standard notice of appeal for appeals to our supreme
court and [to] this court' " -- to file an appeal. Cleveland v. Armstrong,
[Ms. CL-2025-0331, Apr. 3, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2026)(plurality opinion)(quoting Okafor, 225 So. 3d at 80).
4A transcript of the May 28, 2025, hearing is not included in the
record.
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Standard of Review
" ' " ' " Our standard of review is very limited in cases
where the evidence is presented ore tenus. A custody
determination of the trial court entered upon oral testimony
is accorded a presumption of correctness on appeal, and we
will not reverse unless the evidence so fails to support the
determination that it is plainly and palpably wrong, or unless
an abuse of the trial court's discretion is shown. To substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court would be to reweigh
the evidence. This Alabama law does not allow." ' " ' "
Gurganus v. Clay, 372 So. 3d 1222, 1229-30 (Ala. Civ. App.
2022)(citations omitted).
" ' "Furthermore, when evidence is presented ore tenus, the trial
court is ' " unique[ly] position[ed] to directly observe the witnesses and to
assess their demeanor and credibility." ' Therefore, a presumption of
correctness attaches to a trial court's factual findings premised on ore
tenus evidence." ' " Id. at 1230 (citations omitted).
Analysis
I. Whether there was insufficient evidence to support the initial childcustody determination
The mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
the circuit court's initial child-custody award of joint physical custody
and a "2-2-3" custody schedule. We initially note that, although the
mother did not raise this issue in her postjudgment motion, it is properly
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before this court. See Rule 52(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("When findings of fact
are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be
raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the
court an objection to such findings or has made a motion to amend them
or a motion for judgment or a motion for a new trial.").
First, the mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the initial child-custody award under "the best-interest
standard." However, the mother does not cite any relevant legal
authority pertaining to the factors that a trial court should consider when
making an initial child-custody determination based on the best interest
of a child.5 Instead, the mother argues, without citing any supporting
legal authority, "that a custody judgment that materially disrupts a
5See Gurganus v. Clay, 372 So. 3d 1222, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App.
2022)(" ' " ' In making an initial award of custody based on the best
interests of the children, a trial court may consider factors such as the
" ' characteristics of those seeking custody, including age, character,
stability, mental and physical health ... [and] the interpersonal
relationship between each child and each parent.' " … Other factors the
trial court may consider in making a custody determination include "the
sex and age of the [children], as well as each parent's ability to provide
for the [children's] educational, emotional, material, moral, and social
needs." The overall focus of the trial court's decision is the best interests
and welfare of the children.' " ' " (citations omitted)).
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CL-2025-0359
young child's primary attachment should be supported by evidence that
such disruption serves the child's welfare."
" 'It is the appellant's burden to refer this Court to legal
authority that supports its argument. Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.
App. P., requires that the argument in an appellant's brief
include "citations to the cases, statutes, [and] other
authorities … relied on." Consistent with Rule 28, "[w]e have
stated that it is not the function of this court to do a party's
legal research." ' "
Mullins v. Sellers, 80 So. 3d 935, 945 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(quoting Board
of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of City of Mobile v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.,
27 So. 3d 1223, 1254 (Ala. 2009)). Because the mother has failed to
present any authority that supports her argument pertaining to the
application of the best-interest standard to an initial child-custody
determination, she has waived that argument. See White Sands Grp.
L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008)(holding that an
appellant's argument is waived if it is not supported by a discussion of
facts or relevant legal authority to support its position).
Second, the mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the child-custody award using the statutory factors that a trial
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court may consider when determining whether joint custody is in the best
interest of the child.6
The circuit court made the following findings of fact supporting its
child-custody determination of joint physical custody and a "2-2-3"
custody schedule:
"5. Factual Findings Related to Custody and
Child Support:
6Section 30-3-152(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"In determining whether joint custody is in the best interest
of the child, the court shall consider the same factors
considered in awarding sole legal and physical custody and all
of the following factors:
"(1) The agreement or lack of agreement of
the parents on joint custody.
"(2) The past and present ability of the
parents to cooperate with each other and make
decisions jointly.
"(3) The ability of the parents to encourage
the sharing of love, affection, and contact between
the child and the other parent.
"(4) Any history of or potential for child
abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnapping.
"(5) The geographic proximity of the parents
to each other as this relates to the practical
considerations of joint physical custody."
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"a. 'It is the policy of this state to assure
that minor children have frequent and continuing
contact with parents who have shown the ability
to act in the best interest of their children and to
encourage parents to share in the rights and
responsibilities of rearing their children after the
parents have separated[.]' § 30-3-150, Ala. Code
1975.
"….
"c. The evidence established the Father's
housing and employment instability and
established the Mother's employment instability
and residence with her family. However, while
normally a point of concern, in this case, the
Mother and Father are on either end of young
adulthood and are still establishing their career
paths and testing their options. This phase of life
often includes an amount of housing and
employment instability that would be concerning
at other ages or if their careers were established.
…
"d. Both the Mother and the Father have
extensive support systems in their hometowns and
with their families ….
"e. The Father has consistently sought
and exercised visitation with the child since the
child's birth.
"f. The Mother and Father reside roughly
a 30-45 minute drive from each other.
"g. There were no allegations of
domestic/familial violence or allegations of any
history or harm by any party, nor were any proven
at trial.
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"h. This Court has considered each of the
factors set forth in §§ 30-3-152 and 30-3-132, Ala.
Code 1975, and applicable case law, and has
accurately calculated the presumptive child
support under Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.
"i. While both the Mother and the Father
made blunders during the pregnancy and after the
child's birth as they navigated their new
relationship status, they have also largely shown
admirable maturity, or at least the ability to model
and follow advice from their family/elders, as they
have settled into parentage. They also show
hallmarks of youth and/or immaturity, but based
on the evidence presented, they have confined
those instances to before the child's birth or at
least to times when they do not have care of the
child. On balance, however, this Court is presented
two willing, capable parents who desire an active
role in the child's life, who now have stable
housing, and who have or are pursuing stable,
viable employment, and whose resources and
abilities should continue to grow as they settle into
adulthood."
(Bold typeface in original; footnotes omitted.)
The parents were on equal footing when the circuit court made the
initial child-custody determination. See Gurganus, 372 So. 3d at 1230
(" ' " ' When the trial court makes an initial custody determination, neither
party is entitled to a presumption in his or her favor, and the "best
interest of the child" standard will generally apply.' " ' " (citations
omitted)). The circuit court received evidence in the form of the parties'
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testimony at the March 26, 2025, hearing. It received testimony
concerning the parties' support systems and employment histories, the
father's attempts at visitation, and the distance between the parties'
residences. After considering the evidence, the circuit court made
findings of fact that tracked the statutory factors that a trial court may
consider when determining whether joint custody is in the best interest
of the child, and those findings are afforded a presumption of correctness,
see Gurganus, 372 So. 3d at 1230. Thus, based on our limited standard
of review in child-custody cases, we cannot say that the circuit court's
initial child-custody determination based on those findings was plainly
and palpably wrong.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment as to the circuit court's initial
child-custody determination.
II. Whether the circuit court erred by declining to award retroactive
child support
The mother argues that the circuit court erred when it did not
award retroactive child support because, she argues, children have a
fundamental right to receive support.
"[I]t is within the discretion of the trial court to award retroactive
support back to the filing of the complaint." K.H.L. v. K.G.M., 782 So. 2d
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804, 807 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-110 (creating
a cause of action to establish an order of retroactive child support); and
Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-114 ("The order of retroactive support shall be a
sum certain judgment and may cover all periods in which the nonsupporting parent failed to provide support. For all time periods in which
support is requested, the court shall consider the needs of the child or
children and the ability of the parents to respond to these needs ….").
The record does not demonstrate that, in the proceedings below, the
mother ever presented an argument to the circuit court that it had erred
by denying retroactive child support. See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
("Any error or ground of reversal or modification of a judgment or order
which was asserted in the trial court may be asserted on appeal without
regard to whether such error or ground has been raised by motion in the
trial court under Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 of the [Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure]."). The mother timely filed a postjudgment motion, but, in
that motion, the mother states as the only assignment of error that "the
[judgment] is not supported by the law or facts." That general statement
did not sufficiently put the circuit court on notice of the error that the
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mother has argued on appeal concerning retroactive child support.7 See
Docen v. Docen, 294 So. 3d 767, 773 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019)("The father did
not sufficiently apprise the trial court of the objections he now argues at
length before this court. Therefore, we cannot put the trial court in error
for failing to address those objections.").
Because the circuit court made specific findings of fact related to
retroactive child support, Rule 52(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., would allow
appellate review of an argument concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence to support those findings, but, crucially, the mother has not
asserted a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument on appeal. Instead, the
mother argues on appeal that the circuit court's failure to award
retroactive child support "constitutes error." Arguments concerning legal
error must first be presented to the trial court, and the mother was
therefore required to present her argument that the failure to award
retroactive child support constitutes legal error to the circuit court, which
7We recognize that the mother could have made this argument to
the circuit court during the May 28, 2025, hearing on her postjudgment
motion. However, a transcript of that hearing was not included in the
record, and "the effect of failing to provide this court with a transcript of
the hearing on the postjudgment motion is the same as if the [mother]
had not raised this issue before the trial court." Jones v. Jones, 236 So.
3d 119, 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
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she did not. Thus, the mother's appellate argument concerning
retroactive child support is not preserved for appellate review. See
Cauthen v. Cauthen, 415 So. 3d 63, 81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(declining to
address an argument concerning retroactive child support that had not
been raised during the trial or in a postjudgment motion).
Even if the mother had preserved her argument regarding
retroactive child support, which she did not, the mother waived it. The
authority cited by the mother correctly demonstrates that the circuit
court had discretion when deciding whether to award retroactive child
support. What is missing from the mother's argument, however, is any
authority to support her conclusion that the circuit court exceeded its
discretion when it denied retroactive child support. Because the mother
failed to support her retroactive-child-support argument with relevant
legal authority, she waived it. See White Sands, 998 So. 2d at 1058.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment as to the issue of retroactive
child support.
III. Whether the circuit court erred by failing to comply with the
requirements of Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin.
The mother argues that the circuit court "erred in calculating the
Father's child-support obligation at $193 per month despite the absence
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of current CS-41 and CS-42, or CS-42-S, forms in the record and where
the only CS-42 forms filed reflected a substantially higher recommended
support amount." The mother's brief at 18.
Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., requires the filing of a
standardized Child-Support Guidelines form (Form CS-42 or Form CS42-S), a Child-Support-Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit form
(Form CS-41), and a Child-Support Guidelines Notice of Compliance form
(Form CS-43) in each action to establish or modify a child-support
obligation. Notwithstanding the mandatory language of Rule 32(E), "this
court has excused the filing of CS-41 and CS-42 forms in cases in which
the evidence in the record clearly established that the child-support
award complied with the child-support guidelines." Ruberti v. Ruberti,
117 So. 3d 383, 386 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).
We note that the record does not indicate that the mother argued
in the circuit court that it had erred by failing to append the proper childsupport forms to the judgment in compliance with Rule 32(E). This court
has refused to address some Rule 32 issues based on the failure of a party
to have raised those issues before a trial court. See, e.g., Cauthen, 415
So. 3d at 80 (declining to consider a mother's argument that the trial
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court had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 32 by incorrectly
calculating her monthly income when determining her child-support
obligation because she had not raised that issue in the trial court); and
Routzong v. Baker, 20 So. 3d 802, 810-11 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)("The
father contends that the trial court failed to follow Rule 32(B)(7)(c), Ala.
R. Jud. Admin., when it did not recalculate his child-support obligation
to reflect that he, rather than the mother, was providing healthinsurance coverage for the children. The father did not present this
argument to the trial court, and, accordingly, he has failed to preserve it
for appellate review."). However, we have consistently held that the
failure to include the proper child-support forms in compliance with Rule
32(E) is reversible error, see Morrow v. Dillard, 257 So. 3d 316, 325-26
(Ala. Civ. App. 2017), even when there was no indication that a party had
raised that issue before a trial court. See Clark v. Clark, 292 So. 2d 1054,
1060-61 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019)(reversing the trial court's amended
judgment as it pertained to the child-support award when the parties
agreed on appeal that the trial court had erred by failing to append the
required child-support forms to the amended judgment and there was no
indication that either party had raised that issue in a postjudgment
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motion). Thus, we will address the mother's argument that the circuit
court erred by failing to append the proper child-support forms to the
judgment in compliance with Rule 32(E).
In this case, the circuit court awarded joint physical custody and a
"2-2-3" custody schedule and stated that it had used Form CS-42-S to
calculate the child-support award. See Rule 32(C)(7)(b), Ala. R. Jud.
Admin. ("When the court orders shared 50% physical custody, … child
support shall be calculated using Form CS-42-S, instead of Form CS42."). However, a copy of that Form CS-42-S is not included in the record.
The record does include a copy of the Form CS-41 affidavits and the Form
CS-42 child-support-guidelines forms that were completed by the mother
and the father in August 2024. However, neither those forms nor any
other evidence in the record clearly establishes that the child-support
award complied with the child-support guidelines. Therefore, the circuit
court erred by failing to append the proper child-support forms to the
judgment in compliance with the requirements of Rule 32(E).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment as
it pertains to the issues of child custody and retroactive child support. We
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reverse the judgment as it pertains to the award of child support and
remand the cause for the circuit court to enter a judgment that awards
child support in compliance with the requirements of Rule 32(E).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
Bowden, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
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BOWDEN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Sections I and II of the main opinion and
respectfully dissent as to Section III.
It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that " '[i]ssues not
raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on
appeal.' " Duke v. Walmart, Inc., [Ms. SC-2026-0074, Mar. 20, 2026] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ n.4 (Ala. 2026)(quoting ITEC, Inc. v. Automated Precision,
Inc., 623 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Ala. 1993)); see Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
("Any error or ground of reversal or modification of a judgment or order
which was asserted in the trial court may be asserted on appeal without
regard to whether such error or ground has been raised by motion in the
trial court under Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 of the [Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure]."). As our supreme court has stated, " ' " ' there is something
unseemly about telling a lower court it was wrong when it never was
presented with the opportunity to be right ….' " ' " Birmingham Hockey
Club, Inc. v. National Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 827 So. 2d 73, 80 (Ala.
2002)(citations and emphasis omitted).
Mackenzie Mae Pike ("the mother") argued for the first time on
appeal that the Randolph Circuit Court ("the circuit court") had erred by
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failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud.
Admin. Nonetheless, the main opinion considers the mother's argument
and reverses the circuit court's judgment in part on that issue.
I recognize that the plain language of Rule 32(E) requires the filing
of certain standardized child-support forms in each action to establish or
modify a child-support obligation. However, to my knowledge, neither
this court nor our supreme court has expressly held that we can consider
an argument regarding Rule 32(E) that was made for the first time on
appeal. Furthermore, as the main opinion correctly points out, this court
has refused to address other Rule 32 arguments because they were raised
for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Cauthen v. Cauthen, 415 So. 3d 63,
80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024); and Routzong v. Baker, 20 So. 3d 802, 810-11
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009). I do not see a logical reason to allow some issues
regarding Rule 32 to be raised for the first time on appeal but not others.
I would conclude that the mother waived her Rule 32(E) argument
because she presented it for the first time on appeal. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent as to Section III of the main opinion.
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