Rel: July 2, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0007
Septemba Kinnaird
v.
CNU of Alabama, LLC
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-25-171)
FRIDY, Judge.
Septemba Kinnaird appeals from an order of the Madison Circuit
Court ("the circuit court") purporting to deny her motion to vacate an
arbitration award that an arbitrator had entered against her and in favor
CL-2026-0007
of CNU of Alabama, LLC ("CNU"). For the reasons set forth herein, we
vacate the circuit court's judgment and dismiss the appeal.
Background
This action began on October 27, 2025, with Kinnaird's filing in the
circuit court of a motion to vacate an arbitration award. In her motion,
Kinnaird asserted that she had obtained an account with CNU pursuant
to a consumer credit agreement into which CNU and she had entered.
She asserted that, two days after the agreement was executed, she had
tendered full payment to CNU, which CNU declined. She said that, after
declining her payment, CNU initiated withdrawals from her account that
she had not authorized. Those withdrawals, she said, led to the contract
dispute that was submitted to arbitration pursuant to the parties'
agreement.
According to Kinnaird, during the arbitration, CNU filed a
dispositive motion, to which Kinnaird filed a response. She attached to
her motion to vacate the arbitration award a copy of her response to
CNU's dispositive motion but not a copy of the dispositive motion.
Kinnaird indicated that, on October 16, 2025, the arbitrator granted
2
CL-2026-0007
CNU's dispositive motion. She attached a copy of the arbitrator's order to
her motion. In pertinent part, the order reads:
"Respondent [CNU] filed its Dispositive Motion on September
15, 2025 and Claimant Septemba Kinnaird filed Claimant's
Formal Opposition to [CNU]'s Dispositive Motion on
September 21, 2025.
"Pursuant to the Report of Preliminary Management Hearing
and Scheduling Order dated August 4, 2025, and American
Arbitration Association Consumer Rule 31, I determined that
the Dispositive Motion should be allowed. Accordingly, I
reviewed both [CNU]'s Motion and all supporting evidentiary
materials, and [Kinnaird]'s Formal Opposition.
"After reviewing the above-described information, I have
decided that [CNU]'s Dispositive Motion is due to be granted.
"The concise written reasons for my decision are:
"1) There was a binding contract between the parties to this
arbitration;
"2) [CNU] performed all of its contractual obligations;
"3) [Kinnaird] breached the contract by not repaying the
money that she borrowed or the interest due;
"4) [CNU] was damaged in the amount of $4,038.94 due to
[Kinnaird's] failing to repay the debt according to the
contract's terms.
"5) [Kinnaird]'s purported payment of the debt was not U.S.
Dollars as required by the contract.
"6) [Kinnaird]'s argument that she made a 'tender of
payment' of a negotiable instrument that satisfied the debt is
3
CL-2026-0007
frivolous, and was previously rejected by two federal court
cases, Kinnaird v. Capital One, and Kinnaird v. AT&T. In
AT&T, the Court described [Kinnaird]'s substantially similar
theories to what she raises here as 'utter nonsense.' In Capital
One, [Kinnaird]'s substantially similar theories were rejected
as frivolous. [Kinnaird] had the benefit of these legal opinions
before initiating this arbitration, but proceeded to initiate it
anyway. Accordingly, I find that [Kinnaird] acted in bad faith
in bringing frivolous claims against [CNU] in this arbitration.
"7) [CNU] shall file any motion for its reasonable attorneys'
fees by October 24, 2025.
"8) [Kinnaird] shall file any opposition to [CNU]'s motion
for attorneys' fees by October 31, 2025.
"Other than [CNU]'s motion for attorneys' fees, this award is
in full settlement of all claims and counterclaims submitted
to this Arbitration. All claims not expressly granted or
preserved (attorney's fees) are hereby denied."
As grounds for vacating the arbitrator's award, Kinnaird asserted
(1) that the arbitrator had engaged in misconduct by granting CNU's
dispositive motion before the evidentiary hearing, thereby depriving her
of a fair hearing; (2) that the arbitrator's ruling denying her an
evidentiary hearing while labeling her claims as frivolous and as having
been made in bad faith created at least an appearance of partiality that
undermined the integrity of the proceeding; and (3) that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority by issuing an award without first holding a
4
CL-2026-0007
hearing. Kinnaird sought an order vacating the arbitrator's award and
requiring that a new arbitration be held before a new arbitrator.
On November 18, 2025, Kinnaird filed a supplement to her motion
to vacate the arbitration award. According to that supplement to her
motion, on November 14, 2025, the arbitrator issued a "Final Award" in
which he added an attorney-fee award of $4,038.94 against Kinnaird to
his prior award, for a total award in favor of CNU of $8,077.88. Kinnaird
asserted that the agreement between the parties allowed an attorney fee
to be awarded only for bad faith as measured by the standard set forth in
Rule 11(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and that the award contained no analysis or
findings supporting an attorney-fee award under that standard. She also
argued that the amount awarded as attorney's fees was arbitrary and
unexplained. She wrote that the award reinforced the arbitrator's evident
partiality and that the arbitrator had received no additional evidence and
had failed to address her objections to CNU's attorney-fee petition.
Kinnaird attached to her supplement to her motion to vacate the award
a copy of the arbitrator's final award. In that order, the arbitrator
restated his findings from his previous order, including the finding that
Kinnaird had "acted in bad faith in bringing frivolous claims" against
5
CL-2026-0007
CNU, and he addressed CNU's petition for an award of attorney's fees.
On the same day she filed her supplement to her motion to vacate the
award, Kinnaird filed a motion to stay enforcement of the arbitration
award pending resolution of her motion to vacate the award.
On November 24, 2025, the circuit court entered an order
purporting to deny Kinnaird's motion to vacate the arbitration award and
an order denying her motion to stay enforcement of that award. Kinnaird
filed a timely appeal.
Analysis
Rule 71B, Ala. R. Civ. P., sets forth the procedure for appealing an
arbitration award. It provides:
"(a) Who May Appeal. Any party to an arbitration may
file a notice of appeal from the award entered as a result of
the arbitration.
"(b) When Filed. The notice of appeal shall be filed
within thirty (30) days after service of notice of the arbitration
award. Failure to file within thirty (30) days shall constitute
a waiver of the right to review.
"(c) Where Filed. The notice of appeal shall be filed with
the clerk of the circuit court where the action underlying the
arbitration is pending or if no action is pending in the circuit
court, then in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the
county where the award is made.
6
CL-2026-0007
"(d) What Filed. With the notice of appeal, the appellant
shall file a copy of the award, signed by the arbitrator, if there
is only one, or by a majority of the arbitrators, along with the
submission to the arbitrator or arbitrators and any
supporting documents or record of the proceedings, if
available. If no record is available, the appellant shall so state.
If a record is to be prepared but is not completed within the
time provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, the appellant shall
so state in the notice of appeal and shall file the record within
thirty (30) days after the filing of the notice of appeal, unless
the court for good cause shown shall allow additional time.
"(e) How Served. If the arbitration arose out of a pending
action, service shall be made as provided in Rule 5[, Ala. R.
Civ. P.]. If there is no action pending, service shall be made as
provided in Rules 4 through 4.4, [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] and upon
any counsel who appeared in the arbitration for the party
being served.
"(f) Procedure After Filing. The clerk of the circuit court
promptly shall enter the award as the final judgment of the
court. Thereafter, as a condition precedent to further review
by any appellate court, any party opposed to the award may
file, in accordance with Rule 59, [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] a motion to
set aside or vacate the judgment based upon one or more of
the grounds specified in Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-14, or other
applicable law. The court shall not grant any such motion
until a reasonable time after all parties are served pursuant
to paragraph (e) of this rule. The disposition of any such
motion is subject to civil and appellate rules applicable to
orders and judgments in civil actions.
"(g) Appellate Review. An appeal may be taken from the
grant or denial of any Rule 59 motion challenging the award
by filing a notice of appeal to the appropriate appellate court
pursuant to Rule 4, Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure."
Our supreme court has summarized the procedure under Rule 71B:
7
CL-2026-0007
"(1) A party must file a notice of appeal with the appropriate
circuit court within 30 days after service of the notice of the
arbitration award; (2) the clerk of the circuit court shall
promptly enter the award as the final judgment of the circuit
court; (3) the aggrieved party may file a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ.
P., motion to set aside or vacate the judgment, and such filing
is a condition precedent to further review by any appellate
court; (4) the circuit court grants or denies the Rule 59 motion;
and (5) the aggrieved party may then appeal from the circuit
court's judgment to the appropriate appellate court."
Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton, 130 So. 3d 179, 181 (Ala. 2013).
In this case, Kinnaird did not file a document titled "notice of
appeal," so the first issue we must consider is whether she properly
commenced her appeal of the arbitration award in the circuit court. We
conclude that she did.
In Guardian Builders, LLC, the parties that lost an arbitration
proceeding (collectively "Guardian") sought to appeal the arbitration
award at issue there. Id. Guardian initiated its challenge to the
arbitration award in the circuit court by filing a motion to vacate or
modify the award; it did not file a document titled "notice of appeal." Id.
Our supreme court concluded that that document was sufficient under
Rule 71B to constitute a notice of appeal of the arbitration award,
writing:
8
CL-2026-0007
"In this case, Guardian never filed with the circuit court
a document titled a 'notice of appeal.' Rather, Guardian
attempted to appeal from the arbitration award by filing with
the circuit court a motion to vacate or modify the arbitration
award, which Guardian filed within 30 days of the entry of the
award. The Useltons [(the parties that were successful in the
arbitration)] argue that Guardian does not have a right to
appellate review because Guardian did not file a notice of
appeal; instead, it filed only a motion to vacate or modify.
Conversely, Guardian argues that its motion to vacate or
modify the arbitration award may be construed to be both a
notice of appeal and a Rule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion, filed
pursuant to Rule 71B[, Ala. R. Civ. P.].
"In J.L. Loper Construction Co. v. Findout Partnership,
LLP, 55 So. 3d 1152 (Ala. 2010), this Court addressed a
similar situation. In Loper, an arbitrator entered an award in
favor of Findout and adverse to Loper. Loper filed with the
circuit court a motion to set aside the award. Findout
subsequently moved the circuit court to confirm the award,
and Loper filed a motion to enjoin Findout from attempting to
collect the award. Although Loper did not file a 'notice of
appeal,' the circuit court treated the motions filed by Loper --the motion to set aside the award and the motion to enjoin
enforcement of the award -- ' "as an appeal of th[e] award" '
under Rule 71B. 55 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting circuit court's
order). The circuit court ordered the clerk of the circuit court
to enter the arbitration award as the judgment of that court
in accordance with Rule 71B(f). The circuit court then
considered Loper's motion to set aside, i.e., its Rule 59 motion,
and granted that motion. Findout appealed to this Court.
"In Loper, this Court did not conclude that Loper's
failure to file a separate document titled a 'notice of appeal,'
in addition to the two motions filed by Loper, precluded
further appellate review. Instead, it noted that the circuit
court had considered Loper's motions challenging the
arbitration award as a notice of appeal of the award. This
9
CL-2026-0007
Court then reviewed the merits of the circuit court's judgment
setting aside the arbitration award and reversed that
judgment. Thus, based on Loper, the circuit court in this case
could have treated Guardian's motion to vacate or modify as
a notice of appeal. Guardian attached to that motion a copy of
the arbitration award and served a copy of the motion on the
Useltons; that motion provided notice that Guardian was
appealing the award. We construe Guardian's motion as a
notice of appeal in this case; however, we emphasize that, to
avoid potential confusion, a party desiring appellate review of
an arbitration award should follow the explicit procedure for
appealing established by Rule 71B."
Id. at 181-82.
In the present case, Kinnaird filed her motion to vacate the award
within thirty days of the arbitrator's order granting CNU's dispositive
motion, and the circuit court treated Kinnaird's motion to vacate as a
filing that was sufficient to initiate a civil action. The case-actionsummary sheet indicates that the circuit court issued a summons by
certified mail. Kinnaird filed her supplement to her motion to vacate the
award -- which addressed the arbitrator's "final award" -- within five days
of the arbitrator's entry of that award. Kinnaird's motion to vacate the
award and her supplement to that motion indicate that those documents
were served, respectively, on counsel for CNU and on CNU. In those
documents, Kinnaird made clear that she was challenging the arbitration
award. Instead of dismissing Kinnaird's motion to vacate the award as
10
CL-2026-0007
supplemented as improperly filed, the circuit court denied that motion.
Given these circumstances, we conclude, based on our supreme court's
analysis in Guardian Builders, LLC, that Kinnaird's motion to vacate the
award and her supplement to that motion served as a notice of appeal of
the arbitrator's award under Rule 71B.
Turning to a separate issue, Rule 71B(f) requires that, after an
appeal of an arbitration award has been filed, the circuit clerk promptly
enter the arbitration award as the final judgment of the circuit court. In
Guardian Builders, LLC, the circuit clerk failed to do so. As to the effect
of that failure, our supreme court wrote:
"[A]fter Guardian appealed to the circuit court, i.e., after it
filed its motion to vacate or modify the award, there is no
indication that the clerk of the circuit court entered the
arbitration award as the judgment of that court as required
by Rule 71B(f)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]. That rule provides that '[t]he
clerk of the circuit court promptly shall enter the award as the
final judgment of the court' after the filing of the notice of
appeal in that court. Rule 71B, which became effective on
February 1, 2009, superseded the procedure established by §
6-6-15, Ala. Code 1975. Committee Comments to Rule 71B
Effective February 1, 2009 ('[Rule 71B] clarifies the method
for taking an appeal from an arbitration award and
supersedes the procedure provided by Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-15.'); and Parham v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 24
So. 3d 1102, 1104 n.2 (Ala. 2009). Although Rule 71B
superseded the procedure established by § 6-6-15, the two
procedures are similar in some respects; that similarity
11
CL-2026-0007
informs our discussion on the effect of the noncompliance with
Rule 71B(f) in this case.
"Under § 6-6-15, a party initiated an appeal from an
arbitration award by filing a notice of appeal in the circuit
court. See generally Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So. 2d
462, 467 (Ala. 2008) (clarifying and modifying the procedure
for appealing an arbitration award under § 6-6-15). Like the
current procedure under Rule 71B(f), under § 6-6-15 the clerk
of the circuit court was required to enter the arbitration
award as the judgment of the circuit court. Under § 6-6-15, as
under Rule 71B(f), the aggrieved party could then file a Rule
59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion asking the circuit court to set aside
or to vacate the judgment.
"Under the procedure established by § 6-6-15, it was
essential that the circuit court enter the arbitration award as
the judgment of the circuit court. That point was illustrated
in Parham v. American Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida,
supra. In Parham, American Bankers sought review of an
arbitration award in the circuit court. However, the clerk had
not entered the award as the judgment of the circuit court.
The circuit court later entered an order purporting to grant
American Bankers' motion to vacate the award. On appeal,
this Court vacated the circuit court's order and dismissed the
appeal, concluding:
" 'We find no indication in the record that the
clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court entered the
arbitrator's order as the judgment of that court as
required under § 6-6-15, Ala. Code 1975; thus,
there is no final judgment from which Parham can
appeal. Accordingly, the trial court's ... order
[purporting to grant the motion to vacate the
award] is void and is hereby vacated, and this
appeal is dismissed. See Harvey v. City of
Oneonta, 715 So. 2d 779, 781 (Ala. 1998) ("A
judgment of a court without jurisdiction is void. An
12
CL-2026-0007
appeal will not lie from a void judgment." (citing,
among other cases, Luken v. BancBoston
Mortgage Corp., 580 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1991))).'
"Parham, 24 So. 3d at 1104. See also Jenks v. Harris, 990 So.
2d 878, 882 (Ala. 2008) (stating that, under § 6-6-15, a circuit
court's order purporting to set aside an arbitration award was
void because the circuit clerk had not first entered the award
as the judgment of the court).
"Like § 6-6-15, Rule 71B(f) requires the clerk of the
circuit court to first enter the arbitration award as the
judgment of that court before the circuit court may act on a
motion to set aside the award. In this case, there is no
indication that the clerk entered the arbitration award as the
judgment of the circuit court. Thus, the circuit court's order
purporting to deny Guardian's motion to vacate or modify the
arbitration award is void. Parham and Jenks. Accordingly, we
vacate the order and dismiss the appeal.
"....
"In summary, we construe Guardian's motion to vacate
or modify the arbitration award of December 21, 2011, as a
notice of appeal under Rule 71B, thus effectuating the appeal
of the award to the circuit court. However, because the clerk
of the circuit court never entered the award as the judgment
of that court, the circuit court's order of May 31, 2012,
purporting to deny Guardian's motion to vacate or modify is
void. Essentially, Guardian's appeal remains pending in the
circuit court, awaiting further procedures under Rule 71B."
Guardian Builders, LLC, 130 So. 3d at 182-84.
In this case, although Kinnaird attached the October 16, 2025,
arbitration order granting CNU's dispositive motion to her motion to
13
CL-2026-0007
vacate the award and attached the November 14, 2025, final arbitration
award to her supplement to her motion to vacate, as in Guardian
Builders, LLC, there is no indication in the record on appeal that the
circuit clerk entered either of the arbitration awards as the final
judgment of the circuit court. As a result, the trial court was not
empowered to act on Kinnaird's motion to vacate the award, and its order
denying that motion is void. Because a void order will not support an
appeal, see Dalton Drug Co. v. OptumRx, Inc., 424 So. 3d 1254, 1262 (Ala.
2025), we are constrained to vacate the order and dismiss the appeal, see
Guardian Builders, LLC, 130 So. 3d at 183.
Conclusion
Because the circuit clerk did not enter the arbitration award as a
final judgment of the circuit court, the circuit court was not empowered
to resolve Kinnaird's motion to vacate the award. As a result, the circuit
court's order denying Kinnaird's motion to vacate the award is void and
will not support this appeal. Id. We therefore dismiss this appeal, albeit
with instructions to the trial court to vacate its void order and to comply
with the procedures set out in Rule 71B. Id.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
14
CL-2026-0007
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
15