Rel: July 2, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-0679
T.L.L.
v.
K.L.H.
CL-2025-0735
K.L.H.
v.
T.L.L.
Appeals from Mobile Juvenile Court
(CS-22-900489)
CL-2025-0679; CL-2025-0736
PER CURIAM.
T.L.L. ("the father") and K.L.H. ("the mother") separately appeal
from a judgment entered by the Mobile Juvenile Court ("the juvenile
court"), regarding the paternity and custody of their child, who was born
out of wedlock in April 2020. We dismiss the appeals.
"It is well settled that 'subject-matter jurisdiction may
not be waived; a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
may be raised at any time by any party and may even be
raised by a court ex mero motu.' C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So. 2d
451, 453 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); see, e.g., Ex parte Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 816 So. 2d 469, 472 (Ala. 2001) ('We are obliged to
recognize an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction obvious
from a record, petition, or exhibits to a petition before us.'). A
judgment entered by a court that lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction is void. See C.J.L., 868 So. 2d at 454; see also J.B.
v. A.B., 888 So. 2d 528 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)."
S.B.U. v. D.G.B., 913 So. 2d 452, 455 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
The father initiated this action in the juvenile court. " 'Juvenile
courts are purely creatures of statute and have extremely limited
jurisdiction.' T.B. v. T.H., 30 So. 3d 429, 431 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)."
K.W.N. v. H.G.T., 30 So. 3d 437, 442 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). Section 12-15-114(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"A juvenile court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
of juvenile court proceedings in which a child is alleged to
have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in
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CL-2025-0679; CL-2025-0736
need of supervision. A dependency action shall not include a
custody dispute between parents."
Additionally, § 26-17-104, Ala. Code 1975, provides, pertinent part:
"A circuit or district court of this state or any other court
of this state, as provided by law, shall have original
jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage pursuant to [the Alabama
Uniform Parentage Act, § 26-17-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,]
and may determine issues of custody, support, and visitation
incidental to a determination of parentage."
See also Ex parte S.C.S., 413 So. 3d 756, 759 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).
The father in his petition did not allege that the child is dependent;
therefore, the juvenile court could not have derived jurisdiction from §
12-15-114(a). G.W.K. v. B.W.M., 387 So. 3d 1126, 1132 (Ala. Civ. App.
2023) (recognizing that "to invoke the dependency jurisdiction of a
juvenile court, a party must allege specific facts in its petition indicating
that a child is a 'dependent child' as defined in § 12-15-102(8)a.[, Ala.
Code 1975]"). The father did allege that he had executed an
acknowledgment of paternity,1 but he did not ask the juvenile court to
adjudicate paternity. Therefore, the father's petition did not invoke the
1The record does not include a copy of the father's acknowledgment
of paternity. The juvenile court, in its judgment, found that "[t]his case
involves a presumed father by virtue of a valid acknowledgment of
paternity filed with the office of vital statistics."
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CL-2025-0679; CL-2025-0736
juvenile court's subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to § 26-17-104.
A fair reading of the father's petition reveals that the father sought
only an award of custody of the child, subject to the mother's visitation.
The juvenile-court clerk reached the same determination and designated
the action as a CS action. A juvenile court "judge ha[s] no jurisdiction to
adjudicate custody of the child in the juvenile court once he determine[s]
that the case [is] not a dependency [or paternity] case." T.B. v. T.H., 30
So. 3d at 433. See also J.A.P. v. M.M., 872 So. 2d 861, 866 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) ("Determinations of child custody are matters within the discretion
of the [circuit] court.").
Nevertheless, the juvenile court, in its judgment entered on July
15, 2025, found that it was exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over
this action pursuant to a standing order entered by the presiding judge
of the Mobile Circuit Court appointing the juvenile-court judge as a
special circuit-court judge with the authority to hear such cases.
In L.R.S. v. M.J., 229 So. 3d 772, 779 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (opinion
on application for rehearing), we examined whether a standing order
could enlarge a juvenile court's jurisdiction "to include all nondivorce
child-custody and visitation cases, even those … that do not fall within
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CL-2025-0679; CL-2025-0736
the statutory jurisdiction of a juvenile court." We rejected the appellant's
argument that the juvenile court had the authority to enter a custody
determination, concluding that the presiding circuit-court judge's
standing order had no legal effect. We explained:
"We do not believe Rule 13(A)[, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,]
authorizes the standing order … because it 'affects' the
jurisdiction of the Mobile Juvenile Court in a manner that
violates the constitutional limitation on the judicial rulemaking power, and, hence, we find the standing order to be
void ab initio. See Ex parte Ward, 540 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1988)
(holding resolution and order promulgated by supreme court
that violated constitutional prohibition against suspension of
laws to be void ab initio).
"… Because we have determined that the standing order
lacks any legal effect, we conclude that [the juvenile-court
judge] was not acting as a properly appointed circuit-court
judge when he entered the judgment."
Id. Additionally, to the extent that the juvenile-court judge's
appointment may have been made pursuant to § 12-1-14.1, Ala. Code
1975,2 we note that the juvenile-court judge's appointment could
2Section 12-1-14.1(a), provides, in pertinent part, that
"the presiding circuit court judge of the circuit may appoint
and commission a special circuit court judge, special district
court judge, or special judge of probate for temporary service.
… The appointment shall confer on the special judge all
powers, authority, and jurisdiction of the judgeship to which
he or she is appointed."
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CL-2025-0679; CL-2025-0736
authorize the juvenile-court judge to serve as a special circuit-court judge
only for 180 consecutive days and the record does not include orders
indicating successive appointments.
As we held in L.R.S., subject-matter jurisdiction is determined
solely by the Alabama Constitution and statutory law, not administrative
orders. Thus, the standing order referenced in the juvenile court's
judgment cannot enlarge the juvenile court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Consequently, like the juvenile court in L.R.S., the juvenile court in this
case never acquired jurisdiction over the action.
Because the father's petition did not invoke the juvenile court's
subject-matter jurisdiction, all subsequent determinations by the
juvenile court are void.3 See Double B Country Store, LLC v. Alabama
Dep't of Transp., 171 So. 3d 28, 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)("[I]f a complaint
fails to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court, the trial
Section 12-1-14.1(b), defines "temporary service" as not more than 180
consecutive days and authorizes the reappointment of a special judge "for
more than one period of 180 consecutive days."
3We recognize that the mother filed a counterclaim requesting that
the juvenile court determine paternity. That pleading, however, was in
response to a legal nullity and had no effect.
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CL-2025-0679; CL-2025-0736
court 'has no power to take any action other than to dismiss the
complaint.' Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 26 (Ala.
2007)."); A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d 587, 595 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) ( " ' The
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction renders void any judgment entered
in the action.' Moore v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 876 So. 2d 443, 448
(Ala. 2003).").
"A void judgment will not support an appeal; an appellate court
must dismiss an attempted appeal from such a void judgment." Reed v.
White, 80 So. 3d 949, 953 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). See also Colburn v.
Colburn, 14 So. 3d 176, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); and Vann v. Cook, 989
So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). Accordingly, we dismiss these
appeals, and we instruct the juvenile court to vacate its July 25, 2025,
judgment.
CL-2025-0679 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0735 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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