Rel: July 2, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
SC-2025-0247
Ex parte City of Tuskegee et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Amanda Busby et al.
v.
City of Tuskegee et al.
(Macon Circuit Court: CV-24-900059)
SC-2025-0251
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Ex parte JENOPTIK Smart Mobility Solutions, LLC, f/k/a
Traffipax, LLC; and JENOPTIK North America, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Amanda Busby et al.
v.
City of Tuskegee et al.)
(Macon Circuit Court: CV-24-900059)
SHAW, Justice.
These consolidated mandamus proceedings stem from the passage
and implementation of Ordinance No. 2023-01 ("the ordinance"), a local
ordinance of the City of Tuskegee ("the City") allowing the use of
automated photographic-enforcement devices to enforce traffic laws
within the City's corporate limits. The plaintiffs below -- Amanda Busby,
Michael Johnson, Flolaidra Todd, Martez Graham, E. Kennedy, Samuel
Peterson, Martha Washington, and Betty Ligon ("the plaintiffs") -- are all
individuals who were cited for traffic violations under the ordinance. As
a result, the plaintiffs filed suit against various entities and individuals,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.
2
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
In case no. SC-2025-0247, the City; Ulysses Roberts, the city
manager for the City; Lawrence Haygood, the mayor of the City; and
Christopher Lee, Johnny Ford, Norma Jackson, and Orlando Whitehead,
the members of the City of Tuskegee City Council (all of the foregoing are
referred to collectively as "the City defendants"), who were named as
defendants in the plaintiffs' amended complaint,1 petition for a writ of
mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying
the motion of the City defendants seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims. In case no. SC-2025-0251, JENOPTIK Smart Mobility Solutions,
LLC, f/k/a Traffipax, LLC; and JENOPTIK North America, Inc. (referred
to collectively as "JENOPTIK"), the entities allegedly responsible for the
installation, maintenance, and monitoring of the automated
photographic-enforcement devices, who are also named defendants,
separately petition for similar relief. We grant the petitions in part and
deny them in part.
Facts and Procedural History
1The City was named as a defendant in the plaintiffs' original
complaint; the city manager, the mayor, and the city-council members, in
both their official and individual capacities, were added as defendants by
an amendment to the plaintiffs' original complaint.
3
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
In February 2023, the City passed the ordinance; it provided for
both photographic traffic-signal enforcement and photographic vehiclespeed enforcement. The ordinance vested the City's municipal court with
jurisdiction to conduct administrative hearings regarding all violations
of the ordinance, and violations of the ordinance were deemed civil
violations subject to a fine. As to that administrative process, the
ordinance provided:
"SECTION 5.2 REQUEST FOR ADJUDICATIVE HEARING
"A person who receives a notice of violation may contest
the imposition of the [F]ine by submitting a request for an
administrative hearing of the Civil Violation, in writing,
within 15 days of the 10th day after the date the notice of
violation is mailed. Upon receipt of a timely request,
[JENOPTIK] or its designee shall notify the person of the date
and time of the administrative hearing by U.S. mail. The Fine
shall not be collected if, after a hearing, the Municipal Judge
sitting as the Administrative Judge and hearing officer shall
enter a finding of no liability.
"SECTION 5.3 FAILURE TO PAY
"Failure to pay a Fine or to contest liability in a timely
manner is an admission of liability in the full amount of the
Fine assessed in the notice of violation."
Elsewhere, the ordinance stated that if, following an administrative
hearing, the municipal judge found the person cited for a violation liable,
a fine and court costs could be imposed; it further provided for an appeal
4
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
to the circuit court. It appears that, following enactment of the
ordinance, there was an initial 30-day period when only warning
citations were issued.
Thereafter, each of the plaintiffs apparently received, on a date
before March 26, 2024, citations for purportedly having violated the
posted speed limit. On March 26, 2024, the City passed Resolution No.
2024-36, which "extend[ed] the period of warning citations and
established a period of amnesty and pardon for" citations that had issued
under the ordinance between February 7, 2024, and April 14, 2024.2
According to the resolution, any citations issued during that period were
"cancelled, voided, nullified and dismissed" and should be considered "as
warnings," and any recipient who had already paid any related fine and
costs would be "eligible for reimbursement and refunds."
In May 2024, the plaintiffs filed their original complaint against the
City and JENOPTIK in the Macon Circuit Court. For the most part, the
complaint did not disclose the issuing dates of the plaintiffs' citations and
2See generally § 12-14-15, Ala. Code 1975, which grants to a
municipal mayor the power, among others, to "remit fines and such costs
as are payable to the municipality and commute sentences imposed by a
municipal court" for violation of municipal ordinances.
5
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
failed to indicate who among them, before the filing of the complaint, had
paid the fine for the citation or had, instead, opted to pursue -- whether
successfully or unsuccessfully -- the administrative process for contesting
the citation, as provided for in the ordinance and set out above.
As explained in their complaint, the plaintiffs generally disputed
the validity of the traffic-related "findings" cited by the City as
necessitating the ordinance. They took further issue with the fact that
the ordinance provided for the issuance of citations to a vehicle's owner
even when the owner was not operating the vehicle at the time of the
alleged traffic violation and the fact that citations were not issued
pursuant to a traffic stop initiated by a witnessing law-enforcement
officer. Their complaint also cited purported inadequate notice of the
devices' locations and raised various constitutional challenges.
Accordingly, all the plaintiffs sought, among other relief, a judgment
declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and violative of Alabama law,
an order enjoining its enforcement and requiring the removal of the
devices, and the refund of all fees, costs, and fines collected under the
ordinance, with interest.
6
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
The plaintiffs' original complaint also asserted the following tort
claims: negligence, invasion of privacy, and fraud. According to the
complaint, the plaintiffs' negligence claim was premised on the purported
failure of the City and JENOPTIK to follow Alabama law and procedures
regarding the enforcement of traffic laws and the issuance of citations for
traffic violations. They further alleged that the City and JENOPTIK had
breached alleged duties to provide adequate notice of the devices used to
detect violations, to ensure proper maintenance of the devices, to ensure
the competence of the devices' operators, and to ensure that any citation
issued under the ordinance was issued to the actual violator.
In response to the plaintiffs' original complaint, the City, on July 2,
2024, initially filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R.
Civ. P., on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.
On July 11, 2024, the City passed Resolution No. 2024-55, which
ceased both the issuance of all citations under the ordinance and all
related administrative hearings.
The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on July 31, 2024.
That complaint, while it did not expound upon the factual allegations
7
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
included in the original complaint, added as defendants the city manager,
the mayor, and the city-council members, in both their official and
individual capacities, and asserted negligence, invasion-of-privacy, and
fraud claims against them. See note 1, supra.
On that same date, JENOPTIK filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' original complaint pursuant to both Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P. Relying on prior decisions from this Court, JENOPTIK
specifically asserted, among other contentions, that, because, before
filing the original complaint, each of the plaintiffs had allegedly accepted
liability under the ordinance by either paying the fine associated with the
citation he or she had received or failing to properly contest liability,
there was no justiciable controversy and the trial court therefore lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition, according to JENOPTIK, the
action was mooted, the plaintiffs lacked standing, and the trial court was
similarly deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction by the fact that the City
had voluntarily suspended enforcement of the ordinance and had
resolved that any previously imposed fines would be eligible for
reimbursement. In its motion, JENOPTIK further disputed that it was
a "proper part[y]" to a suit challenging the enforcement of a municipal
8
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
ordinance; that it owed no duty to the plaintiffs that would support the
plaintiffs' negligence claim against it; that the complaint failed to allege
conduct by it amounting to an invasion of the plaintiffs' privacy; that the
complaint failed to allege any misrepresentation made by it to the
plaintiffs; and that it was entitled to a dismissal of the claims against it
based on lack of personal jurisdiction and because of improper and/or
insufficient service of process.
Thereafter, the City defendants filed, also pursuant to Rule 12(b),
a joint motion seeking the dismissal of the plaintiffs' amended complaint.
That motion, in addition to other grounds, raised the fact that the City
had, in March 2024 -- one month before the filing of the plaintiffs' original
complaint -- passed Resolution No. 2024-36, which voided prior citations
issued by the devices installed pursuant to the ordinance, deemed such
citations warning citations, and provided that all persons who had
previously paid the fine for a citation were eligible for reimbursement.
Thus, according to the City defendants, the City had voluntarily ceased
issuing citations and enforcing the ordinance. Also, the City defendants
asserted that, before filing the original complaint, each of the plaintiffs
had either accepted liability under the ordinance or had failed to
9
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
challenge the legality of the ordinance by resorting to the administrative
process provided therein. Accordingly, they contended that there was no
justiciable controversy and that the plaintiffs' claims were moot under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq.
In response, the plaintiffs conceded that a justiciable controversy
must exist in order to obtain declaratory relief; however, they maintained
that the required controversy existed because, at the time their action
was initiated, the City defendants allegedly had not discontinued
enforcing the ordinance. They further noted that an exception to the
mootness doctrine arises when a matter presents a question of public
interest or when the factual scenario is likely to be repeated in the future.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss
filed by the City defendants and by JENOPTIK. Its order, which did not
contain the factual and/or legal conclusions on which the decision was
based, did explain that the trial court had, in issuing its ruling, treated
the motions as motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12 and had, in
considering the motions, excluded all extraneous attachments.
The City defendants and JENOPTIK separately petitioned this
Court for mandamus relief; we subsequently ordered answers and briefs.
10
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Standard of Review
" ' "The question of subject-matter
jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
888 So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala. 2003). However, "[f]or
the writ of mandamus to issue ' "[t]he right sought
to be enforced by mandamus must be clear and
certain with no reasonable basis for controversy
about the right to relief." ' " Ex parte Vance, 900
So. 2d 394, 398-99 (Ala. 2004).'
"Ex parte Tuscaloosa County Special Tax Bd., 963 So. 2d 610,
611-12 (Ala. 2007).
" 'This Court has consistently held that the
writ of mandamus is an extraordinary and drastic
writ and that a party seeking such a writ must
meet certain criteria. We will issue the writ of
mandamus only when (1) the petitioner has a clear
legal right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent
has an imperative duty to perform and has refused
to do so; (3) the petitioner has no other adequate
remedy; and (4) this Court's jurisdiction is
properly invoked. Ex parte Mercury Fin. Corp.,
715 So. 2d 196, 198 (Ala. 1997).'
"Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2000)."
Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 348 (Ala.
2008). See also Ex parte Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 707 (Ala. 2013)
(" ' "[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper device by which to
11
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction." ' " (citations omitted)).
Discussion
I. Mootness of Claims Challenging the Legality of the Ordinance
In their respective petitions, the City defendants and JENOPTIK
challenge the trial court's denial of their motions to dismiss on the basis
of the lack of a justiciable controversy and/or mootness grounds.
Specifically, both petitions contend that each of the plaintiffs either paid
the fine associated with the citation he or she was issued pursuant to the
ordinance or failed to seek relief by resorting to the administrative
process provided in the ordinance and, nonetheless, was reimbursed or is
eligible for reimbursement for the payment of the fine. Thus, they argue,
the trial court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claims and those claims are due to be dismissed.
In Woodgett v. City of Midfield, 319 So. 3d 1231 (Ala. 2020), this
Court noted that, following authorization by the Alabama Legislature,
the City of Midfield ("Midfield") had adopted Ordinance No. 2011-4,
which similarly provided for the automated photographic enforcement of
red-light violations within the corporate limits of Midfield and the
12
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
imposition of related civil penalties for those motorists whose vehicles
were photographed running a red light. 319 So. 3d at 1233. Thereafter,
two named plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class of individuals who had
all received notices of such a violation, sued both Midfield and the entity
responsible for the installation of its traffic-light-enforcement cameras.
Specifically, their complaint sought a judgment declaring the underlying
legislative act and Midfield's ordinance unconstitutional, an injunction
prohibiting further citations using automated photographic equipment,
and the refund of all fines and fees collected from persons who had
previously been cited. Id. at 1234.
In the ensuing appeal from the trial court's judgment dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims in Woodgett, the Court explained:
"It is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not seek relief from
the notices of violations by invoking the judicial procedures
provided for in the Act and the ordinance.
"This Court has stated:
" ' "There must be a bona fide existing
controversy of a justiciable character to confer
upon the court jurisdiction to grant declaratory
relief under the declaratory judgment statutes,
and if there was no justiciable controversy existing
when the suit was commenced the trial court had
no jurisdiction." State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson,
293 Ala. 69, 73, 300 So. 2d 106, 110 (1974).
13
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
" ' "Unless the trial court has before it a justiciable
controversy, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
and any judgment entered by it is void ab initio." ' "
Sustainable Forests, L.L.C. v. Alabama Power Co.,
805 So. 2d 681, 683 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Hunt
Transition & Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Grenier, 782
So. 2d 270, 272 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex
parte State ex rel. James, 711 So. 2d 952, 960 n. 2
(Ala. 1998)). "A moot case lacks justiciability."
Crawford[ v. State], 153 S.W.3d [497] at 501 [(Tex.
App. 2004)]. Thus, "[a]n action that originally was
based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be
maintained on appeal if the questions raised in it
have become moot by subsequent acts or events."
Case[ v. Alabama State Bar, 939 So. 2d [881] at
884 [(Ala. 2006)] (citing Employees of Montgomery
County Sheriff's Dep't v. Marshall, 893 So. 2d 326,
330 (Ala. 2004)).'
"Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 983-84 (Ala. 2007)."
319 So. 3d at 1237 (emphasis added).
Considering those circumstances in Woodgett, which are
substantially similar to the circumstances in this case, we held:
"Here, the legislature and the City, respectively,
specifically vested the municipal court with original
jurisdiction to adjudicate contested notices of violations under
the Act and the ordinance within a detailed set of procedures
that provides for an adjudicative hearing in the municipal
court and an appeal to the circuit court for a trial de novo.
Rather than challenging the notices of violations on any
grounds, including constitutional and statutory ones, as
provided for in the Act and the ordinance by requesting an
adjudicative proceeding in the municipal court, the plaintiffs
simply accepted liability under the Act and the ordinance by
14
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
paying the fines. Once the plaintiffs accepted liability under
the Act and the ordinance without challenging the notices of
violations, a justiciable controversy no longer existed between
the parties. Sparks [v. Brock & Blevins, Inc., 274 Ala. 147,
145 So. 2d 844 (1962)]. Nothing remained between the parties
to be settled because the matter had been determined in the
court having jurisdiction over the notices of violations issued
pursuant to the Act and the ordinance. The plaintiffs cannot
now use this declaratory-judgment action ... as a substitute
for an appeal to challenge the Act and the ordinance on
constitutional and statutory grounds after failing to raise
such a challenge pursuant to the procedures for doing so set
forth by the legislature and the City in the Act and the
ordinance. Sparks, supra. Because no justiciable controversy
existed between the parties when the complaint for
declaratory relief was filed, the trial court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction. Chapman [v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d
972 (Ala. 2007)]. See also Underwood v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 127 (Ala. 2009)(' " 'There must be a
bona fide existing controversy of a justiciable character to
confer upon the court jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief
under the declaratory judgment statutes, and if there was no
justiciable controversy existing when the suit was commenced
the trial court had no jurisdiction.' " ' (quoting Chapman, 974
So. 2d at 983, quoting in turn State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson,
293 Ala. 69, 73, 300 So. 2d 106, 110 (1974)))."
319 So. 3d at 1238 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). See also Mills v.
City of Opelika, 320 So. 3d 554, 560-61 (Ala. 2020) (same), Moore v. City
of Center Point, 319 So. 3d 1223, 1231 (Ala. 2020) (same), and City of
Montgomery v. Hunter, 319 So. 3d 1213, 1223 (Ala. 2020) (same).
In fact, Moore, supra, further held that either "accept[ing] liability
under the ... ordinance by paying the fines" or "accept[ing] liability under
15
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
the … ordinance by failing to challenge … liability within the time and
in the manner provided" would "settle[] the matter and moot[] the
controversy between the parties." 319 So. 3d at 1231. See also Hunter,
319 So. 3d at 1223 (explaining that, when one plaintiff had accepted
liability under the ordinance by paying the fine and the other plaintiff,
although he had not paid the fine, had "nonetheless accepted liability by
taking no action to challenge the ... ordinance" as provided therein, both
"plaintiffs' acceptance of liability ... settled the matter and mooted the
controversy between the parties").
Here, regarding the identity and legal standing of the plaintiffs to
challenge the ordinance, the original complaint alleged only the
following:
"1. Plaintiffs are persons who received traffic citations
for exceeding the posted speed limit based solely on
photographic enforcement devices pursuant to [the]
Ordinance. …
"2. Plaintiff Amanda Busby is over the age of 19 years
and is a resident citizen of Auburn, Alabama. Number of
tickets (2).
"3. Plaintiff Michael Johnson is over the age of 19
years and is a resident citizen of Tuskegee, Alabama. Number
of tickets (11).
16
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
"4. Plaintiff, Flolaidra Todd is over the age of 19 years
and is a resident citizen of Tuskegee, Alabama. Number of
tickets (3).
"5. Plaintiff Martez Graham is over the age of 19
years and is a resident citizen of Tuskegee, Alabama. Number
of tickets (1).
"6. Plaintiff E. Kennedy is over the age of 19 years and
is a resident citizen of Montgomery, Alabama. Number of
tickets (1).
"7. Plaintiff Samuel Peterson is over the age of 19
years and is a resident citizen of Opelika, Alabama. Number
of tickets (1).
"8. Plaintiff Martha Washington is over the age of 19
years and is a resident citizen of Montgomery, Alabama.
Number of tickets (3).
"9. Plaintiff Betty Ligon, is over the age of 19 years
and is a resident citizen of Tuskegee, Alabama. Number of
tickets (2)."
Elsewhere, the plaintiffs' original complaint explained that plaintiff
Michael Johnson had received, among his multiple citations, a warning
notice on February 26, 2024, that had no accompanying fine. It also
indicated that plaintiff Martha Washington had paid the $25 fee required
to contest a citation and had received a hearing but did not indicate
whether, following that hearing, she had been found liable and required
17
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
to pay the accompanying fine or whether, if she paid the fine, she later
sought reimbursement.
The original complaint also included the following reference to
Resolution 2024-36, which was passed by the City following adoption of
the ordinance:
"88. Upon information and belief, without Amending
[the] Ordinance ..., the City has suspended enforcement of
issuing citations for 30 days. The City also has changed the
procedures for contesting a citation by now allowing a person
to contest the citation by requesting a hearing in writing on a
form provided by the Tuskegee Municipal Court. The
procedure has not been amended into the Ordinance.
"89. The City has also suspended payment of the $25.00
fee that some have had to pay [to receive a hearing as provided
on the citations]."
The foregoing facts, which are similar to the facts in the above-cited
cases, establish each of the plaintiffs' acceptance of liability under the
ordinance either by the payment of the fine for which the complaint
sought reimbursement or by the failure to challenge the ordinance by
resorting to the administrative process provided therein.3 Further, the
3It appears that, regarding the plaintiffs' claims stemming from the
adoption and enforcement of the ordinance, the City defendants and
JENOPTIK sought to obtain dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R.
Civ. P., based on the trial court's alleged lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d
18
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
allegations in their complaint go one step beyond the allegations made in
the above-cited cases and appear to concede that the City voluntarily
discontinued its enforcement of the citations issued pursuant to the
ordinance and/or waived the fee required to administratively challenge
them -- a fact that provides the majority of the relief sought by the
plaintiffs. In other words, to the extent that the plaintiffs' complaint
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, any such claim was mooted by
the facts that each of the plaintiffs either paid the fine or failed to
challenge the citation through the prescribed administrative-appeal
process and that, nonetheless, the citations were nullified and any
remitted payments were refunded (or at least subject to reimbursement)
pursuant to the subsequent resolutions. Thus, the liability of each
plaintiff under the ordinance was either accepted before the filing of the
original complaint or was extinguished by the passage of Resolution No.
2024-36, passed in March 2024, which entitled each plaintiff to a refund
of any fine paid, or by the passage of Resolution No. 2024-55, passed in
344, 350 (Ala. 2008) ("[A] Rule 12(b)(1) motion can allege either a facial
challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face
of the complaint, or a factual challenge, which requires consideration of
evidence beyond the face of the complaint.").
19
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
July 2024, pursuant to which the City ceased both the issuance of all
citations under the ordinance and any related administrative hearings.
See, e.g., Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 984 (Ala. 2007) (" '[A]n
action that originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be
maintained on appeal if the questions raised in it have become moot by
subsequent acts or events.' " (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, just as in the above-cited cases,
"[t]he plaintiffs' acceptance of liability under … the ordinance,
without challenging the notices of violations within the time
and manner provided for … in the ordinance, settled the
matter and mooted the controversy between the parties.
Because a justiciable controversy no longer existed between
the parties, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' subsequently filed declaratory-judgment action
challenging … the ordinance."
Woodgett, 319 So. 3d at 1239.
Notably, in their answers filed in this Court, the plaintiffs do not
address the implication of the above-cited cases on their claims, do not
seek to have those cases overruled, and do not argue that any recognized
exception to the mootness doctrine -- including the public-interest
exception they raised to the trial court -- exists in this case. Instead, the
plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their claims from those asserted in the
above-cited cases by maintaining that, unlike the plaintiffs in those
20
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
cases, they had no means by which they could contest or pay the citations
once those citations were, through the actions of the City defendants,
either dismissed or converted to mere warnings and that, as a result, they
had "no citations to contest" or to pay. That admission, however, further
underscores the lack of a justiciable controversy -- cancellation of the
citations, a refund of fees and costs, and the discontinuation of
enforcement of the ordinance moots the controversy.
II. The Plaintiffs' Tort Claims
Regarding the plaintiffs' tort claims, however, we reach a different
result. Those claims appear to be based on allegations that the citations
issued under the ordinance -- regardless of their legality -- independently
and tortiously caused damage to certain plaintiffs. Specifically, the
plaintiffs' negligence claim alleged breach of alleged duties to provide
adequate notice of the devices, to ensure that citations were lawfully
issued to the actual violator, to properly maintain the devices, and to
properly train all operators. Their invasion-of-privacy and fraud claims
were premised on the allegation that the City defendants and JENOPTIK
had improperly shared the fact of the violation with "other entities" and
"outside agencies," purportedly contrary to representations contained in
21
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
the ordinance. In particular, as to their invasion-of-privacy and fraud
claims, some plaintiffs alleged that the dissemination of the fact of their
violations to third parties, despite purported contrary representations in
the ordinance, not only had "plac[ed] Plaintiffs in a negative light and/or
position in the public eye," but also had consequences beyond any civil
penalty imposed by the ordinance:
"94. ... Plaintiff Flolaidra Todd ... received 3 traffic
citations under [the] Ordinance on February 22, 2024,
February 25, 2024, and February 26, 2024. None of these
citations were due to be paid before March 25, 2024, March
28, 2024, or March 31, 2024, respectively.
"95. However, Plaintiff Todd was terminated from her
employment, Southern Cross[,] by letter dated March 25,
2024.
"96. The letter stated that Ms. Todd was terminated for
receiving 3 speeding tickets for traveling 20 miles over the
speed limits, prior to her cases being contested or
adjudicated.[4]
"97. At the time of receiving his citation, Plaintiff
Martez Graham was in a rental vehicle while his vehicle was
being repaired. The citation accusing Plaintiff Graham of
speeding was sent to the rental car company. As a result,
Plaintiff Graham was told that he could not pick his personal
vehicle up until he paid the citation. To that end Plaintiff
Graham was forced to pay the ticket in order to get his
4Presumably, Todd's employer was the owner of the vehicle that she
was operating at the time she received the citations and, accordingly,
received the notices of the citations.
22
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
personal vehicle back. As a result he was not afforded an
opportunity to exhaust his due process rights because doing
so would result in additional storage fees on his personal
vehicle.
"98. Plaintiff Amanda Bush was threatened with
termination of employment after her employer received
citations for speeding."
As to these three individual plaintiffs, the complaint sought attendant
damages for loss of employment, mental anguish, emotional distress, and
"damages to reputation."
Nothing before us suggests that the availability of the
administrative process outlined in the ordinance, the failure to use that
process, the payment of fines associated with the citations, or the
discontinuation of the ordinance's enforcement moots these three
plaintiffs' claims.5 Therefore, unlike the ordinance-based claims, it has
not been demonstrated that these plaintiffs' tort-based claims would have
been mooted by the City's passage of subsequent resolutions affecting the
ordinance's enforcement, by the failure to challenge the citations
pursuant to the administrative process, or by the payment of a fine.
5Although the amended complaint appears to allege tort claims by
all the plaintiffs, that complaint, in substance, alleges claims related to only Todd, Graham, and Bush.
23
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Further, neither the payment of a fine nor a refund of any such payment
would appear to alleviate the damage associated with the independent
tortious conduct the plaintiffs allege.
A. The Plaintiffs' Tort Claims Against the City Defendants
As noted, the City defendants' mandamus petition addresses the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort claims only in conjunction with its reliance
on general mootness principles based on the plaintiffs' pleading failures
and the cessation of enforcement of the ordinance -- a fact that the City
defendants suggest mooted the entire action. Thus, their petition does
not present any specific argument or grounds establishing that those tort
claims are moot, that there is no justiciable controversy, or that the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims. As a result, we have no basis
to grant the City defendants' petition insofar as it relates to those claims.
We express no opinion as to the viability of those claims. See Ex parte
Brown, 331 So. 3d 79, 81 (Ala. 2021) ("The general rule is that, subject to
certain narrow exceptions, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not
reviewable by petition for a writ of mandamus. ... Furthermore, '[t]he
denial of a Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion is not appealable unless
24
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
this Court has granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.
App. P.' ").
B. The Plaintiffs' Tort Claims Against JENOPTIK
For the same reason, JENOPTIK's assertion that the plaintiffs
generally failed to state viable claims of negligence, invasion of privacy,
and fraud against it is also not subject to mandamus review. See Brown,
supra. We express no opinion on the general viability of those claims.
We note that JENOPTIK does, however, contend that, as a result
of the plaintiffs' own purported lack of "standing," the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' tort claims. As support for
that contention, it argues that all of the plaintiffs' tort-based "injuries
[arose] out of their uncontested traffic violations" and that their
complaint facially demonstrates the claims' lack of merit. JENOPTIK's
petition at 20. As set out above, however, we are unconvinced that the
plaintiffs' failure to contest the citations issued under the ordinance
impacts either their claim of negligence in enforcing the ordinance while
it remained in effect or their claims of invasion of privacy and/or fraud in
connection with the alleged dissemination of the fact of a citation's
issuance in purported conflict with the language of the ordinance.
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SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Further, the authority JENOPTIK includes for its "standing" issue is
both nonbinding on this Court and inapposite. Accordingly, JENOPTIK
has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the dismissal of all of the
plaintiffs' tort claims on this general basis. Again, we otherwise express
no opinion on the viability of those claims.
III. Alleged Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Over JENOPTIK
Finally, we are unable to conclude, in the case's present posture,
that JENOPTIK successfully demonstrated a legal right to dismissal on
the alleged basis of a lack of personal jurisdiction. JENOPTIK's motion
to dismiss did include unsupported allegations as to the circumstances of
the incorporation of JENOPTIK Smart Mobility Solutions, LLC, and
JENOPTIK North America, Inc.; their affiliation with Traffipax, LLC;
and the fact of the plaintiffs' service of those entities by certified mail at
their corporate headquarters in Florida. The motion further alleged that
JENOPTIK lacked sufficient contacts with Alabama to render it subject
to either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Notably, however, a
determination of personal jurisdiction over a corporation is factintensive. There is, at this point, simply insufficient evidence before the
26
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Court to establish that JENOPTIK carried its burden demonstrating an
entitlement to relief on this basis at this time.
"This Court has explained the appropriate analysis and
the parties' respective burdens on a personal-jurisdiction
issue as follows. 'The plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226 (Ala.
2004).' J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. West,
991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala. 2008).
" ' " 'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction, a court
must consider as true the allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco &
Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996),
and Cable/Home Communication Corp.
v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d
829 (11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict, the ...
court must construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff."
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255 (quoting
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990)).' "
" 'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc.,
853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).
However, if the defendant makes a prima facie
evidentiary showing that the Court has no
personal jurisdiction, "the plaintiff is then
required to substantiate the jurisdictional
27
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other
competent proof, and he may not merely reiterate
the factual allegations in the complaint."
Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal Transtel, Inc.,
193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing
Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See also
Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471,
474-75 (D. Del. 1995) ("When a defendant files a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2), and supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits
with his own affidavits or other competent
evidence in order to survive the motion.") (citing
Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts,
Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30
(Ala. 2004) (emphasis added; footnote omitted)."
Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010).
The plaintiffs, as JENOPTIK concedes, alleged in their complaint
that "JENOPTIK" is the "owner" of Traffipax, LLC, the entity that
indisputably contracted with the City for the installation of the devices
installed and operated -- in Alabama -- pursuant to the ordinance. In
support of its motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint,
JENOPTIK, relying on the contracts providing for the installation and
service of the devices, argued that "Traffipax, not [JENOPTIK], had the
contract with the City .... Thus, [JENOPTIK] has no contacts relevant to
28
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
this dispute within the state of Alabama and cannot be subject to general
or specific personal jurisdiction." To the contrary, however, at least one
of the contracts on which JENOPTIK relied below specifically provided
that it was "made ... between Traffipax, LLC, a member of the
JENOPTIK group, ... and the City." That language, along with the
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, appears, without an affidavit or
some other evidentiary showing by JENOPTIK to the contrary, sufficient
to have survived dismissal on personal-jurisdiction grounds at this time.
See id.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the City defendants and JENOPTIK have
demonstrated a clear legal right to have the plaintiffs' claims challenging
the legality of the ordinance dismissed as moot. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court erred in denying the City defendants' and
JENOPTIK's motions to dismiss in that respect and direct that court to
vacate its order denying those motions and, instead, to enter an order
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims challenging the legality of the ordinance.
However, we deny the City defendants' and JENOPTIK's petitions
challenging the trial court's order denying their motions regarding the
29
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
plaintiffs' tort claims and JENOPTIK's petition challenging the trial
court's personal jurisdiction over it.
SC-2025-0247 -- PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0251 -- PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, McCool, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Cook, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion.
30
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
COOK, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).
I concur in Part II of the main opinion. Specifically, I agree that the
defendants have not demonstrated that the plaintiffs' tort-based claims
would have been mooted by the City's passage of subsequent resolutions
affecting the enforcement of the ordinance, by the plaintiffs' failure to
challenge their citations pursuant to the administrative process provided
in the ordinance, or by the payment of a citation. I also concur in Part III
of the main opinion, holding that JENOPTIK failed to demonstrate a
clear legal right to dismissal based on the trial court's alleged lack of
personal jurisdiction.
However, I only concur in the result as to Part I of the main opinion,
which concerns the mootness of claims challenging the legality of the
ordinance. As to that issue, I write separately to explain why I would
distinguish between (1) retrospective claims (for instance, claims seeking
reimbursement of the fines) and (2) prospective claims (for instance,
claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the legality of
the ordinance going forward).
Despite drawing a distinction between retrospective and
prospective claims, I nonetheless concur in the result as to Part I because
31
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
the plaintiffs abandoned any argument that the challenged program was
ongoing or likely to recur, making any claim for prospective relief moot.
In Part I of the main opinion, the Court correctly concludes that,
under Woodgett v. City of Midfield, 319 So. 3d 1231 (Ala. 2020), Mills v.
City of Opelika, 320 So. 3d 554 (Ala. 2020), City of Montgomery v.
Hunter, 319 So. 3d 1213 (Ala. 2020), and Moore v. City of Center Point,
319 So. 3d 1223 (Ala. 2020), the plaintiffs' challenge to the legality of the
ordinance is not justiciable for retrospective relief. Those cases hold that,
when a plaintiff has either accepted liability under an ordinance by
paying the imposed fine or by failing to challenge liability in the forum
designated by the ordinance, a justiciable controversy ceases to exist. See
Woodgett, 319 So. 3d at 1238; Mills, 320 So. 3d at 561; City of
Montgomery, 319 So. 3d at 1223; Moore, 319 So. 3d at 1231. Based on
this caselaw, I agree with the main opinion that the plaintiffs' claims for
retrospective relief -- both their challenges to past traffic violations and
their constitutional attack on the ordinance -- cannot proceed because the
amended complaint either alleges that certain plaintiffs had paid the
fines or fails to allege that the plaintiffs had pursued the prescribed
review process.
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SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
However, I note that the Woodgett line of cases does not appear to
expressly address a distinct question that I find to be important here --whether a plaintiff may maintain a challenge seeking only prospective
relief from future enforcement of an ordinance. Indeed, in Woodgett
itself, one of the plaintiffs sought "an order enjoining the defendants from
further ticketing individuals using automated photographic equipment."
Id. at 1234. That is, the plaintiff presented a forward-looking claim for
prospective relief. But the Woodgett Court did not undertake a separate
analysis of that forward-looking claim. See Woodgett 319 So. 3d at 1238-39. As a result, in my view, our precedent leaves unanswered the
question of whether a plaintiff who seeks only to restrain future
enforcement of an ordinance may maintain such a claim even when
retrospective challenges are barred.6
Federal precedent in a similar context recognizes a distinction
between retrospective challenges to enforcement proceedings and
6The question of prospective relief also raises the problem of
whether the administrative forum would even be able to grant such
prospective relief to an alleged violator. And, what about a person who
has not yet been cited for a violation by the speed or red-light cameras,
how could they bring a claim for prospective relief? Why would such a
claim be analytically different from a claim for prospective relief by an
alleged violator who has paid a past fine?
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SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
prospective claims aimed solely at preventing future enforcement. For
example, in Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, 607 U.S. 552 (2026),
a street preacher was arrested for violating a city ordinance restricting
expressive activity near a public amphitheater. In municipal court, the
preacher pleaded no contest, paid the fine, and did not serve prison time.
Id. at 556-57. Afterward, however, he still wished to continue preaching
near the amphitheater without fear of future prosecution. Therefore, he
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the ordinance violated his
constitutional rights and seeking an injunction against future
enforcement of it. Id. at 557. The district court held that the preacher
could not maintain his suit because the judgment would have
undermined his prior conviction, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that judgment based on the same reasoning.
Id. at 558.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held
that the preacher could maintain his suit based on "wholly prospective
relief," despite his prior conviction. Id. at 561. The Supreme Court
emphasized that he was not challenging the validity of his prior
conviction or seeking monetary damages as a result of it. Id. at 563-64.
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SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Moreover, the Court warned that a contrary holding would leave the
preacher with the "untenable choice" to "violate the law and suffer the
consequences …, or else give up what he takes to be his [constitutional]
rights." Id. at 561.
However, in the case before us, the plaintiffs face an additional
hurdle. Even if we could theoretically consider prospective relief, the
defendants argue that such a claim is moot because of the cessation of
the conduct. For example, in their motion to dismiss, the City defendants
asserted that the City had "ceased the issuance of citations and other
enforcement of the ordinance." In support of that assertion, the City
defendants attached a copy of Resolution No. 2024-55 to their motion,
which stated that "[a]ll enforcement procedures and all issuance of
citations [from the ordinance] shall cease from and after July 11, 2024,
until further action by the City Council of the City of Tuskegee." In their
mandamus petition, the City defendants reasserted that "Resolution No.
2024-5[5] … altogether ceased the issuance of citations and all
enforcement" of the ordinance. City defendants' petition at 18.
JENOPTIK likewise asserted that "[t]he Ordinance is no longer being
enforced." JENOPTIK's petition at 18.
35
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
Our Court has previously recognized that a showing of a
defendant's " 'voluntary cessation' of the challenged conduct can moot the
action," but "[d]emonstrating that the action should be deemed moot on
this basis, however, is not an easy burden." Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty.
Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 71 (Ala. 2009). The party asserting mootness
bears that burden of proof. See id. A case becomes moot only when it is
" ' "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur." ' " Id. at 71 (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000), quoting in turn
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S.
199, 203 (1968)).
In response to the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs
argued that the ordinance could be reinstated. But in their answers to
the defendants' petitions for a writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs
abandoned that position and instead asserted, repeatedly, that "[i]t is
readily apparent that … the City terminated the photo generated traffic
tickets" ordinance and that the City had "ceased the program altogether."
Plaintiffs' answer to JENOPTIK's petition at 9, 20; Plaintiffs' answer to
the City defendant's petition at 9, 19 (emphasis added). Because the
36
SC-2025-0247; SC-2025-0251
plaintiffs failed to reassert and develop their earlier contention, it is
waived. See Ex parte Baldwin Cnty. Sewer Serv., LLC, 413 So. 3d 686,
691 (Ala. 2024) (explaining that this Court will not consider issues not
properly briefed on mandamus review).
As a result, there effectively is no dispute that the City has
"terminated" the ordinance. Accordingly, we need not decide whether a
claim seeking wholly prospective relief would remain justiciable under
the circumstances presented here. However, in an appropriate future
case, I would encourage litigants to fully brief the question of whether
prospective relief is available even if retrospective relief is unavailable
because of a plaintiff's payment of a fine or failure to pursue the
prescribed review process.
37