In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00260--CV
JOHN NEUDORF, APPELLANT
V.
JEFFREY COOMER, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 72nd District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2024-CV-0007, Honorable John C. Grace, Presiding
June 30, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ.
This appeal arises from an easement dispute between neighbors. John Neudorf,
Appellant, insists there is no easement and appeals a traditional summary judgment
granted in favor of Jeffrey Coomer, Appellee. He contends the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because: (1) easement by estoppel cannot exist when the easement
was added to Neudorf’s deed by a correction deed which Neudorf did not execute; and
(2) Coomer presented legally insufficient evidence to establish his claim of easement by
estoppel. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2005, Timothy and Vickie Vaughn purchased a 21.194-acre tract
from the Veterans Land Board of Texas located in Lubbock County. Contemporaneously
with the purchase and pursuant to a contract for sale, the Vaughns sold 5.204 acres out
of their tract to John Neudorf (the Neudorf Tract).1 The contract for sale for the Neudorf
Tract identified an easement across the north 30 feet of the Neudorf Tract to be accessible
and usable by the remaining 15.990-acre tract. Without this easement, the Vaughns had
no access to the 15.990-acre tract. On January 25, 2006, apparently realizing the deed
to Neudorf omitted the agreed easement, the Vaughns executed a correction deed which
added language identifying and reserving the easement. Because the terms “grantor”
and “grantee” were juxtaposed in the correction deed, the Vaughns contemporaneously
executed a second correction deed on the same day. Neudorf did not sign these
correction deeds, and there is no evidence he was requested to sign the correction deeds.
On February 16, 2007, the Vaughns sold the remaining 15.990 acres to Lyndall
and Celia Staggs. The Staggs sold that tract to Coomer sixteen years later on May 1,
2023 (the Coomer Tract). Both deeds contained a description of the thirty-foot easement
described in the contract for sale executed by the Vaughns and Neudorf. Shortly
thereafter, Neudorf’s attorney sent Coomer a letter denying the existence of the easement
across Neudorf’s land. When the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, Coomer
1 The warranty deed states an execution date of August 12, 2005, a week before the Veterans Land
Board executed the deed to the Vaughns. However, because the Vaughns executed a general warranty deed, title to the five-acre tract passed to Neudorf due to the long-standing doctrine of after-acquired title. Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942).
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filed the present suit seeking a declaratory judgment declaring there exists an easement
by estoppel across Neudorf’s land.
During the pendency of the suit, motions for summary judgment were filed by both
parties. The trial court initially denied both Neudorf’s and Coomer’s motions. However,
upon reconsideration, the trial court granted Coomer a final summary judgment and
declaration an easement exists across the Neudorf Tract. Neudorf appeals from that
judgment.
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). To obtain traditional
summary judgment, a party must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the movant
does so, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
First Sabrepoint Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc., 712 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tex.
2025).
Easements are nonpossessory interests in land that authorize the holder to use
another’s property—the burdened or servient estate—only for a particular purpose.
Boerschig v. Rio Grande Elec. Coop., Inc., No. 24-0213, 69 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 771, 2026
Tex. LEXIS 455, at *10 (May 22, 2026) (citations omitted). Because easements are real
property interests, the statute of frauds and conveyances generally require a signed and
recorded writing to evidence the creation of an easement. Id. (citing Copano Energy, LLC
v. Bujnoch, 593 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tex. 2020) and ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn, 704
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S.W.3d 515, 530 (Tex. 2024)). However, the owner of the burdened estate may be
estopped to deny the existence of an easement despite the lack of a conforming writing.
Id.; see also Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 454 (Tex. 1979). This doctrine of easement
by estoppel is an exception to the statutes requiring a writing to evidence the creation of
the easement. Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 451.
To prove the existence of an easement by estoppel, the holder must show (1) the
owner of the burdened estate represented that an easement would be conveyed, (2) the
holder believed the representation, and (3) the holder relied on the representation to his
detriment. Boerschig, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 455, at *11. Representation and belief are fixed
at the time of transfer, but if the reliance terminates, so does the estoppel. Id. “Once
created, an easement by estoppel is binding upon successors in title if reliance upon the
existence of the easement continues.” Goodenberger v. Ellis, 343 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). A writing that fails as an express easement can be
some evidence supporting the representation element of an easement by estoppel.
Boerschig, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 455, at *12. The holder bears the burden to prove an
easement by estoppel exists; however, an express easement is recognized as a property
interest as a matter of law, even if its interpretation or application may be disputed. Id.
Because easements by estoppel are a specific application of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, they are a creature of equity that seeks to prevent injustice and to
protect innocent parties from fraud. Boerschig, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 455, at *21 (citations
and quotations omitted). It applies when injustice can be avoided only by establishment
of a servitude to protect the user’s substantial change of position in reasonable reliance
on the owner’s representation. Id. at *22 (citations, quotations, and edits omitted).
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We begin with Neudorf’s second argument. Here, Neudorf challenges the trial
court’s summary judgment by arguing Coomer failed to meet his burden to prove his
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. He claims genuine issues of material fact
precluded the trial court from awarding summary judgment. We disagree.
Our review of the record reveals both parties attached copies of the same
documents to their respective motions for summary judgment. Coomer also included an
affidavit from Lyndall Stagg containing additional facts. Neudorf attached no evidence to
his response to Coomer’s motion to controvert the facts stated in Lyndall Stagg’s affidavit.
Instead, Neudorf argued genuine issues of material fact existed and re-urged his
affirmative defenses. However, he also averred in his response “[p]art of the agreement
was for the reservation of [the easement] to benefit the [Coomer Tract] to be used for
access and utilities.” In effect, he admitted he had agreed to buy his land subject to the
easement. On appeal, Neudorf claims his own earlier-filed affidavit contradicts the factual
allegations and evidence contained in Coomer’s motion and demonstrates the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.2
Even if Neudorf’s earlier-filed affidavit was “on file,” and therefore could have been
considered by the trial court, the affidavit does not in fact contradict the factual statements
made by Lyndall Stagg. Neudorf urges the following statements preclude summary
judgment:
• “At no time since I have owned [the Neudorf Tract] has an easement
existed across my property.”
2 Neudorf’s affidavit was attached to his reply to Coomer’s response to Neudorf’s motion for summary judgment filed early in the case. Neudorf moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, and the trial court denied his motion. Because he has not separately appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, Neudorf’s motion is not at issue.
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• Neither did the Vaughns or the Staggs continuously and regularly use
the driveway on my property to access [the Coomer Tract].”
But, the above statements merely draw legal conclusions—there is no easement and
there was no continuous, regular use—unsupported by any facts. Such conclusory
statements are not evidence and are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact. See Aguilar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 07-20-00036-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS
718, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Dolcefino v.
Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (op.
on reh’g)); Dickerson v. Davis, 925 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ
dism’d w.o.j.) (“An affidavit containing conclusory statements unsupported by facts is not
competent summary judgment proof.”).
Based on the undisputed facts, Neudorf is estopped from denying the existence of
the easement. Neudorf agreed to the original contract for sale, which contained a
description of the easement. He did not dispute the Vaughns’ land—now the Coomer
Tract—was landlocked after their conveyance to Neudorf, and the easement was, at the
time, the only means of ingress and egress to this tract. He also does not dispute the
Staggs’ continual use of the easement to access their property during the 16 years they
owned the Coomer Tract after the Vaughns. Nor does he dispute the Staggs’
contributions to improve the easement or the fact that he never prevented their access to
the easement during their period of ownership. We conclude there was no genuine issue
of material fact, and Coomer was entitled to summary judgment if he could demonstrate
he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Neudorf next argues, even if there was no genuine issue of material fact on the
existence of the easement, Coomer did not provide any evidence Neudorf made a
representation to him regarding the easement, and Coomer also did not establish he
relied on the representation of the easement. But “[r]epresentation and belief are fixed at
the time of transfer,” and a subsequent purchaser takes the property subject to notice of
those representations at the time of purchase. Boerschig, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 455, at *11,
23.
Here, there is a regular chain of title for Coomer’s tract. Each conveyance—from
the Vaughns to the Staggs to Coomer himself—involves a general warranty deed by
which the successors-in-interest have purchased all the rights, title, and interest of the
grantors. The grantors have bound themselves to defend the title conveyed therein. And,
the Vaughns’ warranty deed to the Staggs specifically contains a description of the
easement at issue. Therefore, the question is whether Neudorf made the representation
of the easement to the Vaughns, not the Staggs or Coomer. As discussed above, Neudorf
indeed made that representation in the contract for sale he signed with the Vaughns for
the original purchase of his land.
Neudorf nonetheless complains because he did not sign the correction deeds filed
by the Vaughns, the correction deeds were ineffective to retroactively include the
easement in the original conveyance to Neudorf. He suggests the changes made by the
correction deeds were material and required Neudorf’s signature on the correction
instruments to be enforceable. TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.029. But unenforceable, written
instruments may be used to prove easement by estoppel. Id. at *12. Moreover, Neudorf’s
argument ignores the fact that the Vaughns’ correction deeds were executed in 2006,
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before the passage of the correction deed statutes. In fact, the subsection immediately
following the ones cited by Appellant states:
A correction instrument recorded before September 1, 2011, that
substantially complies with Section 5.028 or 5.029 and that purports to
correct a recorded original instrument of conveyance is effective to the
same extent as provided by Section 5.030 unless a court of competent
jurisdiction renders a final judgment determining that the correction
instrument does not substantially comply with Section 5.028 or 5.029.
TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.031. The plain language of the statute requires a “final judgment
determining that the correction instrument does not substantially comply” with the current
requirements before it is deemed ineffective. Neudorf never sought a determination from
the trial court regarding the validity and “substantial compliance” of the Vaughns’
correction deeds. Therefore, the correction deeds are effective to correct the omission of
the easement from the contract for sale the parties signed.3
Coomer’s evidence conclusively proved an easement by estoppel: (1)
Neudorf made a representation of the easement in his contract for sale with the
Vaughns, (2) the representation in the contract was believed by the Vaughns, and
(3) the Vaughns—being left with a landlocked parcel—relied on that representation
to their detriment. Neudorf’s issues are overruled. The trial court did not err in
awarding summary judgment to Coomer.
3 Arguably, the omission of the easement is also not a material change requiring the signature of
Neudorf. TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.028(a-1) (a nonmaterial change includes an “inadvertent error, including the addition, correction, or clarification of . . . a legal description prepared in connection with the preparation of the original instrument but inadvertently omitted from the original instrument[.]”). However, because Coomer’s claim is for easement by estoppel, we need not determine whether the Vaughns’ correction deeds were material under the 2011 legislative amendments to the Property Code.
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CONCLUSION
Having overruled the issues presented on appeal, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice
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