Joseph Richard Rozsa v. 2500 Hwy 183 LP

majority opinion

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

No. 08-24-00100-CV

Joseph Richard Rozsa, Appellant

2500 Hwy 183 LP, Appellee

On Appeal from the 345th District Court

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court No. D-1-GN-24-000381

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a temporary injunction prohibiting Appellant Joseph Richard Rozsa

from occupying or interfering with a leased commercial property. The dispute arose from Appellee

2500 HWY 183, LP’s (Landlord) efforts to evict Lessees Launch Commerce, LLC and Launch

Studios, LLC for non-payment of rent. Lessees and Rozsa were enjoined by the trial court, and

Rozsa challenges the temporary injunction on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2021, Launch Commerce entered into a commercial lease agreement with Landlord.

Rozsa signed the agreement as President of Launch Commerce. In August 2023, Launch Studios

assumed the lease, but Launch Commerce was not released from any obligations under the lease.

Rozsa signed the “Assignment and Assumption of Lease” agreement as President of both Launch

Commerce and Launch Studios (collectively, the LLCs). Rozsa also signed a personal guaranty.

Landlord alleges that the LLCs failed to pay rent beginning in June 2023.

In October 2023, Landlord exercised a right it claimed the lease expressly provided—

retaking the property by altering the locks and terminating the tenant’s right of possession. Launch

Studios responded by obtaining an ex parte writ of reentry from a justice court in November 2023.

But two weeks later, after a hearing, the justice court dissolved the writ of reentry, finding that

“the lockout by [Landlord] was not improper by the terms of lease” and the Launch Studios was

“not entitled to continued use and enjoyment of the property[.]” The justice court set the amount

of an appeal bond at $7,014. Launch Studios appealed that decision to a county court and attempted

to meet the appeal bond requirement through Rosza filing an affidavit of inability to post appeal

bond. Landlord successfully challenged that bond because (1) the affidavit addressed Rozsa’s

personal financials, not the LLCs’, and (2) that type of affidavit does not apply to commercial

leases. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the county court remanded the appeal to the justice court.

In January 2024, Landlord filed suit in a district court against the LLCs and Rozsa for

breach of contract and trespass. A month later, it amended the petition to seek injunctive relief,

claiming Rozsa had filed a second ex parte writ of reentry with a justice court, which was later

dismissed with prejudice. Contending that a forcible entry and detainer action would not be an

effective or useful remedy, Landlord sought a temporary and permanent injunction to order the

LLCs and Rozsa to vacate the property and refrain from further interfering with it. The amended

petition alleges that after the justice court held that Landlord was entitled to possession of the

premises and the appeal of that decision was remanded, Launch Studies refused to leave.

Additionally, it alleged that Rozsa was manipulating the “civil process in the justice court to

prevent [Landlord] from its use and enjoyment of the property” by falsely swearing to facts that

were not true. Adding causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against the

LLCs and Rozsa, Landlord further claimed that Launch Studios “has continued to engage in

conduct that disrupts other Tenants in the center and has harassed and made threats against the

property manager and others.”

Together, the LLCs and Rozsa filed a response, signed only by Rozsa. Rozsa is not an

attorney. Because only a licensed attorney may represent an entity in a Texas district court,

Landlord moved to strike the LLCs’ answer.

In March 2024, the trial court heard and granted the Application for Temporary Injunction.

Its order reflects that the LLCs did not appear through counsel, and Rozsa could not represent their

interests. The order recites that the court took testimony and received evidence. The court’s

decision is supported by several findings, including:

9. [Landlord] has prevailed on two writs of reentry hearings, has terminated

the Lease, and has requested Defendants to vacate the Premises.

Defendants refuse to vacate the Premises, and remains in possession of

the Premises without consent of the landlord.

10. Joseph Rozsa, an individual defendant has no independent right to use or

occupy the Premises.

11. [Landlord] has a bona fide cause of action against Defendants for trespass

and a probable right to the relief sought in this action for a continuing

trespass. [Landlord] will in all likelihood prevail on the merits on its cause

of action for trespass.

13. The lost use and interference of its property is probable, imminent,

continuous, and constitutes irreparable injury to [Landlord]. Unless

Defendants’ acts are enjoined prior to trial on the merits, Defendants are

likely to continue in their course of conduct, which threatens [Landlord]

use and enjoyment of its property including its contractual rights, property

rights, possessory rights, and financial interests.

The temporary injunction ordered the LLCs and Rozsa to surrender and vacate the

property, and refrain from future interference with Landlord’s right of possession and use. The

order became effective on Landlord’s posting of a $5,000.00 bond. The case was set for final trial

in August 2024.

The LLCs and Rozsa then filed a notice of appeal from the temporary injunction order,

signed only by Rozsa.1 Rozsa alone filed an appellate brief for the LLCs and himself. Because

corporate entities must be represented by a licensed attorney, we ordered the LLCs to file an

amended notice of appeal and appellate brief complying with the rules of representation of

corporate parties. See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 81.101–102 (prohibiting the practice of law in Texas

unless the person is a member of the state bar); Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 83.001–006 (prohibiting

unlicensed persons from practicing law).

In response, Attorney Jamie D. Pesantes purportedly entered an appearance for the LLCs.

Other pleadings followed: (1) a motion on behalf of the LLCs to adopt the brief previously filed

by Rozsa; (2) an emergency motion to stay temporary injunction pending appeal; and (3) a motion

The filing was in the Third Court of Appeals, as the property and lower courts are in Travis County. The appeal was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. As such, we apply the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals to extent it may conflict with our own. Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

to stay and vacate summary judgment ruling. We requested a response from Landlord. Almost

immediately following the entry of appearance, Pesantes contacted this Court claiming that the

filings made on behalf of the LLCs were fraudulent and allegedly submitted by his now-former

paralegal without his authorization. He moved to withdraw the filings and to withdraw his name

as attorney of record for the LLCs. Relying on Pesantes’s representations as an officer of the court,

we granted the motions. Concluding that the LLCs failed to appear and amend their filings in the

time provided for by the court, we dismissed them from the appeal.

In response to Pesantes’s filings, Landlord filed a combined motion to dismiss and motion

for sanctions urging this Court to dismiss the appeal as an appropriate sanction for Rozsa’s fraud

on the Court. Specifically, Landlord alleged that Rozsa committed fraud by (1) explicitly

representing to this Court and to Landlord that the LLCs had retained Pesantes, when they had not,

(2) fabricating a false email and phone number for Pesantes, and (3) using the fabricated contact

information and forged signature to make five filings in this Court. Rozsa disputed Pesantes’s

allegations, and we remanded the appeal to the trial court for a hearing to determine the truth of

the disputed allegations.

In November 2024, the trial court held a hearing and found that no attorney-client

relationship existed between Rozsa and Pesantes at the time the filings were made in this Court. It

further found that Rozsa and the paralegal created a fraudulent email address and phone number,

which they “together conspired to use and did use . . . in appellate filings for the purpose of

misrepresenting that Mr. Pesantes filed the documents . . . and acted as counsel for [the LLCs] on

appeal.” Based on those findings, we concluded that the appropriate remedy was monetary

sanctions. On a second remand, the trial court determined that Landlord incurred $35,519.02 in

fees in addressing Rozsa’s improper actions, which we then ordered as sanctions.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Rozsa subsequently filed an appellate brief on his own behalf, raising four issues. First, he

claims the trial court abused its discretion by granting a temporary injunction based on a defective

verification and insufficient evidence. Second, he contends Landlord failed to establish each of the

necessary elements for a temporary injunction (a probable right to relief, irreparable harm, a

balance of the equities, and maintenance of the status quo). Third, he maintains the trial court failed

to comply with the procedural requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683, rendering the

injunction void or voidable. Fourth, he claims the trial court failed to issue proper findings of fact

and conclusions of law, which failure prevents meaningful appellate review.

III. STANDING AND MOOTNESS

As a preliminary matter, we must address challenges by the parties that implicate our

jurisdiction.

First, we address challenges based on the standing of both parties to maintain this appeal.

Standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 787

(Tex. 2015). Standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit to

have a “justiciable interest” in its outcome. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845,

848 (Tex. 2005). Standing may be raised at any time. Id. at 849.

Second, we address claims by both parties that this dispute is now moot. A case is moot if

a controversy no longer exists between the parties. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d

732, 737 (Tex. 2005). A case can become moot at any stage of the legal proceedings, including on

appeal. Id. Courts of appeal are prohibited from deciding moot cases. Nat. Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (“This prohibition is rooted in the separation of powers

doctrine in the Texas and United States Constitutions that prohibits courts from rendering advisory

opinions.”).

A. Landlord’s standing challenge

In its brief on the merits, Landlord contends that Rozsa lacks standing to claim any right to

possess the premises because only the LLCs have that right, and they are not parties to this appeal.

Rozsa responds that he has standing as a guarantor, citing the following lease term:

and limitations contained in the Lease which are to be observed or performed

by Tenant thereunder, the same as if Guarantor were named as the tenant

therein;

Whether a party has standing, and thus whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, is a

question of law subject to de novo review. McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d

278, 282 (Tex. 2018). “To maintain standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact that is

both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that

the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed

to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Data Foundry,

Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021). Texas Supreme Court precedent cautions,

however, that “‘extra-constitutional restrictions on the right of a particular plaintiff to bring a

particular lawsuit’ do not implicate standing in the jurisdictional sense.” McLane Champions, LLC

v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907, 912–13 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Dyer v.

Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 646 S.W.3d 498, 505 n.36 (Tex. 2022)). Thus “a plaintiff does not

lack standing simply because some other legal principle may prevent it from prevailing on the

merits; rather, a plaintiff lacks standing if its claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford

redress.” Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Nat’l Health Res. Corp. v. TBF Fin., LLC, 429 S.W.3d 125, 128–29

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“Whether a party is entitled to sue on a contract is not truly a

standing issue because it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it is, instead, a decision on

the merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We conclude that Landlord’s standing challenge is a merits-based argument rather than a

jurisdictional standing challenge. As to any jurisdictional challenge, Rozsa has at least some injury

sufficient to allow him to challenge the trial court’s order, as it found that Rozsa was a trespasser

subjecting him to a damage claim and prohibiting him from taking other actions in the future apart

from dispossessing him of the premises.

B. Landlord’s mootness challenge

In a post briefing motion to dismiss, Landlord first claims the temporary injunction has

been replaced by a permanent injunction, and once that happens, any challenge to the temporary

injunction becomes moot. See Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235,

236 (Tex. 1991) (“If, while on the appeal of the granting or denying of the temporary injunction,

the trial court renders final judgment, the case on appeal becomes moot.”). On June 12, 2024, while

this appeal was pending, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment that found Rozsa guilty

of trespass and granted a “permanent injunction” against Rozsa with six prohibitions, five of those

identical to those in the temporary injunction. 2 The partial summary judgment order left pending

the amount of damages from Rozsa’s trespass.

The “permanent injunction” added one new prohibition: “(e) refrain from preventing 2500 HWY 183 LP, its property manager representatives, or potential replacement tenants from accessing the property at 2500 Highway 183 Austin, Texas 78744, including without limitation the Premises located at Building 3, Suite 310.” The Clerk’s Record does not contain the partial summary judgment motion or any response. It is unclear why this additional injunction term was added. But Rozsa does not separately assign error to the inclusion of this added term, and we do not address it separately on appeal.

A temporary injunction preserves the status quo of the subject of a suit pending final

disposition on the merits. Matlock v. Data Processing Sec. Inc., 618 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex.1981).

Thus, a temporary injunction generally expires upon rendition of a final judgment by the trial court

or express order dissolving the injunction. See Brines v. McIlhaney, 596 S.W.2d 519, 523

(Tex. 1980); Texas City v. Community Public Service Co., 534 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The partial summary judgment is not a final judgment, nor does

it expressly dissolve the prior temporary injunction. Rather, it adopts the bulk of the terms from

the temporary injunction but labels the relief as a “permanent” injunction.

Landlord’s reasoning that this “permanent” injunction moots this appeal would create an

unintended anomaly in appellate procedure. Generally, only a final judgment is appealable. As an

exception to that rule, a party may appeal an interlocutory order that “grants or refuses a temporary

injunction.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4). There is no express statutory basis to

appeal an interlocutory “permanent” injunction. To apply Landlord’s reasoning, Rozsa’s appeal of

the temporary injunction would be dismissed for mootness, but he would be precluded from

challenging, and be subject to, the interlocutory “permanent” injunction until it becomes final. His

only redress would be claim that the “permanent” injunction is misnamed, and is in fact a new

temporary injunction, and thus immediately appealable. See Harley Channelview Props., LLC v.

Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 35–36 (Tex. 2024) (holding that a non-final order which

acts like a temporary injunction, might still be appealed, even if not denominated as such). To do

so would require the parties to restart the entire appeal anew. Landlord cites no authority for that

proposition, and we are aware of none. We therefore decline to dismiss the appeal as moot on that

ground.

Landlord also posits that a final hearing was set for August 12, 2024. While a final

judgment would generally supersede and moot the appeal of the temporary injunction, Isuani v.

Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam), Landlord

concedes the setting was not reached, and nothing in our record shows that a final order has been

entered.

Finally, Landlord argues that the term of the LLCs’ leases has now expired, so neither

Rozsa nor the LLCs would have any current right of possession. An appeal from a forcible entry

and detainer action becomes moot when (1) the only issue is possession under the terms of a lease,

and (2) the lease expires during the pendency of the appeal. Marshall v. Housing Authority of San

Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006) (so holding where tenant could not show collateral damages

from the dispossession order and the court deleted the court cost judgment against tenant).

However, when there are damages issues beyond the mere right of possession, the end of the lease

does not moot the appeal. Spencer v. Gilbert, No. 03-09-00207-CV, 2010 WL 3064346, at *1–2

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2010, writ dis’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“The damages portion of the case

is not moot . . . the controversy over the monetary damage award persists and is not moot.”); Brown

v. Apex Realty, 349 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (declining to dismiss

appeal as moot and distinguishing Marshall based on a live damage issue). Here, the partial

summary judgment against Rozsa for trespass—reserving the damage determination—means this

dispute was not mooted by the end of the lease.

We deny Landlord’s motion to dismiss for mootness.

C. Rozsa’s motion to dismiss 3

Rozsa files his own motion claiming the case is moot and that Landlord lacks standing

based on the sale of the leasehold to a third party during the pendency of the appeal. Rozsa

contends this sale—occurring a year after issuance of the temporary injunction—renders all the

orders in the case (including the sanctions order against Rozsa for his fraud on this Court) void.

We disagree.

Landowners sometimes initiate legal proceedings to make their property marketable, such

as clearing clouds to title, settling boundary disputes, challenging liens, or as relevant here,

evicting trespassers. We are aware of no authority that the subsequent act of selling the property

to another makes any prior judicial declaration about the property void ab initio. If that were true,

every purchaser of property would face relitigating any prior judicial determination that made their

purchase possible. We also reject Rozsa’s contention that Landlord acted improperly by not

informing this Court of the fact of the sale. The focus of this appeal is the propriety of a temporary

injunction issued at a time when Landlord undisputably owned the premises. Accordingly, we

conclude that Landlord has standing to assert a trespass claim (with damages yet to be determined)

that is not moot. We deny Rozsa’s motion. 4

IV. DISCUSSION

Having confirmed our jurisdiction over the appeal, we turn to the merits.

The actual title of the motion is “Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Judicial Notice of Jurisdictional Defect, to Declare Proceedings Void Ab Initio, and Motion for Sanctions for Systematic Fraud on the Court.” 4

For the same reason, we reject the portion of Rozsa’s motion seeking sanctions against Landlord and its counsel. Rozsa draws adverse inferences from the misnomer of Landlord’s name on some pleadings or the omission of the guaranty agreement in certain filings. He also asserts that Landlord offered perjured testimony. Were these matters properly raised, they would fail for lack of a complete record below to establish the adverse inferences Rozsa claims.

A. Landlord’s burden and our standard of review

A temporary injunction serves to preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). It is an extraordinary remedy and

not a matter of right. Id. To obtain such relief, a party must plead and prove a cause of action, a

probable right to relief, and irreparable injury in the interim. Id. A trial court must exercise its

sound discretion in either granting or denying a temporary injunction. State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d

484, 485 (Tex. 1984).

We review an order granting a temporary injunction for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Tex. 2024). Under this standard, we defer to the trial court’s factual

findings if supported by evidence, but review its legal determinations de novo. Id. As the reviewing

court, we must not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court’s action

was so arbitrary it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. In

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, “we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor.” Grossman

v. City of El Paso, 642 S.W.3d 85, 107 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. dism’d).

B. Because Rozsa declined to file a reporter’s record, our review is limited

The temporary injunction order reflects that the trial court took testimony and admitted

exhibits at the hearing below. The court reporter notified this Court that Rozsa had made no

arrangements to obtain the record, and we offered Rozsa the opportunity to cure. Rozsa responded

with a filing indicating that “this Appellant will not be requesting a reporter’s record for this

appeal. Please consider the clerk’s record, which has already been submitted to the Court, for the

purposes of this appeal.” Rozsa’s decision narrows the scope of what the Court may consider.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 37.3 controls when, as here, a clerk’s record but no

reporter’s record is filed due to Appellant’s fault. Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). In that circumstance,

“after first giving the appellant notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure,” the appellate court

should only “consider and decide those issues or points that do not require a reporter’s record for

a decision.” Id.; In re Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d 643, 646 n.1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.)

(“[W]hen the reporter’s record is missing and the issue before us depends upon matters within that

record we may overrule or reject it.”); Yacopino v. Waters, No. 03-21-00529-CV, 2022 WL

3691675, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

One class of errors where the absence of a reporter’s record precludes review is factual or

legal insufficiency complaints. Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968)

(“When the complaint is that the evidence is factually or legally insufficient to support vital

findings of fact, or that the evidence conclusively refutes vital findings, this burden cannot be

discharged in the absence of a complete or an agreed statement of facts.”); Yacopino, 2022 WL

3691675, at *3. When no reporter’s record is filed, “it is presumed that the omitted evidence

supports the trial court’s judgment.” Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002)

(explaining that “absent a complete record on appeal, [court of appeals] must presume the omitted

items supported the trial court’s judgment”); In re Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d at 646 (“Moreover, the

reporter’s record is so pivotal to our review that its absence obligates us to presume that the missing

evidence actually supported the trial court’s ruling.”). We must also presume the omitted portions

are relevant to disposition of this appeal. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843

(Tex. 1990) (per curiam).

C. Rule 37.3 precludes most of Rozsa’s issues; his remaining claims lack merit

Looking to the substance of the issues argued in his brief, Rozsa’s first three issues claim

that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding, or that the evidence conclusively

establishes the opposite. He contends that Landlord did not meet its burden to show the elements

for a temporary injunction (i.e. probable right to relief, irreparable injury, last peaceable

possession). He also complains that the trial court did not find what would be affirmative defenses,

such as waiver and unconscionability. Because we have no record against which to test the trial

court’s discretion, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See Middleton v. National

Fam. Care Life Ins. Co., No. 14-04-00428-CV, 2006 WL 89503, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s judgment “[b]ecause we

are bound by the dual presumption that the omitted record is relevant to the disposition of this

appeal and that it supports the trial court’s judgment”). The absence of a reporter’s record is fatal

to the substance for most of the first three issues on appeal and we overrule Rozsa’s Issues One,

Two, and Three, with the exception of the sub-part of Issue One and the sub-part of Issue Three

separately addressed below.

One thread of Rozsa’s first issue claims the trial court erred in granting a temporary

injunction based on a petition that lacked a sworn affidavit. Even if this sub-issue could be

addressed in the absence of a reporter’s record, it lacks merit. The application for a temporary

restraining order was accompanied by the unsworn declaration of Shelley Lamoglia, the Senior

Property Manager for a company that provided the “day-to-day leasing and management of the

property.” As such, she “directly interacted with Mr. Joseph Rozsa.” Her declaration states that

she read the amended petition and the matters in specified paragraphs. She declared “under penalty

of perjury that the matters indicated in those paragraphs are within my personal knowledge and

are true and correct.” The unsworn declaration tracks the requirements of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code § 132.001. That statute provides, with exceptions not applicable here, that “an unsworn

declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or

affidavit required by statute or required by a rule, order, or requirement adopted as provided by

law.” Id. Even if there were some technical deficiencies in the declaration, the Third Court of

Appeals requires that any defect as to form be raised in the trial court. ACI Design Build

Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 517–18 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet denied). We

are not directed to any objection or ruling in the trial court as to the form of the declaration.

Accordingly, we overrule the sub-part of Issue One claiming the injunction petition was not sworn.

One thread of Rozsa’s third issue challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter a

temporary injunction because a forcible entry and detainer action before the justice court is the

exclusive remedy for possession. Rozsa contends that a forcible entry and detainer action gave

Landlord an adequate remedy at law. McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984)

(holding trial court erred in granting injunction for possession when Landlord had an adequate

remedy at law through a forcible entry and detainer action).

Landlord’s petition alleges, however, that a forcible entry and detainer action was not an

adequate remedy in this case. The parties had already been before the justice court twice on

Rozsa’s actions to re-enter the property after Landlord locked Rozsa out. Each time, Landlord

ultimately prevailed in the justice court. In one of those proceedings, the justice court found that

Launch Studios was “not entitled to continued use and enjoyment of the property.” Rozsa

attempted to appeal that determination to a county court, but the appeal was remanded for failure

to properly file a bond. The second justice court action was dismissed with prejudice, denying

Rozsa any relief. The injunction petition alleges that Rozsa made false filings in those actions.

Without a record of the injunction hearing, we have no basis to conclude that the trial court abused

its discretion in finding that under the unique circumstances of this case Landlord lacked an

adequate remedy through a forcible entry and detainer action. 5 Middleton, No. 14-04-00428-CV,

2006 WL 89503, at *1–2. Accordingly, we overrule the sub-part of Issue Three addressing the

exclusive remedy argument.

In his fourth issue, Rozsa contends that the trial court erred in its findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The trial court’s order contains thirteen findings. Rozsa filed a request for

amended and additional findings of fact and conclusion of law. 6 The issue on appeal faults the

trial court for adopting the findings from Landlord’s proposed order, contending the trial court

failed to make adequate findings. Contained in this point is a sub-issue that the trial court abused

its discretion in setting the bond at only $5,000.00. Without a record of the hearing, we are unable

to test the sufficiency of any of the trial court’s findings or determine if additional findings were

warranted. As to the bond, we presume that the omitted record supports the trial court’s

determination as to the bond amount. Middleton, No. 14-04-00428-CV, 2006 WL 89503, at *1–2.

We overrule Rozsa’s Issue Four.

A forcible entry and detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative, of any other remedy that a party may have in the courts of this state. McGlothlin, 672 S.W.2d at 232. Only one part of the injunction dealt with possession of the premises. Several other provisions prevented Rozsa from interfering with the premises in future. 6

Our record does not contain a Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (“If the court fails to send timely findings of fact and conclusions of law, the party making the request must, within thirty days after filing the original request, file with the clerk and serve on all other parties in accordance with Rule 21a a ‘Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law’ which must be immediately called to the attention of the court by the clerk.”). The failure to file the reminder as required by Rule 297 waives any complaint about the failure to make additional findings. Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1986). For that reason alone, we may overrule the portion of Issue Four complaining of the failure to make additional findings.

V. CONCLUSION

Having denied all pending motions of the parties and overruled Appellant’s four issues on

appeal, we affirm the trial court’s order. We incorporate into our judgment the monetary sanctions

award, which amount was found by the trial court to accurately reflect the additional fees incurred

by Landlord as a result of Rozsa’s improper conduct, and assess all costs against Appellant.

LISA J. SOTO

June 26, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

Joseph Richard Rozsa v. 2500 Hwy 183 LP

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain