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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-7118
K.C. LANGFORD,
Petitioner – Appellee,
v.
WARDEN DONNIE STONEBREAKER, Warden, Evans Correctional Institution,
Respondent – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
Donald C. Coggins, Jr., District Judge. (9:20-cv-01298-DCC)
Argued: October 21, 2025 Decided: July 2, 2026
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and THACKER and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Reversed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
Diaz and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Tommy Evans, Jr., Richard Brandon Larrabee, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Ernest Charles Grose, Jr., THE GROSE LAW FIRM, LLC, Greenwood, South
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka,
Deputy Attorney General, Melody J. Brown, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant.
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RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
A South Carolina jury convicted K.C. Langford of criminal conspiracy, armed
robbery, first-degree burglary, and kidnapping. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed Langford’s convictions, and a state court denied his subsequent application for
postconviction relief. Langford then sought relief in federal court, raising arguments that
the state courts had already rejected about his speedy trial right and ineffective assistance
of counsel. The federal district court granted Langford the writ of habeas corpus on both
grounds and ordered his release from state custody. We reverse.
I.
A.
We begin with the facts as recounted by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
On August 14, 2008, Ji Quing Chen, along with his son, Li Guan Xin, and
wife, Li Ai Ming, left the Chinese restaurant they own in Johnston, South
Carolina, shortly after 10:00 p.m. and headed home. With them was a black
bag containing the day’s earnings. When they arrived home, Ji Quing stayed
outside to water some plants while his wife and son entered the house. As
he was tending to his garden, three men wearing masks came out from the
bushes, forced him to the ground, hit him, and took his wallet. Concerned
that his father had not yet come inside, Li Guan stepped out onto the porch
to check on him. Once he was outside, the men forced Li Guan to the ground
and asked where the restaurant’s money was. He told them it was in the
house, and one of the men went inside to find it. That man returned shortly
with the black bag, and all three of them ran off. Because the men wore
masks, the victims were unable to provide a useful description to law
enforcement. Moreover, it does not appear the men left any forensic
evidence during the commission of these crimes.
State v. Langford, 735 S.E.2d 471, 475 (S.C. 2012).
A few weeks after the robbery, a man named Joseph Patrick Stevens contacted
Investigator Roosevelt Young of the Edgefield County Sheriff’s Department. Stevens
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volunteered information about the crime, which led to seventeen-year-old Alvin Phillips.
Investigators met with Alvin, who implicated himself, his cousin Bryan Phillips, and
Langford in the robbery. Langford was arrested on October 3, 2008, and ultimately
indicted for criminal conspiracy, first-degree burglary, armed robbery, and kidnapping.
His co-defendant, Bryan, was indicted on the same charges, as was Alvin, who was also
charged with assault and battery with intent to kill and possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime.
In January 2010, Bryan’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on a
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial or, in the alternative, to promptly set a
trial date. The state trial court held a hearing on May 17 of that year, at which time
Langford’s counsel raised a similar speedy trial motion. Langford’s counsel also asserted
that Langford had previously filed a pro se speedy trial motion and requested to “renew
that motion.” J.A. 467–468.
The prosecutor responded that “the State [had been] prepared to call these two cases
for trial today,” but Alvin had “reverse[d] his previous decision to testify and cooperate
against” Langford and Bryan because they had been “pressuring him not to testify.” J.A.
468–470. As a result, the State would first have to try Alvin but could not do so at the
current term of court because his new lawyer had been appointed “approximately eight
days” earlier and was “not prepared to go forward.” J.A. 472. The prosecutor urged that
Bryan and Langford should not “be rewarded for” pressuring Alvin not to testify against
them. J.A. 470. When defense counsel pointed out that Alvin was housed in a different
jail than Bryan and Langford, the prosecutor explained that Alvin had been moved “at the
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request of local law enforcement” precisely because they “received information from the
jail that these two individuals were putting pressure on him not to testify.” J.A. 472–473.
The hearing also touched on the difficulty the State had faced in finding an
interpreter who was proficient in Mandarin Chinese, the victims’ language. The prosecutor
explained that the State had resolved the issue and now had an interpreter assisting the
State with talking to the victims and also had located an out-of-state court interpreter to
appear at trial.
The trial court denied the motions to dismiss but ordered that Langford and Bryan
be tried within nine months. The court noted that “the State had gone to a great deal of
time and expense in arranging an interpreter for Mandarin Chinese, having to bring the
interpreter from another State since none are certified in South Carolina.” J.A. 1037. And
the court observed that Alvin, the cooperating witness, had changed his mind about
testifying “[a]t the last moment,” which created issues that required the State to try him
before Bryan and Langford. J.A. 1037. Although the court was “deeply concerned about
the length of time that these defendants have been incarcerated,” it concluded that “[n]one
of this delay was occasioned by any impropriety on the part of the State.” J.A. 1037; see
also J.A. 226 (“The State has not been unduly dilatory under the circumstances . . . .”).
Langford and Bryan were tried before a South Carolina jury from September 7–9,
2010. The three victims testified through an interpreter. The star witness, however, was
Alvin, who had once again decided to cooperate with the State after pleading guilty to
armed robbery. Alvin testified in detail about how he, Bryan, and Langford robbed the
victims at gunpoint. He admitted to pointing a gun at a victim on the ground and testified
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that Langford was the one who ran into the house and grabbed the bag of cash. Alvin
testified that after the robbery they ran to Bryan’s house, where they divvied up the money.
After that, Alvin testified, he and Langford went to Alvin’s sister’s house, where they got
in the car with Alvin’s sister and mother, who was going to work. He testified that a police
officer stopped their car to check identification and ultimately let them go.
On cross-examination by Bryan’s counsel, Alvin read two written statements dated
January and March 2009 that he had signed. The statements said that Bryan and Langford
were not involved in the robbery and that Alvin was not in a “right state of mind” when he
had told the police otherwise. J.A. 745. On redirect, Alvin explained that he did not write
those statements. Rather, when he and Langford had been held at the same jail pending
trial, Langford had given the statements to Alvin and told him to sign them so that “nobody
will be in trouble.” J.A. 758–759. Alvin testified that the written statements were false
and that his testimony in court was true.
The State called two law enforcement witnesses, who corroborated Alvin’s
testimony and explained the course of the investigation. Officer Zachary Strom testified
that immediately after the robbery he set up a perimeter to stop vehicles and seek
information about the crime. During that time, he testified, he stopped the car carrying
Alvin and Langford but let them go after checking Langford’s identification. Investigator
Lamaz Robinson explained other details about the investigation, including Alvin’s
statement to law enforcement implicating himself, Bryan, and Langford. On crossexamination by Bryan’s counsel, Investigator Robinson acknowledged that information
from Stevens led investigators to Alvin.
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Langford did not testify or call any witnesses. Bryan did not testify but called one
witness, Investigator Young. On direct examination, Investigator Young testified that the
investigation into the robbery did not make headway until Stevens, “an acquaintance” of
Investigator Young’s who was seeking help to resolve a family court bench warrant against
himself, called Investigator Young to volunteer information about the robbery. J.A. 851.
Investigator Young testified that Stevens gave him three names in connection with the
robbery—Alvin, Bryan, and Langford. On cross-examination by Langford’s counsel,
Investigator Young confirmed that Stevens “had some trouble with the law.” J.A. 866.
The jury convicted Langford and Bryan on all charges. The court sentenced them
each to twenty years’ imprisonment for armed robbery, twenty years for kidnapping,
twenty years for first-degree burglary, and five years for conspiracy, all to be served
concurrently.
B.
Langford appealed his convictions to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
affirmed. The court held that South Carolina Code § 1-7-330, which vested state
prosecutors with exclusive control over the dockets for general sessions courts, violated
the separation of powers provision of the South Carolina Constitution. Langford, 735
S.E.2d at 479. But that determination was “not dispositive of Langford’s appeal” because
he “must demonstrate that he sustained prejudice as a result of the solicitor setting when
his case was called for trial.” Id. The court considered and rejected both forms of prejudice
Langford alleged: that he was denied due process because Section 1-7-330 “permitted the
solicitor to judge shop,” and that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Id.
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As relevant here, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the State did not
infringe Langford’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Applying the framework of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the court
examined the length of the delay, the reasons for it, Langford’s assertion of his right, and
any prejudice he suffered. Langford, 735 S.E.2d at 481–484. Considering these factors
and “the case as a whole,” the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Langford was
not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at 484. The United States Supreme
Court denied Langford’s petition for a writ of certiorari. See Langford v. South Carolina,
571 U.S. 831 (2013).
Langford then filed an application for postconviction relief in the Court of Common
Pleas for Edgefield County (the PCR court). Among his asserted grounds for relief,
Langford alleged that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object
to hearsay in Investigator Young’s testimony about the Stevens tip. After an evidentiary
hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application. Applying the framework of Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the PCR court concluded that Langford had not
proven his counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced thereby because
Investigator Young’s testimony about Stevens’s statement was offered for the non-hearsay
“‘purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’” J.A. 1360
(quoting State v. Brown, 451 S.E.2d 888, 894 (S.C. 1994)). The South Carolina Court of
Appeals denied Langford’s petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, in a separate proceeding, another state court granted postconviction
relief to Bryan, Langford’s co-defendant. That court found Bryan’s counsel
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constitutionally deficient in three respects, one of which was “fail[ing] to speak with
[Investigator] Young before” calling him to testify about Stevens’s tip. J.A. 102. The court
reasoned that Investigator Young’s testimony about Stevens’s statement connecting Bryan
to the crime was allowed into evidence only because Bryan offered it; if the State had
attempted to introduce it, the testimony “would have been double hearsay.” J.A. 102. In
the court’s view, Bryan’s counsel should have spoken with Investigator Young before
putting him on the stand in order to confirm that the testimony would support counsel’s
strategy of showing “an ongoing informant” relationship. J.A. 102. The court concluded
that counsel’s “deficient representation in calling and examining [Investigator] Young” had
prejudiced Bryan at trial. J.A. 104.
C.
Langford then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising
eight grounds for relief. A magistrate judge reviewing the petition recommended that the
writ be granted on five grounds, and the warden objected to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation. Langford v. Stonebreaker, No. 9:20-CV-01298-DCC-MHC, 2024
WL 4309519 (D.S.C. July 31, 2024). The district court ultimately granted the writ on two
claims—violation of Langford’s speedy trial right and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Langford v. Stonebreaker, No. 9:20-CV-01298-DCC, 2024 WL 4542342 (D.S.C. Oct. 22,
2024).
The warden appealed to this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a); Fed. R. App. P.
22(b)(3) (“A certificate of appealability is not required when a state or its representative
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. . . appeals.”) The district court ordered the State to release Langford from custody
pending this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 23(c).
II.
We owe no deference to the district court’s decision granting habeas relief. Tyler v.
Hooks, 945 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2019). But under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), we owe “considerable deference” to the decisions of the South
Carolina courts resolving Langford’s speedy trial and ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012).
In AEDPA, Congress has prohibited federal courts from granting habeas relief to
state prisoners on the basis of claims previously adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). A
decision may be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent either because “the state court
arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of
law,” or because “the state court confront[ed] facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrive[d] at” the opposite result. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state-court decision is an “unreasonable application”
of Supreme Court precedent if the state court “correctly identifies the governing legal rule”
but “unreasonably applies the law . . . to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407, 409. A
state court’s factual findings must be “presumed . . . correct,” and the habeas petitioner
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bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 813 F.3d
517, 524 (4th Cir. 2016).
“In order for a state court’s decision to be an unreasonable application of [Supreme
Court] case law,” as is claimed here, “the ruling must be ‘objectively unreasonable, not
merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.’” Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U.S. 91, 94
(2017) (per curiam) (quoting Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam)).
In other words, “a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). This standard is
intentionally “difficult to meet,” stopping just “short of imposing a complete bar on federalcourt relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.” Id. at 102; see Shinn v.
Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1731 (2022) (explaining that habeas corpus “guards only against
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus to Langford based on two federal
claims already rejected in state court: (1) violation of Langford’s Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to hearsay
testimony by Investigator Young. Both of the district court’s rulings were in error, as we
will explain.
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A.
We first address Langford’s claim that the 23-month delay between his arrest and
trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. There is no dispute
that the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the correct legal standard as announced by
the United States Supreme Court for analyzing this claim. See Langford, 735 S.E.2d at
481–484 (applying Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). The parties instead debate
whether the South Carolina Supreme Court unreasonably applied that clearly established
law to the facts of this case.
“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the
rule’s specificity.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). “The more general
the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.” Id. As relevant here, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. In Barker, the Supreme Court explained that the right to a speedy trial “is a
more vague concept than other procedural rights.” 407 U.S. at 521. It is “impossible to
determine with precision when the right has been denied,” and so “any inquiry into a speedy
trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the
case.” Id. at 521–522. Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule for
speedy trial claims and instead adopted a balancing test that “necessarily compels courts to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Id. at 530. The Court identified four
relevant factors for courts to assess: the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. However, “none of
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the four factors” is “a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of
the right of speedy trial.” Id. at 533. Rather, they “must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant” in the court’s “difficult and sensitive balancing
process.” Id.
Barker undoubtedly articulated a “general standard” that “demand[s] a substantial
element of judgment” as applied “to a specific case.” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664. For
that reason, when we review a state court’s application of the Barker factors to a particular
case, the “‘always-substantial deference’ we afford to state courts in federal habeas review
‘is at an apex.’” Russell v. Denmark, 68 F.4th 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Amos v.
Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 2011)). “Section 2254(d)(1) thus requires us to give
the widest of latitude to a state court’s conduct of its speedy-trial analysis.” Amos, 646
F.3d at 205.
With this deference in mind, we turn to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s analysis
of Langford’s speedy trial claim. Applying the first Barker factor, the length of delay, the
court determined that the relevant period began with Langford’s arrest on October 3, 2008,
and ran until his trial commenced 23 months later on September 7, 2010—a “length of time
[that] is presumptively prejudicial and triggers the remaining Barker inquiry.” Langford,
735 S.E.2d at 482 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992)).
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The court then addressed the second factor, the reason for the delay. It found that
the first twenty-month delay 1 was attributable to the State’s difficulty in finding an
interpreter to facilitate any “‘meaningful’ conversation with the victims.” Id. at 483.
Although the court was not convinced the State had used its “best efforts” to obtain an
interpreter, it saw “no evidence that [the State] had intentionally tarried in finding one.”
Id. “At most,” the court concluded, “the State was negligent,” which was a “neutral reason”
for the delay that did “not weigh heavily against” the State. Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at
531). As for the final four-month delay, the court “review[ed] . . . the record” and found
“evidence that Langford and his co-defendant persuaded [Alvin] Phillips to remain silent,”
which “effectively gutted the State’s case on the day of trial” and required the State to
proceed against Alvin first. Id. But Alvin’s attorney “was not ready to proceed during that
term of court,” and thereafter “the State moved with reasonable haste.” Id. The court
determined that the four-month delay did not “count . . . against the State” because it was
“the product of Langford’s efforts to spoil the State’s evidence” by “tampering with the
State’s star witness.” Id. at 483 & n.9 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
316 (1986)).
1
Nineteen and one-half months passed between Langford’s arrest on October 3,
2008, and the speedy trial hearing on May 17, 2010. Three and one-half months passed
between the May 17, 2010, hearing and the commencement of trial on September 7, 2010,
for a total delay of about 23 months between Langford’s arrest and his trial. For simplicity,
we follow the South Carolina Supreme Court’s approximation of these two delays as
twenty months and four months respectively.
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Moving to the third Barker factor, the defendant’s assertion of his right, the court
accepted that Langford “filed what seems to be a pro se speedy trial motion in June 2009.”
Id. at 483. But the court observed that he did not seek a ruling on the motion “until the
May 2010 hearing” at which his counsel adopted the motion, after the initial twenty-month
delay. Id. The court further observed that “it may have been futile for [Langford] to raise
the issue again” after the trial court’s May 2010 ruling but nevertheless noted that “‘failure
to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial.’” Id. at 483–484 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
Finally, the court addressed the prejudice to Langford, which is the fourth Barker
factor. Id. at 484. It considered prejudice from “oppressive pre-trial incarceration,”
“anxiety stemming from being publicly accused of a crime,” and the possibility that the
“defense will be impaired,” of which the last is “‘the most serious.’” Id. (quoting Barker,
407 U.S. at 532). The court found no evidence “of anxiety caused by the stigma of being
accused of these crimes,” and while it acknowledged “the deleterious effects of lengthy
pre-trial incarceration,” the court concluded that the delay here did “not amount to a
constitutional violation in the absence of any actual prejudice to Langford’s case.” Id.
Regarding prejudice to his case, the court held that “Langford ha[d] not demonstrated how
his own defense was prejudiced by the delay.” Id. Although the final four-month delay
allowed the State to once again secure Alvin’s testimony for trial, the court explained that
“the State only had to do so because of [Langford’s] interference.” Id. Considering all the
factors “and the case as a whole,” the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Langford
was not denied a speedy trial. Id.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court’s application of Barker to the facts of this case
was not so lacking in justification that “every fairminded jurist would disagree” with it.
Klein v. Martin, 146 S. Ct. 589, 596 (2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties
dispute the second and fourth Barker factors, which arguably drove the court’s analysis;
but the court’s assessment of those factors was not unreasonable, that is, “beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 2 Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Regarding the reason
for the delay, the court found that the State was not intentionally dilatory and that the final
four-month delay was the product of Langford’s efforts to spoil the State’s evidence. In
those circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the court not to weigh this factor
dispositively against the State. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009) (“[D]elay
caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.”); Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 316
(holding that a defendant who causes delays in his trial “should not be able . . . to reap the
reward of dismissal for failure to receive a speedy trial”); Barker, 407 U.S. at 531
(characterizing government “negligence” as a “more neutral reason” for delay that “should
be weighted less heavily”). And given the absence of any evidence of prejudice to
Langford from the delay—apart from the time necessary to undo the prejudice that he had
2
Langford contends that the warden waived certain arguments by failing to object
to specific parts of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. However, the
warden did object to the magistrate judge’s Barker analysis, focusing on the reasons for
the delay and prejudice to the defense. See United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622
(4th Cir. 2007) (“[T]o preserve for appeal an issue in a magistrate judge’s report, a party
must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as
reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.”). Even assuming
the warden waived objections to other points in the speedy trial analysis, he did not waive
his arguments regarding the second and fourth Barker factors.
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caused to the State’s case by tampering with Alvin—the court’s weighing of the fourth
Barker factor also was not unreasonable. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Because fairminded
jurists could disagree about how to weigh the lack of prejudice and reasons for the delay
among the other Barker factors in the context of this case, the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision that the 23-month delay did not violate Langford’s Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial was not “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established
Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Langford attempts to impugn the South Carolina Supreme Court’s factual
determinations, but his effort is unconvincing. Although he criticizes the court’s findings
regarding the reasons for the twenty-month and four-month delays, he has not identified
“clear and convincing evidence” rebutting the presumption that those findings are correct.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Regarding the twenty-month delay, which the South Carolina Supreme Court found
was attributable to negligence at most, Langford parrots the magistrate judge’s critique that
the court “ignore[d] the underlying reason” for the State’s negligence, namely that “the
[prosecutor] controlled the criminal trial docket at that time.” Langford, 2024 WL
4309519, at *15. According to the magistrate judge, the court’s supposed failure to
“consider the State’s control of the docket—a power of control that violated the state
constitution—as a part of its speedy trial analysis under Barker was unreasonable.” Id.
That conclusion misreads the South Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion and misconceives
AEDPA’s standard of review. The first half of the court’s opinion analyzed South
Carolina’s docket-control statute and held that it was unconstitutional. Langford, 735
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S.E.2d at 477–479. The court then proceeded to analyze whether Langford suffered any
prejudice “as a result of” the prosecutor unconstitutionally possessing that authority in
Langford’s case. Id. at 479. The entire speedy trial analysis occurred in the context of
assessing whether the prosecutor’s control over the docket prejudiced Langford. Far from
ignoring the issue, the court considered the prosecutor’s docket control and scrutinized the
State’s reasons for how it exercised that control in this case. In any event, this line of
argument identifies only the opportunity for a prosecutor to intentionally delay. Langford
has not supplied the clear and convincing evidence necessary to rebut the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s presumptively correct finding that the prosecutor in this case was, at
most, merely negligent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
As for the four-month delay, Langford similarly fails to make the required showing.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, based on its “review of the record” before it,
determined that the four-month delay was “the product of Langford’s efforts” to persuade
Alvin not to testify. Langford, 735 S.E.2d at 483; see also id. at 484. That record included
the trial court’s findings on the motion to dismiss and the transcript of the motion-todismiss hearing, where counsel explained that law enforcement moved Alvin to a different
prison after discovering that Langford and Bryan were pressuring him not to testify. It
included Alvin’s signed statements retracting the portions of his original statement to
police that implicated his co-conspirators. It included Alvin’s trial testimony that the
retracting statements were false and written by Langford, who told him to sign them so no
one would be in trouble. And it included trial testimony from Investigator Young that he
moved Alvin to a different jail based on tips that “he was being intimidated and influenced
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into not testifying against his co-defendants.” J.A. 865 (“He was the only one cooperating
at the time and he was the youngest and . . . vulnerable[] . . . .”). This “evidence presented
in the State court proceeding” supported the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
determination that Langford caused the additional four-month delay. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). But more importantly, under AEDPA the burden was on Langford to rebut
the state court’s factual findings by clear and convincing evidence—not, as Langford
would have it, on the State to prove that those findings were supported. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). Langford has not carried his burden.
Viewed with the deference AEDPA demands, the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
decision was not an unreasonable application of the United States Supreme Court’s speedy
trial precedents nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in state court. Langford’s speedy trial claim, therefore, cannot be the
basis for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B.
We turn now to Langford’s second claim for habeas relief: ineffective assistance of
counsel. In Langford’s view, Investigator Young’s testimony that Stevens gave him three
names—Alvin, Bryan, and Langford—was hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Langford claims that his
attorney should have objected to this testimony and that failure to do so was such a serious
error that his attorney was no longer “functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the
Sixth Amendment” and the result of his trial is not reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
see U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
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. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”). The state PCR court considered
and rejected this claim.
The requirements for proving ineffective assistance of counsel are articulated in
Strickland v. Washington. First, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. When reviewing
counsel’s performance, a court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. That
presumption requires us “not simply to give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt, but to
affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons . . . counsel may have had for
proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a defendant must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different”
absent counsel’s deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “That requires a
‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Pinholster, 563 U.S.
at 189 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 112).
AEDPA requires that we review Langford’s Strickland claim through “an additional
layer” of deference. Owens v. Stirling, 967 F.3d 396, 411 (4th Cir. 2020). Applying the
“highly deferential” standards of AEDPA and Strickland in tandem, our question “is not
whether counsel’s actions were reasonable” but “whether there is any reasonable argument
that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Like the speedy trial standard discussed above, “‘the Strickland
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standard is a general standard’”; therefore, “‘a state court has even more latitude to
reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.’” Shinn v. Kayer,
141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).
Thus, while “‘[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,’ it is ‘all the more
difficult’ to establish ‘that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable . . .
under § 2254(d).’” Owens, 967 F.3d at 411 (alterations in original) (quoting Morva v.
Zook, 821 F.3d 517, 528 (4th Cir. 2016)).
Applying Strickland, the PCR court held that Langford had failed to prove counsel’s
performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced thereby because Investigator Young’s
testimony was not hearsay. As the PCR court explained, Langford’s co-defendant Bryan
elicited Investigator Young’s testimony “to present the jury information about how the
investigation ended up focusing on [the defendants],” in particular, “to show [that] an
alleged informant who had a pending legal problem called [Investigator Young] and
offered information on [Langford] and his co-defendants.” J.A. 1360. Quoting a decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the PCR court reasoned that “‘an out of court
statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a
government investigation was undertaken.’” J.A. 1360 (alteration omitted) (quoting
Brown, 451 S.E.2d at 894). Because Bryan introduced Investigator Young’s testimony
about Stevens’s statement for that purpose, it was not hearsay and therefore not
objectionable on that ground.
The PCR court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland, for
multiple independent reasons. To begin with, whether the relevant portion of Investigator
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Young’s testimony was hearsay is not beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” S.C. R. Evid.
801(c). An out-of-court statement that is not offered for the truth but instead for the limited
purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken is not hearsay.
Brown, 451 S.E.2d at 894. Investigator Young testified that the robbery investigation did
not make headway for weeks until Stevens, an acquaintance with a bench warrant, called
him out of the blue and volunteered the suspects’ names. That testimony was not solicited
by the State but by Langford’s co-defendant in an effort to show that police focused on the
defendants only because of an unsolicited tip from an informant with something to gain by
currying favor with law enforcement. It is not beyond the realm of reasonable
disagreement to conclude, as the PCR court did, that Bryan’s counsel offered the testimony
not for the truth of Stevens’s tip but rather to cast doubt on the veracity of the tip and the
integrity of the investigation as a whole.
Even if the testimony was hearsay, a court could reasonably conclude that counsel’s
decision not to object nevertheless fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 196 (requiring courts
to “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons . . . counsel may have had for
proceeding as they did” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is an “objective” inquiry
that does not depend on counsel’s “subjective state of mind.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 110.
Langford’s counsel could have reasonably expected that Bryan’s attorney was not eliciting
the testimony for the truth of Stevens’s accusation, because such a use would implicate his
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own client (along with Langford). Counsel could have strategically withheld an objection
to avoid thwarting a co-defendant’s attempt to cast doubt on the State’s investigation, even
if a step in that line of questioning elicited potentially damaging hearsay. Counsel could
have reasonably thought that giving the jury a reason to question the informant’s reliability
was a decent way to create reasonable doubt, even at the price of revealing the informant’s
accusation. Indeed, Langford’s attorney furthered this defense theory on crossexamination by confirming with Investigator Young that Stevens had “had some trouble
with the law.” J.A. 866. Because there is at least a “reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” the PCR court’s conclusion that counsel was
not deficient cannot be unreasonable. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105; see also Valentino v.
Clarke, 972 F.3d 560, 581 (4th Cir. 2020) (petitioner must show “that no fair-minded jurist
could find one of those reasons to be sound trial strategy”).
Moreover, even if the testimony was hearsay and competent counsel would have
objected, resulting in exclusion of the evidence, fairminded jurists could still disagree about
whether Langford’s claim fails on Strickland’s prejudice prong. In making this
determination, a court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. As the South Carolina courts recognized, the State’s “star
witness” was Alvin, and the verdict depended largely on whether the jury believed him.
Langford, 735 S.E.2d at 483 n.9. Alvin admitted his own significant role in the armed
robbery and testified in detail about Langford’s participation with him in the crime. Among
other things, Alvin testified that Langford participated in holding the victims at gunpoint,
that Langford stole the bag of cash from inside the home, and that Langford took a portion
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of the money for himself. Other evidence corroborated Alvin’s account. The victims’
testimony was consistent with his version of events. And Officer Strom corroborated
Alvin’s testimony that immediately following the robbery, he rode in a car with his sister,
his mother, and Langford, and that an officer stopped the car to check Langford’s
identification. Further, the jury already knew from Investigator Robinson’s testimony that
Stevens’s tip had led investigators to interview Alvin. Langford’s only contention is that,
had counsel objected, the trial court would have excluded Investigator Young’s testimony
that Stevens’s tip named Alvin, Bryan, and Langford. Considering the totality of the
evidence, however, it was not “necessarily unreasonable” for the PCR court to conclude
that Langford “had failed to show a ‘substantial’ likelihood” that the jury would have
returned a different verdict had Investigator Young’s testimony been excluded. Pinholster,
563 U.S. at 202 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 112); see also Mays v. Hines, 141 S. Ct. 1145,
1149 (2021).
Langford’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Like the district court and
the magistrate judge, he calls Investigator Young’s testimony “double hearsay” without
any analysis. That characterization comes from the state court that considered codefendant Bryan’s application for postconviction relief. The court there remarked that, had
the State offered the testimony, it “would have been double hearsay,” but it “was allowed
in evidence only because [Bryan’s counsel] offered it.” 3 J.A. 102. That observation says
3
Investigator Young reporting Stevens’s out-of-court statement would be one layer
of hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The trial evidence did not suggest
a second layer of hearsay, although in this Court the parties speculate that Stevens received
his information from another person.
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nothing about whether the testimony, as actually presented at trial, was hearsay, much less
whether Langford’s counsel was constitutionally deficient for not objecting to it. And it
does not disturb the conclusion that fairminded jurists could disagree on all of this, which
is the determinative question for AEDPA purposes.
Langford also argues that, in all this talk about hearsay, the warden managed to
waive any response to Langford’s claim that Investigator Young’s testimony was also
objectionable as a Confrontation Clause violation. Not so. The warden has consistently
asserted that “there were no grounds to object” to the testimony at trial because it was not
offered for the truth. J.A. 2055. That summarizes the warden’s argument as to hearsay
and the Confrontation Clause, because a statement “‘must be hearsay (‘for the truth’)’” to
implicate the Confrontation Clause at all. United States v. Seward, 135 F.4th 161, 169 (4th
Cir. 2025) (quoting Smith v. Arizona, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 1801 (2024)); see Smith, 144 S. Ct.
at 1792 (“The Clause’s prohibition applies only to testimonial hearsay.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). “When a statement is admitted for a reason unrelated to its truth, . . . the
Clause[] . . . is not implicated.” Smith, 144 S. Ct. at 1792. The warden’s hearsay-based
response preserved his Confrontation Clause argument too. And all of our conclusions
about a hearsay objection apply equally to an objection on Confrontation Clause grounds.
It was not unreasonable for the PCR court to find that Langford had not proven ineffective
assistance of counsel in either regard.
The district court reached a contrary conclusion by proceeding “in a manner
fundamentally inconsistent with AEDPA.” Kayer, 141 S. Ct. at 523. The district court
reasoned that Investigator Young’s testimony about Stevens’s tip was in fact hearsay and
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a Confrontation Clause violation, “[t]herefore, the PCR court’s holding” that trial counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object “is unreasonable.” Langford, 2024 WL 4542342,
at *12; see also Langford, 2024 WL 4309519, at *26. Likewise with prejudice: the district
court determined for itself that “the statements were prejudicial” and so “granted [the
petition] as to this Ground,” without bothering to ask whether any fairminded jurist could
disagree with that conclusion. Langford, 2024 WL 4542342, at *13; see also Langford,
2024 WL 4309519, at *26.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished federal courts for this
practice of “‘essentially evaluat[ing] the merits de novo, only tacking on a perfunctory
statement at the end of [their] analysis asserting that the state court’s decision was
unreasonable.’” Kayer, 141 S. Ct. at 523 (quoting Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961,
968 (2018) (per curiam)); see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 102–103 (“[H]abeas corpus is . . .
not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”). We reiterate: “All that
matter[s]” for AEDPA review of a Strickland claim is “whether the [state] court,
notwithstanding its substantial ‘latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not
[satisfied Strickland’s standard],’ still managed to blunder so badly that every fairminded
jurist would disagree.” Hines, 141 S. Ct. at 1149 (quoting Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 123).
Because the PCR court did not, its decision was not unreasonable. Therefore, habeas
corpus relief may “not be granted with respect to” Langford’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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III.
The district court erred in granting Langford the writ of habeas corpus on his speedy
trial claim and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. South Carolina courts
adjudicated both of those claims on the merits, and their decisions did not involve an
unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the writ of habeas corpus is reversed.
REVERSED
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