In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-26-00103-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF W.E.
On Appeal from the 279th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24DCFM1398
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother and Father appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to
their eighteen-month-old daughter, W.E. The trial court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for the termination of Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights and that termination of their parental rights would be in
the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (I),
(N), (O).
Mother’s and Father’s court-ordered attorneys submitted briefs in which both
attorneys conclude that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeals
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are frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161
S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures
apply in parental-right termination cases). The briefs present the attorneys’
professional evaluation of the record and explain why no arguable grounds exist to
overturn the trial court’s judgment. Both attorneys filed a letter with this court
indicating that they sent Mother and Father a copy of the Anders brief they filed,
notified both parents of their right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother and
Father a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother and Father of their
right to file a pro se response and of the deadline for doing so. Neither Mother nor
Father filed a response with the Court.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the briefs filed by
Mother’s and Father’s court-appointed attorneys. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2009, no pet.). Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably
support an appeal, and we agree that the appeals are frivolous and lack merit. See
Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating
in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record
for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619.
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Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief
the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights. We deny the motions to withdraw filed by Mother’s and Father’s courtappointed appellate attorneys because the right to counsel in suits seeking the
termination of parental rights extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all
appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016). Accordingly, the obligation of Mother’s counsel to Mother and the
obligation of Father’s counsel to Father have not been discharged. See In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27. Should Mother or Father decide to pursue an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Texas, their respective counsel’s obligation can be met “by filing
a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-28.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on June 17, 2026
Opinion Delivered June 25, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
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