In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00282-CR
MICHAEL WAYNE STOWE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23-11-17350-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael Wayne Stowe (“Stowe”) appeals his conviction for assault
family violence with a previous conviction, a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2)(A). In his sole issue, Stowe complains the trial court erred
by admitting extraneous-offense evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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BACKGROUND
The grand jury indictment alleges that on or about January 19, 2023, Stowe:
did then and there intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily
injury to [Brandy], a member of the defendant’s family or a member of
the defendant’s household or a person with whom the defendant has or
has had a dating relationship . . . by hitting and striking [Brandy] with
defendant’s arm, elbow, hand and extension thereof.1
The indictment further alleges that before the commission of the alleged offense,
Stowe was convicted of the offense of assault causing bodily injury to a family
member. The indictment includes two enhancement paragraphs which allege that
before Stowe committed the alleged offense on or about January 19, 2023, Stowe
was finally convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance in 2017, and
prior to that Stowe was finally convicted of felony delivery of a controlled substance
in 1998, and that both felonies became final before he committed the alleged offense.
The State filed a Notice of Intent to Use Prior Conviction for Enhancement Purposes,
including Stowe’s prior convictions for manufacture or delivery of a controlled
substance and violation of bond or a protective order assault/stalking.
The trial court granted Stowe’s Motion in Limine regarding extraneous
offenses and ordered the State to advise the court before eliciting evidence of
1
We use pseudonyms to refer to the victim and her friends to protect the victim’s privacy. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
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extraneous offenses except for the prior assault offense alleged in the indictment.
The State advised the trial court that when Stowe pleaded guilty to the prior assault,
he also pleaded guilty to violation of a protective order, and the State intended to
offer evidence that Stowe violated a court order not to be around Brandy. The State
understood that it could only use the words “parole,” “prison,” or “conviction” when
referring to the prior assault which was a strangulation. Stowe stipulated to the prior
assault. When the State argued that there was no legal authority to keep out Stowe’s
conviction for violation of a protective order, Stowe argued “[i]t’s just conformity.”
The State argued it was not conformity because “[i]t goes to the very nature of the
relationship[,]” which also included offering evidence that the prior instances of
violence included Stowe’s use of alcohol and drugs.
The trial court allowed the State to offer evidence that a court order prohibited
any contact with Brandy but not evidence that Stowe had a conviction or was on
parole. The trial court explained that article 38.371 allowed the State to show the
nature of the relationship, and the State agreed. Stowe argued that such evidence was
only admissible to rebut a defensive theory. The trial court added that Brandy had
recanted and filed an affidavit of nonprosecution and it believed that evidence of
Stowe’s and Brandy’s prior assaultive relationship would probably be admissible to
show why she recanted and filed the affidavit. The trial court noted it would consider
the issue again after hearing evidence, and if Brandy appeared and testified, it would
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allow such evidence to come in. The trial court allowed the State to discuss the
abusive nature of the relationship during opening argument but not the specifics. The
trial court denied the Motion in Limine concerning the relationship between Stowe
and Brandy and overruled Stowe’s objection, finding that the evidence was relevant
and went to the proof.
During the jury trial, Chris, Brandy’s friend and ex-husband, explained that
Brandy told him she was married to Stowe. Chris testified that on January 19, 2023,
he received a distressed call from Brandy, who asked him to pick her up at a gas
station because she “was beat up[.]” Chris knew that Brandy and Stowe had been
arguing and involved in an altercation because Brandy told him that Stowe ‘was
beating her up and that she needed help.” Chris called the police at Brandy’s request
and observed Brandy’s face was red, she had fresh marks on her neck, and she could
not walk well. Chris testified that Stowe walked into the woods before the police
arrived. Chris provided a written statement to the police. Chris believed that both
Stowe and Brandy were intoxicated. Brandy told Chris that she was afraid of Stowe
all the time, and Chris had observed Stowe and Brandy argue on a prior occasion
and remembered they had arguments.
Deputy Trevor Buckley Rivers (“Rivers”) with the Montgomery County
Sheriff’s Office testified that on January 19, 2023, he responded to two calls
reporting a man and woman were arguing at a gas station and that the woman had
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been assaulted. Rivers explained he was unable to locate the suspect, who had left
on foot. Rivers photographed the scene and Brandy, who appeared beaten,
distressed, belligerent, and intoxicated; was verbally noncompliant; and reported
that she feared reprisal and would face consequences from Stowe if she cooperated
with the police. Brandy told Rivers that Stowe struck her in the face twice while she
was driving, and she pulled into the gas station, where the assault continued. Brandy
also reported that she felt pain from being strangled and grabbed by the neck, and
that Stowe had strangled her multiple times in the past. Stowe threatened to kill
Brandy and her family. Rivers testified that Brandy was extremely fearful and
traumatized and had swelling to the left side of her face, bruising on her neck, and
cuts on her nose and chin, which were typical signs of domestic violence victims.
Detective Rogelio Vargas with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office
testified that he was assigned to Stowe’s family violence case and reviewed the
offense report and other evidence but was unable to contact Brandy. Vargas testified
that the video from the gas station showed the physical altercation between Brandy
and Stowe. When Defense counsel asked Vargas if he attempted to contact Stowe,
Vargas stated that he did not and did not remember if he had Stowe’s phone number.
Defense counsel then showed Vargas the offense report, which included a phone
number for Stowe, and Vargas agreed he had access to the report. Defense counsel
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asked Vargas if he filed a charge without ever speaking to a living witness, and
Vargas answered, “Yes.”
After defense counsel passed the witness, the trial court conducted a bench
conference, during which the State argued that the portion of the offense report that
defense counsel referenced concerned Vargas contacting Stowe’s parole officer to
get Stowe’s contact information. The State argued that by attempting to establish
that contact had been an issue, defense counsel opened the door to testimony that
Vargas had tried to contact Stowe through his parole officer. When defense counsel
explained that she only asked if Vargas called the phone number included in the
offense report, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to testimony that
Vargas contacted Stowe’s parole officer to get Stowe’s contact information, because
defense counsel implied that Vargas did not do anything else to contact Stowe. After
Vargas’s memory was refreshed with the offense report, Vargas testified that when
he contacted Stowe’s parole officer to determine Stowe’s whereabouts, he learned
that Stowe only checked in by phone.
Investigator Francisco Saavedra with the Montgomery County District
Attorney’s Office testified that he is assigned to the Domestic Violence Division.
Saavedra explained that his duties included retrieving phone calls between inmates
and other people outside the jail that are managed by the Montgomery County
Sheriff’s Office. Saavedra retrieved calls Stowe made to Brandy and determined that
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Stowe attempted to place 1,935 calls to Brandy and completed 631 of those calls.
Saavedra listened to some of the calls to monitor whether Brandy was being
threatened or coerced. Saavedra listened to calls Stowe made to multiple people to
try to get those people to contact Brandy and tell her Stowe needed to talk to her.
Stowe told one of the people that the end goal was to have Brandy sign a
nonprosecution affidavit and recant. During a call Stowe made to Brandy, Brandy
confronted Stowe about trying to claim self-defense and told him he needed to tell
the truth. After having trouble, Saavedra located Brandy, who appeared at his office
after she had signed an affidavit of nonprosecution and disappeared. Saavedra was
aware that Brandy had given conflicting statements, but he never heard Brandy
admit she was lying during any of the calls he listened to.
Saavedra testified that a court order was issued February 17, 2023, ordering
Stowe to have no contact with Brandy, and that Stowe violated that order by
contacting Brandy. Saavedra also testified that Stowe had stipulated that on February
1, 2021, he had pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of assault causing bodily
injury to a family member.
After Brandy testified and explained that she and Stowe had been married
twice, the trial court conducted a bench conference, during which the State informed
the trial court that it intended to question Brandy about the abusive nature of her
relationship with Stowe. The State explained that it intended to question Brandy
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about three specific events, which included a 2021 and 2022 violation of a protective
order, and a strangulation charge. Stowe objected to the admission of prior
extraneous offenses and noted that he had stipulated to the prior assault conviction
alleged in the indictment. The trial court explained that the testimony about an
affidavit of nonprosecution and cross-examination about Brandy changing her story
had changed things, so the trial court allowed the State to offer testimony about the
abusive nature of Brandy’s relationship with Stowe and how Brandy felt
uncomfortable or fearful.
The State also argued that it should be allowed to offer evidence about the
underlying facts of the prior assault conviction alleged in the indictment despite
Stowe’s stipulation because it goes to the very nature of the relationship and rebuts
a defensive theory and fabrication. The State explained that Stowe was arrested for
violating a protective order involving Brandy and that in 2021, Stowe was charged
with strangulation and another violation of a protective order. The trial court agreed
that the theory of fabrication and a theory that Brandy had changed her story had
been raised by the evidence. The trial court explained that due to the crossexamination and Brandy filing an affidavit of nonprosecution, it would allow the
State to “get into it.”
Brandy testified that over time, her relationship with Stowe changed due to
Stowe using steroids and becoming verbally and physically aggressive. Brandy
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explained that she knew Stowe had past issues with drugs and tried to get him help,
but the abuse continued. Brandy did not report the abuse because she did not want
Stowe to get into trouble. Brandy testified that Stowe violated a 2020 protective
order by frequenting her house all the time. Brandy explained that in 2021, there was
an active protective order in place when she and Stowe had an argument and Stowe
was charged with strangulation. At that point, Brandy began to distrust the police
because Stowe was in jail for a year but continued to locate her that entire time.
Brandy felt like she could not get away from Stowe and feared his being released
from jail, and she felt pressure to stay with Stowe because of the children.
Concerning the current offense that occurred in January 2023, which took
place after Stowe was released for the 2021 incident, Brandy testified that she and
Stowe had been drinking with friends when they argued in the car and Stowe wanted
to “get high[.]” Brandy explained that after Stowe hit her on the right side of her face
with his fist, she pulled into the gas station where Stowe kept hitting her and put his
hands around her neck. Stowe told Brandy he wanted to kill her and burn the house
down with Brandy’s daughter inside. Brandy explained that the reason she was seen
following Stowe and pulling on his shirt in the video from the gas station was
because she was trying to keep Stowe from walking away from the gas station
because she “just knew what would happen once he left.” Brandy called her cousin
and Chris for help because she believed she was going to die, and she was worried
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Stowe would hurt her daughter if he left. Brandy did not initially ask Chris to call
the police because they had never helped her in the past and it just caused chaos, but
after Chris arrived, she asked him to call the police because she had a witness, and
it was not just her word against Stowe. Brandy did not want to come to court to
testify against Stowe because she was worried about her daughter.
Brandy testified she was intoxicated when the police arrived at the gas station,
and she was angry and aggressive because the deputy did not treat her like a victim.
Brandy did not believe the police would do anything to help her and did not want to
give a written statement because she feared Stowe would use it against her. Brandy
received medical assistance at the scene and was given an ice pack for her face and
jaw, which still has pain. Brandy explained that she changed her phone number so
Stowe could not contact her, but Stowe had different people contact her on different
occasions. Brandy eventually talked to Stowe because of her daughter and offered
Stowe support, including paying for the jail calls, and Stowe asked her to sign an
affidavit of nonprosecution, which she filed. At that time, Brandy believed Stowe
wanted help and would change.
Brandy had been in contact with the district attorney’s office, and she admitted
that she had lied about the details of what happened because she wanted it to go
away and be done with it and never have to deal with it again. Brandy testified that
her testimony in court was not a lie, and she had changed her phone number and was
10
no longer talking to Stowe because she learned that Stowe had been lying to her to
get her to “do whatever he wanted me to so he could get out of jail.” Brandy
explained that she had intentionally made it hard for people to find her, but Chris
convinced her to appear at trial and tell the truth. Brandy testified that when Stowe
had someone contact her three days before trial, she changed her phone number and
felt like running again.
Brandy recalled talking to Stowe’s investigator and agreed that he had not
threatened her, but Brandy claimed Stowe had threatened her. Brandy explained that
Stowe sent her a letter with a printout of the affidavit and told her she “had to do it
or he would find a way to have others do that for him,” which meant that Brandy
“wouldn’t have a relationship with the kids or anything again.” Brandy agreed that
she sent emails to defense counsel asking when she could meet and what she could
do to have the charges dismissed, but she claimed she did so at Stowe’s requests,
which he made in a letter, over the phone, and in person. Brandy claimed that
Stowe’s investigator had the same printout Stowe sent her when she met the
investigator at his office and that “those words” in the affidavit of nonprosecution
saying she wanted the prosecution terminated and that no assault took place were
“not mine.” Brandy agreed that she swore that “those were my words[,]” and that
she gave the affidavit because she was asked to do so.
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Jade Farias, an EMS Captain with the Montgomery County Hospital District,
testified that she was the paramedic who treated Brandy at the gas station. Brandy
told Farias she had been in an altercation with her ex-husband while in the car, he
struck her seven times in the face with closed fists, and she fell to the ground three
to four times and hit her head. Brandy complained of pain to her left jaw and tailbone
area and had swelling to her left cheek, a contusion to her chin and left temple, and
abrasions on her neck. Brandy also reported being strangled. Brandy refused to be
transported to the hospital, and Farias explained that such refusal was common for
domestic violence victims. Farias recalled that Brandy reported that it was not the
first time this had happened with her ex-husband. Farias noted that Brandy admitted
she had used alcohol.
Amayramy Doss, a Victim’s Assistance Coordinator with the Montgomery
County District Attorney’s Office, testified that she was assigned to the Domestic
Violence Unit. Doss explained the cycle of violence and abuse seen in a family
violence relationship and the power and control a perpetrator may have over the
victim. Doss stated that victims may distrust law enforcement if they are unable to
receive the assistance they need. Doss explained that victims may struggle with
substance abuse and other issues which lead them to recant and have the charges
dismissed. Doss testified that a victim’s recanting or signing an affidavit of
prosecution does not mean the victim was lying about the incident because they may
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be doing it at the hands of somebody else. Doss explained that victims fear retaliation
if they cooperate with police and testify at trial.
Doss met with Brandy multiple times and explained that Brandy had trust
issues and had been inconsistent about whether she wanted the charges to be
dropped. Doss believed that Brandy’s inconsistency was based on her
communications with Stowe, because she was not cooperative and hard to contact
when Stowe had contacted her. Doss stated that she was not surprised when Brandy
told her she did not want to proceed with the charges and that she had lied, because
Brandy did not want to cooperate in a prior assault case. Doss could clearly see that
Brandy was fearful when she testified at trial and did not want to recount the events.
The defense called one of Brandy’s former friends, who testified that Brandy
did not have a “very highly[]” reputation among her friends for being truthful. The
defense also called its retained private investigator, Roy Underwood, who testified
that he recorded his interview with Brandy and assisted Brandy in completing and
signing her affidavit of nonprosecution. Underwood explained that during the
interview, Brandy was sincere about wanting to change her prior statement because
it was inaccurate, and Underwood was not concerned that Brandy had been coerced
or threatened to do so. Underwood agreed that the conditions of Stowe’s bond, which
were court ordered by the judge, included having no direct or indirect contact or
communication with Brandy while out on bond. Underwood was not aware of
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Stowe’s attempts to contact Brandy while he was in jail, and he stated that Brandy
signed the affidavit of nonprosecution ten days after Stowe contacted Brandy from
jail.
The jury found Stowe guilty of the offense of assault causing bodily injury to
a family member with a previous conviction as alleged in the indictment. During
punishment, the jury found that the two enhancement paragraphs were “true[,]” and
assessed Stowe’s punishment as a habitual offender at life in prison.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Stowe complains the trial court erred by admitting evidence
through Brandy regarding his abusive relationship history with Brandy, which
included three extraneous offenses between Stowe and Brandy, because the evidence
was offered to establish character conformity in violation of Rule 404(b). See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b); Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Specifically, Stowe
complains about the admission of testimony about a strangulation charge and
violations of a protective order in 2020 and 2021. Stowe also complains the trial
court erred by admitting extraneous-offense testimony from Detective Vargas
regarding his parole status. Stowe argues that Vargas’s testimony was not related to
a material issue and should not have been admitted because it informed the jury of
an extraneous offense that resulted in a prison sentence and being on parole. Stowe
argues that even if the extraneous-offense evidence was admissible under article
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38.371 or Rule 404(b), the trial court should not have admitted the evidence because
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403.
Relevant evidence is evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of
any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. Rule 404(b)
of the Texas Rules of Evidence limits character evidence, but it is nevertheless a rule
of inclusion. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). Rule 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of a crime,
wrong, or act solely to prove a person’s character to show that he acted in conformity
with that character on a particular occasion, but the rule allows for such evidence to
be admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Tex.
R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Those listed purposes “are neither mutually exclusive nor
collectively exhaustive.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343.
Article 38.371, which applies to family-violence prosecutions, provides
another non-character-conformity purpose for admitting extraneous-offense
evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371. Although the statute explicitly
prohibits the admission of character evidence that is otherwise prohibited by the
Rules of Evidence or other laws, it expressly allows “evidence of all relevant facts
15
and circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor
committed the offense . . ., including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of
the relationship” between the accused and the complainant. Id. art. 38.371(b), (c).
Thus, Article 38.371(b) expressly allows extraneous-offense evidence regarding the
nature of the relationship between an accused and a complainant. Mourning v. State,
No. 02-19-00168-CR, 2020 WL 6165309, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 22,
2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Franco v. State, No. 08-18-00040-CR, 2020 WL 3168560, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 15, 2020, no pet.)
(not designated for publication) (“[T]he Legislature has determined under article
38.371 that the nature of the relationship itself is a permissible, non-characterconformity purpose for which evidence is admissible.”) (citing Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b); Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); Fernandez v. State, 597 S.W.3d
546, 564-66 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. ref’d)).
The extraneous-offense evidence concerning the nature of his relationship that
was admitted during Brandy’s testimony was admissible under article 38.371(b) and
Rule 404(b) on that basis. The evidence, which reflected the volatile relationship and
prior domestic-violence incidents, gave the jury important insight into the abusive
nature of the relationship and revealed why Brandy was afraid to cooperate with the
State and testify at trial. See Baxter v. State, No. 02-22-00258-CR, 2023 WL
8268292, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 30, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
16
designated for publication). Thus, we hold the evidence was admissible for the same
reason the trial court ruled it admissible—it concerned the abusive nature of Stowe’s
and Brandy’s relationship, a purpose that is not character conformity. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371(b); Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); Fernandez, 597 S.W.3d at
564-66; Mourning, 2020 WL 6165309, at *4-5; Franco, 2020 WL 3168560, at *8.
The evidence also helped rebut Stowe’s defensive theory of fabrication and
questioning Brandy’s credibility and veracity. See Fillmore v. State, No. 03-22-00504-CR, 2024 WL 3586040, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 31, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
Stowe also complains the trial court erred by admitting extraneous-offense
testimony from Vargas regarding his parole status because the testimony was not
related to a material issue and informed the jury of an extraneous offense that
resulted in a prison sentence and being on parole. Stowe argues that while defense
counsel’s cross-examination sought to show Vargas did not investigate the offense,
the State could have rebutted defense counsel’s claim without identifying that
Vargas contacted Stowe’s parole officer. The State contends that Vargas’s testimony
rebutted Stowe’s defensive theory that Vargas’s investigation was inadequate, which
is one of the permissible purposes for the admission of relevant evidence under Rule
404(b).
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“Rebuttal of a defensive theory such as mistake . . . is also one of the
permissible purposes for which relevant evidence may be admitted under Rule
404(b).” Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see Tex. R.
Evid. 404(b); Burrell v. State, No. 02-18-00242-CR, 2019 WL 4048862, at **4-5
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citation omitted). Additionally, evidence offered by a party may be
admitted when the other party “opens the door” to the otherwise inadmissible
evidence. Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A party’s
attempt to leave the jury with a false impression effectively invites the response.
Hayden v. State, 296 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Here, the State argued that defense counsel opened the door to testimony that
Vargas tried to contact Stowe through his parole officer when defense counsel
attempted to establish that contact had been an issue. The trial court overruled
defense counsel’s objection to testimony that Vargas contacted Stowe’s parole
officer to get Stowe’s contact information, because defense counsel implied that
Vargas did not do anything else to contact Stowe. Based on this record, we conclude
the trial court could have reasonably determined that Vargas’s testimony about
contacting Stowe’s parole officer was offered for a non-conformity purpose under
Rule 404(b) to rebut the defensive theory that Vargas’s investigation was inadequate
because he did not speak with Stowe.
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Stowe also argues that even if the extraneous-offense evidence is admissible
under article 38.371 or Rule 404(b), Rule 403 precludes its admission. See Tex. R.
Evid. 403, 404(b); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.371(b). Evidence admissible
under Rule 404(b) may nevertheless be excluded under Rule 403 “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403; see Emich v. State, No. 02-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 311153, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant
evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence is more probative than
prejudicial. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 388-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
(op. on reh’g); Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citation
omitted); Emich, 2019 WL 311153, at *7. It is the burden of the party opposing the
admission of the evidence to overcome this presumption by showing that the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice or by the other dangers listed in Rule 403. Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661,
669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d); Sanders v. State, 255 S.W.3d 754,
760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d).
While Stowe complains the trial court erred by admitting the complained-of
evidence because the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence was
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substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and its admission affected
his substantial rights, the record does not reflect that Stowe made a Rule 403
objection at trial when the challenged extraneous-offense evidence was offered
during Brandy’s and Vargas’s testimony. Accordingly, we hold that Stowe failed to
preserve this complaint for our review on appeal. See Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d
687, 691-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003); Smith v. State, No. 09-17-00302-CR, 2019 WL 1270817, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Mar. 20, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
see also Tex. R. Evid. 403; Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
Having considered and overruled each of Stowe’s arguments, we overrule his
sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
JAY WRIGHT
Justice
Submitted on February 27, 2026
Opinion Delivered July 1, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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