USCA11 Case: 24-13814 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 07/06/2026 Page: 1 of 18
FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-13814
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
UNDER SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION,
DIRECTOR, ACCREDITATION GROUP,
OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13814
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-61188-JB
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRASHER and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
The question in this appeal is whether the Department of
Education may constitutionally rely on private educational accreditors in disbursing federal education funds. The Higher Education
Act requires that, for their students to be eligible for federal financial aid, colleges and universities must be accredited by a recognized accreditor. Accreditors are private, voluntary organizations
that are usually funded by the schools or programs that they accredit. The State of Florida says that, by requiring accreditation,
Congress and the Department of Education have unconstitutionally delegated governmental power to these private accreditors and
that the accreditors should be, but have not been, appointed as federal officers. Florida also says that the accreditation requirement is
an unascertainable, and therefore unconstitutional, condition attached to federal funds provided to States. After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument, we disagree. The accreditation requirement is neither a delegation of government
power nor an unascertainable condition. Because the district court
dismissed Florida’s suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, we affirm.
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I.
Accrediting agencies have been accrediting educational institutions and their programs since the late nineteenth century.
ALEXANDRA HEGJI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43826, AN OVERVIEW OF
ACCREDITATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2024). Their primary function was to provide an assurance of quality for postsecondary education institutions and programs. See id.
at 1–2. Accreditors are primarily funded by the schools and programs they accredit, and membership in an accrediting agency is
voluntary. Id. at 4.
When the federal government began funding higher education through the Higher Education Act, it incorporated accreditation. The main source of funding in the Higher Education Act is
federal student financial aid, such as Pell Grants and Direct Loans.
Id. at 1. Authorized in Title IV of the Act, federal student aid now
comprises billions of dollars per year. Id. To ensure that educational institutions that receive these Title IV dollars perform at a
minimum level of quality, Congress requires that they be accredited. Id. In fact, Congress has required accreditation as a condition
for federal financial aid eligibility since the 1952 GI Bill. See Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-550,
§ 253, 66 Stat. 663, 675 (first incorporation of private accreditors
into higher education funding); Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-329, §§ 302(c), 435(a), 441(3), 123(b)(1), 79 Stat. 1219,
1229, 1247–50 (expanding higher education funding). For an instiUSCA11 Case: 24-13814 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 07/06/2026 Page: 4 of 18
4 Opinion of the Court 24-13814
tution’s students to be eligible to receive Title IV financial aid today, educational institutions must be: (1) accredited, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(5); (2) authorized to provide a program of postsecondary
education within their states, id. § 1001(a)(2); and (3) certified by
the Department of Education as having satisfied these requirements as well as having administrative capability and financial responsibility, id. § 1099c(a). If institutions are eligible, students may
receive Title IV financial aid to spend at those institutions.
Accreditation will satisfy the statute only if the Department
of Education recognizes the accreditor. Id. § 1001(a)(5) (requiring
institutions to be accredited by “a nationally recognized accrediting
agency or association”). The Higher Education Act specifies several
broad requirements that accreditors must satisfy for the Department to recognize them. See id. § 1099b. These requirements include that a private accreditor must have “voluntary membership”;
“consistently appl[y] and enforce[]” accreditation standards “that
respect the stated mission of the institution of higher education”
and “ensure that the courses or programs” that the institution offers “are of sufficient quality to achieve” their stated objectives; and
have accreditation standards that assess each institution’s “success
with respect to student achievement,” curricula, faculty, fiscal
soundness, recruiting and admissions, program length, student
complaints, facilities, equipment, and supplies. Id. § 1099b(a)(2)–
(5).
Historically, the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools Commission on Colleges has served as the accreditor for
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Florida’s state colleges and universities. But the State of Florida has
not always had a smooth relationship with SACS. Over a decade
ago, Governor Rick Scott suggested that the president of Florida
A&M be suspended following a deadly hazing incident, but SACS
threatened to withhold Florida A&M’s accreditation if the university were to act under the Governor’s influence. Am. Council of
Trs. & Alumni, Florida Rising: An Assessment of Public Universities in
the Sunshine State 39 (June 2013), https://www.goacta.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/florida_rising.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XXS-RP8B]. SACS later said that it was launching an inquiry into Governor Scott’s meeting with a prospective
candidate to replace the incumbent president at the University of
Florida. Tia Mitchell, Gov. Rick Scott’s involvement in UF president decision under review, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 18,
2013), https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/college/gov-rick-scotts-involvement-in-uf-president-decision-underreview/1271239/ [https://perma.cc/5KE8-TBEM]. And recently,
SACS threatened to revoke Florida State University’s accreditation
because the Florida Board of Governors considered appointing the
Florida Commissioner of Education as its next president, and SACS
hinted that “some of the candidates” being considered (such as the
Commissioner) lacked “appropriate experience and qualifications.”
Letter to Sydney Kitson, Chair, Fla. Bd. of Governors, from Belle
S. Wheelan, President, SACS (May 13, 2021),
https://www.scribd.com/document/508024434/SACS-Letter-toSydney-Kitson [https://perma.cc/XC2R-6FTU]; Divya Kumar,
Richard Corcoran out of FSU presidential search; three academics move
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on, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 15, 2021), https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/2021/05/15/richard-corcoran-out-offsu-presidential-search-three-academics-move-forward/
[https://perma.cc/GA5F-WEMH].
Until recently, a college or university was assigned an institutional accreditor based on its geographic region. But in 2019, the
Department of Education revised its regulations to permit institutions to switch to an accreditor outside their region. See The Secretary’s Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, 84 Fed. Reg. 58,834, 58,893
(Nov. 1, 2019) (explaining that the regulations removed “geographic area of accrediting activities” from the definition of “scope
of recognition or scope”). Florida’s legislature took advantage of
this regulatory revision and passed a law directing its public colleges and universities to switch to an accreditor that the Florida
Board of Governors or State Board of Education had approved.
FLA. STAT. § 1008.47(2)(a) (2023).
Florida has now sued the Secretary of Education and several
Department of Education officials, maintaining that the accreditation requirement is unconstitutional. Florida brought four claims:
a private nondelegation doctrine challenge, an Appointments
Clause challenge, a Spending Clause challenge, and a now-abandoned Administrative Procedure Act challenge. The federal government moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court explained that there was no private nondelegation issue because accreditation is not a legislative function,
the government maintains ultimate decision-making authority
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over Title IV funds, and accreditors are not promulgating generally
applicable rules. The court added that the Spending Clause claim
was meritless because Title IV funds go to students and not institutions, and in any event, the accreditation requirement is unambiguous and not overly coercive. And the court dismissed the Appointments Clause claim because accreditors do not determine eligibility for Title IV funds.
Florida timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Simone v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 156 F.4th
1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. at 1216. We also review
constitutional questions de novo. United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d
1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992).
III.
Florida argues that the district court should not have dismissed its constitutional claims. Those claims identify two alleged
infirmities in the Department of Education’s reliance on accreditors. First, in Florida’s view, these private accreditors exercise governmental power by determining eligibility for Title IV funding. If
that’s so, Florida says it creates related constitutional problems.
There would be an Article I delegation-of-power problem because
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the statute delegates that authority without sufficient supervision.
And, along the same lines, there would be an Appointments Clause
problem because these accreditors have not been properly appointed to act as federal officers. Second, even if the accreditors are
not exercising governmental power, Florida says that the condition
requiring accreditation is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause power because it is unascertainable. Florida argues that colleges and universities can never really know
what they must do to satisfy a private accreditor, so the condition
requiring accreditation is too uncertain to be constitutional.
We will address each issue in turn. We ultimately agree with
the Department of Education that private accreditors are not exercising governmental authority—so there is no constitutional infirmity with the delegation of such authority or the failure to appoint
accreditors as executive branch officers. We also think that the accreditation requirement is an ascertainable condition that Congress
may attach to federal funds.
A.
We begin with Florida’s nondelegation and Appointments
Clause theories, which are two sides of the same coin. Florida says
that the law unconstitutionally delegates to private accreditors the
government’s authority to decide who is eligible for Title IV funds
(nondelegation), and, if accreditors want to perform the task, they
must be properly appointed as executive branch officers (Appointments Clause). We will unpack each theory, but the bottom line is
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the same: both theories fail because, under the statutory scheme at
issue here, accreditors are not exercising government authority.
1.
Let’s start with Florida’s nondelegation theory—that accreditors are exercising government power that properly belongs to the
legislative or executive branches. Generally, the government cannot delegate legislative, executive, or judicial authority to private
parties. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding that “legislative delegation” and regulatory delegation to private parties is unconstitutional). The Article I, II, and III Vesting
Clauses vest “legislative Powers,” “[t]he executive Power,” and
“[t]he judicial Power” in Congress, the President, and the federal
judiciary, respectively. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id.
art. III, § 1. The vesting of these three powers is exclusive, meaning
that the three branches cannot give away their power. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (explaining that Congress may not “transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested”). At a minimum, the
Vesting Clauses prevent the delegation of power to a private party
to the same degree they prevent the delegation of one branch’s
power to a government actor in another branch. See Oklahoma v.
United States, 163 F.4th 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “unchecked delegations to private entities violate core separation-ofpower guarantees”); Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 394
(4th Cir. 2004) (similar); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575
U.S. 43, 87–88 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the
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private nondelegation doctrine “flows logically from the three
Vesting Clauses”); Consumers’ Rsch., Cause Based Com., Inc. v. Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, 88 F.4th 917, 935 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J.,
concurring) (writing that the private nondelegation doctrine flows
from structural Vesting Clause concerns).
Of course, the delegation of government authority to a private party raises Due Process concerns as well. Private parties may
be more likely than government actors to be self-interested or to
act arbitrarily. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. But States like Florida
do not have Due Process rights. The Due Process Clauses protect
“person[s]” against the government, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV,
not the States against the federal government. Cf. Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (explaining
that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a limitation on the
State’s power to act”). For that reason, Florida has wisely conceded
away any private nondelegation theory that depends on the Due
Process Clause.
Florida has a similar Appointments Clause theory, arguing
that accreditors are wielding executive power without having been
appointed to be executive officers. The Appointments Clause provides that all “Officers of the United States” must be appointed in a
specific way depending on whether they are principal or inferior
officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But for the Appointments
Clause to apply at all, the person or entity in question must exercise
significant government authority, Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.
651, 662 (1997), and occupy an office that is “established by Law,”
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Significant authority can include promulgating rules, adjudicating public rights, or determining eligibility
for funds or elected office. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 (1976)
(holding that the Federal Election Commission exercised significant government authority through “rulemaking, advisory opinions, and determinations of eligibility for funds and even for federal
elective office itself”). Significant authority also includes taking testimony, conducting trials, ruling on admissibility of evidence, and
enforcing compliance with discovery orders. Freytag v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991); Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S.
237, 248 (2018).
2.
The problem for Florida’s theories is that accreditors do not
exercise the kind of government authority that could violate the
Vesting Clauses or the Appointments Clause. Florida asserts that
accreditors exercise government power in the form of legislative
rule-setting power and executive decision-making power. But a
wall of precedent establishes that accreditors exercise neither kind
of authority.
To begin with, private educational accreditors preexisted
the Higher Education Act. Their power to accredit comes not from
the federal government, but from their member institutions who
voluntarily submit to their authority and by-laws. See North Dakota
v. N. Cent. Ass’n of Colls. & Secondary Schs., 99 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir.
1938) (explaining that membership in an accrediting agency is
“purely voluntary”); HEGJI, supra, at 4 (explaining that institutions
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voluntarily submit to accreditation). Private accreditors do not rely
on any delegation of government power to do what they have always done: accredit their member educational institutions.
Even though accreditation has a bearing on eligibility for Title IV funding, this connection does not mean that accreditors are
exercising Congress’s spending power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
States routinely rely on similar, privately controlled institutions to
make decisions about who is qualified to receive a license or benefit. For example, many States (including Florida) require applicants
for certain professional licenses to have graduated from an accredited program or institution. 1 Courts have explained that, even
1 See, e.g., Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir.
2015) (recognizing that Florida requires applicants for licenses to work as certified registered nurse anesthetists to have graduated from an accredited program and be certified by a private organization (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 458.3475,
459.023)); McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 24
F.3d 519, 520–21 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that Pennsylvania will only recognize the education or degrees obtained from accredited medical residency programs (citing 63 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 422.2, 422.23(c))); ALA. CODE § 34-39-8(1)
(2026) (requiring applicants for an occupational therapy license to have completed an accredited program); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-205-108(1)(a)–(b) (2020)
(requiring applicants for an athletic training license to have earned a degree
from an accredited college or university and completed an accredited program); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-10 (2026) (requiring certain applicants for medical licensure to have graduated from an accredited medical school or program); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2817(1)(a) (2025) (requiring certain applicants
for a professional engineering license to have graduated from an accredited
program); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-11-71(a) (2026) (requiring dental hygienists to
have graduated from an accredited program); LA. STAT. ANN. §
37:2805(B)(1)(d) (2023) (requiring applicants for a chiropractic license to have USCA11 Case: 24-13814 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 07/06/2026 Page: 13 of 18
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though private accreditors play a significant role in state licensure
requirements, accreditors performing these roles are not state actors. See, e.g., McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate
Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that an accreditor did not perform state action even though Pennsylvania only
recognized degrees from accredited programs); cf. Sanjuan v. Am.
Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a private medical Board was not a state actor even
though “states make certification by the Board a prerequisite for
some public positions”).
graduated from an accredited college or university and an accredited chiropractic school); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 13-303(a)(1) (2020) (requiring
certain applicants for a physical therapy license to have graduated from an approved or accredited program); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 23I(b) (1982)
(requiring certain applicants for a physical therapy license to have graduated
from an accredited program); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-31-13(d) (2025) (requiring
applicants for a psychologist’s license to hold a doctoral degree in psychology
from an accredited or authorized institution of higher education); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. 4741.11 (2016) (requiring certain applicants for veterinary licenses
to have graduated from an approved or accredited veterinary college); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-33-36(D)(1)(d), (E)(1) (2021) (requiring applicants for a graduate nurse license to complete an accredited basic nursing education program
within one year of seeking licensure); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-4-108(1) (2026)
(requiring applicants for chiropractic licenses to have graduated an accredited
or approved chiropractic college); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 605.252(b)(1) (2017)
(requiring that applicants for an orthotics or prosthetics license hold a degree
from an accredited program or a program with equivalent standards); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2709(B)(ii) (2017) (requiring that applicants for a dentistry
license have graduated from an accredited dental school or department). USCA11 Case: 24-13814 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 07/06/2026 Page: 14 of 18
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In assessing similar arguments, we have also explained that
Congress’s decision to use private accreditation as a signal of institutional quality does not transform accreditors into government
actors. Despite the important role that private accreditation plays
in eligibility, the Department of Education “has never delegated to
[private accreditors] its authority to terminate federal funds.” Hiwassee Coll., Inc. v. S. Ass’n of Colls. & Schs., 531 F.3d 1333, 1335 &
n.3 (11th Cir. 2008). As they have done for over a century, accreditors decide whether to accredit (a private decision), and the federal
government decides whether to fund (a government decision). See
Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Trade & Tech. Schs., 817 F.2d 1310,
1313 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that accreditation decisions are
“not attributable to the federal government,” but are “private actions to which the government responds”); Pro. Massage Training
Ctr., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs. & Colls., 781 F.3d 161,
169 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Accreditation agencies are private entities, not
state actors . . . .”).
In a similar vein, our sister circuits have recognized that a
funding condition that amounts to a “legitimate request[] for input” from a private organization is not a delegation of government
authority. State v. Rettig, 987 F.3d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 2021); see also
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating
the general rule). Accordingly, the federal government may condition approval on a private party’s certification if there is “a reasonable connection between the outside entity’s decision and the federal agency’s determination.” See Rettig, 987 F.3d at 531 (quoting
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 567). We agree. And, here, there is
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really no debate that the accreditation requirement is reasonable.
It is obviously connected to Congress’s goal that federal student aid
flow to high quality institutions. The history of private accreditation underscores the reasonableness of relying on that kind of
preexisting practice.
Finally, private accreditors are not executive officers because
they do not exercise any functions recognized as significant government authority, nor do they occupy an office that was “established by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Unlike the rulemaking,
advisory opinions, and eligibility determinations of the Federal
Election Commission in Buckley, see 424 U.S. at 140–41, accreditors’
standards and decisions are not generally applicable. Their accreditation decisions apply to a single institution, and their standards
apply to a discrete number of voluntary member institutions. Private accreditors also do not adjudicate public rights or perform
classic government functions. Unlike in Freytag and Lucia, accreditors do not conduct trials, take testimony, rule on admissibility of
evidence, or enforce compliance with discovery orders. See Freytag,
501 U.S. at 881–82; Lucia, 585 U.S. at 247. Moreover, private accreditors preexisted the Higher Education Act and continue to perform
the same function they always have. They therefore do not occupy
an office “established by Law,” which is required to trigger the Appointments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
In short, Congress’s decision to use private accreditation as
a signal of institutional quality does not delegate legislative or executive power or require accreditors’ appointment as executive
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branch officers. Because accreditors are not exercising legislative or
executive power, the government’s reliance on accreditation as an
indication of quality does not violate the Vesting Clauses or Appointments Clause.
B.
We turn now to Florida’s Spending Clause claim.
There are limits to the conditions Congress can impose under the Spending Clause when it gives money to States. Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1981).
Among other things, those conditions must be ascertainable. Id. at
17; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (explaining
that Congress’s conditions must be unambiguous). The ascertainability requirement reflects the consent-based approach of State-directed Spending Clause legislation, Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 219 (2022), and enables States “to exercise
their choice [to accept funds] knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
The district court concluded that the ascertainability requirement doesn’t apply to the accreditation condition on Title IV
funds because those funds only indirectly flow to States through
the educational choices of students. We will assume without deciding, however, that the ascertainability requirement applies. Indulging that assumption, the federal government argues that the accreditation condition is ascertainable because it is straightforward
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for an institution to determine whether it is accredited. Florida disagrees, arguing that the standards that private accreditors apply can
be nebulous and change unpredictably.
We agree with the federal government. Congress need not
“prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity concerning particular applications of the requirements of [a federal grant program].”
Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985). The point is
that Congress must “make the existence of the condition itself—in
exchange for the receipt of federal funds—explicitly obvious.” Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)). That condition here is accreditation by a recognized accreditor.
The accreditation condition does not become ambiguous
just because it could have diverse applications depending on the
accreditor and the institution. In Benning, for example, we held that
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act imposed
an ascertainable condition on recipients of federal funds when it
applied strict scrutiny to any of their actions that substantially burdened religious exercise. 391 F.3d at 1306. There, we acknowledged that under strict scrutiny, state actions that constituted discrimination could “vary widely,” but we still held that this funding
condition was a well understood means-end test that was “far from
ambiguous.” Id. In the same way, as the federal government points
out, accreditation has been around for over a century and is a well
understood system. We have no doubt that the standards are ascertainable.
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Florida cites our decision in West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 59 F.4th 1124 (11th Cir. 2023), but it
offers no support. In Morrisey, we considered whether a provision
of the American Rescue Plan Act violated the Spending Clause’s
ascertainability requirement. The provision prohibited States from
using federal funds to offset “directly or indirectly” any reduction
in net tax revenue resulting from a change in state law. Id. at 1132
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 802(c)(2)(A)). We concluded that the offset
provision was not ascertainable for three reasons: (1) it did not provide a baseline standard against which to measure net tax revenue,
(2) the words “directly or indirectly” made it an “extraordinarily
expansive” condition considering the fungibility of money, and (3)
it was a novel restriction aimed at a State’s entire budget. Id. at
1144–46 (citation modified). None of these reasons apply here. Colleges and universities know whether they are accredited, the accreditation condition doesn’t encumber a State’s entire budget, and
accreditation is not novel in any way. We reject the State of Florida’s comparison between this case and Morrisey.
Because accreditation is an ascertainable condition on federal funds, it does not violate the Spending Clause.
IV.
The district court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.