UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHEILA LANG,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 20-cv-1199 (TSC)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Sheila Lang, a former teacher at the District of Columbia Public Schools
(“DCPS”), filed this lawsuit against the District of Columbia and former DCPS Principal Anna
Krughoff, alleging employment discrimination and First Amendment violations. In March 2023,
the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Third Amended
Complaint, allowing Plaintiff to proceed with her First Amendment claim against Krughoff and
her hostile work environment claims against the District. See Mem. Op. at 28, ECF No. 25.1 As
the case proceeded to discovery, the court set a June 2023 deadline for amended pleadings. See
Scheduling Order, ECF No. 29.
Approximately two-and-a-half years after that deadline, in January 2026, Plaintiff moved
for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 60; see also Proposed
Fourth Am. Compl., ECF No. 60-1 (“FAC”). She seeks to revive her dismissed First
Amendment municipal liability and retaliation claims and add allegations to buttress her nondismissed claims. See Pl.’s Mot. at 3–4. Defendants oppose further amendment. See Defs.’
1
For a more detailed overview of this case’s background and procedural history, see
Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 25.
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Opp’n, ECF No. 68. Despite receiving two extensions to reply to Defendants’ Opposition, see
Min. Order (Apr. 15, 2026), Min. Order (Apr. 16, 2026), Plaintiff’s counsel was late to file a
Reply, see Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 73. Although the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to
accept the late filed and overlength Reply, ECF No. 74, the court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, ECF No. 60.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) ordinarily governs a motion for leave to amend a
complaint. Under Rule 15(a)’s “liberal standard for granting leave,” Firestone v. Firestone, 76
F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), “leave to amend should be freely given unless there is a good
reason, such as futility, to the contrary.” Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But when a plaintiff seeks to amend after the scheduling order deadline
for amendment has passed, “the more stringent good cause standard imposed by” Rule “16(b)
applies.” In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litig., 762 F. Supp. 2d 56, 59 (D.D.C. 2011);
see also Sacerdote v. NYU, 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The period of ‘liberal’ amendment
ends if the district court issues a scheduling order setting a date after which no amendment will
be permitted.”); Cheeks v. Belmar, 162 F.4th 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2025) (“Rule 16(b)—rather than
Rule 15(a)—governs the amendment of pleadings after the [scheduling order] deadline
expires.”).
“To show good cause under” that “more stringent” standard, “the moving party must
show both diligence and a lack of prejudice to the opposing parties.” In re Papst, 762 F. Supp.
2d at 59 (emphasis added). The primary consideration is diligence; “if the party was not diligent,
the inquiry should end.” United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 285 F.R.D. 133, 136
(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.
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1992)). “Only after the movant shows good cause may the court consider whether amendment is
[also] proper under Rule 15(a).” Cheeks, 162 F.4th at 907; see also 6A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1522.2 (3d ed. 2026) (“[T]he Rule 16(b) standard
controls any decisions to alter a scheduling order for purposes of making pleading amendments
and it must be satisfied before determining whether an amendment should be permitted under
Rule 15.”).
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s counsel contends that during discovery he learned of evidence to support ten
sets of new allegations. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel had
most of this evidence by early April 2024, and that his one-year-and-nine-month delay in moving
to amend—approximately two-and-a-half years after the amended pleadings deadline—reflects a
lack of diligence. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10. The court agrees with Defendants.
a. Family Issues and Workload
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s counsel attributes roughly six months of delay to his
obligations as his father’s “primary caregiver” and his father’s death. Pl.’s Reply at 7, ECF No.
73. Specifically, counsel’s father became “terribly ill” around late April 2024 and passed away
on September 2, 2024. Id. According to Plaintiff’s counsel, that means any delay until midOctober 2024—“or about one month after [his] father’s funeral”—is categorically justified. Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel also justifies this and other delays by pointing to his responsibilities “working
for other clients.” Id. at 8. But although counsel “regrettably suffered through a period of
personal hardship” and had competing work demands, “‘a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends
both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.’” Strong-Fischer v. Peters, 554 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25
(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe,
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257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2001)). Even if personal tragedy excuses some delay, it cannot justify
six months’ worth. Cf. Davila-Alvarez, 257 F.3d at 65 (reasoning that counsel “was not
relieved” of his “ongoing responsibility to inquire into the status of a case” by “his brother’s
untimely death”); Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that
counsel’s “abandonment of the case during discovery . . . cannot be excused by the deaths in his
family”). Nor does counsel’s status as “a busy sole-practitioner . . . relieve [him] of [his] duty to
diligently pursue discovery.” Gaines v. United States, 54 F. App’x 797 (5th Cir. 2002). “That
an attorney has other matters in his office which require his attention does not constitute excuse
for neglect of attention to any one matter.” Citizens’ Protective League v. Clark, 178 F.2d 703,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also Stonkus v. City of Brockton Sch. Dep’t, 322 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir.
2003) (“Most attorneys are busy most of the time and they must organize their work so as to be
able to meet the requirements of the matters they are handling or suffer the consequences.”
(cleaned up)).
b. New Allegations
As for the ten sets of new allegations, Plaintiff’s counsel largely does not dispute that the
evidence underlying most of them was turned over in April 2024 or otherwise already available
to him.2 Beginning with the first two sets of new allegations, Plaintiff’s counsel states that
2
The ten sets of new allegations are: “(1) the identity of the defendants’ major coconspirators;
(2) relevant emails to and from those coconspirators; (3) the District’s illegal, secret
investigations of Lang wherein the District violated the law by never affording Lang with
notice of those investigations and by never granting Lang’s right to defend against those
investigations; (4) the adverse actions imposed against Lang during those illegal investigations;
(5) the District’s elimination of Lang’s salary from its fiscal year 2019 budget; (6) the
District’s elimination of the salaries of two black coworkers who opposed racial discrimination
against Lang; (7) possible proof that the District’s chancellor retaliated against Lang for her
protected speech; (8) a striking example of disparate treatment between the black plaintiff and
her white supervisor; (9) coworker and parent complaints about the District’s racially hostile
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through discovery he learned of “(1) the identity of the defendants’ major coconspirators and (2)
relevant emails to and from those coconspirators.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Defendant responds that the
identity of alleged co-conspirators and each email cited in the proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint was disclosed in April 2024. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10 & n.7. Plaintiff’s counsel fails
to dispute that assertion in the Reply.
Turning to set 3—the District’s alleged “illegal, secret investigations of Lang wherein the
District violated the law by never affording Lang with notice of those investigations and by
never granting Lang’s right to defend against those investigations,” Pl.’s Mot. at 2—Plaintiff’s
counsel clarified in the Reply that he was referring to “a secret reopening of DCPS’s
investigation of [Plaintiff’s] trip to Europe.” Pl.’s Reply at 11. Specifically, Plaintiff supervised
a school trip for several students and a parent to Europe, but while “Plaintiff was at the departure
gate . . . , the students and parent slipped away from” Plaintiff who “did not realize until the
flight reached London that the rest of the group had missed the flight.” Mem. Op. at 4 (cleaned
up). An initial DCPS investigation found “no wrongdoing on [Plaintiff’s] part with regard to the
field trip.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s counsel contends, however, that some of the documents
turned over in April 2024—DC-3599 through DC-3606—contained redactions which covered up
evidence relevant to the claim that DCPS had secretly reopened this investigation. Pl.’s Reply at
11. But counsel concedes that the basis for these new allegations largely comes from DC-680
through DC-682, which counsel does not dispute he received in April 2024. Id. In any event,
Plaintiff asked for unredacted versions of DC-3599 through DC-3606 on May 12, 2025, and
received them about a week later. Id. Notably, it took Plaintiff more than a year to address these
workplace; and (10) the District’s materially false but secret and illegal job performance
evaluations that resulted in both the elimination of Lang’s job assignment and her constructive
discharge.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3.
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deficiencies in the April 2024 production, which does not reflect diligence. Moreover, Plaintiff’s
counsel does not explain his eight-month delay in moving to amend after he received the
unredacted versions.
It is unclear what Plaintiff’s counsel is referring to with set 4—“the adverse actions
imposed against [Plaintiff] during those illegal investigations.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3. The adverse
actions alleged in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint appear to be that Plaintiff was placed
on “forced indefinite administrative leave” following her November 2017 PTA speech in which
she complained of race discrimination, FAC ¶ 27(a); investigated without an opportunity to
defend herself, id. ¶ 27(c); had her salary defunded from the FY2019 budget, id. ¶ 38; and had
her position as a reading teacher at Cleveland excessed, id. ¶ 47. Set 4 thus substantially
overlaps with set 5—“the District’s elimination of Lang’s salary from its fiscal year 2019
budget.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. But the Third Amended Complaint already alleges that Plaintiff’s
position as a reading teacher was excessed in 2018 after Plaintiff was transferred to a different
school, see, e.g., Third Am. Compl. ¶ 34(a), ECF No. 15, so the elimination of that salary in the
FY2019 budget is not new. The same is true for set 6—“the District’s elimination of the salaries
of two black coworkers who opposed racial discrimination against Lang.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. The
Third Amended Complaint already alleges that those positions were excessed, see Third Am.
Compl. ¶ 26(x), (z), so this too is not new.
Set 7 concerns “possible proof that the District’s chancellor retaliated against Lang for
her protected speech.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. Specifically, documents DC-3599 through DC-3606
reflect that the DCPS Chancellor was involved in the decision to involuntarily transfer Plaintiff
from Cleveland to Browne. See Pl.’s Reply at 11. Plaintiff’s counsel contends that these
documents contained redactions which “blotted out” the critical information when they were
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initially turned over in April 2024. Id. at 11. But as discussed above, it was not diligent for
Plaintiff’s counsel to wait until May 2025 to request unredacted versions to documents he
received in April 2024. Counsel has failed, moreover, to explain his eight-month delay after he
received the unredacted versions to seek leave to amend.
Set 8—“a striking example of disparate treatment between the black plaintiff and her
white supervisor”—concerns how Principal Krughoff was treated after a child was improperly
released under her watch from a Cleveland afterschool program to a stranger in December 2017.
Pl.’s Mot. at 3; see also Pl.’s Reply at 15–16. According to Plaintiff, the leniency Krughoff was
afforded stands in stark contrast to the “racist harassment” Plaintiff received in the aftermath of
the failed Europe trip. Pl.’s Reply at 16. Plaintiff’s counsel contends that he learned of this
incident in November 2025 through online research that was prompted by emails released to him
in April 2024 mentioning media coverage at Cleveland Elementary in December 2017. Id. at 15.
This again shows a lack of diligence. The media stories have been publicly available since
December 2017 and could have been discovered by simple internet searches into Cleveland
Elementary long before November 2025. In any event, Plaintiff’s counsel received the emails
that prompted his simple internet search in April 2024; his more than year-and-a-half delay in
reviewing those emails was not diligent.
Set 9—“coworker and parent complaints about the District’s racially hostile
workplace”—appears to refer to a petition campaign by parents and teachers who sought to
preserve the job of a Black assistant principal at Cleveland, which Plaintiff’s counsel links to a
“closely related petition campaign in April 2018 to preserve [Plaintiff’s] employment as a
Cleveland reading teacher.” Pl.’s Reply at 12; see also FAC ¶ 43 (conceding Plaintiff “agreed
to” a petition drive on her behalf in 2018). To start, it is unclear why Plaintiff’s counsel needed
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discovery to plead “closely related” petition campaigns that his client was aware of in 2018. In
any event, the relevant discovery was disclosed in April and October 2024. See Defs.’ Opp’n at
12–13; see also Pl.’s Reply at 13. Although Plaintiff contends some of these documents
contained redactions that were not lifted until July 2025, he does not indicate that those
redactions concealed the existence of the petition campaigns or parent complaints, as opposed to
non-essential details like the names of the parents involved. See Pl.’s Reply at 12–13. Given
these circumstances, Plaintiff’s counsel has again failed to show diligence.
Finally, set 10 concerns “the District’s materially false but secret and illegal job
performance evaluations that resulted in both the elimination of Lang’s job assignment and her
constructive discharge.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. Defendants produced the performance evaluation and
evaluation rubric in April 2024. Defs.’ Opp’n at 13; Pl.’s Reply at 8, 14. Plaintiff’s counsel
indicates that he “studied” the rubric used to make excessing decisions in August 2024, but did
not “realize[]” until more than a year later, in November 2025 that “the illegal excessing of
[Plaintiff’s] job assignment by way of the ‘rubric’ . . . needed to be alleged in a fourth amended
complaint.” Pl.’s Reply at 8, 14. Having possessed the relevant documents since April 2024,
Plaintiff’s counsel cannot characterize his delayed comprehension of their relevance and his
further delay in moving to amend as the product of diligence. This is emblematic of the larger
problem. Across the new allegations, the pattern is the same: Plaintiff’s counsel had most of the
underlying evidence since the April 2024 production or before, but then took many months, and
in most instances more than a year, to review those documents, grasp their significance, and act
on them. That is not diligent.
Plaintiff’s counsel notes that discovery has been voluminous—Defendants produced
roughly 4,500 pages of documents in response to his requests. Pl.’s Reply at 2. To the extent
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Plaintiff’s counsel thereby means to suggest that his delay is justified by the volume of discovery
and the number of discovery disputes he raised, the court is not persuaded. See id. at 2, 12.
Although the challenges associated with discovery in this case may have justified several months
of delay for a diligent lawyer, it does not justify counsel’s delay of one year and nine months in
moving to amend his pleadings after the vast majority of documents were turned over in April
2024, and two and a half years after the amended pleadings deadline had passed. Because
Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to establish diligence, the Rule 16(b) analysis is at its end and the
court need not consider whether amendment would be justified under Rule 15(a). See Kellogg
Brown, 285 F.R.D. at 136; Cheeks, 162 F.4th at 907.
Plaintiff’s counsel also notes that the court granted Defendants’ unopposed motion to stay
the Scheduling Order deadlines in November 2024 to allow the parties time to resolve discovery
disputes. See Pl’s Reply at 10; Min. Order (Nov. 26, 2024). But that order merely stayed expert
discovery deadlines, the end of discovery, and summary judgment briefing; the amended
pleadings deadline had already long passed. Thus, the stay of those discovery and summary
judgment deadlines does not excuse counsel’s considerable delay in moving to amend the
pleadings based on discovery materials he already had after the amended pleadings deadline.
Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel worries that because the “Third Amended Complaint never
referred to [certain] evidence” learned in discovery, the court “will bar” Plaintiff from using “this
newly acquired proof” at trial and summary judgment. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. That concern is largely
misplaced. Although “a plaintiff is not permitted to raise new claims at the summary judgment
stage, where those claims were not pleaded in the complaint,” Taylor v. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d
124, 137 (D.D.C. 2012), or make a “fundamental change” to their theories of liability, Trudel v.
SunTrust Bank, 924 F.3d 1281, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2019), a plaintiff is not prohibited from using
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evidence obtained in discovery to support existing claims and theories merely because that
evidence was not mentioned in the complaint. As the pleading that merely initiates litigation, a
complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
not all the evidence which supports the claim. See Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d
1203, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (explaining that a complaint “need not set out all the precise facts
on which the claim is based” (cleaned up)). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
court looks beyond the pleadings and may take into consideration affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file[.]” Mann-Paller Found. v. Econometric Rsch.,
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 92, 93 (D.D.C. 1986) (emphasis added). Thus, this decision does not limit
Plaintiff to the evidence alleged in the Third Amended Complaint when this case moves to
summary judgment, but merely holds that Plaintiff’s counsel was too tardy in seeking to revive
the already dismissed claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to accept the late filed and overlength
Reply, ECF No. 74, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 60, is DENIED. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer and file a
Joint Status Report by July 20, 2026, proposing next steps in this long-delayed litigation.
It is SO ORDERED.
Date: July 6, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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