************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
BROADRIDGE OUTPUT SOLUTIONS, INC. v.
TOWN OF SOUTH WINDSOR
(AC 48289)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant town appealed from the trial court’s judgments in two tax appeals filed by the plaintiff, B Co., a company that converts electronic data from clients and prepares printed documents for mailing to the clients’ customers. The court determined, inter alia, that certain machines, used to insert and sort the documents as part of B Co.’s printing process, were exempt from personal property taxes pursuant to statute (§ 12-81 (76)). The defendant claimed that the court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff’s machines were exempt from taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (76) because the plaintiff’s machines were not installed in a manufacturing facility because the plaintiff was not engaged in the manufacturing process. Held:
This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the plaintiff’s printing equipment was not entitled to tax exempt status, as the defendant had conceded at trial that the printing equipment was used for manufacturing and, thus, because it was not an issue before the trial court, no evidence was presented as to the printing process and the parties and the court did not address it.
This court declined to review the defendant’s claims as to certain other equipment used by the plaintiff that the trial court had concluded was entitled to the tax exemption, as the claims did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the machines were entitled to the tax exemption because their predominant function was integral to the manufacturing process of the printing equipment but, rather, challenged the court’s conclusion that the printing process was not manufacturing.
Argued January 22—officially released July 7, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal, in the first case, from the assessment of municipal taxes on certain of the plaintiff’s personal property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain, Tax Session, and appeal, in the second case,
from the assessment of municipal taxes on certain of the
plaintiff’s personal property, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford and transferred to the judicial district of New Britain, Tax Session, where the two appeals were consolidated and tried to the court,
Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge trial referee; judgments in
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
part for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Jesse A. Langer, with whom, on the brief, were Brian
C. Hoeing and Richard D. Carella, for the appellant
(defendant).
Elliott B. Pollack, with whom was Meagan A. Cauda
and, on the brief, Michael J. Marafito, for the appellee
(plaintiff).
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. This appeal arises from two tax appeals
filed by the plaintiff, Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc., pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119,1 for grand list
years 2020 and 2021, claiming that certain personal
property installed in its facility located in the defendant municipality, the town of South Windsor, was exempt
from taxation.2 The defendant appeals from the judgments of the trial court, rendered after a consolidated
trial to the court, in favor of the plaintiff, as to the tax exempt status of certain personal property owned by
the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court incorrectly concluded that certain of the plaintiff’s personal property was exempt from taxation pursuant
to General Statutes § 12-81 (76)3 because it is used for
manufacturing. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court.3
1
General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: “When it is claimed that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town . . . in whose tax list such property was set, or that a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof . . . may . . . make application for relief to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town . . . is situated. . . .”
2
The plaintiff also filed tax appeals for the grand list years 2022, 2023 and 2024. The trial court issued stays in those cases pending this court’s decision in this appeal.
3
General Statutes § 12-81 (76) provides in relevant part: “Effective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011, machinery and equipment, including machinery and equipment used in connection with biotechnology [shall be exempt from taxation]. For purposes of this
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
The following facts, which either were found by the
trial court or are undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this
appeal. The plaintiff is the owner of certain personal
property (property) located at its facility in South Windsor. The property consists of various equipment used by
the plaintiff to print data received electronically from its clients and to prepare the resulting printed documents
for mailing to its clients’ customers. Those documents
“include credit card bills, utility statements, customer
letters associated with those industries and insurance
industries as well, [in other words] financial documents.”
The plaintiff filed two tax appeals, pursuant to
§ 12-119, against the defendant, challenging the defendant’s tax assessment of its personal property for the
grand list years of 2020 and 2021. The plaintiff claimed
that the tax had been wrongfully assessed because its
property is used for manufacturing and, therefore, is
exempt from taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (76).4 The two
tax appeals were consolidated for trial, which was held
on May 13 and 15, 2024, before the court, Hon. Henry
S. Cohn, judge trial referee.
Prior to the commencement of the presentation of evidence, the court confirmed with the plaintiff’s counsel
subdivision, ‘machinery’ and ‘equipment’ . . . have the same meanings as provided in subdivision (72) of this section. . . .”
Section 12-81 (72) (A) (i) provides in relevant part that “ ‘[m]achinery’ and ‘equipment’ means tangible personal property which is installed in a manufacturing facility . . . and the predominant use of which is for manufacturing, processing or fabricating . . . .”
Section 12-81 (72) (A) (iii) defines manufacturing as “the activity of converting or conditioning tangible personal property by changing the form, composition, quality or character of the property for ultimate sale at retail or use in the manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at retail. . . .”
4
In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed that the tax assessed on its property was “manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes and laws for determining the valuation and exempt status of such property.” At trial, the plaintiff clarified that its claim that the assessment was excessive was not based on valuation but, rather, on its argument that its machinery was exempt from taxation.
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
that the plaintiff was claiming that the defendant’s
assessment of the plaintiff’s personal property was
incorrect because all of the personal property at issue
“should have been classified—as the statute allows—as
machinery that is not subject to taxation.” Counsel for
the defendant explained that “the evidence will show
that we did indeed exempt some of the machinery onsite
pursuant to the statute, so what is at issue is a subset, is a portion of the machinery that is onsite that’s at issue.” The court confirmed with counsel for the defendant:
“So, certain machines, from your perspective, do not
qualify for the exemption?” Counsel for the defendant
responded: “That is correct, Your Honor.”
During trial, it became clear that the plaintiff’s property could be divided into four categories: (1) printing equipment; (2) inserting equipment; (3) sorting/
presorting equipment; and (4) mailing equipment. The
defendant’s assessor had exempted the first category of
equipment, the printing equipment, from taxation, so
that equipment was not at issue at trial.
On October 24, 2024, the court issued its decision
from the bench. The court began by recounting: “There
are four classes of machinery at issue here . . . . The first category is printing equipment. The plaintiff receives
data from various collectives that it uses, and it uses
machinery to produce large rolls that take the form of
bills to be sent to the consumer. These bills are attached to the rolls themselves. So, they come out of the machinery
attached to these large rolls.
“The second category is what we might call inserting
equipment. The machinery that this involves takes these
bills that are attached to the rolls and prepare[s] these
bills for insert into mailers.
“The third category, a sort and presort equipment. The
machinery works with category two to produce finished
envelopes in which these bills are now [sent].
“The fourth category is mailing equipment. This
machinery moves the final product in the envelopes from
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
the plant floor to the waiting [United States Postal Service (USPS)] trucks [for] delivery. This equipment also
. . . assigns zip codes to the envelopes.”
The court noted that, in order to be exempt from taxation, “there must be a change in form by the—from what
initially existed by use of the machinery . . . .”
The court then explained: “[L]ooking at . . . the evidence . . . there’s no question, it could almost be by agreement that those are what the machines do, and I’m going to
conclude the following: in regard to category one, that is this creation of these large rolls from data receipt at the plant, the parties are actually in agreement that those
printers that do this function qualify for the exemption.
The assessor has given the plaintiff this exemption. So,
there’s really no question about them. . . .
“[A]s to [the second category] the inserters, here the
court concludes in favor of the plaintiff that the [defendant] has incorrectly classified this machinery [as] ineligible for exemption. These machines are taking the bill
from the large rolls of paper. This . . . is manufacturing or it’s officially tied to the first category [in that it is] . . . a predominant compliment to the manufacturing process
. . . . [T]his is [true] for [the third] type [of machinery at issue] as well. So, that the third category of sorting
is also—those machines are also exempt from taxation.
“However, there’s a fourth category. That’s mailing
equipment. I conclude that it’s too divorced from the
manufacturing, so that these machines are not exempt.
So, in other words, the step of relaying the final envelopes to the conveyor that takes them to the post office
is a process which is still subject to taxation. . . . [T]he mailing equipment is too divorced [from] manufacturing [to] be exempt. . . . So, in other words, the step of
relaying the final envelopes to the conveyor that takes
them to the post office is a process which is still subject to taxation. Those are my conclusions based upon the
facts that I see as proof on both sides and the conclusion of law based upon those facts.”
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
When counsel for the defendant asked the court to
articulate its rationale regarding the application of the
exemption, specifically, “the exception to the exemption
that . . . identifies sorters, presorters, and inserters as not being exempt,” the court explained: “We know that
the creating of the [printed] rolls [of paper] with the
bills attached, in other words, $50 comes into American
Express for Mrs. Jones and they take that $50 charge and
relay it to [the plaintiff] and [the plaintiff] puts it into a machine, spits out . . . what we usually see as available
consumer[s], but . . . it’s not just there and put in the
envelope, it’s attached to a large roll of paper, and it
could be a hundred bills on there like that. [Something
has] to take that bill, which is adhered to the big roll,
undo it from the big roll, and put it into an envelope. [It] takes a machine to do it. [Whether] that machinery is tax
exempt is one of the questions, and my conclusion is that
the taking of the bill, as it’s eventually produced from
the information, the data that company A, sends to [the
plaintiff] . . . they create a roll with the bills attached, and . . . they . . . have the machine that clips it in some way from this big roll and places it in an envelope and gets
it ready for the fourth process, which is that it’s got to be sealed up and have an address on it [indiscernible]—
So, the first three [categories] would be sufficiently a
[manufacturing] function, and the last which is getting
it ready to go to the USPS, is not manufacturing, but it’s something else. It’s . . . facilitating [the] mailing out [of] the letter. It’s not the same [as] separating the bill from the roll of paper as in the [indiscernible] [categories] two or three. That clearly creates something new and it’s also derived from the original equipment. But when we get
to the fourth category, why should there be a tax exemption for mailing equipment which is a mailer. It’s not a
manufacturer thing. That’s my conclusion.”
The court also set forth its rationale for concluding
that the third category, the sorting and presorting equipment, was exempt from taxation. The court explained:
“I think it’s sufficiently related to this machinery that
creates the roll because it is a function closely associated
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
with it—it would be useless for the accomplishment of
[the plaintiff’s] purposes just to create a roll and not be able to undo it and get it ready for mailing it out. That’s their purpose. Again, the sealing of the envelope . . .
the—preparing for putting a stamp on it, I suppose, or
metering it, and getting it to the trucks doesn’t strike me as manufacturing equipment. So, that’s my rationale.”
The court further elaborated: “[T]here’s a portion of
approximately 600 total assets, which were involved in
[the] separate process of printing, the post[printing]
assets, the ones that take the printed product, fold it,
stuff it, sort it, arrange it for coordinated direct shipment to [the] USPS. So, in postprinting collating, [indiscernible], those are all in my written orally announced
opinion, exempt. . . . [W]hen [the] mailing equipment
moves the final product, the envelopes, from the plant
to . . . the USPS . . . that is not . . . officially connected in the manufacturing process to have an exemption.
That’s my ruling. . . .
“Because the cases say not only that they must be
manufacturing, but there’s also exemption if the machine
supplement[s] the manufacturing process directly. So,
that the manufacturing process, which is being exempt,
direct manufacturing, that is the creating of the large
rolls with the bills attached, cannot be accomplished
without those assisted machinery which relates to it. . .
. I think they can also [be] included in what is manufacturing. When you get to the issue, as I’ve been saying,
of mailing, of assisting it . . . preparing it for mail, we’re not doing anything which is manufacturing, where is it
directly related to manufacturing and that group—so
[categories] one, two, and three, are essentially manufacturing sufficiently to be exempt under the statute,
where [category] four, which is the mailing [is not].”
The defendant thereafter filed a motion to reargue or
for reconsideration, which the court summarily denied.
This appeal followed.
The following statutes govern the issues presented in this case. Section 12-81 (76) exempts from personal property
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
taxes “machinery and equipment” and provides that
those terms shall have the same meaning as provided in
subsection (72).5 Section 12-81 (72) (A) (i), in turn, provides in relevant part that “[m]achinery and equipment
means tangible personal property which is installed in a
manufacturing facility6 . . . and the predominant use of
which is for manufacturing, processing7 or fabricating8
. . . .” (Footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Section 12-81 (72) (A) (iii) defines manufacturing
as “the activity of converting or conditioning tangible
personal property by changing the form, composition,
quality or character of the property for ultimate sale
at retail or use in the manufacturing of a product to be
ultimately sold at retail. . . .” The issue of whether the court properly determined that certain of the plaintiff’s
personal property constituted machinery within the
meaning of the foregoing statutes and was therefore
exempt from taxation presents an issue of statutory
construction, of which our review is plenary. McHenry
Solar, LLC v. Hampton, 235 Conn. App. 355, 360–61,
345 A.3d 916 (2025).
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred
in concluding that the plaintiff’s personal property was
5
We note that both § 12-81 (72) and (76) provide exemptions for machinery and equipment used for manufacturing. Subsection (72), however, is “[e]ffective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2002, but prior to assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011”; General Statutes § 12-81 (72); whereas subsection (76) is “[e]ffective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011 . . . .” General Statutes § 12-81 (76). Because the plaintiff challenges the tax assessed on its property for the assessment year commencing October 1, 2020, it claims the exemption pursuant to § 12-81 (76).
6
“ ‘Manufacturing facility’ ” means “that portion of a plant, building or other real property improvement used for manufacturing, processing or fabricating . . . .” General Statutes § 12-81 (72) (A) (ii).
7
“ ‘Processing’ ” means “the physical application of the materials and labor in a manufacturing process necessary to modify or change the characteristics of tangible personal property.” General Statutes § 12-81 (72) (A) (v).
8
“ ‘Fabricating’ ” means “to make, build, create, produce or assemble components or tangible personal property work in a new or different manner, but does not include the presorting, sorting, coding, folding, stuffing or delivery of direct or indirect mail distribution services.” General Statutes § 12-81 (72) (A) (iv).
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (76). The defendant
argues, for the first time on appeal, that all four of the categories of property at issue fail to meet the statutory definition of machinery which would have entitled that
property to be exempt from taxation. The defendant did
not assert such a claim before the trial court. Because the defendant’s assessor had granted the exemption for the
first category—the printing equipment—that equipment
was not at issue before the court.
In its posttrial brief, the defendant stated: “[T]he
overarching issue to be decided by this court is whether
a group of the plaintiff’s assets functioning at its mailing fulfillment facility, which pre-sort, sort, stuff and
post mail for delivery are exempt under . . . § 12-81 (76) and (72). Applying Connecticut laws governing property
tax exemption and personal property assessment to the
evidence adduced at trial, it is abundantly clear that
[the plaintiff] has failed to meet its burden of proving
entitlement to tax exemption under these statutes for its
postprinting assets.” The defendant represented in its
posttrial brief that the only disputed property at issue in the plaintiff’s tax appeals was the “postprinting assets,” specifically, the second, third and fourth categories of
property, as enumerated and agreed upon by the parties.
In fact, the defendant consistently represented to the
trial court that its assessor had applied the exemption
to the first category of equipment, the printing equipment, and that the property at issue was the postprinting
equipment, the second, third and fourth categories of
equipment. At no time did the defendant challenge the
tax exempt status of the plaintiff’s printing equipment
before the trial court. It does so now for the first time
on appeal.
“Our appellate courts, as a general practice, will not
review claims made for the first time on appeal. . . . [A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also]
will not address issues not decided by the trial court. . . . The purpose of our preservation requirements is to ensure
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
fair notice of a party’s claims to both the trial court and opposing parties. . . . These requirements are not simply
formalities. They serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there is still time for the court to act. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after
it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade,
which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing
party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guddo v.
Guddo, 185 Conn. App. 283, 286–87, 196 A.3d 1246
(2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (appellate court
is generally not bound to consider claim not distinctly
raised at trial).
In its appellate brief, the defendant argues for the
first time that “the plaintiff . . . does not manufacture
anything insofar as the exemption is concerned.” The
defendant contends that “the plaintiff is not converting
or conditioning anything by changing its form, composition, quality or character.” On that basis, the defendant
contends that the plaintiff’s personal property was not
installed in a manufacturing facility and therefore is
not entitled to tax exempt status. In so arguing, the
defendant essentially seeks to withdraw the concession
that it made at trial, that the printing equipment was tax exempt because it is used for manufacturing. Indeed, at
oral argument before this court, when pressed as to its
new position as to the tax exemption of the plaintiff’s
printing equipment, counsel for the defendant argued
that this court should engage in a plenary review of all
four categories of the property at issue.9 In so arguing,
the defendant essentially asks this court to conduct a trial de novo, which is not the province of this court, versus
a de novo review of a legal issue.10 Because the printing
equipment was not at issue before the trial court, there
9
We note that the trial court determined that the fourth category at issue was not tax exempt and the plaintiff has not challenged that determination. Presumably, the defendant would not want this court to review that determination.
10
At oral argument before this court, counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant’s assessor did not have the authority to exempt the
Broadridge Output Solutions, Inc. v. South Windsor
was no evidence presented as to the printing process, the
parties did not address it in their closing arguments or
their posttrial briefs, and the court did not address it.
The defendant’s challenge to the tax exempt status of the
printing equipment therefore is not properly before us.
As to the second and third categories of property at
issue, rather than challenge the court’s conclusion that
that property was entitled to tax exemption because its
predominant function was integral to the manufacturing
process of the printing equipment, the defendant challenges the court’s conclusion that that equipment was
entitled to tax exemption on the ground that the printing
process was not manufacturing.11 For the reasons stated
previously, that claim is not properly before this court.
We therefore decline to review the defendant’s claims
concerning the second and third categories of property
at issue in this case.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
plaintiff’s printing equipment from taxation. At no time did the defendant raise this argument before the trial court, nor has the defendant provided any legal authority in support of it.
11
In its principal appellate brief, the defendant argues that “[c]ategories two through four do not fabricate personal property [in] a new or different manner.” Because the court found that the equipment in those categories was predominantly used for manufacturing, we need not address this argument.