Opinion issued July 2, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00987-CV
MARIA SANCHEZ, Appellant
V.
YSIDRO HERNANDEZ, Appellee
On Appeal from the 309th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-72513
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Maria Sanchez appeals from the trial court’s final decree of
divorce involving the characterization and division of property in her divorce from
Appellee Ysidro Hernandez. After a two-day trial, a jury returned a verdict finding
that the parties’ residence in Houston, Texas was community property, that certain properties used in connection with a bail bond business were not community
property, and that Sanchez did not commit fraud against the community estate by
transferring the bail bond properties to her adult son. Over a year later, the trial
court entered a final decree of divorce declaring that the bail bond properties are
the separate property of the parties with each owning a fifty percent interest as
tenants in common.
On appeal, Sanchez argues the trial court abused its discretion in
characterizing the properties as the separate property of the parties because there is
legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the
properties are not community property and that the properties were not
fraudulently transferred to Sanchez’s adult son who paid for the properties with his
funds. She argues the trial court lacked authority to disregard the jury’s findings
and make its own findings with respect to the characterization of the properties and
further that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that the properties are the separate property of the parties.
We reverse and render.
Background
Sanchez and Hernandez married on December 21, 2000. Sanchez and
Hernandez owned a residential property located on Wallisville Road in Houston,
Texas. It is undisputed that this residential property is community property.
2
Sanchez had two children prior to her marriage to Hernandez. While still
married to Hernandez, Sanchez helped her son—Marcos Antonio (“Antonio”)—
start a bail bond business. To obtain the two years of experience necessary to
secure a bail bond license, Sanchez started working at a bail bond business during
the “graveyard [shift] from 12:00 to 8:00 in the morning” and doing “hot shot
loads until 5:00 in the evening.” After working at the bail bond company for two
years, Sanchez was able to secure a license for Antonio to open a bail bond
business. Antonio and Sanchez agreed that the license would initially be in
Sanchez’s name because Antonio was not yet a U.S. citizen and citizenship is
required to obtain a bail bond license.
When Antonio and Sanchez first started the bail bond business, Antonio was
able to secure underwriting for the business, but only for $35,000, which made it
difficult. Antonio explained that most bonds “go from like 50 and up” and for
those bonds, Antonio had to secure approval from the underwriter to finance the
bond, which often required collateral and “not every[one] has collateral.” To
overcome this limitation, Antonio began purchasing properties to use them as
collateral for bonds. From 2012 through 2021, Antonio was able to purchase a total
of twenty-three properties for his bail bond business. (“Properties”). Antonio
testified that he used his funds to purchase the Properties, but because he was not a
U.S. citizen at the time of purchases, he and his mother agreed that the deeds
3
would be in her name, and in Hernandez’s name, until Antonio secured his U.S.
citizenship.1 Sanchez testified that although the deeds to the Properties were in her
name and Hernandez’s name, Antonio purchased the Properties “with his own
funds” and neither she nor Hernandez “paid any monies for the purchase” of the
bail bond Properties.
In June 2021, after Antonio became a U.S. citizen, Sanchez and Hernandez
transferred the Properties to Antonio “as agreed.” The special warranty deeds were
signed before a notary public and they reflect signatures from Sanchez and
Hernandez. According to Sanchez, there was no separate property purchased or
owned by her or Hernandez and the only property she and Hernandez owned
together was their residence in Houston, Texas.
Sanchez filed for divorce in November 2021. Hernandez filed a counterpetition for divorce asserting claims against Sanchez and her two adult children for
fraud, theft, and conspiracy to commit theft involving the transfer of the Properties
to Antonio. Hernandez alleged that the bail bond Properties were “community
property,” that he owned a community property interest in some, or all, of the
1
Sanchez testified that the license was in her name because Antonio, although a
legal U.S. resident, was not yet a U.S. citizen. According to Antonio, the bail bond
commission requires that owners of bail bond companies be U.S. citizens. Sanchez
testified that the bail bond properties were purchased in her name “[b]ecause the
license was under my name, and the insurance required for me to be, you know, in
the paperwork.” Antonio testified that Hernandez did not help start the bail bond
company.
4
Properties, and that Sanchez and Antonio had conspired to transfer the Properties
fraudulently into Antonio’s name “without just cause, without [Hernandez’s]
permission, [and] without adequate consideration” in an effort to defraud the
community estate. Hernandez also alleged that Sanchez’s other adult child—a
public notary—had conspired with Sanchez and Antonio by notarizing the special
warranty deeds that transferred the Properties to Antonio.2 The trial court
dismissed Hernandez’s fraud, theft, and conspiracy claims against Antonio and his
sibling before the trial commenced.
Sanchez testified during trial that Antonio owned the Properties. After he
became a U.S. citizen, the Properties were transferred to Antonio as agreed.
Antonio testified that he purchased the bail bond Properties with his funds and he
did not receive money from Sanchez or Hernandez to help purchase the Properties.
He testified that “it was understood from the beginning that [the Properties] were
mine.” As agreed, after he became a U.S. citizen, the Properties were transferred to
him. He testified that the Properties “were transferred back to me because those
were my properties. I purchased those properties . . . . I had got my citizenship. I
was able to apply for my own bail bond license.”
2
Although the special warranty deeds bear Hernandez’s signature, Hernandez
claimed he had not appeared before Sanchez’s other child—the notary public. He
claimed the notarization on the deeds was fraudulent and that the signatures on the
deeds were not his.
5
Hernandez appeared at trial pro se. During cross-examination, he conceded
that Antonio started the bail bond business and that initially, the license for the
business was secured in Sanchez’s name because Antonio was not yet a U.S.
citizen. Hernadez testified that he was a truck driver and that at some point, he also
worked at the bail bond company. When asked about the purchase of the bail bond
Properties, Hernandez stated that the Properties had come “out of the bail bonds.”
He then testified, without much elaboration, that the Properties were purchased
with money out of his joint account with Sanchez. When pressed for more
information, Hernandez testified he did know how much money was spent to
purchase the Properties, he did not handle the money, and he was not “aware of
any monies [Sanchez had] used from [his] income to purchase the [P]roperties.”
Hernandez also testified he had no proof he paid for the Properties:
Q: But it is true that you didn’t pay—you don’t recall paying any
money for those properties that were used for the bail bond
company. Is that correct?
A: But I was working there.
Q: So if your stepson Marcos Antonio testified that he paid for all
of those properties from his own funds, would you agree with
him?
A: I need proof.
Q: Do you have any proof that you paid for the properties?
6
A: I don’t have proof.
After a two-day trial, the jury found that:
• The parties’ homestead property in Houston, Texas was community
property;
• Twenty-six3 properties used as collateral for the bail bond company were
not community property;
• Sanchez did not commit fraud with respect to the community property
rights of Hernandez; and
• The transfer [of the properties] made by Sanchez to Antonio was fair and
did not constitute constructive fraud against the community estate.
After the trial court polled the jury, the parties accepted the verdict and the trial
court excused the jury. At a subsequent “post-jury trial conference,” the trial court,
on its own motion and without prior notice to the parties, sua sponte set aside the
jury’s verdict and granted a new trial. Sanchez sought mandamus relief in this
Court arguing the trial court had abused its discretion by “unilaterally ordering a
new trial” and entering a “one-page order [that] [was] facially invalid.” See In re
Sanchez, No. 01-23-00309-CV, 2024 WL 2061673, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] May 9, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). We conditionally granted
3
Sanchez argues on appeal that the final judgment “erroneously and arbitrarily
characterized an additional property owned by Antonio and two other entities and
identified them as the separate property of Sanchez and Hernandez.” Those three
properties were identified with the other bail bond Properties in the jury charge.
7
Sanchez’s petition directing the trial court to vacate her order for new trial.4 Id. at
*6.
Soon thereafter, the trial court vacated the challenged order setting aside the
jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial. The trial court then held a conference,
during which the trial court judge, without notice to or prompting from the parties,
stated:
We had a jury trial on January 9th, 2023 and January 10th, 2023. And
based on that jury charge and other issues, the Court has to set aside
that jury verdict and grant a new trial. And the reasons that I’ll have to
set that verdict in the trial is the jury charge itself was inadequate in
that it did not actually characterize the property. And that’s—the issue
before the jury was the characterization of the property. They just—
their answer said what the property was not. It did not give the Court
an option of what the property was. It also did not set out definitions
for important terms like separate property5 and the burden that each
party would have to meet in order to—for property to be confirmed as
separate property.
4
We declined to direct the trial court to enter final judgment on the jury’s findings
because the basis for the trial court’s order setting aside the jury’s verdict and
ordering a new trial was unclear, and we thus could not determine whether
Sanchez was entitled to that relief. In re Sanchez, No. 01-23-00309-CV, 2024 WL
2061673, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2024, orig. proceeding)
(mem. op.).
5
The charge defined separate and community property in the definition section of
the charge, and it repeated the concepts of separate and community property in
Instruction No. 2 preceding Questions No. 2 and 3, which asked whether the
parties’ homestead (Question 2) and the bail bond Properties (Question 3) were the
community property of Sanchez and Hernandez.
8
And there were—there were some exhibits that [were] provided by
[Sanchez’s counsel]6 in a binder, but those exhibits were not admitted.
Mr. Hernandez stated that he was not opposed to them, but [Sanchez’s
counsel] said, wait, they’re not all going to be admitted. So because
they weren’t admitted, I couldn’t even consider looking at any of
them. The inventory and appraisement were not admitted, and so I
could not look at an inventory—I could [sic] look at any documents
that had not been admitted into evidence.
And since this was a case where it involved a lot of real property,
there were no—there were some deeds submitted that supported the
inception of title, but property, we all know that—with the statute of
frauds that anything dealing with land has to be in writing. Those
were not admitted to the Court either.
So you all have an option of—if Mr. Hernandez wants to go through
the procedure of another jury trial, he has the right to do that. And
we’ll have to set you up a time to—y’all pick another jury. Or if he
waives, he can waive for a bench trial. But we need to make sure that
we have everything in order the next time we go.
Sanchez objected to the trial court’s directive that a new trial be conducted.
Hernandez stated that he wanted a new trial. The trial court then stated that it
would make “a just and right determination of the property that the Court heard
evidence on.”
No new trial was conducted either to the jury or to the bench. Rather, more
than a year later, the trial court issued a final decree of divorce reflecting the jury’s
finding that the parties’ residence in Houston was community property and
6
Ten special warranty deeds transferring property to Antonio, all of which were
apparently attached to Hernandez’s counter petition for divorce, were entered into
evidence as exhibits 8-17. The exhibits are not in the appellate record, although
there are ten special warranty deeds conveying bail bond properties to Antonio
attached to Hernandez’s counter-petition.
9
awarding a fifty percent interest in the residence to each spouse. With respect to
the bail bond Properties, the court confirmed the jury had found that the Properties
were not community property and it declared that the Properties were the separate
property of Hernandez and Sanchez “with each party respectively owning a fifty
percent interest as tenants in common” in the bail bond Properties.7
On appeal, Sanchez challenges the trial court’s final judgment declaring the
Properties as the separate property of the parties.
Applicable Law
Community property consists of all property, other than separate property,
acquired by either spouse during marriage. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.002. Separate
property is property owned or claimed by a spouse before marriage or acquired
during marriage by gift, devise, or descent. Id. § 3.001. A spouse advancing a
claim of separate property has the burden to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the property is separate. Id. § 3.003(b); see Cockerham v.
Cockherham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167 (1975) (holding that “party asserting separate
ownership must clearly trace the original separate property into the particular
assets on hand during the marriage”); see also Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391,
405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (“In order to overcome the
7
Sanchez filed a motion to modify the final judgment, arguing that trial court had
erroneously listed the Properties as the “separate property” of the parties. The
motion was denied.
10
[community property] presumption, the party claiming separate property must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the property is, in fact, separate.”).
A jury’s finding as to the character of property—whether it is community or
separate—is binding on the trial court and the trial court may not disregard the
finding. Although a trial court is vested with wide discretion and authority in
dividing marital property and may even disregard advisory jury findings regarding
division, a court may not ignore jury findings “which extend to issues of fact from
which the status of property is determined.” Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 173
(citations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court made this clear in Cockerham,
where the Court held that “[t]he action of the trial court in disregarding the jury’s
answer regarding the status of the property was error.” Id.
A trial court is thus bound by jury findings on the factual question of
whether property is community or separate. Id. And equally relevant to our
analysis, a trial court is bound by a jury’s finding that a transfer of property from a
spouse to a third party is not a fraudulent transfer. See id. (holding trial court erred
in awarding husband interest in certain property because jury had already
determined wife had not fraudulently gifted such property to third party and thus
“there was no basis for the award to the husband”).
Separately, when a trial court “sua sponte disregards a [jury’s] finding, the
court’s action may be upheld only where the disregarded finding is immaterial.”
11
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Hayes, 507 S.W.3d 263, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2016), pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (quoting Harris Cty. v.
Gibbons, 150 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.));
see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bjornson, 831 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1992, no writ) (“[W]here the trial court, sua sponte, disregards jury
findings . . . such action can be upheld only where the disregarded findings are in
regard to immaterial issues.”) (citations omitted). A jury finding is immaterial
“when the trial court should not have submitted the question to the jury and the
jury’s finding does not apply to the case.” Hayes, 507 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Brown
v. Armstrong, 713 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)). A trial court may also disregard a jury finding when other jury
findings render it immaterial. Id. (citing C. & R. Transp., Inc. v. Campbell, 406
S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. 1966); Watson v. Nortex Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 830
S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1992, writ denied)). If the trial court
improperly disregards a jury’s findings, the court commits reversible error. See
generally Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); Gibbons, 150 S.W.3d at 885.8
8
See also Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (“A trial court is not at liberty to disregard a jury’s
answers to material issues.”); Harris Cty. v. Garza, 971 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (“The judge may not disregard [the
jury’s] answers to material issues, set aside findings and make contrary ones, hear
12
Analysis
After a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding that the parties’
residence in Houston was the only community property of the estate. As to the bail
bond Properties, the jury found that the Properties were not community property
and further that Sanchez had not committed fraud9 with respect to Hernandez’s
community property rights by transferring the Properties to her son Antonio,
finding that the transfers were “fair.”10
Although the jury was asked to determine whether the bail bond Properties
were community property, they were not asked to determine whether they were
separate property of the spouses. Because this question was not presented to the
jury, the trial court apparently believed there was error in the jury charge. No one
additional evidence and make supplementary findings on material issues, or select
from conflicting findings those which he approves.”) (citing Highlands Ins. Co. v.
Baugh, 605 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1980, no writ)). 9
The jury was instructed that a spouse commits fraud
if that spouse transfers community property or expends community
funds for the primary purpose of depriving the other spouse of the
use and enjoyment of the assets involved in the transaction. Such
fraud involves dishonesty or purpose to deceive.
(Emphasis in original.)
10
The jury was instructed that a “gift, transfer, or expenditure of community
property that is capricious, excessive, or arbitrary is unfair to the other spouse.”
Factors to be considered in determining the fairness of a transfer are (1) the
relationship between the spouse making the transfer and the recipient; (2) whether
special circumstances tended to justify the transfer; and (3) whether the
community funds used for the transfer were reasonable in proportion to the
community estate remaining.
13
objected to the charge or moved for a new trial on this basis. During a conference
following this Court’s order conditionally granting Sanchez’s petition for writ of
mandamus, however, the trial court stated that “the jury charge itself was
inadequate in that it did not actually characterize the property. And that’s—the
issue before the jury was the characterization of the property. They just—their
answer said what the property was not. It did not give the Court an option of what
the property was.” But under the circumstances and the evidence presented, that
was not a necessary finding. The only claims advanced by Hernandez were his
claim that the Properties were community property because the Properties had been
purchased with funds from his joint account with Sanchez and his claim that the
transfer of the Properties from Sanchez to her son was a fraud on the marital estate.
The jury rejected both claims finding that the Properties were not community
property, that Sanchez had not committed fraud on the community estate, and that
the transfer of the Properties to Antonio was “fair.” Those findings are supported
by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
The jury heard evidence that Antonio paid for the Properties with his funds,
that he did not use Sanchez’s or Hernandez’s funds for the Properties, that while
the Properties were initially Sanchez’s and Hernandez’s names, both understood
and agreed that the Properties were Antonio’s properties and would be transferred
to him when he became a U.S. citizen, and that Sanchez and Hernandez both
14
signed the deeds transferring the Properties before a notary public. Although
Hernandez testified that joint funds were used to purchase the Properties and that
he had not consented to the transfers, he provided no evidence that community
funds were used to purchase the Properties, and even if he had, the jury, as the sole
finder of fact, was at liberty to disregard his testimony and believe the testimony of
Antonio and Sanchez that the Properties were purchased by Antonio with his
separate funds and were his property. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 819 (Tex. 2005) (“Jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to give their testimony.”).
The jury’s findings that (1) the Properties were not community property,
(2) the transfer of the Properties to Antonio did not constitute fraud, and (3) the
transfer was fair are thus supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. It
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to disregard the jury’s findings and to
declare, without conducting a new trial on the matter, that the Properties were the
separate property of Sanchez and Hernandez with each owning a fifty percent
interest in the Properties as tenants in common, and further to include them in the
divorce decree’s property division. “Though the trial court has wide discretion in
dividing the property of the spouses as its feels just and in disregarding advisory
findings of the jury, it may not ignore the jury’s answers which extend to issues of
15
fact from which the status of property is determined.” Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at
173 (citing Stafford v. Stafford, 41 Tex. 111 (1874)).
In Cockerham, as in this case, the jury determined that the wife had not
fraudulently conveyed community property to a third party. 527 S.W.2d at 164,
173. The trial court disregarded the jury’s finding, concluding the wife “had
fraudulently taken community property and made gifts” to the third party, and
based on that finding, it awarded the husband a fifty percent interest in the
transferred property. Id. at 166, 173. On appeal, the court of appeals recognized
that while the testimony “was sharply conflicting on this issue and there was
certainly at least some evidence to support the jury’s answer,” the trial court
nonetheless “had the power to disregard the jury’s answer because answers of the
jury regarding disposition of property are advisory only.” Id. at 173. The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court’s disregarding the jury’s
answer regarding the property’s status was error. Id.
Other courts also have held that while a trial court may disregard a jury’s
finding as to the division of property, it may not disregard the jury’s findings as to
the characterization of property. See Nieto v. Nieto, No. 04-11-00807-CV, 2013
WL 1850780, at *13 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 1, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (“In making a division, the trial court may disregard a jury’s suggestion as to
the division of the property, but [it] may not disregard the jury’s findings as to the
16
status or characterization of the property[.]”) (citing Cockerham, 527 S.W.3d at
173). Simply put, “a trial court may not ignore jury findings which extend to issues
of fact from which the status of property is determined[.]” In re Marriage of
Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821, 838 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, no writ). Because the
trial court did so in this case, entering a final decree declaring that the bail bond
Properties are the separate property of the parties, in contravention of the jury’s
finding that the Properties are not community property and were not fraudulently
transferred to Antonio who now owns them, the trial court abused its discretion.
The parties requested a jury trial to determine the character of the parties’
homestead and the bail bond Properties, and the record does not reflect that either
party waived that right. The trial court was thus not at liberty to make that factual
determination nor was there any evidence supporting the trial court’s holding that
the bail bond Properties were the separate property of the parties.11 See In re
11
It is unclear whether the trial court granted a new trial after this Court
conditionally granted Sanchez’s petition for mandamus. While the trial court
initially stated that Hernandez was entitled to a new trial and that “we need to
make sure that we have everything in order the next time we go,” when the court
entered final judgment a year later, the court stated in the judgment that a jury trial
had been conducted and the judgment reflects the findings of the jury. It thus
appears that court did not grant a new trial. To the extent the court did so, the trial
court abused its discretion by entering judgment without conducting a new trial.
See Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Cook, 122 Tex. 446, 60 S.W.2d 764, 768 (1933)
(orig. proceeding) (“[T]he setting aside of the judgment, rendered upon the verdict
of the jury, was tantamount to granting a new trial, and another judgment could
not be entered without another trial.”) (citation omitted); Pinkley v. Vega, 768
S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989, no writ) (observing that because trial
court granted motion for new trial, “another judgment could not properly be
17
Marriage of Leeson¸ No. 13-23-00158-CV, 2025 WL 555766 at *5, 7 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial court
abused its discretion in denying husband’s request for jury trial because if jury had
believed husband’s claim that tract of land was his separate property, trial court
would have been forbidden from awarding tract to wife). Antonio testified that he
purchased and owned the bail bond Properties. And Sanchez testified that she did
not purchase or own the Properties but had legally transferred title of the Properties
to Antonio—a non-party—once he became a U.S. citizen. There was no evidence
presented at trial that Sanchez or Hernandez had any ownership interest in the
Properties, that community funds were used to purchase the Properties, or that the
Properties were the separate property of Sanchez or Hernandez. The trial court thus
abused its discretion in characterizing the bail bond Properties as the separate
property of the parties in the final judgment. See Sloan v. Sloan, 683 S.W.2d 751,
752–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (holding that district
court could not divest third person of her legal interest in property, reversing trial
entered without a trial.”) (citation omitted); cf. Otis Elevator Co. v. Bond, 373
S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1963), rev’d on other grounds, 388 S.W.2d
681 (Tex. 1965) (“Having decided to disregard the jury’s answer to the only issue
submitted on negligence of the Building, the court below should have granted a
new trial. He had no authority to substitute his own finding in that respect for that
of the jury.”); Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex.
2005) (“[W]hen the trial court grants a motion for new trial, the court essentially
wipes the slate clean and starts over.”).
18
court and rendering judgment that certain property was not community property
and that spouses take nothing as to that property).
Conclusion
We reverse and vacate that portion of the trial court’s final decree of divorce
declaring that the Properties are Sanchez’s and Hernandez’s separate property and
awarding each a fifty percent interest in the Properties as tenants in common, and
render judgment that the Properties are not community property, that they were not
fraudulently transferred to Sanchez’s adult son, and that Sanchez and Hernandez
take nothing as to the Properties. We affirm the final decree of divorce in all other
respects.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
19