United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1880
EDUARDO TAYLOR,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HUNG CAO,* Acting Secretary of the Navy,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Dunlap, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Dane Robert Voris, with whom Michael John McMahon, Matthew
Oliver, and Cooley LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Nicole M. O'Connor, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
July 7, 2026
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao is automatically substituted
for former Secretary of the Navy John C. Phelan as appellee.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Eduardo "Ed" Taylor appeals from
an order of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granting Defendant-Appellee the Secretary of the
Navy's cross-motion for summary judgment and denying Taylor's
motion for summary judgment. The district court upheld the denial
by the Board for Correction of Naval Records (the "Board" or
"BCNR") of Taylor's application in 2022 to upgrade his 1986
discharge from the Marine Corps from "Other Than Honorable" to
"Honorable." Taylor argues that the Board failed to apply
Department of Defense ("DOD") guidance concerning veterans
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") and other
mental health conditions and failed to adequately explain its
decision. He further contends that the district court employed an
overly deferential standard of review.
On de novo review, we reject Taylor's challenge to the
BCNR's decision and affirm the district court's order.
I.
We recount the following facts from the administrative
record before the Board. Taylor, who is African American, spent
large portions of his upbringing in Medford, Massachusetts, where
he experienced significant racial hostility, including the murder
of a close friend by a local white gang. Following his high school
graduation in 1981, he served for over two years in the National
Guard. On December 22, 1983, he enlisted in the United States
- 2 -Marine Corps (the "Marine Corps"). In 1984, he graduated from
Marine bootcamp as the "Honorman," or outstanding recruit in his
platoon. He completed the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Training
("Amtrac") Program and was assigned to Company C, 3d Assault
Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division, at Camp Pendleton in
California ("Charlie Company") as an Amtrac crewman.
In his Marine Corps enlistment application, Taylor
acknowledged he had experimentally used marijuana during his Guard
service and had been arrested once for disorderly conduct. His
command was notified in February 1984 that he had a positive
urinalysis from December 1983. The command chose not to discipline
Taylor because the positive test was around the time of his initial
enlistment. Instead, he was notified of the Marine Corps drug
policy.
While serving in Charlie Company, Taylor experienced
racial discrimination and harassment. He began to abuse alcohol
to cope with these traumatic experiences. During this period,
Taylor received three "non-judicial punishments" ("NJPs").1 First,
on August 7, 1984, he received an NJP for "disrespectful language"
after an incident in which he insulted a corporal. Taylor's
December 2022 application stated that he believed he was targeted
1 A "non-judicial punishment" may be administratively
imposed by a commanding officer "for minor offenses without the
intervention of a court-martial." 10 U.S.C. § 815(b).
- 3 -based on his race when the white corporal ordered him to sweep a
floor despite an ankle injury that impeded Taylor's ability to
walk. On February 12, 1986, Taylor received an NJP for two
specifications of assault after entering into a physical
altercation with two lance corporals while he was intoxicated.
Taylor, who had known both men since bootcamp and was friends with
one, in his application characterized the incident as a "scuffle"
leaving "no hard feelings." According to a sworn statement
submitted at Taylor's discharge proceedings, the incident also
involved a woman who was present and used a racial slur against
Taylor. On May 30, 1986, Taylor received a third NJP on charges
of conspiring to wrongfully appropriate and wrongfully
appropriating a stereo. The Marine who implicated Taylor in the
theft later recanted his statement. This recantation was
considered by the Navy before Taylor was discharged. Taylor did
not appeal any of these NJPs.
In addition, Taylor was formally counseled four times
between July 1985 and April 1986, first for poor judgment, then
for lack of professionalism and professional deficiencies, and
finally for driving while intoxicated.
In February 1986, Taylor was arrested for driving under
the influence after he crashed his car on base in Camp Pendleton.
His base driving privileges were suspended, but nonetheless he
continued to drive on base, was caught, and received a disciplinary
- 4 -citation on May 14, 1986. In June 1986, he tested positive for
cocaine in a urinalysis. In his application for correction of his
military record, he denied intentionally using cocaine, arguing
that he might have smoked a cigarette laced with the substance.
The positive urinalysis and Taylor's violation of the base's
driving rules were referred to summary court martial proceedings.
On July 24, 1986, Taylor was found not guilty of using cocaine but
guilty of driving without privileges.
Taylor was then transferred to a new command, Company A,
3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division ("Alpha
Company"), where he faced no racial incidents, performed
successfully, and did not incur any disciplinary charges. On
September 15, 1986, shortly after Taylor's transfer to Alpha
Company, the Marine Corps initiated separation proceedings. The
Corps cited Taylor's "pattern of misconduct" based on his three
NJPs and his summary court martial conviction. As part of the
separation proceedings, Taylor underwent a physical examination,
in which he denied experiencing challenges with his mental health.
He acknowledged his alcohol problem and requested treatment.
Members of the naval service may receive one of three
administrative discharge characterizations relevant here:
(1) "Honorable," which is "contingent upon proper military
behavior and performance of duty"; (2) "Under Honorable
Conditions" or "General Discharge," which constitutes service "not
- 5 -sufficiently meritorious to warrant an Honorable Discharge"; and
(3) "Under Other Than Honorable Conditions." 32 C.F.R.
§ 724.109(a). On December 4, 1986, Taylor was discharged with an
Other Than Honorable characterization of his service. During his
time in the National Guard and the Marine Corps, he was never
deployed abroad and never served in active combat.
Following his service, Taylor returned to Massachusetts,
where he worked as a plumber for twelve years and eventually
started his own plumbing business. After a series of personal
losses in the 2000s, Taylor struggled with drug and alcohol abuse
and by 2020 had lost his job and home. He sought treatment for
his alcohol use and achieved sobriety. While attending treatment,
he began receiving therapy and was later diagnosed with PTSD
sometime between 2020 and 2022.
II.
The Secretary of a military department "may correct any
military record of [that] . . . department when the Secretary
considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice."
10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). Such corrections are generally made
"through boards of civilians" within the military department. Id.
For the Department of the Navy, the Secretary has established the
BCNR, which consists of civilian members of the Department of the
Navy. 32 C.F.R. § 723.2(a). The BCNR considers applications to
determine whether there is an "error or injustice in the naval
- 6 -records of current and former members of the Navy and Marine Corps"
and may "make recommendations to the Secretary or . . . take
corrective action on the Secretary's behalf when authorized." Id.
§ 723.2(b). "Applications for correction" must generally be filed
"within [three] years after discovery of the alleged error or
injustice," though the Board may excuse an untimely filing if doing
so "would be in the interest of justice." 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(b);
see 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b).
Congress has codified additional procedures for a subset
of discharge review claims involving PTSD or traumatic brain
injury. Those procedures apply when a former service member seeks
"review of a discharge or dismissal" and the claim is "based in
whole or in part on matters relating to [PTSD] or traumatic brain
injury," and the PTSD or traumatic brain injury "is related to
combat or military sexual trauma, as determined by the Secretary
concerned." 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(1). For those claims, the Board
must review medical evidence presented by the claimant and must
"review the claim with liberal consideration" to whether PTSD or
traumatic brain injury "potentially contributed to the
circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal or to the
original characterization of the . . . discharge or dismissal."
Id. § 1552(h)(2). When reviewing a claim covered by
subsection (h), the Board must also "seek advice and counsel" from
"a psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker with training on
- 7 -mental health issues associated with [PTSD] or traumatic brain
injury or other trauma as specified in the current edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by
the American Psychiatric Association." Id. § 1552(g)(2).
Taylor expressly acknowledges that his PTSD diagnosis is
unrelated to combat or military sexual trauma and so disclaims
reliance on § 1552(h)'s codified "liberal consideration"
procedures. He argues instead that applicable DOD memoranda
required the Board to give liberal and special consideration to
two aspects of his discharge upgrade application: whether his PTSD
and major depressive disorder existed during his Marine Corps
service, and whether those conditions excused or mitigated the
misconduct that led to his Other Than Honorable discharge. The
Board here stated that it considered Taylor's application under
three such DOD memoranda: the Hagel, Kurta, and Wilkie Memoranda.
We take them in turn.
First, on September 3, 2014, then Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel issued guidance regarding discharge upgrade requests
by veterans claiming previously unrecognized PTSD. The "Hagel
Memorandum" recognized that PTSD was not understood or diagnosed
during earlier periods of service and that, in many cases,
"diagnoses were not made until decades after service was
completed." The memorandum explained that this history had made
it "extremely difficult" for veterans to document either the
- 8 -existence of PTSD at the time of service or a nexus between PTSD
and the in-service misconduct underlying an Other Than Honorable
discharge. The memorandum instructed boards to "fully and
carefully consider every petition based on PTSD" and to give
"[l]iberal consideration" to "petitions for changes in
characterization of service to Service treatment record entries
which document one or more symptoms . . . which meet the diagnostic
criteria of [PTSD] or related conditions." In particular, the
memorandum said boards should give "liberal consideration" to a
later "finding that PTSD existed at the time of service."
On August 25, 2017, then Acting Undersecretary of
Defense Anthony M. Kurta issued clarifying guidance for discharge
review boards and correction boards reviewing requests for
discharge relief "due in whole or in part to mental health
conditions, including [PTSD]." The "Kurta Memorandum" instructs
that, "[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary, a diagnosis
rendered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is evidence
[that a] veteran had a condition that may excuse or mitigate the
discharge." The memorandum also states that "[c]onditions or
experiences that may reasonably have existed at the time of
discharge will be liberally considered as excusing or mitigating
the discharge." It cautions, however, that "[i]n some cases, the
severity of misconduct may outweigh any mitigation from mental
- 9 -health conditions, including PTSD," and that "[l]iberal
consideration does not mandate an upgrade."
Finally, on July 25, 2018, then Undersecretary of
Defense Robert L. Wilkie issued guidance concerning equity,
injustice, and clemency determinations by discharge review boards
and correction boards. The "Wilkie Memorandum" provides standards
for determining whether relief, including a discharge upgrade, is
warranted on "equity, injustice, or clemency" grounds. It states
that "[r]equests for relief based in whole or in part on a mental
health condition, including [PTSD] . . . should be considered for
relief on equitable, injustice, or clemency grounds whenever there
is insufficient evidence to warrant relief for an error or
impropriety." It also directs boards to consider, among other
factors, any "aggravating and mitigating facts related to the
record." The memorandum reinforced that DOD "guidance does not
mandate relief" and leaves "[t]he relative weight" of its
principles "within the sound discretion of each board," while also
instructing boards to consider the "military custom and practice"
of "punish[ing] only to the extent necessary,
. . . rehabilitat[ing] to the greatest extent possible, and
. . . favor[ing] second chances" where appropriate.
III.
By letter dated December 1, 2022, Taylor submitted
through counsel an application to the BCNR seeking, among other
- 10 -things, "to upgrade [his] character of service from Other than
Honorable to Honorable." Taylor primarily argued that his Other
Than Honorable discharge was "inequitable because it resulted from
conduct caused by undiagnosed PTSD and [major depressive
disorder]." He noted that, since his 1986 discharge, "military
programs and regulations concerning mental health and
administrative discharge" have become "far more favorable" and
more comprehensive for service members. He also argued that his
"overall exemplary service" and meritorious "post-service conduct"
"further justif[ied] an upgrade to his unjust [Other Than
Honorable] discharge."
In support of his application, Taylor submitted an
assessment report by Sandra A. Dixon, a licensed psychologist,
dated December 1, 2022. Before preparing her report, Dr. Dixon
conducted video interviews with Taylor, administered a diagnostic
assessment tool for PTSD, and reviewed his medical and military
personnel records. She concluded that Taylor did not meet the
criteria for PTSD or major depressive disorder in June 1984 while
stationed at Camp Pendleton but did meet the criteria for both
diagnoses by "May 1986 while stationed at Camp Pendleton after
experiencing multiple traumatic events." She found that "[a]t
some point" during his service, "in response to [Taylor]
experiencing multiple traumatic incidents of racism, he began to
have significant trauma responses." Dr. Dixon also concluded
- 11 -that, at the time of the assessment, Taylor met "the criteria for
the diagnosis of PTSD, at a severe level, and has done so since
discharge from the U.S. Marine Corps." She stated that his "PTSD
directly contributed to his abuse of alcohol and pattern of
misconduct." Dr. Dixon's report also concluded that there was a
"nexus" between Taylor's mental health disorders and the
misconduct that led to his discharge. This section of her report
did not separately examine each incident of misconduct, but
generally concluded that, as Taylor "was struggling with PTSD
symptoms, . . . his functioning began to deteriorate."
As part of its review, the Board referred Taylor's
application to a Navy licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Molly
Summers, for an advisory opinion. Dr. Summers concluded that it
was "possible that some of [Taylor's] misconduct could be
attributed to undiagnosed symptoms of PTSD or depression"; that it
was "plausible that his alcohol use may have increased and become
more problematic in the context of stressors during military
service"; and that it was "possible that assault and disrespectful
language could be attributed to unrecognized symptoms of
irritability associated with PTSD." But she reasoned that not all
of Taylor's misconduct could be attributed to his mental health
diagnoses. First, Dr. Summers noted that Taylor had acknowledged
pre-enlistment substance use and had a positive urinalysis in
December 1983, before the period in which he claimed to have
- 12 -incurred PTSD and major depressive disorder. Second, she stated
that Taylor "denie[d] the charges of theft and cocaine usage, [so]
that misconduct c[ould] not be attributed to a mental health
condition."
On April 13, 2023, Taylor's counsel responded to
Dr. Summers's advisory opinion. Counsel argued that Dr. Summers
understated the connection between Taylor's PTSD and his inservice misconduct and neglected to take into account his
accomplishments during his military service. Taylor's counsel
also argued that although Taylor had denied the charges of theft
and cocaine usage, "[c]ontrary to the Opinion, if those incidents
evidence anything, it is that [Taylor's] untreated PTSD and
MDD -- along with his efforts to self-medicate the same -- caused
him to put himself in situations that he otherwise would not have,
even if he was ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing."
On May 2, 2023, the Board denied Taylor's application.
In its decision letter, the Board stated that it had "carefully
considered all potentially mitigating and/or extenuating factors
to determine whether the interests of justice warrant relief in
[Taylor's] case in accordance with the Kurta, Hagel, and Wilkie
Memos." The Board noted that it had considered among those factors
Taylor's "contention that [he was] struggling with undiagnosed
mental health issues caused by racial harassment," "the impact
that [his] mental health had on [his] conduct during service," and
- 13 -his "assertion that [he was] self-medicating with alcohol." The
Board acknowledged the evidence that Taylor had provided in support
of his PTSD diagnosis, including Dr. Dixon's report, his
Department of Veterans Affairs treatment progress notes, and a
disability benefits questionnaire referencing his PTSD diagnosis.
It also considered Dr. Summers's advisory opinion and Taylor's
response to that opinion, including his arguments about the
mitigating factors for his various incidents of misconduct. The
Board found that "the potentially mitigating factors were
insufficient to warrant relief" in light of the "seriousness of
[Taylor's] misconduct and the fact that it involved assault and a
DUI." The Board noted that Taylor "attribute[d] most of [his]
misconduct to drinking or being drunk at the time the misconduct
was committed." Ultimately, the Board "concluded that at least
some of [Taylor's] misconduct was not due to mental health-related
symptoms, rather, was intentional and demonstrate[d]" that he was
"unfit for further service."
On June 6, 2024, Taylor filed a complaint against then
Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro in the District Court for
the District of Massachusetts. Taylor argued that the Board erred
in rejecting his service characterization upgrade, and he
requested either an injunction directing "the BCNR to correct [his]
record in accordance with his December 5, 2022 petition for a
discharge upgrade," or an order "hold[ing] unlawful and set[ting]
- 14 -aside the BCNR's May 2, 2023 decision and remand[ing] with
instructions to review [his] BCNR petition in accordance with the
Hagel, Kurta, and Wilkie Memos and all other applicable laws."
On December 20, 2024, Taylor moved for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, requesting that
the Court "remand this case to the Board . . . with instructions
to consider [Taylor's] discharge-upgrade petition in accordance
with governing law and binding Department of Defense guidance."
Del Toro opposed and cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court held that "under [its] 'unusually deferential'
review, '"substantial evidence" of "probable material error or
injustice,"'" and therefore upheld the Board's decision. Taylor
v. Phelan, No. 24-CV-11479-PBS, 2025 WL 2371299, at *6 (D. Mass.
Aug. 14, 2025) (quoting Mahoney v. Del Toro, 99 F.4th 25, 34 n.2,
35 (1st Cir. 2024)). The court denied Taylor's motion and granted
Del Toro's cross motion. Id. Taylor timely appealed.
IV.
A.
We begin with Taylor's contention that "the District
Court abdicated its responsibility to set aside arbitrary and
capricious agency action by reviewing [Taylor's] claims through an
'unusually deferential' standard that has no application here."
The parties agree that, under the APA, a court may set
aside a BCNR decision if that decision is "arbitrary, capricious,
- 15 -an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or if the decision is "unsupported by
substantial evidence," id. § 706(2)(E). This court reviews the
administrative record de novo, focusing on the Board's decision
and "afford[ing] no special deference to the district court's
determination[]." Sasen v. Spencer, 879 F.3d 354, 360 (1st Cir.
2018).
The parties also agree that courts -- including this
court -- have consistently held that BCNR decisions are typically
entitled to "unusual" deference, in the sense that "[i]t is simply
more difficult to say that the Secretary has acted arbitrarily if
he is authorized to act 'when he considers it necessary to correct
an error or remove an injustice' . . . than it is if he is required
to act whenever a court determines that certain objective
conditions are met." Kreis v. Sec'y of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Kreis I"); see Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 34;
Bolton v. Dep't of the Navy Bd. for Corr. of Naval Recs., 914 F.3d
401, 407 (6th Cir. 2019) (reviewing the decision of a military
board under "an unusually deferential application of the
'arbitrary or capricious' standard"); Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d
360, 368 (5th Cir. 2008) (reviewing a military board judgment under
an "exceptionally deferential" standard). Taylor argues, however,
that the "unusually deferential" standard applies only in "narrow
and circumscribed" circumstances. In his view, courts owe such
- 16 -deference only when the Board makes a "forward-looking, subjective
assessment," not when it makes an "'objective,' backward-looking
evidentiary determination of actual 'error' or 'injustice' in the
records themselves" (quoting Kreis I, 866 F.2d at 1514).
We reject that distinction as inconsistent with the text
of the Board's governing statute. Our holding in Mahoney rested
on that text, which provides that the Secretary of the Navy "may
correct any military record of [the Navy] when [he] considers it
necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice," 10 U.S.C.
§ 1552(a)(1) (emphasis added). See Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 34. We
expressly agreed with the D.C. Circuit that this language
"substantially restrict[s] the authority of the reviewing court to
upset the Secretary's determination." Id. (quoting Kreis I, 866
F.2d at 1514). The text of the statute does not condition the
Secretary's broad authority on whether or not a particular case
involves a forward-looking determination of necessity or a
backward-looking determination of whether error or injustice
occurred.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Cone v. Caldera, which
Taylor cites in his briefing, illustrates why the "unusually
deferential application of the 'arbitrary or capricious' standard"
applies here. 223 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Kreis I,
866 F.2d at 1514). Cone, a former captain in the United States
Army, challenged the Army's refusal to amend his Officer Evaluation
- 17 -Report, arguing that his senior rater had failed to maintain a
rating profile that approximated a bell-shaped curve. Id. at
790-92. The D.C. Circuit applied the "unusually deferential
application of the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard" of the
APA. Id. at 793 (quoting Kreis I, 866 F.2d at 1514). The court
explained that, in reviewing the decisions of a military correction
board, that standard "is calculated to ensure that the courts do
not become a forum for appeals by every soldier dissatisfied" with
military action against him, "a result that would destabilize
military command and take the judiciary far afield of its area of
competence." Id. That reasoning applies with equal force here.
The BCNR was charged with determining whether Taylor had
demonstrated an error or injustice warranting correction of his
service characterization. Like Cone, Taylor seeks judicial review
of a correction board's refusal to alter a military record.
Nothing removes Taylor's case from the Secretary's broad
discretion granted by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a), to which we apply
unusual deference.
Moreover, even if the "unusually deferential"
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
applied only where "military judgment requiring military
expertise" is involved, Kreis v. Sec'y of Air Force, 406 F.3d 684,
686 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Kreis II"), the Board's determination here
involved such judgment. Unlike Kreis II, which concerned "the
- 18 -Board's application of a procedural regulation governing its case
adjudication process," id., this case involved the BCNR's
assessment of whether Taylor's serious misconduct, including
assault on his fellow service members and driving on base after
his driving privileges had been suspended following a DUI arrest,
affected "the good order and discipline of [his] command," "pose[d]
an unnecessary risk to the safety of fellow service members," and
"render[ed] [him] unfit for" further service. The Board is
empowered to consider whether such misconduct interferes with
discipline, the operation of a military installation, and the
safety of fellow soldiers, and that assessment is the type of
military judgment to which unusually deferential review applies.
See Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 41; Cone, 223 F.3d at 793-95.
B.
Turning to the merits, Taylor's next argument is that
"the [district court] erred in concluding that the Board gave [his]
application the 'liberal' and 'special' consideration" mandated by
the Hagel, Kurta, and Wilkie memoranda. On de novo review, and
giving unusual deference to the Board, we see no basis to upset
the Board's decision.
Taylor's argument that "the Board failed to give liberal
and special consideration to the question of whether [his] PTSD
and major depression existed during his military service" is
undercut by the essential components of the Board's decision
- 19 -letter. In accordance with the Kurta Memorandum, the Board did
not ignore or dispute the existence of Taylor's post-service PTSD
and major depressive disorder diagnoses. It "carefully
considered" Taylor's "contention that [he was] struggling with
undiagnosed mental health issues caused by racial harassment," as
well as "the impact that [his] mental health had on [his] conduct
during service" and his "assertion that [he was] self-medicating
with alcohol." The Board quoted from Dr. Summers's evaluation,
including her conclusion that there existed "post-service evidence
to attribute some of [Taylor's] misconduct to symptoms of PTSD or
another mental health condition" (emphasis added). The Board took
into account Taylor's diagnoses, as well as the evidence linking
them to Taylor's military service.
The Board concluded, based on the record evidence before
it, that Taylor's diagnoses did not account for or mitigate all of
the misconduct underlying his discharge. The relevant memoranda
instruct the BCNR to engage in precisely this exercise. The Hagel
Memorandum states that "Correction Boards will exercise caution in
weighing evidence of mitigation in cases in which serious
misconduct precipitated a discharge with a characterization of
service of under other than honorable conditions," and the Kurta
Memorandum clarifies that "[i]n some cases, the severity of
misconduct may outweigh any mitigation from mental health
conditions, including PTSD." Applying this guidance, the Board
- 20 -found that Taylor's serious misconduct -- including, as mentioned,
assault and DUI-related driving misconduct -- outweighed the
mitigating factors he presented, including his post-service mental
health diagnoses, which the Board accepted, and evidence linking
those diagnoses to his military service.
The Board did state that Taylor's diagnoses were
"temporally remote" to his service and noted that he did not raise
mental health concerns at the time that he was disciplined. Read
alone, this statement appears in tension with the Hagel
Memorandum's instruction that "in cases where Service records
. . . substantiate the existence of one or more symptoms of what
is now recognized as PTSD or a PTSD-related condition during the
time of service, liberal consideration will be given to finding
that PTSD existed at the time of service." See also Kurta
Memorandum at 2 ("A diagnosis made by a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist that the condition existed during military service
will receive liberal consideration."). Read in the context of the
full decision, however, the Board did not discount Taylor's postservice diagnosis and did not treat the lack of an in-service
diagnosis as dispositive. The Board discussed both Dr. Dixon's
and Dr. Summers's reports and stated that it "gave liberal and
special consideration to [Taylor's] . . . contentions about mental
health and the possible adverse impact [his] mental health had on
[his] conduct during service." The Board further explained that,
- 21 -notwithstanding these diagnoses, the record evidence did not
establish that Taylor's PTSD accounted for or mitigated all of the
serious misconduct underlying his discharge or outweighed the
seriousness of that misconduct. In particular, the Board
emphasized Taylor's "driving while in a suspended status after
being arrested for DUI and totaling [his] car," indicating that it
viewed this misconduct as "intentional conduct" rendering him
"unfit for further service." Thus, it appears that the Board did
not disregard Taylor's PTSD but instead simply concluded that
conduct not attributable to PTSD justified his discharge
characterization. The Board also took into account Taylor's
contention, as supported by the psychologists' evaluations, that
his in-service alcohol use was an attempt to self-medicate his
PTSD symptoms. With this context and applying the "unusually
deferential" standard of review, the Board's "temporally remote"
remark does not discount Taylor's diagnoses and does not warrant
remand to the Board for reconsideration.
C.
Taylor next contends that the "district court erred in
concluding that the Board engaged in reasoned decisionmaking." On
de novo review, we agree that the Board's decision was "'supported
by a[] rational view of the record' and was reasonably 'based on
a consideration of the relevant factors.'" Mahoney, 99 F.4th at
36 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting
- 22 -Atieh v. Riordan, 797 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2015); and then
quoting U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n,
876 F.3d 360, 368 (1st Cir. 2015)). The Board explained that it
took into account the mitigating factors presented in the record
and weighed those factors against the seriousness of Taylor's
misconduct, including the "likely negative impact [Taylor's]
conduct had on the good order and discipline of [his] command" and
the "unnecessary risk" posed "to the safety of fellow service
members." The Board reasonably concluded that "given the totality
of the circumstances," a service characterization upgrade was
unwarranted.
We further reject Taylor's contention that the Board
failed to adequately consider his other mitigating conduct,
including his graduation as platoon Honorman and his strong
performance in Alpha Company. An agency board "is not required to
'discuss every piece of evidence offered,'" provided that it takes
into account "all relevant evidence in the record." Khanal v.
Blanche, 168 F.4th 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2026) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Aguilar-Escoto v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 334, 337 (1st Cir. 2017)).
And the Board did explicitly consider the fact that "all of
[Taylor's] misconduct in-service occurred while [he was] assigned
to Charlie Company, where [he] suffered racial harassment." The
Board's decision letter further stated that it considered the
entire administrative record before it, including letters
- 23 -submitted in support of Taylor's character and "documentation
related to [his] post-service accomplishments." Contrary to
Taylor's argument, the Board did not "turn a blind eye" to the
mitigating evidence in Taylor's favor.
Taylor is also incorrect that the Board misapplied its
precedent. While an agency "must respect its own precedent,"
Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010), so long
as it "'has given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made
adequate findings,' it is not required to 'expressly parse or
refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence
offered by the petitioner,'" H.H. v. Garland, 52 F.4th 8, 23 (1st
Cir. 2022) (quoting Wei Guang Wang v. B.I.A., 437 F.3d 270, 275
(2d Cir. 2006)). In his application for correction of his military
records below, Taylor attached a copy of a prior case, Docket
No. 1542-05, where the Board had corrected the record of a Marine
who had suffered racial discrimination and had been "disciplined
for a series of relatively minor transgressions." After explicitly
stating that it had "considered" Taylor's "application together
with all material submitted in support thereof," the Board declined
to correct Taylor's record due to the "seriousness of [his]
misconduct." We do not consider the Board to have "depart[ed]
significantly from its own precedent" in reaching a different
outcome in Taylor's case, where it clearly did not consider his
misconduct to be minor. Lafortune v. Garland, 110 F.4th 426, 434
- 24 -(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Thompson v. Barr, 959 F.3d 476, 484 (1st
Cir. 2020)). Rather, when confronted with these materially
different cases, the Board was under no requirement to "confront
the issue [of its precedent] squarely and explain why [its]
departure [was] reasonable." Id. (quoting Thompson, 959 F.3d at
484).
V.
While others might have concluded that an equitable
remedy was appropriate -- particularly in light of Taylor's
evidence that the racial discrimination he suffered at Camp
Pendleton caused his PTSD, which in turn contributed partly to his
Other Than Honorable discharge -- we must give unusual deference
to the BCNR's contrary conclusion. Because the Board's "decision
is supported by [a] rational view of the record," we as the
"reviewing court must uphold it" and "may not substitute [our]
judgment for that of the [Board]." Atieh, 797 F.3d at 138. The
district court's decision is affirmed.
- 25 -