Sullivan v. Schiman

majority opinion

2026 IL App (3d) 250543

Opinion filed July 7, 2026

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2026

WILLIAM SULLIVAN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) La Salle County, Illinois.

)

v. ) Appeal No. 3-25-0543

) Circuit No. 22-LA-96

ALLISON SCHIMAN; ALLY ANDERSON, )

LLC; and RODNEY PEREZ, ) The Honorable

) Jason A. Helland,

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Davenport and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This is a defamation case, but the Sullivan here is not the Sullivan from New York Times

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Here, Dr. William Sullivan is a private individual who asks

whether a plaintiff who proves defamation per se and suffers mental anguish is entitled to more

than a dollar. Under these facts, the answer is yes.

¶2 Allison Schiman posted on Facebook—falsely—that Sullivan sexually abused her during

an examination, and Rodney Perez later reposted the allegations. Following a multi-day bench

trial, the circuit court agreed that Sullivan was actually (not just presumptively) harmed but

awarded $1 in nominal damages. The circuit court also denied Sullivan’s motion for sanctions

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(b) (eff. July 1, 2002) and Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018),

based on alleged false statements by Perez in his responses to Sullivan’s requests to admit. This

appeal ensued.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 23, 2022, Schiman went to the St. Margaret’s Hospital emergency room for

treatment of severe abdominal pain. Sullivan, an emergency physician, performed a physical

examination of Schiman. Based on the examination, Sullivan informed Schiman that he

recommended performing a rectal exam to assess for the presence of blood and mucus. Schiman

consented, and Sullivan performed the exam with a nurse present. Shortly after the exam, Schiman

accused Sullivan of performing an unnecessary rectal exam in an aggressive manner. The next

day, she filed complaints with the hospital, the Illinois Medical Board, and the Spring Valley Police

Department, alleging that Sullivan sexually assaulted her during the exam. On March 25, 2022,

the Bureau County State’s Attorney’s Office declined to file any charges and closed the case.

¶5 On March 31, 2022, Schiman posted the following statement (the Post) on Facebook:

“WARNING SPRING VALLEY/PERU/SURROUNDING AREAS: DR. WILLIAM

SULLIVAN, an ER doctor at St. Margaret’s Hospital, Spring Valley—SEXUALLUY

ASSAULTED ME IN THE ER, WITH a nurse in the room. He was supposed to give me

a rectal exam (I have had endless exams like this, I’m a 30 year Crohns pt) & without lube,

he shoved his fingers aggressively up my rectum & when I cried out he violently twisted

his hand inside of me. My rectum was torn. The nurse told me ‘he didn’t know you had

been raped before!’ When I called someone in from the hospital, they isolated me &

wouldn’t let my mom back. When they finally let her back, they gave her 5 min & stood

with us the entire time. They then let him continue to treat me all evening. I had to do a

rape kit exam & police interrogation. The state [sic] attorneys [sic] office threw out charges

without even speaking to me. HE HAS A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW DEGREE

AND A MEDICAL DEGREE. He knows EXACTLY what he can get away with. The

police told me this is not his first complaint to them. Yet St. Margaret’s keeps him on &

defends him. DO NOT GO THERE. This man is violent & aggressive. Please don’t let

your loved ones near him or this hospital!!!”

¶6 Schiman posted the statement on the City of Peru Updates and Information Facebook page

(the City of Peru Facebook page). Perez, the page’s administrator, commented that he believed the

post was true and compared Sullivan to another local physician who had been charged with a sex

crime. Perez then made the Post a “featured post” so that it would be the first post on the Facebook

page.

¶7 On July 11, 2022, Sullivan filed a complaint alleging defamation per se (counts I, II, and

III), false light (counts IV, V, and VI), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)

(counts VII and VIII) against Schiman (counts I, IV, and VII), Perez (counts II, V, and VIII), and

Ally Anderson, LLC (Anderson LLC) (counts III and VI). Anderson LLC is a limited liability

company, with Schiman listed as the sole managing member. On July 12, 2023, the court entered

a default against Anderson LLC for failing to retain counsel; the default was never vacated.

¶8 The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Sullivan sought summary

judgment on his defamation per se claims, Schiman sought summary judgment on Sullivan’s

defamation per se and IIED claims, and Perez sought summary judgment on Sullivan’s IIED

claim. On October 28, 2024, the trial court denied Sullivan’s motion and granted Schiman’s motion

as to Sullivan’s IIED claim. On December 20, 2024, the court granted Perez’s motion as to

Sullivan’s IIED claim against Perez.

¶9 The court held a four-day bench trial, beginning on June 2, 2025. Sullivan testified as

follows. He is trained in emergency medicine and internal medicine. He has been licensed to

practice medicine in Illinois since 2000. He has served as a clinical assistant professor of

emergency medicine at Midwestern University since 1997 and was a clinical assistant professor

of emergency medicine at the University of Chicago from 2000 to 2018. He is a past president of

the Illinois College of Emergency Physicians and a past chair of the American College of

Emergency Physicians, Medical/Legal Committee. He also authored several chapters in

emergency medicine and frequently lectures on emergency medicine issues, both locally and

nationally. Sullivan worked in the emergency room at St. Margaret’s Hospital in Streator, Illinois,

from 2003 to 2011. Thereafter, he worked in the emergency room at St. Margaret’s Hospital in

Spring Valley, Illinois.

¶ 10 On January 23, 2022, Sullivan was taking over the medical care of patients as another

doctor was leaving. Sullivan learned that Schiman came to the emergency room complaining of

abdominal pain. She had also visited the emergency room the previous day with a complaint of a

headache. The earlier-treating physician had ordered lab work and an anti-inflammatory named

Toradol.

¶ 11 According to Sullivan, when he first evaluated Schiman, she told him that she had taken

Toradol that day and that she had already exceeded the maximum dose, so Sullivan cancelled the

dose of Toradol. Schiman indicated her pain level was 10 out of 10. Schiman asked Sullivan what

he was going to do about her pain and he stated that he was not comfortable giving her additional

opiates to treat the pain. Sullivan was also uneasy prescribing opiate medication because “several

things with her story weren’t matching up” and the previous day she received a large dose of

Dilaudid, a strong opiate.

¶ 12 Sullivan did a full exam of Schiman. Based on the exam and her history of colitis, he was

concerned Schiman had a colitis flare-up. In light of her pain and medical history, Sullivan

informed Schiman that a rectal exam was needed, and she consented to the exam.

¶ 13 Per normal procedure, Sullivan asked a nurse, Megan McNally, to be present during the

exam. McNally retrieved the lubrication and gloves and set them on a tray next to Schiman’s bed.

Sullivan put on the gloves and lubrication and performed the exam. Sullivan indicated there was

no blood on the glove, disposed of the gloves, washed his hands, and left the room.

¶ 14 After Sullivan exited the room, McNally likewise left the room and informed Sullivan that

Schiman was upset because he had not asked her if she had been raped before. She also told

Sullivan that Schiman made a complaint to an administrator at the hospital that the exam was

aggressive and unnecessary. Schiman also requested that Sullivan stay out of her room unless

absolutely necessary. Sullivan did not go back into the room.

¶ 15 Several days later, Sullivan learned that Schiman filed a complaint against him with the

hospital, the Illinois Medical Board, and the police department. In March 2022, Sullivan learned

that the police investigation against him was closed with no charges being filed.

¶ 16 After another few days, Sullivan learned of Schiman’s post on Facebook. Sullivan was

upset, withdrawn, angry, and fearful that he would lose his job at the hospital. A few days later

Sullivan learned of Perez’s posts regarding the incident.

¶ 17 After the Facebook posts, Sullivan had trouble sleeping, felt humiliated, and worried that

patients would find out about the allegations. Sullivan stated he avoided doing pelvic and rectal

exams following the allegations. Within the first two or three weeks of the post, Sullivan learned

that two patients left the emergency room after learning that he was the doctor on call, but he could

not state that they left because of the Facebook posts. Sullivan also did not participate in a woman’s

rights campaign because he was concerned that Schiman and/or Perez would post something about

him. Since this occurred, Sullivan has had to rebuild relationships and credibility with family,

colleagues, and hospital staff. He testified that he is “not the same me.” Including after the Post,

Sullivan knows of patients who go to the emergency room specifically because he is there. Sullivan

denied sexually assaulting Schiman.

¶ 18 McNally also testified. She stated that she is an emergency room nurse who was involved

in the treatment of Schiman on January 23, 2022. On that day, Sullivan asked McNally to be a

chaperone in the room while he conducted a rectal exam on Schiman. McNally set up the gloves

and lubricant on an exam table and was present when Schiman consented to the rectal exam.

McNally observed Sullivan put on gloves, apply lubricant, and perform the exam. During the exam

Schiman did not say or do anything interpreted as a withdrawal of her consent for the exam.

Schiman did not cry out in pain during the exam, and McNally did not observe Sullivan twisting

his hand inside Schiman. McNally did not observe Sullivan restraining or holding down Schiman

during the exam.

¶ 19 Immediately following the exam, Schiman did not complain of pain, injury, or discomfort,

and McNally did not observe any signs of trauma. However, Schiman became upset after Sullivan

left the room, and she informed McNally that she was upset because she was a rape victim and

Sullivan did not know that or ask.

¶ 20 McNally testified that she heard about Schiman’s Facebook post from other staff members

at the hospital. McNally viewed as false the statements that Sullivan sexually assaulted Schiman

during the rectal exam, shoved his fingers aggressively into her rectum, held her down during the

exam, and violently twisted his hand inside of her. McNally also disagreed with the statement that

Shiman cried out during the examination.

¶ 21 Michelle Sullivan, Dr. Sullivan’s wife, testified that prior to January 2022, her husband

was calm, bantered a lot, slept well, loved his work, and loved being a physician. Upon learning

of Schiman’s complaint with the police department, he became angry, frustrated, anxious,

disappointed, and depressed. After learning no charges were going to be filed, Sullivan was elated.

Then, after being informed of the Facebook posts, her husband was first in disbelief, followed by

anger and frustration. He had difficulty sleeping and became withdrawn, moody, and depressed.

He was humiliated and concerned about losing his job and future employability. She testified that

he did not receive counseling or medical treatment related to the stress she observed him having.

¶ 22 Perez testified that he is not familiar with the Peru Pride Facebook group. However, Perez

posts in several Facebook groups and is the administrator of the City of Peru Facebook page. In

March 2022, Schiman posted the Post on the City of Peru Facebook page. Perez moved the Post

into a featured post position in the Facebook group. A featured post is pinned to the top of the

Facebook page. Perez commented on the Post, including in part, “As I stated, the reason for my

comment is to let the dozens of people who are reporting it to be removed is so they understand

that I’m aware of slander charges and that it’s staying up unless I get evidence it’s false. I don’t

believe it’s false.” Perez also commented, “[W]hen Dr. Perales [evidently, a local doctor involved

in an inappropriate incident,] first had allegations of his malpractice people came to his rescue big

time. Finally he got charged then people who defended him went silent. So far, no one has come

to Sullivan’s defense.” Perez compared Sullivan to Dr. Perales because prosecutors had charged

Dr. Perales with a crime.

¶ 23 Perez also commented that Schiman’s post “reached over 15,000” viewers. Perez

calculated 15,000 based on the number of groups that had posted the Post and number of members

in each of those groups. Perez removed the Post within 24 hours of receiving a letter from Sullivan,

dated May 9, 2022, insisting that the Post be taken down.

¶ 24 Alyssa Rossman testified that she is a registered nurse who has worked with Sullivan for

six or seven years. On March 30, 2022, she became aware of the Post from the Illinois Valley

Scuttlebutt Facebook page. She responded to the post on Facebook that it was misinformation. She

did not believe the Post, and that it did not change her opinion of Sullivan.

¶ 25 Dr. Shawn Bailey, the Director of Emergency Medicine at St. Margaret’s on January 23,

2022, also testified. He stated that he did not believe the Post and that the Post did not change his

opinion of Sullivan.

¶ 26 Schiman testified as well. She described Sullivan’s conduct as sexual assault in the Post,

based on what Sergeant Bernard Larsen told her when she filed a police report.

¶ 27 Following the completion of evidence, Schiman moved for a directed verdict. During

argument on the motion for a directed verdict the trial court questioned “[H]ow do you calculate

damages?” When further discussing damages, the trial court noted that the “main issue seems to

be around damages *** defamation damages *** I don’t even know what that looks like.”

Although the trial court was “certain” that mental anguish constituted compensable damages, it

did not “know how to calculate that on a defamation per se case” and asked what the formula was

for calculating damages. The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict.

¶ 28 In its final ruling, the trial court first noted that it found this was not “a simple defamation

case” and that “there were many times where I just thought wow. There’s an unsettled area of law.

Thanks for the guidance, Appellate Court.” The trial court continued, finding that the alleged

sexual assault of Schiman did not occur. The court found in Sullivan’s favor on both counts of

defamation per se against Schiman and Perez. The trial court found that Sullivan demonstrated

mental anguish after the Post and comments by Perez. The physical manifestations of mental

anguish included inability to sleep, embarrassment, concern, changes in temperament, and changes

in the way Sullivan treated patients. As for damages, the trial court found there were no job-related

consequences, no loss of privileges, no issues with state licensing, no increase in medical

malpractice insurance, and no effect on Sullivan’s peers. In addition, the trial judge found that

there was no evidence of the actual circulation size and that Facebook is not a credible news

organization. Further, he stated there was “not the weight of some credible person putting” out the

Post. The trial court awarded $1 in nominal damages against each defendant. The trial court also

held that the claim against the corporation merged into the claim against Schiman, as it was one

act.

¶ 29 Sullivan moved to modify judgment and for sanctions. Sullivan sought sanctions against

Perez pursuant to Rules 219(b) and 137 for Perez’s denial of five of the six requests to admit

regarding the Facebook posts. Sullivan further sought to amend the amount of damages, arguing

that the $1 nominal damages against each defendant was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. The trial court denied both motions.

¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 31 On appeal, Sullivan raises two issues. Sullivan argues that the trial court erred in awarding

only $1 in nominal damages, after finding defendants liable for defamation per se, and in denying

sanctions pursuant to Rules 219(b) and 137. No cross-appeal was filed.

¶ 32 A. Damages

¶ 33 We do not disturb a trial court’s damages award unless it is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. Med+Plus Neck & Back Pain Center, S.C. v. Noffsinger, 311 Ill. App. 3d 853, 856-9

57 (2000). A trial court’s assessment of damages is against the weight of the evidence when it

ignores the evidence or uses the wrong measure of damages. Id. at 857.

¶ 34 A defamatory statement is a statement that harms a person’s reputation to the extent it

lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters the community from associating with her

or him. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1992) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 559 (1977)). A statement is defamatory per se if its harm is obvious and

apparent on its face. Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1986). In Illinois, there are five categories

of statements that are considered defamatory per se: (1) words that impute a person has committed

a crime; (2) words that impute a person is infected with a loathsome communicable disease;

(3) words that impute a person is unable to perform or lacks integrity in performing her or his

employment duties; (4) words that impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person

in her or his profession; and (5) words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication.

Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1998) (citing Bryson v. News America Publications,

Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 88-89 (1996)). When words are defamatory per se, they are considered to be

so obviously and naturally harmful to the plaintiff that the plaintiff need not plead and prove special

damages. Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 518 (1996).

¶ 35 Here, the trial court found that the defendants’ statements and comments constituted

defamation per se. That finding is not contested. The trial court acknowledged that the law

presumes damages for per se defamatory statements and further found that Sullivan suffered

damages of “mental anguish.” However, the trial court awarded only $1 in nominal damages

against Schiman and Perez. Sullivan argues that awarding $1 in nominal damages was against the

manifest weight of the evidence, in light of the trial court’s finding of defamation per se. We agree.

¶ 36 Illinois law has long recognized that many tort injuries are intangible in nature and,

therefore, resist precise economic measurement. Damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment,

pain and suffering, emotional distress, disability, loss of consortium, humiliation, and reputational

harm do not lend themselves to exact calculation in the same manner as contractual damages,

medical expenses, or lost wages. Nevertheless, the law permits recovery for such injuries because

they are often among the most real and consequential harms a plaintiff may suffer.

¶ 37 This principle is particularly evident in cases involving reputational or emotional harm.

Injuries to reputation, dignity, or mental tranquility are often incapable of precise proof because

their effects may manifest in subtle, personal, or long-term ways that are not readily reducible to

financial records. Yet, the absence of exact measurement does not render the injury nonexistent or

legally uncompensable. See Winters v. Greeley, 189 Ill. App. 3d 590, 598 (1989).

¶ 38 Often, when damages cannot be determined through a fixed mathematical formula, the trier

of fact (here, the trial judge) has a task that more resembles art than arithmetic: translating a

qualitative human injury into a monetary award that fairly and reasonably compensates the plaintiff

in light of the claim asserted and the evidence presented. In making that determination, the trial

judge can consider various factors, including—without limitation—the nature, extent, duration,

and permanence of the injury, as well as its effect on the plaintiff’s daily life, relationships,

emotional well-being, and ability to engage in ordinary activities. See Maytag Co. v. Meadows

Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1930) (listing various considerations); Republic Tobacco, L.P.

v. North Atlantic Trading Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that severity of

the conduct factors into the consideration of the amount of presumed damages); Durso v. Lyle

Stuart, Inc., 33 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305 (1975) (intent to harm is a relevant factor); Cook v. East Shore

Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 595 (1945) (in setting general damages, a court or jury will

look to factors such as the breadth of publicity given to the defamatory statement, the plaintiff’s

prominence, the plaintiff’s reputation, and the plaintiff’s injured feelings and mental suffering); cf.

Fisher v. Illinois Office Supply Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1001 (1984) (noting in another context

that the nature and extent of injury to plaintiff’s reputation, as well as mental pain and suffering,

are relevant considerations). Because such harms are inherently subjective, the law necessarily

entrusts substantial, but not boundless, judgment in the trier of fact. See Bentley v. Bunton, 94

S.W.3d 561, 605 (Tex. 2002) (holding that, by necessity, a jury will have some latitude in awarding

damages but it does not have carte blanche to do whatever it will). The ultimate question is largely

whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relationship to the evidence and the injuries. See

Winters, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 598 (a proper award is an estimate of the extent of the loss the plaintiff

has suffered in the past and would suffer in the future either from a monetary or enjoyment of life

standpoint).

¶ 39 This case involves defamation per se, which has presumed damages. “Presumed damages

are those which the law presumes must actually, proximately and necessarily result from the

publication of the defamatory matter.” Id. Again, these damages are inherently imprecise in

connection with the harm suffered. The damages awarded are “an estimate of the extent of the loss

the plaintiff has suffered in the past and would suffer in the future, either from a monetary or

enjoyment of life standpoint.” Id. Such damages are “often extremely difficult, if not impossible,”

for a typical plaintiff to present evidence to support a precise award of monetary damages based

on the harm of the defamatory statement. Id. “[T]here is no scale by which to measure the monetary

value of reputation, good will, loss of esteem and the like.” Id. While absolute certainty of the

amount of damages is not required, this is not to say that damages can be based on mere

speculation, conjecture, hypothesis, or whim. See id.; see also In re Application of Busse, 124 Ill.

App. 3d 433, 438-39 (1984). Rather, the evidence “need only tend to show a basis for the

computation of damages with a fair degree of probability.” Busse, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 439; see also

Moore v. Maxey, 152 Ill. App. 647, 650 (1910) (“there need be no direct evidence of mental

suffering *** but *** it may be inferred from the nature of the injury, and that juries may, from

their knowledge and experience of human nature, estimate damages which may result”).

¶ 40 Here, the trial judge awarded only nominal damages, seemingly due to a lack of

understanding of how reputational harm damages are assessed. Nominal damages are issued when

a legal wrong has taken place but there was no actual, meaningful loss as a result of the legal

wrong. See Krejci v. Capriotti, 16 Ill. App. 3d 245, 247 (1973). Such damages are awarded when

the insignificant character of the defamatory statement leads the trier of fact to conclude that no

substantial harm has been done to the plaintiff’s reputation, and there is no proof that serious harm

resulted from the defendant’s attack on the plaintiff’s character and reputation. Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 620. Nominal damages serve a unique function and do not substitute for

general compensatory damages, which are presumed in defamation per se cases. See Gibson v.

Philip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 267, 278 (1997); Scroggins v. Route 50 Auto Sales, 2016 IL

App (3d) 150149-U, ¶ 32 (reversing award of $1,000 in nominal damages because trial court failed

to also assess general compensatory damages in a defamation per se matter). 1 Given that a

successful defamation per se plaintiff is presumed to have suffered harm and need not plead or

prove said harm, it is difficult for us to see how nominal damages were sufficient. See Gibson, 292

Ill. App. 3d at 278. We do not establish a blanket rule in this regard. Perhaps there exists a

We acknowledge that Scroggins predates Rule 23’s amendment permitting citation of unpublished

cases. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) (eff. June 3, 2025). However, the prior version of Rule 23, by its plain terms,

restricted parties—and not courts—from citing unpublished cases. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) (eff. Apr. 1, 2018);

Global Research Distribution, Inc. v. One Stop Mailing LLC, 2025 IL App (3d) 240298, ¶ 27; Byrne v.

Hayes Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 172612, ¶ 22.

defamation per se case in which nominal damages are sufficient. This is not that case. The law

does not provide a calculator for per se reputational injury, but neither does it permit the court to

throw up its hands and award a dollar.

¶ 41 Here, a physician was publicly accused of committing a violent sexual assault under the

guise of a medical examination. Several thousand people allegedly saw the accusation. No

reasonable person can describe such an allegation as trivial or inconsequential. And even though

Sullivan was not required to plead or prove reputational harm because the statement was

defamatory per se, we observe that he testified that he was humiliated following the Post. He

testified, and his wife corroborated, that he suffered loss of sleep, embarrassment, concern,

changes in temperament, and changes in the way he treated patients. The trial court noted this

evidence in finding that Sullivan experienced mental anguish. Yet, the trial court failed to award

compensatory damages for this harm, instead, awarding only nominal damages.

¶ 42 We note that Sullivan offered the trial court a formula to calculate the compensatory

damages of $20 for each of the 15,000 people Perez’s initial Post had reached (15,000 being based

on Perez’s own calculation). See Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.

749, 761-63 (1985) (upholding presumed damages of $50,000 and $300,000 in punitive damages

following defamatory statements); Gibson, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 279 (an award of $100,000 in

damages for personal humiliation, mental anguish, and suffering was upheld based on evidence

that plaintiff was unable to sleep, afraid he was going to be unable to provide for his family, was

devastated, and was not the same person following his discharge from employment based on

defamatory per se comments); Brown v. Farkas, 158 Ill. App. 3d 772, 779 (1986) (upholding

$50,000 in compensatory damages following defamatory per se statement that plaintiff was

involved in the commission of a crime caused mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment).

We take no position on whether Sullivan’s suggested measure of damages is reasonable, as we

conclude it is better for the trial judge to make another attempt at that determination.

¶ 43 B. Illinois Supreme Court Rules 219(b) and 137 Violations by Perez

¶ 44 Sullivan also argues that the trial court erred in denying sanctions, pursuant to Rules 219(b)

and 137, following Perez’s unreasonable denial of Rule 219 requests to admit. Relatedly, Sullivan

argues that Perez’s defense counsel should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 137 for submitting false

denials.

¶ 45 Rule 219(b) provides:

“(b) Expenses on Refusal to Admit. If a party, after being served with a request to

admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matters of fact, serves a sworn

denial thereof, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness

of the document or the truth of the matter of fact, the requesting party may apply to the

court for an order requiring the other party to pay the requesting party the reasonable

expenses incurred in making the proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees. Unless the

court finds that there were good reasons for the denial or that the admissions sought were

of no substantial importance, the order shall be made.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(b) (eff. July 1,

2002).

¶ 46 Rule 137 provides, in relevant part:

“The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the

pleading, motion or other document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and

belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by

existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of

existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to

cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. *** If a pleading,

motion, or other document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or

upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or

both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or

parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,

motion or other document, including a reasonable attorney fee.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff.

Jan. 1, 2018).

¶ 47 On March 3, 2023, Perez responded to Sullivan’s requests to admit, denying five of the six

requests. Perez denied the following requests to admit: that he is “Perez Elijah Rodney” in the

“Peru Pride” Facebook group; that he had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the Post on the

Peru Pride Facebook page; that he was aware of the potential damage to Sullivan’s reputation if

the allegations made by Schiman about Sullivan on the Peru Pride Facebook page were untrue;

that he made the Post a featured post on the Peru Pride Facebook page; and that the social media

posts made by Perez Elijah Rodney in the attached document (screenshots of posts by several

individuals) were authentic and genuine.

¶ 48 At his October 6, 2023, deposition, Perez testified that he posts on Facebook under the

name Perez Elijah Rodney. Perez also testified that he did not have knowledge of the truth or

falsity of the Post at the time he answered the requests to admit but had more knowledge at the

time of the deposition. Perez also admitted that he had made the Post a featured post, contrary to

his response to the request to admit.

¶ 49 Following trial, Sullivan moved for sanctions against Perez and his counsel under Rules

219(b) and 137, arguing that Perez’s deposition testimony demonstrated that his answers to the

request to admit were false. In response, Perez argued that a request to admit that included a

reference to the Peru Pride Facebook group was denied because the statements were based on the

Peru Pride Facebook group of which he had no knowledge of its existence nor was he a member.

He also argued that he could not authenticate the genuineness of the social media posts attached

to the request to admit because he had not created or provided the social posts and they had since

been removed from Facebook.

¶ 50 At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, Sullivan argued that Perez’s responses

necessitated an unnecessary deposition of Perez. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions,

finding that Perez’s deposition, which was three hours long, was “very far-ranging,” with a lot of

issues addressed. The trial court found that sanctions were “not appropriate at this stage of the

game.”

¶ 51 We review the grant or denial of sanctions for abuse of discretion. Kubicheck v. Traina,

2013 IL App (3d) 110157, ¶ 30. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court fails to apply the

proper law, including the proper criteria. Paul v. Gerald Adelman & Associates, Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d

85, 99 (2006).

¶ 52 In determining whether a respondent violated Rule 219(b), the court must determine (1) if

the moving party proved the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter of fact, (2) if

the nonmovant demonstrated good reasons for the denial, and (3) if the denied facts were material

to the litigation. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(b) (eff. July 1, 2002); McGrath v. Botsford, 405 Ill. App. 3d 781,

789 (2010).

¶ 53 We find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying sanctions because it failed to

apply the criteria set forth in Rule 219(b) in making its decision. Instead, it denied the motion

because Perez’s deposition included more than just questions pertaining to the requests to admit

and it was “not appropriate at this stage of the game.” The “stage of the game,” however, is not a

proper consideration identified in Rule 219(b).Thus, we reverse the order of the trial court denying

sanctions and remand to the trial court to assess whether sanctions under Rules 219(b) and 137 are

appropriate under the criteria set forth in the respective rules. We do not hold that sanctions under

Rules 219(b) or Rule 137 ought to have been awarded; we are directing the trial court to reevaluate

that question, based on the proper criteria set forth in the rules and caselaw.

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 We do not disturb the trial court’s finding of defamation per se. However, we find that the

trial court erred in awarding only nominal damages where plaintiff prevailed in establishing

defamation per se. The law recognizes that reputational harm is difficult to measure. It does not

follow that the proper response is to measure it at one dollar.

¶ 56 We also find that the trial court erred when it denied sanctions under Rules 219(b) and 137

without addressing the required criteria of those rules.

¶ 57 Nominal damages award is vacated; trial court is reversed in part. Case is remanded for

entry of a damage award and with directions that the trial court reevaluate the propriety of

sanctions.

¶ 58 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.

Sullivan v. Schiman, 2026 IL App (3d) 250543

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County, No. 22-LA96; the Hon. Jason A. Helland, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys William P. Sullivan, of Frankfort, appellant pro se.

for

Appellant:

Attorneys Erin K. Russell, of The Russell Firm LLC, of Chicago, and for Jonathan L.A. Phillips, of Phillips & Bathke, P.C., of Peoria, for Appellee: appellees Allison Schiman and Ally Anderson LLC.

No brief filed for other appellee.

Sullivan v. Schiman

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain