Juan Carlos Vivar v. Samantha Jackson Dilts, M.D., et al., Case No. 82, Sept. Term, 2025, Opinion filed on July 8, 2026, by Berger, J.
DEATH – ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH – LIMITATIONS – COMPUTATION
OF LIMITATIONS
Pursuant to the plain language of Maryland Rule 15-1001(d), to participate in a wrongful death action and share in any subsequent recovery, a use plaintiff typically must file a motion to intervene by the earlier of: (1) three years after the death of the injured person (the statutory deadline) or (2) 30 days after being served with the complaint and requisite notice if the use plaintiff resides in Maryland. Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2) provides that a use plaintiff waives their right to participate in the action or claim recovery by failing to file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline. The plain language of Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2) operates to bar use plaintiffs from joining a wrongful death action as party plaintiffs even when service of the complaint and requisite notice is not effectuated until after the statutory deadline has passed.
DEATH – ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH – RIGHT OF ACTION AND
DEFENSES – CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
The requirement that a use plaintiff file a Complaint or motion to intervene within the statutory limitations period is a condition precedent to maintaining suit. Failure to act prior to the statutory deadline extinguishes a use plaintiff’s claim, therefore, the relation back doctrine cannot be applied to render a motion to intervene timely. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. C-16-CV-23-004371
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 2025
JUAN CARLOS VIVAR
v.
SAMANTHA JACKSON DILTS, M.D., ET
AL.
Berger,
Tang,
Kenney, James A., III
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Berger, J.
Filed: July 8, 2026
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.07.08
'00'04- 15:13:02
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
In this case, we must decide whether the relation back doctrine applies in wrongful
death actions so as to allow a “use plaintiff” who is served after the statutory deadline to
formally join the proceedings as a party plaintiff. 1 Alex Vivar Perez (“Alex”), the son of
Appellant Juan Carlos Vivar (“Mr. Vivar”) and Appellee-Plaintiff Cristina Perez (“Ms.
Perez”) tragically passed away on August 30, 2020, after a visit to PM Pediatrics Urgent
Care in Greenbelt, Maryland.
On August 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a statement of claim, including a wrongful
death claim, with the Maryland Healthcare Alternative Dispute Resolution Office
(“HCADRO”) against the attending physician, Samantha Jackson Dilts, M.D. (“Dr. Dilts”),
PM Pediatrics Management Group, LLC, and PM Pediatrics of Maryland, LLC
(collectively, “Appellee-Defendants”). That same day, Ms. Perez waived arbitration.
Thereafter, and pursuant to the relevant statute, Ms. Perez filed the present action in the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on September 22, 2023, in which she named Mr.
Vivar as a use plaintiff. Mr. Vivar was served with the Complaint and requisite notice on
September 26, 2023. On June 7, 2024, Mr. Vivar filed the instant Motion to Intervene.
The circuit court denied Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene on February 11, 2025. This
appeal followed.
1
As explained by the Supreme Court of Maryland, “[a] use plaintiff in common law pleadings is ‘[a] plaintiff for whom an action is brought in another’s name,’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1579 (8th ed. 2004), and ‘who does not join in the action,’ Md. Rule 15-1001(b).” Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 439 Md. 333, 336 n.1 (2014).
On appeal, Mr. Vivar presents two questions for our review, which we have
rephrased as follows: 2
I. Whether the circuit court erred by denying Mr. Vivar’s Motion to
Intervene as untimely under Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2).
II. Whether, provided that the previous question is answered in the
affirmative, good cause was shown to excuse Mr. Vivar’s late
filing under Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(3).
For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the negative and, therefore, do
not reach the second question. We, therefore, affirm.
BACKGROUND
Alex’s Death and the Initiation of the Instant Action 3
In August 2020, Alex, who had a history of chronic constipation, suffered from an
episode of severe abdominal pain and constipation. On August 28, 2020, after Alex’s
constipation had continued for approximately two weeks, Ms. Perez took Alex to PM
Pediatrics in Greenbelt, Maryland. After an enema was administered, the attending
2
Mr. Vivar phrased the questions as follows:
1. Did the Circuit Court err by denying Mr. Vivar’s Motion to
Intervene as untimely pursuant to Md. Rule 15-1001(e)(2)?
2. If the answer to Question Presented #1 is yes, was Mr.
Vivar’s late filing excused under Md. Rule 15-1001(e)(3)
when the clerk refused to accept his Motion to Intervene,
informing him that he was already a plaintiff in the case?
3
The facts of the underlying lawsuit are disputed. To provide context of the underlying claim, we recite here facts from the Complaint.
2
physician, Dr. Dilts, performed an abdominal examination of Alex. Alex was discharged
that same evening, despite having not passed a bowel movement.
The next morning, Alex began throwing up and having diarrhea. Ms. Perez left
Alex in the bathroom to get him a glass of water. When Ms. Perez returned, she found
Alex unresponsive on the floor. Ms. Perez called 911 and Alex was transported to the
hospital where he was diagnosed as having suffered from cardiac arrest and gastrointestinal
bleeding. On August 30, 2020, Alex passed away at the age of nine. According to the
autopsy report, Alex’s cause of death was complications of bowel obstruction due to
congenital constipation.
On August 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a medical malpractice claim stemming from
Alex’s death against Appellee-Defendants in the HCADRO. That same day, Ms. Perez
filed an Election to Waive Arbitration pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2019 Repl. Vol.
2020), § 3-2A-06B of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). 4
On September 22, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a Complaint in the circuit court naming Mr.
Vivar as a use plaintiff. 5 The Complaint contains three causes of action: negligence,
4
Pursuant to CJP § 3-2A-06B(f)(1), a plaintiff has 60 days after filing an election to waive arbitration to file a complaint “in the appropriate circuit court or the United States District Court.” The operative date for purposes of the statutory deadline with respect to Ms. Perez’s claims, therefore, is the date the statement of claim was filed in the HCADRO.
5
According to Ms. Perez, her original statement of claim filed with the HCADRO named Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff. Because our forthcoming analysis does not depend on whether Mr. Vivar was in fact named as a use plaintiff in the original statement of claim, we do not address this fact further.
3
wrongful death, and a survival action. Mr. Vivar was served with a copy of the Complaint
and the appropriate notice pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-1001(d) on September 26, 2023. 6
Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene
According to Mr. Vivar, he attempted to file a formal motion to intervene at the
circuit court on October 19, 2023, but the clerk refused his motion. Mr. Vivar claims that
the clerk printed out a “Case Summary” showing that Mr. Vivar was already listed as a
plaintiff in the action who was represented by counsel, namely the same counsel
representing Ms. Perez. Thereafter, Mr. Vivar mailed the draft motion to intervene to Ms.
Perez’s counsel.
On November 1, 2023, Ms. Perez’s counsel called Mr. Vivar to “allay any
confusion” that Mr. Vivar had concerning his rights as a use plaintiff. According to Ms.
Perez’s counsel, he informed Mr. Vivar that he did not and would not represent him in the
pending matter. Additionally, Ms. Perez’s counsel explained to Mr. Vivar what a use
plaintiff is and informed him that he would have to formally intervene if he wished to
participate in the action, directing him to the legal options outlined in the notice letter
served upon him.
6
In his principal brief, as well as in his motion for reconsideration and at the hearing on his Motion to Intervene, Mr. Vivar contends that he was served on October 6, 2023. In his reply brief and Motion to Intervene, however, Mr. Vivar notes that he was served on September 26, 2023. The affidavit of service by private process similarly provides that Mr. Vivar was served on September 26, 2023. This discrepancy is not addressed by either party. As we shall explain, because the statutory deadline was August 30, 2023, this discrepancy is immaterial. Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, that Mr. Vivar was served on September 26, 2023.
4
After retaining counsel, Mr. Vivar filed the instant Motion to Intervene on June 7,
2024. Ms. Perez and Appellee-Defendants each filed motions in opposition and a hearing
regarding the motion was held on January 28, 2025. At the hearing, Mr. Vivar conceded
that his motion was untimely under the plain language of both the statutory and served
notice deadlines in Maryland Rule 15-1001 (“Rule 15-1001”). 7 To overcome the statutory
deadline, Mr. Vivar asked the circuit court to “make new law” by applying the relation
back doctrine to relate back the filing of the Motion to Intervene to the date Ms. Perez
initiated the action. Mr. Vivar reasoned that the Legislature could not have intended a
situation where, because of the competing timelines in the HCDARO statute and wrongful
death rule and statute, a plaintiff could serve a use plaintiff after the statute of limitations
had passed, thereby nullifying the use plaintiff’s opportunity to participate in the suit. Next,
to overcome the served notice deadline, Mr. Vivar argued that the circuit court should find
that good cause existed based on the clerk’s alleged refusal to accept his Motion to
Intervene and assertion that he was already a party plaintiff.
Ms. Perez contended that she complied with Rule 15-1001(d) by serving Mr. Vivar
with the Complaint and required notice within 30 days of waiving into circuit court.
Further, Ms. Perez argued that, pursuant to Rule 15-1001, because Mr. Vivar filed his
Motion to Intervene after the statutory deadline had passed, the circuit court was precluded
from finding that good cause excused the late filing. Even if the circuit court were allowed
7
As explained infra, under a plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001, the statutory deadline was August 30, 2023, and the served notice deadline was 30 days after service of the Complaint and requisite notice.
5
to consider good cause, Ms. Perez asserted that no good cause existed because Mr. Vivar
did not act with due diligence when confronted with the allegedly contradictory
information received from the clerk. Finally, Ms. Perez urged the circuit court to decline
Mr. Vivar’s request to apply the relation back doctrine and to, instead, apply a plain
language interpretation of Rule 15-1001.
Appellee-Defendants argued that, irrespective of the served notice deadline, Mr.
Vivar was precluded from participating in the suit as a party plaintiff because he failed to
file a Complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline, August 30, 2023. Mr.
Vivar agreed with Appellee-Defendants that, if a plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001 was to be applied, he would be precluded from joining the suit as a party plaintiff.
The Circuit Court’s Ruling
On February 11, 2025, the circuit court denied Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene.
Reading from Rule 15-1001, the circuit court reasoned that to participate in the action, Mr.
Vivar would have had to
file [with] the clerk of court in which this action is pending a
motion to intervene in the action in accordance with the
Maryland rules no later than the earlier of one, the applicable
deadline stated in 3-904(g), which is the statute of limitations,
and section 5-201(a), which is regarding a disability, or 30 days
after being served with the complaint and [the Rule 15-1001]
notice.
The circuit court proceeded to discuss the rule’s waiver by inaction provision, Rule 15-1001(e)(3), explaining that:
If a use plaintiff who is served with the complaint and
notice . . . does not file a motion to intervene by the served
notice deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the
6
action or claim any recovery unless for good cause shown the
Court excuses the late filing.
So (e)(3) is really broken up into two sections. One, if the
notice of the motion to intervene is not filed by the served
notice deadline, then the Court can excuse the late filing if good
cause is shown. However, that sentence ends at, the use
Plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim any recovery
unless for good cause shown the Court excuses the late filing,
period.
The next sentence is applicable here. The Court may not
excuse the late filing if the statutory deadline is not met.
Statutory deadline in this particular case is August 30th, 2023.
Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that, even if it credited Mr. Vivar’s assertion that
he had tried to file a motion to intervene on October 19, 2023, the Motion to Intervene must
still be denied because it was filed after the statutory deadline of August 30, 2023. Mr.
Vivar noted a timely appeal. We shall provide additional facts as necessary in our
forthcoming analysis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to intervene for abuse of discretion.
WAMCO, Inc. v. Northeast 400, LLC, 251 Md. App. 196, 205 (2021) (citing MarylandNat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. Town of Washington Grove, 408 Md. 37, 64 (2009)).
A circuit court abuses its discretion “when no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or
principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences
before the court.” WAMCO, Inc., 251 Md. App. at 205 (quoting Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245
Md. App. 168, 201 (2020)). Questions of law, such as statutory construction and
7
interpretation are, however, reviewed de novo. Bethesda Afr. Cemetery Coal. v. Hous.
Opportunities Comm’n of Montgomery Cnty., 489 Md. 1, 42 (2024) (citing Elsberry v.
Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 482 Md. 159, 178 (2022)).
DISCUSSION
I. The circuit court did not err in denying Mr. Vivar’s motion to intervene.
On appeal -- as he did before the circuit court -- Mr. Vivar concedes that his Motion
to Intervene was untimely under Rule 15-1001. Nevertheless, Mr. Vivar contends that the
circuit court erred in denying his Motion to Intervene.
A. The legal landscape of wrongful death actions in Maryland
To begin, we turn briefly to the history of Maryland’s wrongful death statute. As
explained in Carter,
“[t]he common law not only denied a tort recovery for injury
once the tort victim had died, it also refused to recognize any
new and independent cause of action in the victim’s
dependents or heirs for their own loss at his [or her] death.”
Walker v. Essex, 318 Md. 516, 522, 569 A.2d 645, 648 (1990)
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts §
127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)). In 1846, to counter this harsh rule,
the English legislature created a cause of action for wrongful
death, known as Lord Campbell’s Act, which required a
wrongful death suit to be brought by the executor or
administrator of the estate for the use of the parties named in
the complaint. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23, 569 A.2d at 648.
The purpose of Lord Campbell’s Act was “to compensate the
families of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or
default of another person[,]” and the measure of damages was
based on the loss sustained by the parties on whose behalf the
action was brought. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power
Co., 104 Md. 332, 343, 65 A. 49, 53 (1906). Subsequently,
every American state adopted its own wrongful death statute,
with many states requiring the suit to be brought by the
executor, administrator, or personal representative of the
8
deceased person’s estate. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23, 569
A.2d at 648.
Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 439 Md. 333, 361 (2014).
Maryland adopted its wrongful death statute, bearing close resemblance to Lord
Campbell’s Act, in 1852. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23. Notably, under Maryland’s statute,
unlike under the English law, a wrongful death action “is brought in the name of a person
entitled to recover, and to the use of all such parties who may have an interest.” Id. at 523.
“It follows then, based on the history of the wrongful death cause of action, that a
beneficiary (or a personal representative with an interest) would bring the suit for the use
of the other parties in interest.” Carter, 439 Md. at 362.
Maryland’s wrongful death statute is codified in Sections 3-901 through 3-904 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Critical to our resolution of the present case,
CJP § 3-904 and Rule 15-1001 govern the procedures of a wrongful death action. In
relevant part, CJP § 3-904 provides:
(a)(1) [With exceptions that do not apply here], an action under
this subtitle shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent, and child of the deceased person.
(c)(1) In an action under this subtitle, damages may be awarded
to all beneficiaries proportioned to the injury resulting
from the wrongful death.
(2) Subject to § 11-108(d)(2) of this article, the amount
recovered shall be divided among the beneficiaries in
shares directed by the verdict.
(d) The damages awarded under subsection (c) of this section
are not limited or restricted by the “pecuniary loss” or
9
“pecuniary benefit” rule but may include damages for
mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of
society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital
care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel,
training, guidance, or education where applicable for the
death of:
(2) A minor child;
(f) Only one action under this subtitle lies in respect to the
death of a person.
(g)(1) [With exceptions that do not apply here], an action under
this subtitle shall be filed within three years after the
death of the injured person.
The so-called “one action rule” embodied in CJP § 3-904(f) “codifies one of the
main policies underlying wrongful death statutes[:] . . . . ‘to protect a defendant from being
vexed by several suits instituted by or on behalf of different equitable plaintiffs for the
same injury, when all the parties could be joined in one proceeding.’” Carter, 439 Md. at
363 (quoting Walker, 318 Md. at 523).
The procedure for providing notice to use plaintiffs and the subsequent joinder of
use plaintiffs is delineated in Rule 15-1001. Before we endeavor to interpret the relevant
provisions of Rule 15-1001, we address the pertinent evolution of the rule. The Supreme
Court of Maryland’s decision in Univ. of Md. Medical Sys. Corp. v. Muti, 426 Md. 358
(2012) (superseded by Rule 15-1001) was “the catalyst of this evolution,” which was
subsequently chronicled in Carter. Carter, 439 Md. at 364.
10
The Carter Court was presented with the question of whether use plaintiffs are
required to formally join an action prior to the expiration of the three year limitations period
in order to participate in subsequent recovery. Id. at 347. At the time of the underlying
trial in Carter, Rule 15-1001 provided:
(a) Applicability. This Rule applies to an action involving a
claim for damages for wrongful death.
(b) Plaintiff. If the wrongful act occurred in this State, all
persons who are or may be entitled by law to damages by
reason of the wrongful death shall be named as plaintiffs
whether or not they join in the action. The words “to the
use of” shall precede the name of any person named as a
plaintiff who does not join in the action.
(c) Notice to Use Plaintiffs. The party bringing the action shall
mail a copy of the complaint by certified mail to any use
plaintiff at the use plaintiff’s last known address. Proof of
mailing shall be filed as provided in Rule 2-126.
(d) Complaint. In addition to complying with Rules 2-303
through 2-305, the complaint shall state the relationship of
each plaintiff to the decedent whose death is alleged to have
been caused by the wrongful act.
Id. at 364 (quoting Maryland Rule 15-1001). The Court noted that:
The conclusions drawn from the case law interpreting Rule 15-1001 (prior to Muti) can be summarized in two general
propositions: (1) Maryland Rule 15-1001(b) did not require
formal joinder; and (2) Maryland Rule 15-1001 was more than
just a notice rule because use plaintiffs are real parties in
interest whose interests must be acknowledged and protected
throughout the litigation.
Carter, 439 Md. at 364-65 (citing Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 418 Md. 400, 422 (2011)
(superseded by Rule 15-1001) and Williams v. Work, 192 Md. App. 438, 455 (2010)
(superseded by Rule 15-1001)).
11
For the duration of the trial in Carter, therefore, there was no clear directive
regarding how a use plaintiff could join in a wrongful death action. Indeed,
[t]he first affirmative directive to use plaintiffs explaining how
to join in a wrongful death action occurred in [the Supreme
Court of Maryland’s] 2012 opinion in Muti. In that case, [the]
Court undertook the task of clarifying the case law on use
plaintiffs. In a section entitled “Some Considered Dicta,” the
majority opinion explained the standard for a named use
plaintiff to join in the wrongful death action when it stated:
Rule 15-1001(b) distinguishes between those
beneficiaries who join in the action for damages
and those, the use plaintiffs, who do not. Use
plaintiffs who wish to assert their respective
claims for damages must timely join the action
by indicating to the court and to the original
parties in some clear fashion that they are
claiming their “share.” Ordinarily, this is done
by intervening.
Carter, 439 Md. at 367 (quoting Muti, 426 Md. at 384).
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure Committee (“Rules Committee”) “closed th[e] door” for “interpretation [of]
the precise manner by which a use plaintiff could clearly claim [their] share” by
recommending amendment to Rule 15-1001 “to implement holdings of the Court in
[Muti].” Carter, 439 Md. at 367-68 (citing Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes of June 21, 2012, at 105).
Effective January 1, 2013, “[t]he new version of [] Rule 15-1001 . . . substantially
incorporated the old iteration of sections (a) and (b),” while amending other provisions.
Carter, 439 Md. at 368. In pertinent part, the amended Rule 15-1001 -- which governs the
present case -- provides:
12
(c) Complaint. The complaint shall state (1) the
relationship of each plaintiff to the decedent whose
death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful
act, (2) the last known address of each use plaintiff, and
(3) that the party bringing the action conducted a good
faith and reasonably diligent effort to identify, locate,
and name as use plaintiffs all individuals who might
qualify as use plaintiffs. The court may not dismiss a
complaint for failure to join all use plaintiffs if the court
finds that the party bringing the action made such a good
faith and reasonably diligent effort.
(d) Notice to Use Plaintiff. The party bringing the action
shall serve a copy of the complaint on each use plaintiff
pursuant to Rule 2-121. The complaint shall be
accompanied by a notice in substantially the following
form:
[Caption of case]
NOTICE TO [Name of Use Plaintiff]
You may have a right under Maryland law to claim an
award of damages in this action. You should consult
Maryland Code, § 3-904 of the Courts Article for
eligibility requirements. Only one action on behalf of
all individuals entitled to make a claim is permitted. If
you decide to make a claim, you must file with the clerk
of court in which this action is pending a motion to
intervene in the action in accordance with the Maryland
Rules no later than the earlier of (1) the applicable
deadline stated in § 3-904(g) and § 5-201(a) of the
Courts Article [“the statutory deadline”] or (2) 30 days
after being served with the complaint and this Notice if
you reside in Maryland, 60 days after being served if
you reside elsewhere in the United States, or 90 days
after being served if you reside outside of the United
States [“the served notice deadline”]. You may
represent yourself, or you may obtain an attorney to
represent you. If the court does not receive your written
notice to intervene by the earlier of the applicable
deadline, the court may find that you have lost your
right to participate in the action and claim any recovery.
13
(e) Waiver by Inaction.
(1) Definitions. In this section and in section (f) of this
Rule, “statutory deadline” means the applicable
deadline stated in Code, Courts Article, § 3-904(g)
and § 5-201(a), and “served notice deadline” means
the additional applicable deadlines stated in the
notice given pursuant to section (d) of this Rule.
(2) Failure to Satisfy Statutory Time Requirements. An
individual who fails to file a complaint or motion to
intervene by the statutory deadline may not
participate in the action or claim a recovery.
(3) Other Late Filing. If a use plaintiff who is served
with a complaint and notice in accordance with
section (d) of this Rule does not file a motion to
intervene by the served notice deadline, the use
plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim
any recovery unless, for good cause shown, the court
excuses the late filing. The court may not excuse the
late filing if the statutory deadline is not met.
(f) Subsequently Identified Use Plaintiff. Notwithstanding
any time limitations contained in Rule 2-341 or in a
scheduling order entered pursuant to Rule 2-504, if,
despite conducting a good faith and reasonably diligent
effort to identify, locate, and name all use plaintiffs, an
individual entitled to be named as a use plaintiff is not
identified until after the complaint is filed, but is
identified by the statutory deadline, the newly identified
use plaintiff shall be added by amendment to the
complaint as soon as practicable and served in
accordance with section (d) of this Rule and Rule 2-341(d).
Rule 15-1001. After the amendments, therefore, use plaintiffs must “file a motion to
intervene to be joined as a party plaintiff in a wrongful death action.” Carter, 439 Md. at
369-70. The sample notice provided in Rule 15-1001(d) provides use plaintiffs with
information regarding how to intervene and the applicable deadlines for doing so.
14
The Carter Court went beyond determining whether the use plaintiffs “did enough
to join in the action” prior to the expiration of the three year limitations period under the
law as it stood during the duration of trial. Carter, 439 Md. at 370. Indeed, the Court
analyzed the outcome under three versions of the law: (1) pre-Muti; (2) post-Muti, but
before the 2012 amendments to Rule 15-1001; and (3) post-Rule 15-1001 amendment. The
trial in Carter occurred before the Court’s decision in Muti and the subsequent revisions to
Rule 15-1001 when the relevant use plaintiffs were “real parties in interest that were not
required to formally join in the proceeding in order to share in an award for damages.” Id.
The Carter Court, therefore, concluded that “the use plaintiffs’ knowing consent to and
active participation in the litigation was the functional equivalent of joinder.” Id.
Relevant here, the Court went on to explain:
[I]f we were evaluating the facts of this case under the state of
the law following the 2012 amendments to Rule 15-1001
(effective January 1, 2013), our inquiry would be whether the
use plaintiffs “file[d] a complaint or motion to intervene by the
statutory deadline.” Rule 15-1001(e)(2). This would be a very
brief inquiry because it is clear by all accounts that the use
plaintiffs did not ever formally join in the present action.
Therefore, if the trial in the case at bar took place on or after
January 1, 2013, the use plaintiffs would all be barred from
recovery because the statute of limitations would have run long
before any formal joinder occurred.
Id. at 376.
B. A plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001 is proper
We now turn to interpreting the pertinent provisions in Rule 15-1001. According
to Mr. Vivar, the circuit court erred in denying his Motion to Intervene because a plain
language interpretation of Rule 15-1001 is improper here. Such a reading, Mr. Vivar
15
suggests, would thwart legislative intent where the competing deadlines of Rule 15-1001(e), CJP § 3-904(g)(1), and CJP § 3-2A-06B(f)(1) are in tension. That is, Mr. Vivar
contends that, because CJP § 3-2A-06B(f)(1) gives a claimant who waives arbitration with
the HCADRO 60 days to file their complaint in the appropriate circuit court or the United
States District Court, a plaintiff may -- as was done here -- provide the notice required by
Rule 15-1001(d) to a use plaintiff after the statutory deadline has passed, thereby
eliminating a use plaintiff’s opportunity to intervene. Such an outcome, according to Mr.
Vivar, fails to further the legislative intent to: (1) effectuate the “one action rule to prevent
vexation of the defendant by multiple lawsuits;” and (2) apply the “one action rule to
compensate the families of the decedent as was conceived in the Lord Campbell Act.”
Further, Mr. Vivar asserts that such a result undermines the legislative intent embodied in
the served notice deadline, that is, to allow grieving use plaintiffs time to determine
whether to participate in a wrongful death action. Rather than offering an alternative
construction of Rule 15-1001, Mr. Vivar urges us to conclude that the relation back
doctrine applies to render his Motion to Intervene timely.
Ms. Perez and Appellee-Defendants (collectively, “Appellees”) counter that a plain
reading of Rule 15-1001 is proper because the plain meaning of the rule is unambiguous:
a use plaintiff waives their right to participate in a wrongful death action by failing to file
a motion to intervene or complaint by the statutory deadline. Accordingly, Appellees
contend that the circuit court properly denied Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene as untimely.
“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” Leford v. Jenway
16
Contracting, Inc., 490 Md. 666, 680 (2025) (quoting Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 490
Md. 243, 264 (2025)) (cleaned up). In so doing, “[w]e assume that the General Assembly’s
intent is ‘expressed in the statutory language’ and therefore begin our analysis with the
plain language of the statute.’” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264 (quoting Spevak v. Montgomery
Cnty., 480 Md. 562, 571-72 (2022)). We begin “by looking to the normal, plain meaning
of the text, ‘ensur[ing] that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage,
superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 490 Md. 243,
264 (2025) (quoting Spevak v. Montgomery Cnty., 480 Md. 562, 572 (2022)). “The same
principles which are applied in statutory interpretation apply with equal force to our
interpretation of the Maryland Rules.” In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711 (2001) (citing
Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264 (2000)).
Although we focus our analysis on the plain text, we do not read “statutory language
in a vacuum” or confine our interpretation “to the isolated section [at issue] alone.”
Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010)).
Rather, “we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole, considering the ‘purpose, aim or
policy of the [General Assembly] reflected in the statute.’” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264-65
(quoting McClanahan v. Wash. Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 701 (2015)). “If
we are satisfied that the statute’s plain language is unambiguous and clearly communicates
the General Assembly’s intent, then our inquiry ends, ‘and we apply the plain meaning of
the statute.’” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 265 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows
Point, LLC, 448 Md. 648, 655 (2016)).
17
The parties agree that, pursuant to the plain language of Rule 15-1001(d), to
participate in the present action Mr. Vivar was required to file a Motion to Intervene with
the clerk of the circuit court by the earlier of: (1) the statutory deadline (August 30, 2023)
or (2) the served notice deadline (30 days after being served). Mr. Vivar concedes that the
Motion to Intervene was untimely under either deadline. What is more, Mr. Vivar
acknowledges that, should we apply a strictly plain language review of Rule 15-1001(e)(2),
he would be barred from joining as a party plaintiff because he missed the statutory
deadline. We agree.
To be sure, pursuant to Rule 15-1001(e)(2): “[a]n individual who fails to file a
complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline may not participate in the action
or claim a recovery.” This language unambiguously sets out a process by which an
individual’s failure to act before the statutory deadline constitutes waiver. As noted, it is
undisputed that Mr. Vivar did not file either a complaint or a motion to intervene by the
statutory deadline, August 30, 2023. Rather, Mr. Vivar did not file the instant Motion to
Intervene until June 7, 2024. Accordingly, applying the plain language of Rule 15-1001(e)(2), we conclude that Mr. Vivar waived his ability to participate in the present
action as a party plaintiff.
We are unpersuaded by Mr. Vivar’s argument that a plain language interpretation is
improper because such a result fails to further the legislative intent underpinning
Maryland’s wrongful death statute. First, contrary to Mr. Vivar’s assertion, the waiver that
results from a plain language application of Rule 15-1001(e)(2) does not ignore the policy
of preventing vexation of defendants by multiple suits. Indeed, once the statutory deadline
18
has passed, there can be no second suit. Moreover, had Mr. Vivar acted by filing his own
claim after Ms. Perez filed hers but before he was served, the multiple resulting suits could
simply be joined into one. Rule 15-1001(e)(2) expressly contemplates this by stating that
failing “to file a complaint or a motion to intervene” before the statutory deadline
constitutes waiver.
Second, the result of a plain language interpretation here does not ignore the intent
to compensate aggrieved families. Rather, Rule 15-1001 lays out the express procedures
which eligible individuals must follow to be compensated in a wrongful death action. The
fact that a family member may end up not being compensated for such a loss as a result of
their failure to comply with the express provisions in Rule 15-1001 does not undermine
that intent.
That Mr. Vivar was not served with the Complaint and the Rule 15-1001(d) notice
until after the statutory deadline passed does not change our conclusion. 8 Critically, Rule
8
At oral argument, Mr. Vivar raised an argument not previously articulated before the circuit court or in briefing. Specifically, Mr. Vivar argued that we should apply the good cause exception in Rule 15-1001(e)(3) to excuse his late filing, even without application of the relation back doctrine. As noted supra, Rule 15-1001(e)(3) provides:
Other Late Filing. If a use plaintiff who is served with a
complaint and notice in accordance with section (d) of this
Rule does not file a motion to intervene by the served notice
deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the action or
claim any recovery unless, for good cause shown, the court
excuses the late filing. The court may not excuse the late filing
if the statutory deadline is not met.
According to Mr. Vivar, Rule 15-1001(e)(3) does not apply here because he was not served in accordance with Rule 15-1001(d). As Appellees noted at oral argument, however, Mr. Vivar did not identify how Rule 15-1001(d) was violated. Even if Mr. Vivar had preserved
19
15-1001 expressly contemplates that the statutory deadline may, in some cases, be earlier
than the served notice deadline. Indeed, the Rule 15-1001(d) notice provides that, to
participate as a party plaintiff, a use plaintiff must file a motion to intervene by the earlier
of either the statutory deadline or the served notice deadline. The plain language of Rule
15-1001, therefore, contemplates that, at least in some cases, a use plaintiff may not be
allotted the full served notice window to decide whether to intervene in the suit.
Rule 15-1001(f), regarding the addition of use plaintiffs identified after a complaint
is filed, further evinces an understanding that, because of the statutory deadline, some use
plaintiffs may not be able to intervene. To be sure, Rule 15-1001(f) provides that such
additional use plaintiffs must be added only when identified “by the statutory deadline.”
This provision, therefore, expressly contemplates that if, despite conducting a good faith
and reasonably diligent effort to identify, locate, and name all use plaintiffs, a use plaintiff
is not identified until after the complaint is filed and after the statutory deadline, such an
individual need not be added to the complaint and served because they would be precluded
from participating in the suit.
Moreover, as Appellee-Defendants aptly note, Mr. Vivar could have filed a
Complaint prior to the statutory deadline; nothing required Mr. Vivar to wait for Ms. Perez
to file a suit. Not serving a use plaintiff until after the statutory deadline, therefore, does
not “ice-out fellow plaintiffs” as Mr. Vivar contends. Rather, such putative fellow
this argument, it would not change our conclusion. Indeed, as discussed supra, Rule 15-1001(e)(2) is clear: a use plaintiff’s failure to “file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline” precludes participation in the action and recovery therefrom.
20
plaintiffs maintain the same right to file a complaint or motion to intervene before the
statutory deadline. We recognize the harsh result of strict adherence to the plain language
of Rule 15-1001 and the statutory deadline, but we are duty bound to apply the law as
written. 9
C. The relation back doctrine does not apply
Next, Mr. Vivar urges us to apply the relation back doctrine to overcome his
motion’s untimeliness under the statutory deadline. Specifically, Mr. Vivar argues that his
Motion to Intervene should relate back to the date on which Ms. Perez filed her initial claim
with the HCADRO. Mr. Vivar contends that the Supreme Court of Maryland expressly
left open the question of whether the relation back doctrine applies in wrongful death
actions to allow use plaintiffs to formally join after the expiration of the statutory deadline
in Carter. As explained supra, the Carter Court applied Rule 15-1001 and interpretations
thereof that existed before the current iteration of the rule and concluded that the use
plaintiffs were not barred from recovery. In a footnote at the end of the case, the Supreme
Court noted: “Because we hold that the use plaintiffs are not precluded from claims for
damages, we do not reach the question of whether the relation back doctrine is applicable
here.” Carter, 439 Md. at 376 n.20. Because he would be precluded from claiming
damages under a plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001, Mr. Vivar urges us to
conclude that the relation back doctrine applies.
As for any tension between Rule 15-1001(e), CJP § 3-904(g)(1), and CJP § 3-2A9
06B(f)(1), the Rules Committee and General Assembly are, of course, free to address any unintended outcome by amending the relevant deadlines.
21
Appellees counter that applying the relation back doctrine would “set troubling
precedent” and would potentially allow use plaintiffs “to intervene at virtually any point in
a case’s lifespan,” thereby thwarting the certainty and finality that statutory time limitations
are designed to ensure. Moreover, Appellees assert that Maryland courts have expressly
declined to apply the relation back doctrine in wrongful death actions after the statutory
deadline has passed and in cases where the proposed amendment to the suit may pyramid
damages. 10
1. The relation back doctrine cannot be applied because the three year
statutory deadline is a condition precedent
The relation back doctrine allows for amended causes of action after the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations in certain situations. See Nam v. Montgomery Cnty.,
127 Md. App. 172, 186 (1999) (“Maryland recognizes the doctrine of ‘relating back.’ The
doctrine of relation back provides that if the factual situation remains essentially the same
after the amendment as it was before it, the doctrine of relation back applies and the
amended cause of action is not barred by limitations.”).
Although the relation back doctrine may overcome an expired statute of limitations,
it cannot overcome the failure to meet a condition precedent. Ferguson v. Loder, 186 Md.
App. 707, 727 (2009). Indeed, “the failure to meet a condition precedent extinguishes the
10
Although the circuit court did not expressly articulate the conclusion that the relation back doctrine does not apply in wrongful death actions, such a conclusion is implicit in its holding. Indeed, the circuit court reiterated that the statutory deadline was August 30, 2023, and did not indicate that the fact that Mr. Vivar was served after the statutory deadline had any bearing on that deadline.
22
right itself.” Id. The Supreme Court of Maryland has explained the distinction between a
condition precedent to maintaining suit and a statute of limitations as follows:
We have previously defined a “condition precedent” as “a
condition attached to the right to sue at all.” Waddell v.
Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 59, 626 A.2d 353, 356 (1993). It
“operates as a limitation of the liability itself created, and not
of the remedy alone.” Id., quoting State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477,
480, 129 A. 793, 794 (1925). “The liability and the remedy are
created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy
are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of that right.” Id.
Conversely, “a statute of limitations affects only the remedy,
not the cause of action.” Id. A condition precedent cannot be
waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be
raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if
the condition is not satisfied.
Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 127 (2005).
In University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp. v. Muti, 426 Md. 358 (2012), the
Court explained that,
[s]ince at least State, u/o Stascieicz v. Parks, 148 Md. 477,
479-82, 129 A. 793, 795 (1925), this Court has construed the
time limit in the wrongful death statute to be a substantive
provision, that is, a condition precedent to asserting the
statutorily created cause of action. See, e.g., Trimper v. PorterHayden, 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (superseded in part
by statute, § 3-904(g)(2), regarding occupational disease);
Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076, 96 S. Ct. 862, 47 L.Ed.2d 87
(1976). A plaintiff who does not assert the cause of action
within the statutorily prescribed time, now three years, loses
the right to sue a defendant who is not estopped to assert the
defense. See Chandlee v. Shockley, 219 Md. 493, 502-03, 150
A.2d 438, 443 (1959).
Muti, 426 Md. at 370-71.
23
In Muti, the decedent adopted his stepson, Ricky, during a previous marriage. Id.
at 363. When decedent’s widow filed the subject wrongful death action, she did not list
Ricky as a use plaintiff. Id. The circuit court granted the University of Maryland Medical
System Corp.’s (“UMMSC”) motion to dismiss the case based on the widow’s failure to
name Ricky as a use plaintiff in violation of Rule 15-1001(b). Id. at 366. On appeal, the
widow argued, among other things, that the relation back doctrine should be applied to
relate back the addition of Ricky as a use plaintiff to when the action was initially filed.
Id. at 376. Rejecting the argument, the Court held that “[r]elation back cannot be applied
in this case, [] because Ricky’s claim has expired by operation of the three year condition
precedent.” Id. at 376-77.
Mr. Vivar contends that Muti is inapposite because, unlike Ricky who was unknown
to UMMSC prior to the expiration of the statutory deadline, Mr. Vivar was named as a use
plaintiff at the initiation of the present action and, therefore, was known to AppelleeDefendants. We disagree.
Although it is accurate that Ricky had not been identified to the defendants in Muti,
that fact was not the center of the Court’s relation back analysis as Mr. Vivar suggests. To
be sure, Muti’s holding that “[r]elation back cannot be applied [] because Ricky’s claim
has expired by operation of the three year condition precedent” is not qualified by the fact
that he was not known to UMMSC. Id. at 376-77. Rather, the holding in Muti is based on
the statutory deadline being a condition precedent which, if not met, extinguishes a putative
party plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 370-71.
24
We note that the language from Muti upon which Mr. Vivar relies is extracted from
the Court’s discussion of UMMSC’s argument that the requirement to name use plaintiffs
should be construed as a condition precedent to maintaining suit. In that discussion, the
Court differentiated Ace American Insurance Co. v. Williams, 418 Md. 400 (2011) from
the facts in Muti, noting that in Ace, the original plaintiffs did not lose their claims as a
result of failing to name known beneficiaries as use plaintiffs. Muti, 426 Md. at 376.
Rather, the underlying judgment in Ace was vacated and remanded for proceedings to
which the original plaintiffs and the use plaintiffs, who had made claims prior to the
expiration of the statutory deadline, would be parties. Id. (citing Williams v. Work, 192
Md. App. 438, 468 (2010), aff’d, Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 418 Md. 400 (2011)). The
Muti Court rejected UMMSC’s argument, but explained that allowing the Mutis to proceed,
despite having failed to name Ricky as a use plaintiff, “does not affect the long recognized
condition precedent that requires a beneficiary to sue within three years of death. In the
case sub judice, Ricky did not do so. Consequently, Ricky’s claim has expired.” Muti,
426 Md. at 376.
Mr. Vivar does not cite any case holding that the three year limitation to maintaining
a wrongful death action -- either by intervening in an existing suit or filing a complaint --is not a condition precedent, nor can we find one.
We are not persuaded by Mr. Vivar’s argument that construing the three year
limitation to wrongful death actions as a condition precedent would frustrate the policy
underpinning Maryland’s wrongful death statute. Mr. Vivar contends that treating any part
of Rule 15-1001 as a condition precedent “would allow savvy litigants in medical
25
malpractice wrongful death statutes [sic] to ice-out fellow plaintiffs to their own personal
and financial benefit—no longer being required to share in damages, litigation strategy,
and collective decision-making” and would undermine the one action rule. This argument,
however, presupposes that individuals such as Mr. Vivar must wait on other entitled
individuals before acting upon a wrongful death claim. As explained supra, Rule 15-1001
provides to all entitled individuals the opportunity to bring a wrongful death claim within
three years of the decedent’s death by either initiating an action by filing a complaint or
filing a motion to intervene in an action in which they are named a use plaintiff. The rule
does not require that an individual wait to act until named as a use plaintiff in a lawsuit
initiated by someone else. In other words, the conclusion that the three year limitations
period is a condition precedent does not allow plaintiffs to “ice out” use plaintiffs. Mr.
Vivar had the same three years to bring a suit that Ms. Perez did and the fact that Mr. Vivar
was not served in the present action until after the statutory deadline passed does not alter
that right.
Similarly, we are not persuaded by the additional language from Ace cited by Mr.
Vivar at oral argument. The language cited provides:
As we see it, Rule 15-1001 is in the nature of a joinder rule or
a condition precedent that requires that all known statutory
beneficiaries, i.e., the real parties in interest, be identified as
parties to the litigation.
***
Although Rule 15-1001(b) does not require formal joinder, the
failure to include a known statutory beneficiary as a plaintiff
or a “use plaintiff” in a wrongful death action and to settle
without providing for the beneficiary can be analogized to the
26
failure to join a necessary party in an action where joinder is
required. In our view, because of the one action rule, the
failure to do so is a “defect” or “mistake” of jurisdictional
proportions in the proceeding, which may be raised at any time.
See S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Kevin Willes Constr. Co., 382 Md. 524,
550[, 856 A.2d 626, 641] (2004) (“Failure to join a necessary
party constitutes a defect in the proceedings that cannot be
waived by the parties, and may be raised at any time, including
for the first time on appeal.”). That would be true whether the
failure to name the statutory beneficiary as a plaintiff or use
plaintiff is attributed to a failure to file or to a clerk’s error in
docketing a filed pleading. In a situation where no financial
provisions were made for known beneficiaries, the former is in
the nature of a jurisdictional mistake and the latter is an
irregularity of process or procedure. Either would permit, and,
in the circumstances of this case, require, opening the judgment
to protect the interests of those beneficiaries.
Ace Am. Ins. Co., 418 Md. at 423 (quoting Williams, 192 Md. App. at 452, 455-56)).
This language is inapposite for two reasons. First, Mr. Vivar does not allege, nor
could he, that Ms. Perez failed to name him as a use plaintiff. Rather, Mr. Vivar’s argument
is that he was served after the statutory deadline, making it so he could not join the suit.
Second, and critically, the unnamed use plaintiffs at issue in Ace asserted their rights within
the three year limitations period. Indeed, in distinguishing Ace, the Muti Court noted:
Ace . . . recognized the viability of claims of known
beneficiaries who asserted their rights within three years of the
decedent’s death, but who had not been accounted for in a
settlement that was reduced to a judgment. Ace [allowed for
the] reopening [of] an enrolled judgment in order to permit the
resolution of the claims of the omitted beneficiaries.
Muti, 426 Md. at 390. Mr. Vivar concedes that he did not file a Complaint or Motion to
Intervene within three years of Alex’s death. Ace, therefore, does not alter our conclusion.
27
2. Even if the statutory deadline is not a condition precedent, the
relation back doctrine does not apply
Even if the statutory deadline is not a condition precedent rendering Mr. Vivar’s
claim expired, the relation back doctrine does not apply. As explained in Crowe v.
Houseworth, 272 Md. 481 (1974), upon which Mr. Vivar relies:
A frequently encountered problem, which is the result of the
more liberal use of amendments, is whether a new action has
commenced, an action which may be barred by limitations, or
whether the doctrine of relation back is applicable: that is,
whether the assertion of the original complaint tolled the
running of the statute. The modern view seems to be that so
long as the operative factual situation remains essentially the
same, no new cause of action is stated by a declaration framed
on a new theory or invoking different legal principles. As a
consequence, the doctrine of relation back is applied, and the
intervention of a plea of limitations prevented[.] . . . Similar
problems are encountered where amendments involve the
addition of, or substitution of, parties.
Our cases involving the doctrine of relation back have dealt
more frequently with the amendment of the averments of a
declaration than with the addition or substitution of parties by
amendment. . . .
Crowe, 272 Md. at 485-86.
Noting that “there is scant authority on the question of the applicability of the
doctrine in cases where new plaintiffs seek to come in,” id. at 486, the Court adopted the
rule that, “when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and
is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the
statute of limitations do not exist,” and the relation back doctrine “should be applied.” Id.
at 489 (quoting N.Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922)). The Court
concluded that the amendment at issue to add additional joint tenants as parties should have
28
been allowed under the relation back doctrine, explaining that “the fact that the new parties
might share, should there be a recovery, in no way prejudiced” the defendant. Crowe, 272
Md. at 489.
Our courts, however, have declined to apply the relation back doctrine in cases
where “an additional plaintiff seeks to intervene after the statute of limitations has run[,]
[u]nless the additional plaintiff will merely be sharing in the damage award, and not
‘pyramiding’ the original amount requested.” Grand-Pierre v. Montgomery Cnty., 97 Md.
App. 170, 178 (1993) (collecting cases).
Mr. Vivar contends that the relation back doctrine should be applied -- as it was in
Crowe -- because his identity was known to Appellee-Defendants since the initiation of the
suit because of his status as a use plaintiff. We are not convinced. To be sure, the language
in Crowe upon which Mr. Vivar relies expressly states that the doctrine applies when a
defendant “has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff set[] up and is trying to
enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct.” Crowe, 272 Md. at 489. By
definition, however, a use plaintiff is someone who does not participate in the action. See
supra note 1. It is not the naming of an individual as a use plaintiff by the individual filing
suit, but the subsequent filing of a motion to intervene by a use plaintiff that signifies that
the use plaintiff is trying to enforce a claim.
Here, as Appellees aptly note, if Mr. Vivar was allowed to intervene as a party
plaintiff, he would not merely share in the potential damages. Rather, Mr. Vivar may be
eligible for additional damages that would pyramid Appellee-Defendants’ liability. To be
sure, under the wrongful death statute, damages may be awarded for, among other things,
29
mental anguish and emotional pain and suffering. CJP § 3-904(d). A jury may well award
additional sums for such damages if there are two, rather than one, party plaintiffs involved.
In such circumstances, the relation back doctrine does not apply. 11 In light of this
conclusion, we need not address whether good cause existed to excuse Mr. Vivar’s failure
to meet the served notice deadline.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying
Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene as untimely. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.
11
Further, application of the relation back doctrine here would all but nullify the formal intervention requirements and deadlines delineated in Rule 15-1001, which were the product of deliberate decision making by the Rules Committee. Indeed, to hold that the relation back doctrine applies would render the statutory deadline obsolete; by claiming application of the relation back doctrine, a use plaintiff would never be filing a motion to intervene after the statutory deadline has passed.
30