United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1735
SUSAN FLAHERTY; ROBERT FLAHERTY; DANIEL FLAHERTY,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
AMIGOS DEL MAR LTD., d/b/a Amigos Del Mar Dive Shop,
as owners of the vessel M/V Papa Changa,
Defendant, Appellant,
MAVERICK AVARELLO; ALBINO "CHANGA" PAZ; SCUBA DIVING
INTERNATIONAL; SCUBA SCHOOLS INTERNATIONAL; JOHN ROMERO;
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Howard, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
John J. Bromley and Jeanne M. Donohue, with whom Morrison
Mahoney LLP and Holbrook & Murphy, were on brief, for appellant.
J. Mark Dickison, with whom Brendan P. Slean and Lawson &
Weitzen, LLP, were on brief, for appellees.
July 8, 2026
DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. About two years after the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered a
default judgment against Defendant-Appellant Amigos Del Mar
Unlimited, Ltd. ("Amigos"), and nineteen months after
Plaintiff-Appellee Susan Flaherty ("Flaherty")1 sought to enforce
the judgment in Belize, Amigos appeared for the first time in
United States court to attempt to vacate the judgment under Rule
60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as void for want
of jurisdiction. Because we agree with the district court that
Amigos did not bring its Rule 60(b) challenge within a reasonable
time, we affirm.
I.
Flaherty suffered severe injuries to her lower body
during a May 2019 scuba vacation in Belize, after an Amigos
employee who was not a certified dive master pushed her off a boat
owned and operated by Amigos. As she went into the water, she was
pulled under the boat by the vessel’s engaged propellers, which
seriously mutilated her foot, ankle, and knee. She filed suit in
the District of Massachusetts in August 2020, bringing maritime
law claims and alleging subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333, which vests the federal courts with original jurisdiction
1 Flaherty's husband and son are also plaintiffs-appellees,
but for ease of reference, and because the case concerns her
injury, we refer to Mrs. Flaherty in this opinion.
-2-over maritime law claims. She filed an amended complaint in
September 2020, and, because Amigos is a Belizean company, served
Amigos pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(f)(1), (h)(2), (l)(2). The founder, director, and controlling
shareholder of Amigos, Jose Paz, signed the proof of service,
indicating that it was received voluntarily. Amigos did not appear
in the case. On June 21, 2021, the court entered a default
judgment against Amigos, and in October 2021, after providing
Amigos with notice, held an evidentiary hearing to determine
damages. Again, Amigos did not appear. On February 23, 2022, the
court entered an amended judgment awarding Flaherty over six
million U.S. dollars in damages, plus interest.
Flaherty sought to enforce the judgment in Belize on
July 6, 2022, and served Amigos with Belizean process on July 12,
2022. The Belizean court also granted Flaherty a default judgment
against Amigos on January 11, 2023; following a hearing on
April 26, 2023, the court issued an order on September 29, 2023,
directing Amigos to pay over seven million U.S. dollars as a debt
due and owing to Flaherty, plus interest. In November 2023, Amigos
appeared in Belizean court to contest the Belizean default
judgment. A month later, the Belizean court authorized Flaherty
to seize Amigos' vessels and assets, although it later, in April
2024, set aside its own default judgment.
-3-On February 27, 2024, two years after the District of
Massachusetts entered its amended judgment, and nineteen months
after Flaherty sought enforcement in Belize, Amigos made its first
appearance in the District of Massachusetts action and filed a
motion to vacate the district court's default judgment. The
District of Massachusetts set a hearing on the motion, ordered
limited discovery, considered additional briefing, and finally
rejected Amigos' arguments that the default judgment was void.
Amigos then brought this appeal.
II.
The procedural vehicle by which Amigos seeks relief is
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule allows a court to "relieve a party
or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding" for several reasons, including, under
subsection (b)(4), because "the judgment is void" and, under
subsection (b)(6), for "any other reason that justifies relief."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (6). Amigos focuses its argument on
Rule 60(b)(4), reasoning that the judgment against it is void
because the district court lacked both subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction.2
2 Amigos also argues in the alternative that it is entitled
to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because the Covid-19 pandemic left Amigos "powerless to defend itself in Massachusetts." However, Amigos never raised this argument in the district court below, and it may not do so for the first time on appeal. Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 992 F.3d 44, 59 (1st Cir. 2021) ("[A]ppellants
-4-We need not reach the merits of Amigos' arguments because
we conclude that its Rule 60(b) motion is barred by subsection
(c)(1) of the same rule, which serves as a gatekeeper for Rule
60(b) motions. Rule 60(c)(1) preserves finality and prevents
protracted litigation over final orders and judgments by requiring
motions under Rule 60(b) to be made "within a reasonable time."3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); see generally Farm Credit Bank of Balt.
v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2003) ("As a general
matter, Rule 60(b) . . . seeks to balance the importance of
finality against the desirability of resolving disputes on the
merits."); Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 248 F.3d
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Rule 60(b) relief is 'extraordinary relief'
reserved for 'exceptional circumstances,' given the countervailing
interest in the finality of such orders." (quoting United States
v. One Urban Lot, 882 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1989))).
We have not always read Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable
time" limitation to apply to Rule 60(b)(4). At the time of Amigos'
motion below, the rule in our circuit was that Rule 60(b)(4)
cannot raise an argument on appeal that was not 'squarely and
timely raised in the trial court.'" (quoting Thomas v. Rhode
Island, 542 F.3d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation modified))).
3 Rule 60(c)(1) states that "[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must
be made within a reasonable time -- and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Amigos has not brought a motion under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), so the one-year maximum is not relevant.
-5-motions were excepted from the "reasonable time" limitation, and
such motions could be filed "at any time." Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
v. Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F.3d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citing Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953
F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1992), and United States v. Boch Oldsmobile,
Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)). That rule is no longer
good law. The Supreme Court recently held -- during the pendency
of this appeal -- that "[l]itigants seeking relief under Rule
60(b)(4) must comply with Rule 60(c)(1) and file a motion within
a reasonable time." Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v.
Burton, 607 U.S. 155, 162 (2026). Amigos therefore cannot proceed
on its arguments under Rule 60(b)(4) unless it can establish that
it filed its motion within a reasonable time.
Although this change in law arose between the district
court's decision on Amigos' Rule 60(b) motion and our consideration
of this issue, we do not write on a blank slate. The district
court recognized that Coney Island Auto Parts was pending at the
Supreme Court, and, anticipating that the law of our circuit could
be overruled, held that "[i]f [the reasonable time requirement]
were the rule here" it "would find the time that has elapsed
renders Amigos' motion to vacate untimely." "We typically review
decisions of that sort only for abuse of discretion" because
"[d]istrict courts enjoy considerable discretion in resolving
[Rule 60(b)] motions." Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d at 65. And we
-6-generally only find abuse of discretion where the district court
"made an error of law or has reached a plainly erroneous decision."
Id. at 66. The district court's conclusion is neither based on an
error of law nor plainly erroneous.
Amigos raises two arguments in the wake of Coney Island
Auto Parts. First, it notes that the delay between the attempted
enforcement of the judgment and the filing of the 60(b) motion in
Coney Island Auto Parts was six years, while the delay in this
case was just under two years. Second, it notes that whether a
delay is "reasonable" turns on its justification -- the purported
justification here being that counsel advised Amigos not to appear,
believing the court to lack jurisdiction. In assessing these
arguments, we note that "the determination of what is 'reasonable'
depends upon the circumstances of each case." Bouret-Echevarría
v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir.
2015).
As an initial matter, because the reasonableness
determination is case dependent, id., the fact that the delay in
Coney Island Auto Parts was six years is of limited help to Amigos'
position. Nothing in the Court's opinion indicates that only
delays lasting six years or more are unreasonable; indeed, the
Court declined to "expound on whether Coney Island's timing was
reasonable" because Coney Island "d[id] not contend that it
complied with this requirement." 607 U.S. at 162. Our own
-7-precedent indicates that a delay of "sixteen months" is "overlong
in virtually any event." Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274,
280 (1st Cir. 1993). Amigos therefore faces a significant
challenge in showing that its delay was reasonable, although we do
not moor our analysis on a bright-line timing rule nor anchor it
in any particular factual showing. Instead, we
"consider[] . . . the length of the delay" together with "the
justification for it, and the prejudice (if any) associated with
the granting of relief." Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d at 66. On the
facts of this case, we conclude that Amigos' "protracted delay
scuttles any claim that [its] motion was 'made within a reasonable
time.'" Cotto, 993 F.2d at 280.
Amigos' proffered justification for its delay is that
Belizean counsel advised it that the U.S. courts had no
jurisdiction over Flaherty's claims. This argument holds no water.
The district court provided notice to Amigos after it found
jurisdiction and entered a default judgment, and before it
conducted a hearing to determine damages. Amigos has expressly
waived any challenge as to notice. Amigos does not explain why,
after the district court had found jurisdiction and notified Amigos
of the same, Amigos thought it unnecessary to appear to dispute
the court's finding for over two years. It gestures generally
toward the Covid-19 pandemic, but the pandemic does not explain
its failure to make any electronic filing with the district court.
-8-Disagreement with a federal court's finding is no justification to
ignore it. "Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a license for litigants
to sleep on their rights." United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 275 (2010). The timeline supports the
conclusion that Amigos made a knowing choice not to appear in U.S.
court.
We would not reach a different conclusion even if the
relevant timeline were to be measured from the time of enforcement,
rather than the entry of judgment.4 Though "in the context of a
default judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to
seek relief before learning about a plaintiff's attempted
enforcement," Coney Island Auto Parts, 607 U.S. at 160, Flaherty
We observe that our circuit has arguably been inconsistent
4
on when the clock begins to tick for motions made under Rule
60(b)(4)-(6). Compare Ungar v. Pal. Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 85 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) (tethering the reasonable time calculus for not only a Rule 60(b)(1) motion but also a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to the "entry of the judgment"), with Bouret-Echevarría v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2015) (measuring the reasonableness of appellants' delay in filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion from the time that appellants first learned of potential juror misconduct). The Sixth Circuit, in the decision affirmed by Coney Island Auto Parts, took the view that the clock for filing Rule 60(b)(4)-(6) motions "generally begins ticking when the
movant is or should be aware of the factual basis for the motion," and acknowledged, without deciding, that in the context of Rule 60(b)(4) specifically, the clock may "not start running until
enforcement is first attempted." In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2024), aff'd sub nom., Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026) (citation modified). We need not address this issue further because, even taking the most favorable view for Amigos, its delay was
unreasonable.
-9-sought to enforce the judgment in Belize in early July 2022 and
served notice on Amigos less than a week later. Amigos does not
purport to have been ignorant of the enforcement action. So, as
Amigos acknowledges, even if we start the "reasonable time" clock
at the time of Flaherty's attempted enforcement, Amigos still
waited nineteen months to appear in federal court to contest the
judgment -- with no valid justification. See Cotto, 993 F.2d at
280 (indicating that a motion filed sixteen months after the entry
of judgment was not filed within a reasonable time); see also A & F
Bahamas LLC v. World Venture Grp., Inc., 796 F. App'x 657, 661
(11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) ("[B]y failing to pursue relief
under Rule 60(b)(4) until . . . 11 months after [the defendant]
admits he was made aware of the judgment, [the defendant] sat on
his rights." (emphasis added)).
In Bouret-Echevarría, we concluded that a roughly
three-and-a-half-month period of delay after the appellants first
learned of the basis for a 60(b) motion was justified because the
appellants' attorney (1) "was actively attempting to
obtain . . . admission" in the jurisdiction, (2) was "seeking
local counsel to assist him" after existing counsel resigned, and
(3) encountered several major roadblocks to communication with
relevant parties. 784 F.3d at 44. Further, during the delay of
three-and-a-half months, the appellants were consistently making
"diligent efforts" towards "strengthen[ing] the basis for their
-10-motion." Id. By stark contrast, Amigos lay idle for a much longer
period after Flaherty attempted enforcement and did not "act[]
promptly when put on notice" nor make "diligent efforts" to file
any motion. Id. And we see no other extenuating circumstances to
explain the delay. Cf. United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1123
(1st Cir. 1987) (finding a Rule 60(b)(6) motion timely despite a
five-year delay because "the government lulled the [movant] into
delaying through its promises, . . . itself delayed [several]
years . . . in demanding payment, and [then] . . . breached its
obligations under the settlement agreement"). Put simply, Amigos
waited too long and without good cause.
Finally, we note that the parties disputed below whether
Flaherty was prejudiced by Amigos' delay in bringing its Rule
60(b)(4) motion. Flaherty argued that she would be prejudiced by
the revival of this litigation since critical evidence went
"missing" from Amigos' office, namely, an incident file Amigos had
generated about the underlying events of this case. Amigos argued
that Flaherty would not be prejudiced by reviving the U.S.
litigation since the litigation in Belize is still live. We need
not resolve this issue because, even assuming the prejudice to
Flaherty is minimal and consists primarily of delay and litigation
costs, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding
Amigos' delay unreasonable. The prejudice to the non-moving party
is but one part of the Rule 60(c)(1) analysis, and not the
-11-lodestar. See Boch Oldsmobile, 909 F.2d at 660-61 (describing
prejudice as one "relevant consideration[]," along with "whether
a good reason has been presented for failing to take action
sooner," while stating that what ultimately "constitutes
reasonable time . . . depends on the facts of [the] case"). Here,
where Amigos failed to provide any meaningful justification for
its delay, the district court could reasonably find the motion to
be untimely.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
-12-