IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship of: Te.R., K.R., and Ko.W. (Minor Children), and
T.R. (Father) and K.W. (Mother), FILED
Appellants-Respondents Jul 08 2026, 9:10 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
v. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
and
Kids’ Voice of Indiana,
Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem
July 8, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-38
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Melanie Kendrick, Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 1 of 20
Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D22-2506-JT-5984
49D22-2506-JT-5986
49D22-2506-JT-5987
Opinion by Judge Brown
Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur.
Brown, Judge.
[1] T.R. (“Father”) and K.W. (“Mother,” and together with Father, “Parents”)
jointly appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to their minor
children Ko.W, K.R., Te.R. (the “Children”). 1 We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother is the biological mother of Ko.W., born in July 2014, K.R., born in
September 2016, and Te.R., born in April 2018. Father is the biological father
of K.R. and Te.R. In 2022, law enforcement responded to a report that Parents
were involved in an episode of domestic violence that “involved the discharge
of a firearm.” Transcript Volume II at 10. On July 7, 2022, the Indiana
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that the
1
For ease and clarity in this consolidated appeal, we will generally refer to these minor children collectively
as the Children. Mother challenges the termination order as to all three of the Children. However, Father is
not the biological father of Ko.W., and thus he challenges only the trial court’s termination order with respect
to K.R. and Te.R. The father of Ko.W. does not participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 2 of 20
Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) due to domestic
violence, Parents’ history of substance abuse, and Parents’ inability to “provide
the [C]hildren with a safe and stable home.” Exhibits Volume II at 59. 2
Following a hearing, at which Father failed to appear, 3 the trial court
adjudicated the Children as CHINS but left them placed with Mother. At the
time, Mother was living in an extended stay hotel. Within the first month,
Mother decided she no longer wanted the Children in her custody and
“dropped [the Children] off” at the DCS offices because she wanted them “to
stabilize” and felt they would be “safer” in custody rather than “struggling”
with her “in an extended stay hotel.” Transcript Volume II at 7. As Mother
was “unwilling to provide for [the Children’s] basic needs and ha[d] abandoned
them,” the court ordered the Children removed from Mother’s care. Exhibits
Volume I at 74. The Children were placed together in foster care. On
December 21, 2022, the court entered a dispositional decree ordering Mother
into services.
[3] Father first appeared in the CHINS case on May 17, 2023, and began working
with service providers in August 2023. The court entered a parental
participation order on December 12, 2023. The court ordered Father to
complete a domestic violence assessment and follow treatment
2
The record indicates Parents had history with DCS dating back to July 2015.
3
Father was initially served with notice of the CHINS proceedings by newspaper publication. As he failed to
appear, he was found in default.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 3 of 20
recommendations, engage in home-based therapy and follow all
recommendations, participate in Father Engagement services and follow all
recommendations, and meet his own medical and mental health needs
including medication management and provide proof to DCS.
[4] On June 26, 2024, the court held a review hearing. The court noted that the
“case has been open for two years,” the Children have been removed from
Mother for two years, and “Mother is not making progress.” Exhibits Volume I
at 92. The court found that Father “made some progress, but then went to jail.”
Id. The court approved a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption.
[5] On November 20, 2024, the court held a review hearing. DCS presented
evidence that Mother was compliant with some services but her status as to
other services was “uncertain.” Id. at 97. DCS presented evidence that Mother
had been aggressive and defiant with services providers. The evidence
indicated that Father was participating in therapeutic supervised parenting time
and Father’s counsel noted that Father was engaging in “an intensive housing
search but [had] not a lot of options due to his criminal history.” Id. Mother
addressed the court and accused DCS of “dropping the ball” and not helping
her the way she wanted. Id.
[6] The court held a review hearing on April 23, 2025. DCS presented evidence
that Mother’s home-based case management “closed in January for lack of
contact” but that the service was “re-referred” when Mother asked to re-engage
in early April 2025. Id. at 100-101. DCS noted that Mother was “fairly
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 4 of 20
compliant” with other services but she refused to participate in domestic
violence services as ordered or random drug screens despite admitted regular
marijuana use. Id. at 101. DCS presented evidence that Mother behaved
inappropriately during supervised visitation with the Children and would not
“accept redirection.” Id. Mother became “animated” during the hearing
regarding her frustrations with DCS, with the court ultimately “mut[ing]” her
“as there ha[d] been enough profanity and personal attacks.” Id. at 102. 4 As to
Father, the evidence indicated that he was participating in services, was
appropriate during visits with the Children, and had a connection with the
Children. Father was living with his sister-in-law, looking for other housing,
trying to obtain a driver’s license, and trying to secure reliable transportation.
[7] On June 16, 2025, DCS filed verified petitions to terminate both Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights. The court appointed Kids’ Voice of Indiana as
Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”). The court held a factfinding hearing on
November 4 and 18, 2025. On December 9, 2025, the court entered extensive
findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and orders terminating the parent-child
relationship between Parents and the Children.
4
The record indicates that the review hearings were conducted via video.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 5 of 20
Discussion
[8] Parents each challenge the termination of their parental rights. Regarding
petitions seeking the termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
provides in pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:
(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:
(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances
described in subsection (d);
(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment
of the child; and
(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in
the child’s best interests.
(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence
of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:
*****
(2) That:
(A) the child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a local office or
probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of
the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning
with the date the child is removed from the home as a
result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of
services or a delinquent child; and
(B) despite the department’s reasonable efforts to
preserve and reunify the child’s family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the
circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in
care outside the parent’s home.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 6 of 20
(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will
not be remedied.
[9] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind.
Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights
must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2.
We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but
consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind.
2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and
convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and
convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a
case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in
person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent
Parents do not challenge the court’s findings of fact, the unchallenged facts
stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the
argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 7 of 20
A. Mother
[10] We first address Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal or the reasons for placement outside her care will not be remedied. 5 In
determining whether the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal will
not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M, 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will
not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a
parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into
consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent
improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there
is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that
delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior
history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id.
Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not
preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of
future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a
child’s removal for purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be
terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside
5
To the extent Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusions regarding additional subsections of Ind. Code
§ 31-35-2-4(d), we need not address those arguments as the involuntary termination statute is written in the
disjunctive and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 8 of 20
the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may
consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of
neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment,
and the services offered by DCS and the parent’s response to those services. Id.
[11] The record reveals that Children were removed from Mother’s care due to
domestic violence, substance abuse, and housing instability. Throughout the
CHINS proceedings, Mother was inconsistent with services. While she did
participate in and complete some services, she failed to complete a domestic
violence treatment program as recommended, and her home-based therapy was
closed due to noncompliance. Indeed, in the three years the case was pending,
Mother had a history of disengagement from services, with numerous referrals
closing unsuccessfully. Mother never progressed past supervised parenting time
with the Children and, significantly, in the period leading up to termination,
Mother failed to participate in supervised visitation with the Children and had
not seen the Children in more than nine months at the time of the termination
hearing. 6 Moreover, Mother exhibited emotional, aggressive, and unstable
behaviors with the court, her Children, and service providers, and she failed to
address her mental health despite orders that she do so. Although Mother
6
Mother blames her noncompliance with services, including her demand that visitation with the Children
cease in February 2025, on DCS and the service providers. However, the record reveals that Mother was
often either passive and unengaged or hostile and antagonistic with providers. As for visitation specifically,
Mother was not only inconsistent in attending visitation, she also had a history of behaving inappropriately
toward the Children during supervised visits and her last visit with the Children ended in a heated exchange
with the therapeutic visit facilitator after the facilitator tried to redirect Mother unsuccessfully.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 9 of 20
suggests that the court erroneously relied on its findings of historical
noncompliance with services rather than her current fitness, as observed above,
the court has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than
efforts made only shortly before termination. In light of the evidence set forth
above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother’s care will not
be remedied. 7
[12] Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of her
parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. In determining the best
interests of children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the
evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to
those of the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly
harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The
recommendation of a case manager and child advocate to terminate parental
rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not
be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
7
To the extent that Mother challenges certain trial court findings as unsupported by the evidence, we
conclude that each of those challenged findings is supported by sufficient evidence and/or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. To the extent Mother challenges certain trial court findings as
“misleading” or “flawed,” Appellant Mother’s Brief at 32-33, those challenges amount to an improper
request for this Court to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility which we may not do.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 10 of 20
termination is in the children’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs.,
987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[13] Family Case Manager Robert Phillips (“FCM Phillips”) opined that
termination of Mother’s parental rights and adoption by their current foster
placement was in the Children’s best interests. FCM Phillips explained that
Mother had not “begun engaging in a lot of the services until recently,” she
“does not have stable housing,” and she had not “appropriately treated her
mental health.” Transcript Volume II at 108-109. He further explained the
importance of permanency and allowing the Children to “grow in an
environment where they are able to have stability” and “where their basic needs
are being met.” Id. at 110. Similarly, Kids’ Voice Guardian Ad Litem
TeQuaysha Tubbs (“GAL Tubbs”) opined that termination of Mother’s
parental rights and adoption was in the Children’s best interests. She stated that
she based her opinion on Mother’s “patterns” of behavior and the Children’s
need for permanency and stability. Id. at 157. She testified that she had
reviewed extensive documentation regarding the case, attended hearings, and
worked with FCM Phillips, the Children’s foster mother, and multiple services
providers.
[14] Mother directs us to her counsel’s cross-examination of GAL Tubbs during
which she admitted “she had never spoken one-on-one with Mother and had
never attended a Child and Family Team Meeting” with Mother. Appellant
Mother’s Brief at 29 (citing Transcript Volume II at 160). Mother suggests that
a “GAL cannot possibly assess the totality of the evidence when she admits that
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 11 of 20
she has never spoken one-on-one with [Mother] and never even asked for her
contact information.” Id. Mother’s arguments are a request for this Court to
reweigh the evidence in her favor, a task not within our prerogative on appeal.
As observed by Kids’ Voice of Indiana, even assuming Mother is correct that
GAL Tubbs’s investigation was “flawed,” the recommendation of the GAL is
just “one piece of the best interests assessment that a trial court must make.”
Kids’ Voice Appellee’s Brief at 11-12. In light of the recommendation of the
case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, as well as the
ample evidence in the record regarding Mother’s failure to remedy the
conditions resulting in removal, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in
finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best
interests.
[15] Finally, Mother contends that DCS’s “egregious and chaotic handling of the
case, including the arbitrary removal of service providers and unreasonable
delays in referrals, deprived [her] of procedural due process.” Appellant’s
Mother’s Brief at 6. 8 This Court has previously concluded that “a parent may
waive a due-process claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising
that claim for the first time on appeal.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997
N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of
Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194-195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). Mother failed to
8
We cannot say that the record supports Mother’s characterization of DCS’s handling of this case with
respect to her.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 12 of 20
raise a due process challenge at the fact-finding hearing and therefore, has
waived this due process claim. As the State points out, there is a limited
exception to waiver for claims of fundamental error; however, Mother does not
argue fundamental error in her appellate briefing.
B. Father
[16] Father raises many of the same issues as Mother; however, we find one of those
issues dispositive. Father asserts that “[w]hen the State seeks to terminate
parental rights, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due
process.” Appellant Father’s Brief at 25 (quoting In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607,
613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied). Unlike Mother, by all accounts, Father
was compliant with and successfully participated in ordered services, held a job,
consistently visited with the Children, and had a strong connection with the
Children. 9 Father asserts, DCS essentially concedes, and the record supports,
that the termination of his parental rights centered solely upon his housing
situation and, at the time of termination, the only true barrier to Father’s
reunification with the Children was his lack of stable housing. Specifically, the
trial court concluded:
Despite reasonable efforts of DCS, [Father] has not been able to
achieve stable housing. While the Court notes he has had
supervised visits with the [C]hildren, the CHINS matter has been
9
In its brief, the GAL states that it “responds only to Mother’s argument that [its] investigation was flawed
because the GAL was not in contact with Mother.” Kids’ Voice Appellee’s Brief at 9.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 13 of 20
pending since July of 2022.[ 10] [Father] has not been able to
obtain stable housing in 3.5 years, and thus the Court finds the
housing situation is unlikely to be remedied.
Appellant Father’s Appendix at 114. Father argues that DCS failed to make
reasonable efforts to address that barrier to reunification despite his own
relentless efforts and requests for help and that “DCS’s refusal to comply with
its policy and practice to reunify the Children with [him] violated his Due
Process Rights.” Appellant Father’s Brief at 25.
[17] First, despite DCS’s urging, we decline to find that Father has waived his due
process claim. During the close of the termination hearing, Father’s counsel
specifically argued that DCS’s “hard lined” approach to Father’s failure to
secure “traditional conventional housing” violates “the due process clause of
the federal and state constitutions.” Transcript Volume II at 191-192. 11 Father
has preserved this claim and we address it on the merits.
[18] The Indiana Supreme Court has emphasized that “termination of parental
rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose on a parent” and “is
intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have
failed.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1136 (Ind. 2010) (reversing termination of
10
We observe that the court did not enter a parental participation order as to Father until December 12,
2023.
11
We observe that, in arguing that Father waived his due process claim on appeal, DCS patently misstates
the record in claiming that ‘[n]either Mother nor Father even mentioned the phrase ‘due process’ in their
closing arguments.” Appellee DCS’s Brief at 46. As the above-quoted language makes clear, this assertion is
false as to Father.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 14 of 20
father’s parental rights after determining “[w]e are not convinced that all other
reasonable efforts have been employed in this case to unite this father and
son”). Specifically, “for a parent’s due process rights to be protected in the
context of termination proceedings, DCS must have made reasonable efforts to
preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case[.]” T.W., 135
N.E.3d at 615; see also Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.5 (stating DCS is generally
required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify family during
CHINS proceedings). But what constitutes “reasonable efforts” varies by case
and the requirement that DCS make reasonable efforts to reunite a family “does
not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the parents.”
T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 615. Moreover, the general requirement to make
reasonable efforts to reunify families during CHINS proceedings is not an
element of the termination statute, “and a failure to provide services does not
serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to
law.” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We recognize,
however, that CHINS and termination proceedings are “deeply and obviously
intertwined to the extent that an error in the former may flow into and infect
the latter[.]” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014).
[19] In T.W., we held that where the father consistently attempted to engage with
DCS and participate in reunification services during the CHINS proceeding but
DCS made no genuine effort to provide him with support and services, a risk of
the erroneous filing of a termination petition was created by DCS’s inaction and
the father’s due process rights were violated. 135 N.E.3d. at 618. In short, in
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 15 of 20
T.W., DCS “wholly failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve” the parentchild relationship despite father’s diligent and consistent efforts. Id.
[20] The record here reveals that, at the time of termination, Father had found an
extended stay hotel that he could pay for on a weekly or monthly basis. DCS
opined that such housing was too unstable, and the trial court agreed in finding
that Father had “not achieved stable housing.” Appellant Father’s Appendix
Volume II at 112. The court concluded that this was the case “[d]espite
reasonable efforts of DCS” and that Father’s “housing situation is unlikely to be
remedied.” Id. at 114. This is where we part ways with the trial court and find
T.W. instructive as we are not convinced that the record supports a finding that
reasonable efforts have been employed in this case to unite Father with his
children and that there is, in fact, a reasonable probability that Father’s housing
situation can and will be remedied.
[21] The evidence indicates that Father, with the help of one of his service providers,
submitted applications for at least fifty apartments all of which were rejected
due to Father’s criminal history. 12 Being that obtaining suitable housing was
Father’s only apparent obstacle to reunification, 13 this is exactly the time DCS
12
Father’s Engagement provider, Nando Poindexter, testified that it was his understanding that Father’s
ability to pay for housing was not “an issue,” and that it was simply his criminal history that was causing the
rejections. Transcript Volume II at 79.
13
There was no testimony or evidence presented to indicate that DCS had any other concern regarding
Father’s ability to reunify with the Children. The trial court found that Father’s “criminal history is a barrier
to finding and maintaining stable housing, which is not likely to be remedied.” Appellant Father’s Appendix
Volume II at 113. The housing issue was also used to support the court’s finding that Father had “never
progressed past supervised parenting time.” Id. at 112. The evidence is clear that Father’s failure to progress
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 16 of 20
efforts should have increased. See, e.g., T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 618 (noting that it
“should have been no surprise” to the family case manager that the father, who
had recently been released from incarceration, would, at times, “flounder” in
his reunification efforts and observing that the father “should have been given
more assistance in this situation—especially since he explicitly asked for it”).
[22] At the time of termination, Father had been living in a house with his sister-inlaw for quite some time in order to provide a stable home for the Children, but
his sister-in-law “had some DCS history” which automatically disqualified her
home as suitable. Transcript Volume II at 123-124. DCS admittedly has a
“policy to seek a waiver if there’s DCS history and a placement” to allow
children to be possibly placed in such a home but, inexplicably, “no efforts”
were taken to seek a waiver in this case. Id. Father had also previously
identified another potential home where he could reside, but “a resident that
was in the home was in the middle of a current legal situation” that also
disqualified that home. Id. at 123.
[23] Just a week before the termination hearing, Father’s significant efforts to find
housing paid off as he found an apartment that would accept him despite his
criminal history. Father testified that the lease required a $1,300 up-front
payment, that he did not have the full amount, and that he asked FCM Phillips
for help. FCM Phillips confirmed that, shortly before the termination hearing,
past supervised parenting time was due to his inability to obtain what DCS considered to be suitable housing
and thus, these two findings are intertwined.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 17 of 20
DCS learned that Father had made “progress” as “far as finding a potential
apartment” but FCM Phillips simply “hadn’t had a chance to [meet] with [his]
supervisor regarding assistance for rent and deposit.” Id. at 124. 14 Despite the
fact that Father was clearly “on track to find traditional housing” that DCS
would likely approve of, there is no indication in the record as to why this
option could not have been explored further before the grave consequence of
terminating Father’s rights. Id. at 125.
[24] Finally, we find curious that DCS disapproved of Father’s identified extendedstay hotel as being too unstable, while undisputedly finding a similar
arrangement adequate for Mother to maintain placement of the Children at the
outset of the CHINS proceedings. While we recognize that such nontraditional
housing would not necessarily be a long-term solution for Father, such
arrangement should not serve as the sole grounds for which DCS sought
termination of Father’s parental rights.
[25] Under the unique circumstances presented, we cannot say that the record
demonstrates that DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with his
children so as to protect his right to due process in the termination proceedings.
In light of the ample evidence that Father has consistently demonstrated his
“dedication to the process of reunifying with his children,” Transcript Volume
II at 80, we conclude that DCS’s actions (or inactions) regarding Father’s
14
Father states that DCS policy allows for “a one-time payment of up to $750 for a parent’s rent and security
deposit.” Appellant Father’s Brief at 16 (citing DCS Manual, Ch. 16, Sec. 3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 18 of 20
inability to secure approved housing, created “a risk of the erroneous filing of a
petition to terminate.” T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 618.
[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s
parental rights to all three of the Children. However, we reverse the trial court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights as to K.R. and Te.R. and remand with
instructions to reopen the CHINS case and re-examine the requirements for
reunification.
[27] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT K.W. (MOTHER)
Don R. Hostetler
Indianapolis, Indiana
Talisha Griffin
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT T.R. (FATHER)
Andrea Rahman
Andrea Rahman Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
Talisha Griffin
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 19 of 20 Evan Matthew Comer
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE KIDS’ VOICE OF INDIANA
Katherine Meger Kelsey
Chief Legal Counsel
Kids’ Voice of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-38 July 8, 2026 Page 20 of 20