Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 8, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D26-0129
Lower Tribunal No. 24-3627-CA-01
Victor Manuel Rocha,
Petitioner,
vs.
Ofelia Acevedo Paya, etc.,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto Diaz, Judge.
do Campo & Thornton, P.A., and John A. Thornton, for petitioner.
Continental PLLC, and Carlos Trujillo, Jesus M. Suarez, and Amy M. Bowers, for respondent.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.
Victor Manuel Rocha petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash
an order compelling discovery sought by Ofelia Acevedo Paya. He contends
that responding to the discovery would require him to divulge confidential
information and thereby breach his plea agreement with the United States
government. Rocha, however, would have this Court accept his assertion
that the requested information is classified. That is insufficient. Rocha is not
the arbiter of whether information is classified in this case. That
determination belongs to the United States government. Although Rocha
seeks to invoke his plea agreement as a shield against discovery, he has not
utilized the agreement’s pre-publication review procedure in objecting to the
requested discovery. If Rocha believes that responding would disclose
confidential information, the plea agreement provides a mechanism to
determine whether disclosure is permissible. Until that process is invoked
and completed, any claimed harm remains speculative and too remote to
support certiorari jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss the petition.
BACKGROUND
A. Rocha’s Criminal Case
Rocha served the Republic of Cuba as a covert agent within Cuba’s
intelligence apparatus, the General Directorate of Intelligence (“DGI”). To
further Cuba’s objectives, Rocha held various positions within the United
2
States Department of State from 1981 until August 2002. During that time,
he had access to extensive nonpublic, classified, and sensitive information
and allegedly provided such information to the Cuban government. In
November 2022, an undercover federal agent (“UC”), posing as a covert DGI
representative, contacted Rocha. Following that initial contact, the UC met
with Rocha on three occasions. During those meetings, Rocha stated that
he remained a foreign agent acting on behalf of the Republic of Cuba. He
described the United States as an “enemy” and reaffirmed his allegiance to
Cuba. In December 2023, the United States Department of State Diplomatic
Security Service (“DSS”) conducted a voluntary interview of Rocha. Initially,
Rocha denied having contacted an individual matching the UC’s description.
Once DSS informed him that it possessed reliable information confirming
multiple meetings with the UC, Rocha terminated the interview. He was
indicted soon after.
B. The Plea Agreement and the Government’s Notice of
Restitution
In April 2024, Rocha plead guilty in federal court to committing
conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government, 1 and to defrauding
1
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2023).
3
the United States while acting as an illegal agent of a foreign government. 2
In his written plea agreement with the United States, Rocha agreed to abide
by his obligation not to divulge any confidential information acquired by his
employment and illegal activities as a foreign agent:
5. The defendant understands and acknowledges his
continuing legal obligation to refrain from the
unauthorized oral or written disclosure of information
belonging to the United States Government or
acquired by virtue of his United States Government
employment or derived from the activities which
resulted in his arrest. The defendant further
understands and acknowledges that, in connection
with his employment by the DOS, he entered into
certain agreements proscribing the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, confidential
information, and other information acquired as a part
of his performance of his official duties or acquired
from the files of the intelligence community. Even
though the defendant is no longer a DOS employee,
he acknowledges his continuing duties and
obligations under these agreements, which are
hereby incorporated by reference. In addition,
notwithstanding any prior agreement, the defendant
agrees that he will never disclose to any person or
entity, except to persons or entities specifically
authorized by the United States Government, any
classified information, any confidential United States
Government information (whether or not such
2
18 U.S.C. § 951 (2023).
4
information is formally classified), and all other
information acquired as part of his employment.
The plea agreement also contained a provision that Rocha remained
liable for restitution, if any, in connection with the underlying charges of his
conviction, specifically Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment pursuant to the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. 3 Further, Paragraph 6 of the Plea
Agreement sets forth the pre-publication procedure to be used if Rocha
divulged information about his time as both a Cuban spy and United States
executive employee.
Two months later, the United States filed its Notice Regarding
Restitution in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida stating that
“no restitution is due.” According to the filing, the causal link between
Rocha’s crimes and any “quantifiable physical or pecuniary harm” was too
speculative to justify any restitution award. However, the United States
conceded that “nothing in the plea agreement or any aspect of [Rocha’s]
prosecution precludes any person from seeking damages or other relief from
[Rocha] in any other forum.” The government’s notice concluded by stating,
“nothing about the absence of restitution under the MVRA precludes any
3
18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2024).
5
individual from pursuing a legitimate civil claim against [Rocha] or otherwise
lawfully seeking to vindicate his or her rights.”
C. Rocha’s Civil Case
Soon after, Ofelia Acevedo, on behalf of her deceased husband and
Cuban civil rights humanitarian, Oswaldo Paya Sardinas, filed a civil action
against Rocha which underlies this appeal. Acevedo filed claims against
Rocha for Civil Conspiracy, and for Facilitating and Furthering Terrorism
contrary to the Florida Anti-Terrorism Act, § 772.13(1), Florida Statutes
(2025).
The decedent, Paya, was purportedly assassinated by the Cuban
Government on July 22, 2012.4 At that time, Rocha was an advisor to the
Commander of the United States Southern Command (“USSOUTHCOM”).
Acevedo alleges in her complaint that Rocha conspired with the Cuban
government to orchestrate Paya’s assassination by obtaining critical,
confidential information about him via his advisory role with USSOUTHCOM.
4
Acevedo’s complaint acknowledges that the Cuban government denies involvement in Paya’s death. However, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights published a report on the incident concluding that the Cuban government indeed orchestrated Paya’s assassination. See Admissibility and Merits Report, Case 14.196, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 83/23, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 92 (2023).
6
Acevedo subsequently served discovery on Rocha, including the three
interrogatories pertinent to the Petition, asking Rocha to disclose the
substance of discussions with the United States in the federal case:
13. Identify by date all instances in which You met
with representatives of the United States
Government for the purpose of providing information
as contemplated by your cooperation agreement in
United States v. Rocha, Case No. 1:23-CR-20464-BB(1) (S.D. Fla. 2023).
14. Identify all individuals or entities You provided
information about to the representatives of the United
States Government in connection with your
cooperation agreement in United States v. Rocha,
Case No. 1:23-CR-20464-BB(1) (S.D. Fla. 2023).
15. Identify the substance of all information provided
to representatives of the United States government
in connection with your cooperation agreement in
United States v. Rocha, Case No. 1:23-CR-20464-BB(1) (S.D. Fla. 2023).
Acevedo also requested “[a]ll Documents and Communications provided to
the United States Government in connection with your cooperation
agreement in United States v. Rocha, Case No. 1:23-CR-20464-BB(1) (S.D.
Fla. 2023).”
7
Rocha objected to each of these discovery requests, specifically
asserting that disclosure of such information would force Rocha to breach
his plea agreement with the United States:
Answer: Objection. The Plea Agreement entered into
by Mr. Rocha with the government of the United
States prevents revelation. In that agreement Mr.
Rocha agreed that he would “never disclose to any
person or entity, except to persons or entities
specifically authorized by the United States
Government, any classified information, [or] any
confidential United States Government information
(whether or not such information is formally
classified) …” See United States v. Victor Manuel
Rocha, 1:23-CR-20464-BLOOM, DE 34, p. 3, ¶ 5.
Rocha also filed a motion for a protective order requesting a stay of
“further discovery, soliciting the input of the [Federal] Government
concerning whether and how this matter can be maintained without the
revelation of state secrets or Government information [. . .] to ensure that
Rocha not be required to reveal state secrets.” The United States never
responded with their position on the discovery request.5 And because the
United States never asserted the state secret privilege, no privilege could be
5
On April 6, 2026, this Court ordered the parties to file a joint notice of service of the date of oral argument, attaching a copy the Petition, Response, Reply, and appendices on the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida. The parties complied. The United States has not sought to intervene in this action as of the date of this opinion.
8
applied to the pertinent discovery requests to protect Rocha from the
discovery process. See, e.g. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1953) (establishing that only the government may assert a privilege to
prevent the disclosure of classified documents). Indeed, the trial court
denied Rocha’s motion for a protective order.
Still, Rocha maintained his original objections and refused to respond
to Acevedo’s discovery. In turn, Acevedo filed a motion to overrule
objections and compel discovery after the trial court denied the original
protective order. Rocha responded that Acevedo’s motion “seeks to compel
[Rocha] to answer irrelevant questions about details of his debriefings with
the U.S. government, when to do so would violate his plea agreement and
put him in legal jeopardy.” So Rocha did not assert a state secret privilege
and only asserted the discovery was irrelevant, overly burdensome, and
would violate his plea agreement.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. Acevedo argued
that the motion should be granted for the same reasons it denied the motion
for protective order—the United States never responded to Rocha’s request
for input, and so no state secret privilege could be raised. Rocha countered
that while the earlier motion for protective order attempted to assert that
privilege, “these objections are based upon [. . .] the relevance of the
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material, and the harm to [Rocha]” by disclosing confidential, information;
Rocha did not seek to reassert the state secrets privilege.
The trial court noted that litigation had been ongoing for two years, and
despite attempts to get the United States involved, the Parties “have yet to
hear from the U.S. Attorney’s Office or any federal agency speak on behalf
of [Rocha] and whatever deals he made with the government.” In its ruling,
the trial court found that it had “previously ruled on [Rocha’s] objections,”
overruled them again, and ordered Rocha to answer Acevedo’s discovery
requests. In directly addressing Rocha’s counsel at the hearing, the trial
court advised:
If I didn’t already made [sic] it abundantly clear to
you, I’m doing so now. The objections are overruled
and I’m ordering your client to answer the discovery.
The trial court then explained that if they choose, the United States can
intercede in this procedure and “can intervene if they want to.” An order
reflecting the court’s ruling was entered the following day (the “Order
Compelling Discovery”) requiring Rocha to provide complete responses to
the contested discovery requests. He refused to do so.
After that order was entered, Rocha gave a deposition during which
Rocha’s criminal defense counsel admitted she did not know what
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information discussed at her client’s debriefing with the United States was
classified or confidential:
[Rocha’s Counsel]: I don’t know exactly what’s been
classified and what’s not been classified. It’s not
been classified as confidential, but I was not made
privy to what was classified or what was not, so I’m
protecting all of that information.
Rocha filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari shortly thereafter.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To be entitled to certiorari relief, a petitioner must establish: (1) a
departure from the essential requirements of the law; (2) resulting in material
injury for the remainder of the case; (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. See Blades v. State, Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Stewart,
943 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Bd. of Regents of State v. Snyder,
826 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The second and third elements are “sometimes referred to as
irreparable harm.” Nader v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,
87 So. 3d 712, 721 (Fla. 2012). “The establishment of irreparable harm is a
condition precedent to invoking certiorari jurisdiction.” Stockinger v.
Zeilberger, 152 So. 3d 71, 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). As to the first element,
“[t]he required ‘departure from the essential requirements of law’ means
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something far beyond legal error.” Sucart v. Office of Comm’r, 129 So. 3d
1112, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quotation omitted). “It means an inherent
illegality or irregularity, an abuse of judicial power, an act of judicial tyranny
perpetrated with disregard of procedural requirements, resulting in a gross
miscarriage of justice.” Id.
ANALYSIS
Rocha seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the Order Compelling
Discovery. Rocha argues we have jurisdiction to review the Order because
it threatens irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on appeal.
Specifically, Rocha asserts if he reveals the information, he will suffer
irreparable harm by breaching the plea agreement and committing federal
crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) and (4). He also asserts the discovery
is overbroad and not limited to relevant material—the death of Paya.
A. Plea Agreement
Paragraph 6 of the Plea Agreement delineates the pre-publication
procedure should Rocha at any time produce information regarding his time
as a Cuban spy and United States executive employee:
Should the defendant, at any time, author or
participate in the creation of any book, writing, article,
film, documentary, or other production, or otherwise
provide information for purposes of publication
or dissemination, including but not limited to
information provided through interviews with writers
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or representatives of any media organization or
entity, the defendant hereby agrees to first submit
in a timely fashion such book, writing, article, film,
documentary, or other production, or information,
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
the DOS for timely pre-publication review and
deletion of information which, in the discretion of the
FBI and/or DOS, should not be published or
disseminated on any grounds, including but not
limited to national security interests.
(emphasis added).
The record contains no indication that Rocha attempted to provide
information responsive to the requests to the FBI and the DOS for prepublication review. Indeed, Rocha’s objections to the discovery requests
invoked the Plea Agreement as a complete bar to revealing any confidential
information. And Rocha’s motion for protective order sought a stay so it
could seek advice from the federal government in order to proceed without
revealing state secrets. Yet neither filing mentioned the pre-publication
procedure nor reflected any submission of information responsive to the
discovery requests to the FBI or the DOS.
Rocha would have us take his word that the information requested is
classified. We cannot do so. For one, Rocha’s counsel admitted she did not
know what information discussed at the debriefing was classified and that
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“[i]t’s not been classified as confidential.” 6 But, more importantly, the
privilege over classified and sensitive government information belongs
exclusively to the United States government. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 (“The
[state secrets privilege] belongs to the Government and must be asserted by
it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party.”); see also
Alexander v. Trump, 413 So. 3d 795, 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (“While
government officials may claim the immunities and protections provided to
them in court proceedings, the law is clear that such privileges are not
available to third parties to claim, nor may such privileges be asserted by
others on the officials’ behalf.”), review denied, No. SC2025-0922, 2025 WL
2448990 (Fla. Aug. 26, 2025).
That said, the procedure for pre-publication review was never
presented to the trial court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Order
Compelling Discovery forecloses Rocha from invoking that procedure in
responding to the requests. If Rocha believes he cannot answer because
6
Without a designation of what is classified by a United States Government agency, we would be hard pressed to conclude that if Rocha revealed such information, it constitutes a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) and (4). While the statute prohibits the willful dissemination of classified information to unauthorized individuals, the term “classified information” under the statute means information “which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.” 18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (2026) (emphasis added).
14
doing so would divulge confidential information, a pre-publication review
process exists for him to follow and obtain that determination. Until then, any
injury remains speculative and too remote to invoke this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction. See Venezia v. Wells Fargo Bank, 258 So. 3d 539, 541 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2018) (“Irreparable harm cannot be established on speculation.”);
Mayport Hous. P’ship, Ltd. v. Albani, 244 So. 3d 1176, 1177–78 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2018) (“Generally speaking, irreparable harm cannot be speculative,
but must be real and ascertainable.”).
B. Overbreadth
Generally, “overbreadth is not a sufficient basis for certiorari relief if the
discovery request appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” Oakley Transp. Group, Inc. v. Shinault, 341 So. 3d
440, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). Rocha relies on the exception to this rule.
Certiorari is appropriate in cases where a discovery order effectively grants
carte blanche to irrelevant discovery. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655
So. 2d 91, 95 (Fla. 1995); Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Santos, 118 So. 3d
317, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). This is not the exceptional case. Without
resolving the merits of the underlying action, the information sought has a
nexus to the subject matter of the civil conspiracy action as plead.
15
Acevedo’s complaint alleges that Rocha entered into a conspiracy with
the Cuban government and that conspiracy resulted in the death of Paya.
Rocha’s plea agreement arose from his participation in that conspiracy.
Thus, the information provided in connection with the plea agreement offers
a direct window into the scope and membership of the conspiracy. These
requests therefore bear a direct nexus to the subject matter of the pending
civil conspiracy action. Cf. Langston, 655 So. 2d at 95 (finding discovery
request for insurance company’s internal procedural memos regarding
handling of uninsured motorist claims during prior twelve months lacked
nexus to plaintiff’s standard uninsured motorist action, which did not allege
bad faith or unfair claim practices).
The fact that Rocha knows no one with information about the
allegations, has had no communication about Mr. Paya or the Christian
Liberation Movement, and had no communications with anyone in the Cuban
government in the two years surrounding Paya is not dispositive. 7 Our
jurisprudence does not limit the relevant inquiry to his direct involvement in
7
That is assuming these assertions in Rocha’s deposition testimony are true. Indeed, Acevedo need not take Rocha at his word. Discovery is the mechanism by which a party tests the veracity of these assertions. See, e.g., Bliss v. Brodsky, 604 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (“Even though this discovery may lead to information useful primarily as collateral impeachment, it is appropriate discovery . . . .”).
16
Paya’s death. See Amersham Enterprises, Inc. v. Hakim-Daccach, 333 So.
3d 289, 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (emphasis added) (“[E]ach conspirator is
liable for and bound by the act and declaration of each and all of the
conspirators done or made in furtherance of the conspiracy even if not
present at the time.”); Logan v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, 350 So. 3d
404, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“[A] conspirator need not take part in the
planning, inception, or successful conclusion of a conspiracy.”); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Neff, 325 So. 3d 872, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“A
co-conspirator need not have caused any direct injury to the claimant.”).
This case is distinguishable from the carte blanche discovery in
Santos, on which Rocha primarily relies, that required production of
countless irrelevant incident reports from all Publix stores statewide, despite
the applicable statute limiting the relevant inquiry to the establishment where
the incident occurred. See 118 So. 3d at 319. Accordingly, we do not view
the Order Compelling Discovery as affording Acevedo carte blanche access
to irrelevant discovery.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have no authority, in granting a petition for a writ of
certiorari, to direct the trial court to take any specific action other than to
quash the order of which Rocha complains. See Marriott v. Fisher &
17
Davidson, LLP, 299 So. 3d 511, 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). But without a
threshold showing of irreparable harm, we cannot do so. The petition for
certiorari is dismissed.
Dismissed.
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