UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
MICHAEL CHASE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) Civil Case No. 25-2904 (RJL)
V. )
)
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA )
TRANSIT AUTHORITY, )
)
Defendant. )
_ _ _ _____ _ _ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
IA-,,
July _ er_ , 2026 [Dkt. #5, 7, 10]
Plaintiffs Michael Chase, Teonna Chase, and minor Z.C. ("plaintiffs") sued
defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") for the allegedly
negligent driving of a WMATA Metrobus. There are three motions pending. As explained
further below, I will DENY WMATA's first motion to dismiss [Dkt. #5] as moot, DENY
plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint [Dkt. #7] as moot, and GRANT
WMATA's second motion to dismiss [Dkt. #10] because plaintiffs conceded the motion
under Local Civil Rule 7(b), and, in any event, plaintiffs failed to state a claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Michael Chase, Teonna Chase, and their two-year old child, Z.C., sued
defendant WMATA for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Am.
1
Compl. [Dkt. #8]. Plaintiffs allege that on December 8, 2024, a WMATA Metro bus merged
lanes without yielding and struck plaintiffs' vehicle. Id. ,i,i 5-6. Plaintiffs sought medical
evaluations and treatment for their injuries. Id. ,i,i 8-9.
On July 15, 2025, plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. See Ex. 5 to Compl. [Dkt. # 1-5]. On August 28, 2025, WMATA removed the
case to this Court. See Notice [Dkt. #3]. On September 4, 2025, WMATA filed a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss arguing that plaintiffs' action exceeded the statute of limitations
and failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Def. 's Mot. to
Dismiss ("First Mot. to Dismiss") [Dkt. #5].
On September 18, 2025, plaintiffs opposed WMATA's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See
Pls.' Opp'n [Dkt. #6]. That same day, plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint.
See Pls.' Mot. for Leave to Amend Complaint [Dkt. #7]. Plaintiffs simultaneously filed an
amended complaint on the docket. See Am. Compl. [Dkt. #8].
On October 7, 2025, in response to plaintiffs' amended complaint, WMATA filed a
second Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
See Def. 's Partial Mot. to Dismiss ("Second Mot. to Dismiss") [Dkt. # 1O]. Plaintiffs never
responded. The motions are now ripe.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(l), a party may amend its pleadings
"once as a matter of course" within 21 days of service or receipt of responsive pleadings.
After 21 days, a party must obtain the "opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave" to amend its complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "The grant or denial of leave to
2
amend is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, but the court should freely
give leave when justice so requires." Mann v. United States, 2022 WL 888181, at *2
(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2022) (quoting De Sousa v. Dep 't of State, 840 F. Supp. 2d 92, 113
(D.D.C. 2012)). Courts may deny motions for leave to amend for "undue delay, bad faith
or dilatory motive ... or futility of amendment." Id.
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
Court must determine whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The
complaint cannot merely offer "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, the plaintiff
must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. However, the plaintiff "is entitled to
'the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged."' Islar v. Whole
Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 261,265 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Am. Nat'! Ins. Co.
v. FDIC, 642 F. 3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
ANALYSIS
I. WMATA's First Motion to Dismiss
WMATA's first motion to dismiss should be denied as moot because plaintiffs
subsequently filed an amended complaint. See McKeithan v. Boarman, 2011 WL 2669060,
at *1 (D.D.C. July 7, 2011) ("[B]y filing the amended complaint, the plaintiff rendered his
original complaint a nullity." (cleaned up)); see also Gray v. D.C. Pub. Schs., 688 F. Supp.
3
2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010) ("When a plaintiff amends her complaint, it renders a motion to
dismiss that complaint moot.").
II. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint is denied as moot because
plaintiffs could-and did-file an amended complaint as of right under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(l)(B). According to Rule 15(a)(l)(B), a party "may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course" within "21 days after service of a motion under Rule
12(b)." Here, WMATA filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on September 4, 2025. See First Mot.
to Dismiss. Fourteen days later, on September 18, 2025, plaintiffs timely filed an amended
complaint. See Am. Comp1. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their
complaint is moot. See Shipkovitz v. Barr, 2019 WL 1082161, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2019)
(denying plaintiff's Rule 15(a)(l) Motion for Leave to Amend as moot because the
amended complaint was timely filed as of right).
III. WMATA's Second Motion to Dismiss
WMATA's second motion to dismiss is granted both because plaintiffs conceded the
motion by failing to respond and because the motion succeeds on the merits.
First, Local Civil Rule 7(b) provides that "an opposing party shall serve and file a
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion" within "14 days of the
date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct"; otherwise the "Court may
treat the motion as conceded." Local Civil Rule 7(b) is a '"docket-management tool that
facilitates efficient and effective resolution of motions,' and we have yet to deem a
'straightforward application of Local Rule 7(b)' an abuse of discretion." Cohen v. Bd. of
4
Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819 F. 3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting
Fox. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F. 3d. 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see also Dean v. Lange,
Kim & Dowell, LLP, 2026 WL 172423, at *l (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2026) (applying Local Civil
Rule 7(b)). 1
Second, WMATA's motion to dismiss is granted because plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. To establish a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the negligent actions
of the defendant (1) created a "zone of physical danger," (2) causing '"serious' and
'verifiable' mental distress" so the plaintiff (3) "feared for his own safety." Kowalevicz v.
United States, 302 F. Supp. 3d 68, 78 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Hedgepeth v. Whitman
Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 798 (D.C. 2011)). "'[S]erious and verifiable' means that the
distress must have manifested in an external condition or physical symptoms," and the
"emotional distress must be acute, enduring, or life-altering." Hawkins v. WMATA, 311 F.
Supp. 3d 94, 107 (D.D.C. 2018) (first quoting Rice v. District of Columbia, 774 F.Supp.2d
25, 33 (D.D.C. 2011), then quoting Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 817
(D.C. 2011)).
Plaintiffs' allegations of harm are far too vague and conclusory to allege "serious
and verifiable mental distress. Kowalevicz, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 78. Plaintiffs allege that
they were "physically shaken, causing significant physical and emotional trauma." Am.
1
Due to the tension between Local Civil Rule 7(b), which places the burden of persuasion on the nonmoving party, and Rule 12(b)(6), which places the burden of persuasion on the moving party, courts also typically evaluate the merits of a party's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Voacolo v. Fed. Nat '! Mortg. Ass 'n, 224 F. Supp. 3d 39, 42 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Dean, 2026 WL 172423, at * 1 n.2 .
5
Compl. ,r 7. "Minor Plaintiff'' "began crying and screaming and had to be medically
evaluated for signs of distress and shock." Id. ,r 8. Plaintiffs allege that they "continued to
experience physical pain, emotional distress, and disruption in their daily lives." Id. ,r 9.
Courts have dismissed similarly conclusory allegations of emotional distress. See, e.g.,
Hawkins, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 108 (allegation that plaintiff "became very frightened and was
in pain and began to cry" and that a different plaintiff was "unable to feel safe while going
outside" insufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); see also
Bradley v. Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n, 249 F. Supp. 3d 149, 170 (D.D.C. 2017)
(dismissing the plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim for "recit[ing], in
a conclusory fashion, the elements" of a claim without more).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I DENY defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #5] as
moot, DENY plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File [Dkt. #7] as moot, and GRANT
defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 10]. An accompanying order will issue
contemporaneously with this opinion.
RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge
6