UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
MANOJ MASHATTI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) Civil Case No. 25-1100 (RJL)
)
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. )
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, )
)
Defendant. )
_ _ _ _______ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
July 9 +'--. 2026 [Dkt. #20, 23]
Plaintiff Manoj Mashatti, an Indian national living in the United States on a student
visa, challenges the termination of his Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
("SEVIS") record by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE" or "the
Government"). Before the Court are two motions: the Government's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the
following reasons, I will DENY the Government's motion to dismiss and GRANT
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a citizen and national of India who, in 2022, obtained an F-1 student visa
to pursue a graduate degree in the United States at the University of Texas at Dallas.
1
Compl. [Dkt. #1] ,r,r 8-10. 1 Months after arriving in the United States, plaintiff was
arrested for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. Id. ,r 26. The charges were ultimately
dismissed pursuant to a deferred adjudication plea, and his probation was terminated early.
Id. ,r 27. Plaintiff has no other criminal history. Id. ,r 28.
Plaintiff completed his graduate degree in May 2024. Id. ,r 29. He then applied for
and received authorization for post-completion practical training as a data engineer, id.
,r,r 30-31, allowing him to maintain his F-1 status, see Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. #20] at 3 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i)).
By virtue of his F-1 status, plaintiff received a record in SEVIS, an online database
maintained by ICE's Student Exchange and Visitor Program ("SEVP") and used to
maintain information on foreign students studying in the United States. Compl. ,r,r 14-15
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1372). Schools report information about students ' start dates, course
progress, and graduation dates in SEVIS, and SEVP in tum monitors SEVIS to verify that
students are "maintaining their status." Id. ,r,r 16-17 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(g)).
On April 2, 2025, a school official notified plaintiff that ICE had terminated his
SEVIS record. Id. ,r,r 33-34. Plaintiff received a letter confirming as much and providing
the following explanation:
TERMINATION REASON: OTHERWISE FAILING TO MAINTAIN STATUS -Individual identified in criminal records check and/or has had their VISA revoked.
SEVIS record has been terminated.
1
The basic facts of this case as stated in the complaint and the administrative record are undisputed. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. #20] at 4-5; Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #23] at 2-3; Def.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #26] at 1-2.
2
Id. ,I 34. Plaintiff received no warning of the termination and no opportunity to respond.
Id. ,r,r 36-37. In responding to plaintiff's lawsuit, the Government clarified that plaintiff's
SEVIS record was terminated after his "information was run against criminal databases
and was a verified match to a criminal history record" due to his driving-while-intoxicated
arrest from October 2022, though at the time of the criminal history match, "the disposition
of this charge was unknown." Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. forTRO, Ex. A("First Watson
Deel.") [D kt. #8-1] if 7.
II. This Lawsuit
On April 11, 2025, plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging that the Government's
termination of his SEVIS record violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and
the U.S. Constitution. See Compl. ,r 48. The same day, plaintiff moved for a temporary
restraining order ("TRO"). See PI. 's Mot. for TRO [Dkt. #2].
Following briefing and a hearing, I issued a TRO on April 17, 2025, requiring the
Government to restore plaintiff's SEVIS record and ordering the Government not to
"change or otherwise modify plaintiff's record in SEVIS" for the same reasons in the
future. Mem. Order [Dkt. #10] at 5. The Government subsequently restored plaintiff's
SEVIS record. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A ("Notice to Student") [Dkt. #20-1]; Def.'s
Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B ("Second Watson Deel.") [Dkt. #20-2] ,r 5.
On April 26, 2025, the Government promulgated notice of a new policy regarding
SEVIS termination. Notice of Filing, Ex. A ("Policy Regarding Termination of Records")
[Dkt. #13-1]. The policy set forth a non-exhaustive list of permissible grounds for SEVIS
3
termination, including "objective evidence that a nonimmigrant visa holder is no longer
complying with the terms of their nonimmigrant status for any reason." Id. at 1-2.
On June 12, 2025, the Government moved to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the case was moot. See Def. 's Mot. to Dismiss
("Mot. to Dismiss") [Dkt. #20]. The Government points to the new Policy, asserting that
ICE "has no plans under its new SEVIS policy to re-terminate the plaintiff(s) SEVIS record
based solely on the [National Crime Information Center] record that led to its initial
termination." Second Watson Deel. ,r 6.
Plaintiff responded on June 24, 2025, see Pl. 's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss
("Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss") [Dkt. #22], and moved for summary judgment, see Pl.'s Mot.
for Summ. J. ("Mot. for Summ. J.") [Dkt. #23]. The Government filed its reply on July 10,
2025. See Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Reply") [Dkt. #24]. The
Government filed its brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on
July 29, 2025. See Def. 's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. ("Opp'n to Mot. for Summ.
J.")[Dkt. #26]. Plaintiff filed his reply in support on August 5, 2025. See Pl.'s Reply to
Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Reply") [Dkt. #27]. On March 18, 2026, plaintiff filed
a notice of supplemental authority regarding two similar cases in this District. See Notice
of Suppl. Authority [Dkt. #28]. The motions are now ripe for decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
This Court "must dismiss a case when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction." Wills v.
U.S. Parole Comm 'n, 882 F. Supp. 2d 60, 68 (D.D.C. 2012). "Plaintiff bears the burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Am. Farm Bureau
4
v. US. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). When reviewing a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule l 2(b)( 1), the Court "accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint and may also consider undisputed facts evidenced in the record." Koutny
v. Martin, 530 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2007) (cleaned up).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a party seeks judicial review of agency action under the APA,
the court decides "as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the
administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review."
Franciscan St. Margaret Health v. Azar, 407 F. Supp. 3d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation
omitted). The Court's review is "typically limited to the administrative record" and,
therefore, the Court "need not and ought not engage in fact finding." Kondapally v. US.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 557 F. Supp. 3d 10, 20 (D.D.C. 2021).
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Dismiss
The Government argues this case should be dismissed because it is moot. The
Government points to its reinstatement of plaintiff's SEVIS record and its announcement
of a new policy governing SEVIS termination. Plaintiff disagrees, invoking the voluntary
cessation exception to mootness. I agree with plaintiff that this case is not moot!
Federal courts may decide only "actual, ongoing controversies." Pub. Citizen, Inc.
v. FERC, 92 F.4th 1124, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317
(1988)). A case becomes moot when, because of intervening events, "the issues presented
5
are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."
Already, LLCv. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotingMurphyv. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,
481 (1982)). Mootness is "standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its
existence (mootness)." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) ("[A]n actual controversy
must be extant at all stages of review." (citation omitted)).
A defendant may not, however, '"automatically moot a case' by the simple
expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued." FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S.
234,241 (2024) (quoting Already, 568 U.S. at 91). Such voluntary cessation of challenged
conduct does not moot a case unless it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S.
at 189). Under these circumstances, a case is moot only if (1) "there is no reasonable
expectation ... that the alleged violation will recur," and (2) "interim relief or events have
completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Aref v. Lynch,
833 F.3d 242,251 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Bar Ass 'n v. FTC,
636 F.3d 641,648 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). As the party asserting mootness here, the Government
faces a "heavy burden" to show that the challenged conduct will not recur. Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (citation omitted). Based on the record before me, the Government
has not carried its burden.
6
Though the Government reinstated plaintiff's SEVIS record following my April 17
Order, the Government's actions have not made "absolutely clear" that the allegedly
wrongful termination will not recur. Id. at 190. To be sure, "a case does not become moot
simply because the defendant has complied with [an] injunction." Florence Immigrant &
Refitgee Rts. Project v. US. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 812 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16-17 (D.D.C.
2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Marshall v. Loe. Union No. 639, Int'! Bhd. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers ofAm., Inc., 593 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1979)). The Government also submitted a declaration of a senior official
attesting that ICE "has no plans" to re-terminate plaintiff's SEVIS record "based solely on
the NCIC record that led to its initial tennination," Second Watson Deel. ,r 6, but this
declaration speaks only to the Government's present "plans," id., and does not bar the
Government from terminating plaintiff's record for some "similar" unlawful reason, Fikre,
601 U.S. at 242; see also Bushireddy v. Lyons, 2026 WL 759480, at *5-7 (D.D.C. Mar. 18,
2026) (reaching same conclusion in similar SEVIS termination case). None of these
assurances bar the Government from doing "again in the future what it is alleged to have
done in the past." Fikre, 601 U.S. at 242. 2
2
The Government relies heavily on Moharam v. TSA, 134 F.4th 598 (D.C. Cir. 2025), see Mot. to Dismiss at 9, 13-15, but that reliance is misplaced. In Moharam, our Circuit found that a plaintiff's challenge to his placement on the No Fly List was moot after the Government subsequently removed him from the list and assured that he would not be placed on the list again. However, the plaintiff "expressly disclaimed seeking ... declaratory or injunctive relief' and instead sought "nothing more than" a "classic advisory opinion." Id. at 605 (quoting Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 294 (2023)). Here, plaintiff requests both declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the Government from terminating his SEVIS record for similar reasons in the future. See Compl. ,r,r 55-56; Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2. Thus, plaintiff's "requested relief is more like that requested by the plaintiff in Fikre, who sought 'a declaration that the Government's reliance on particular evidence' in placing him on the No Fly List was legally impermissible and 'an injunction against future consideration of such evidence."' Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *7 n.6 (quoting Moharam, 134 F. 4th at 606). Fikre controls this case, not Moharam.
7
Nor does the Government's new SEVIS termination policy moot this case. See
Policy Regarding Termination of Records. The policy affirms that SEVP "can terminate
records for a variety of reasons," including for "no longer complying with the terms
of ... nonimmigrant status/or any reason." Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). But it is entirely
silent on whether a criminal arrest and prosecution may lead to SEVIS termination, as
happened in this case. As such, the Policy provides no "assurance that the [Government]'s
contested practice has been effectively vitiated," Porup v. CIA, 997 F.3d 1224, 1232 (D.C.
Cir. 2021 ), or that a revocation of plaintiff's SEVIS record for some comparable event
"could not reasonably be expected to recur," Pub. Citizen, 92 F.4th at 1128 (quoting
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190); see also Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *6
(reaching same conclusion in similar SEVIS termination case); Patel v. Lyons, 2026 WL
587640, at *7-9 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2026) (same); Hinge v. Lyons, 2026 WL 787875, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2026) (same).
The Government also has not "completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of
the alleged violation." Aref, 833 F.3d at 251 (quoting Am. Bar Ass 'n, 636 F.3d at 648).
While the reinstatement of plaintiff's SEVIS record is "automatically retroactive to the date
of termination," Notice to Student at 1, the system's "event history" will "memorialize all
modifications" to plaintiff's record, including his "prior termination" and subsequent
"restoration," id. Moreover, the Government "revoked" plaintiff's F-1 visa due to the
SEVIS termination. See First Watson Deel. ~ 8. And plaintiff represents that he "will be
required to attend a new interview at a consulate" to fully restore his visa status. Opp'n to
Mot. to Dismiss at 5; cf Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *6.
8
All told, the Government has not made it "absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Parents Involved, 551 U.S.
at 719 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189). Nor has the Government
"eradicated the effects" of the prior SEVIS termination. Aref, 833 F.3d at 251. Therefore,
plaintiff retains "a legally cognizable interest in the outcome" of this litigation. Already,
568 U.S. at 91 (quoting Murphy, 455 U.S. at 481). Plaintiff's case is not moot. 3
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Safely assured that this case is not moot, I now proceed to plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff asks this Court to grant summary judgment on the basis that
his SEVIS termination was arbitrary and capricious. For the reasons below, I agree and
will grant summary judgment to plaintiff.
A. Whether the Privacy Act precludes plaintiff's APA claim.
At the outset, the Government argues that plaintiff's APA claim is foreclosed by the
Privacy Act. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. Indeed, plaintiff may pursue an APA claim
only ifhe has "no other adequate remedy." 5 U.S.C. § 704. But the Privacy Act provides
no such remedy for plaintiff. How so?
3
Courts across the country have nearly unanimously rejected the Government's same mootness arguments in similar SEVIS termination cases, see Zhou v. Lyons, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2025); Vemula v. Noem, 2025 WL3527141 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2025); Saxena v. Noem, 2026 WL 84248 (D.S.D. Jan. 12, 2026); Roe v. Noem, 2026 WL 194636 (D. Mont. Jan. 26, 2026); Chatwani v. Noem, 2026 WL 458418 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2026); Doe v. Noem, 2026 WL 562452 (W.D. Va. Feb. 28, 2026); Presidents 'All. on Higher Educ. & Immigr. v. Noem, 2026 WL 788185, at *10-11 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2026); Doe #1 v. Noem, 2026 WL 822264 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2026), including several of my colleagues in this District, see Patel, 2026 WL 587640, at *7-8 (Reyes, J.); Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *5-7 (Sooknanan, J.); Hinge, 2026 WL 787875, at *5 (Walton, J.).
9
The Privacy Act establishes record-keeping and disclosure practices for federal
agencies that maintain information about private individuals within their systems of
records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The Privacy Act also authorizes civil actions against federal
agencies that "fail[] to maintain any record concerning any individual with such
accuracy ... as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the
qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may
be made on the basis of such record." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(l)(C).
Where the Privacy Act provides a cause of action, it "may preclude an APA claim."
See Bass v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 817 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2025).
However, an "alternative remedy" will not preclude APA review if it "offers only 'doubtful
and limited relief."' Garcia v. Vi/sack, 563 F.3d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen
v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 901 (1988)). As such, where a plaintiff could not obtain
the same form of relief under the Privacy Act that he could under the APA, the Privacy Act
will not bar an APA claim. See Radack v. DOJ, 402 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2005);
Am. Fed'n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Dep't of Lab., 778 F. Supp. 3d 56, 80-82
(D.D.C. 2025).
Here, any possibility of relief under the Privacy Act is "doubtful and limited" at
best. Garcia, 563 F.3d at 522 (quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901). As the Government
acknowledges, the Privacy Act limits its remedies to citizens of the United States, "alien[s]
lawfully admitted for permanent residence," or citizens of certain designated countries not
including India. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(2), 552a (statutory note); Opp'n to Mot. for Summ.
J. at 6. Plaintiff therefore cannot sue under the Privacy Act because he is an Indian national.
10
As such, plaintiff's "ability to seek relief under the Privacy Act is not just limited, it is
'nonexistent."' Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *7 (quoting Doe v. Noem, 781 F. Supp.
3d 1055, 1065-66 (E.D. Cal. 2025)); see also Patel, 2026 WL 587640, at *6 ("[T]he
Privacy Act cannot afford Plaintiff any remedial mechanism, much less an adequate one.").
The Government does not dispute plaintiff's inability to seek relief under the
Privacy Act. Instead, it argues that his inability to seek review under the Privacy Act also
displaces his ability to bring suit under the APA. The Government cites Liff v. Off. of
Inspector Gen. for US. Dep 't of Labor, 881 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2018), which held that the
Privacy Act provides an "adequate remedial mechanism[]" to preclude a Bivens action. Id.
at 917-18, 921-24 (quoting Schweiker v. Chi/icky, 487 U.S. 412,423 (1988)). But Bivens
actions implicate "unique separation-of-powers concerns" that are absent from "judicial
review under the congressionally enacted APA." Patel, 2026 WL 587640, at *6. And in
the Bivens context, the "mere 'existence of alternative remedies' forecloses relief even if
those 'existing remedies do not provide complete relief."' Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480,
at *8 (citation omitted) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 148 (2017) and Egbert v.
Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 493 (2022)). Not so for the APA. See Garcia, 563 F.3d at 522.
Because the Privacy Act is not the '"exclusive' source of claims or remedies for alleged
mishandling of records," All. for Retired Americans v. Bessent, 770 F. Supp. 3d 79, 105
(D.D.C. 2025), its mere existence does not preclude plaintiff's APA claim.
11
B. Whether the SE VIS termination was final agency action.
The Government also argues that the termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record is not
final agency action and, therefore, is not reviewable under the APA. Opp'n to Mot. for
Summ. J. at 7. I disagree.
Only "final agency action" is subject to judicial review under the APA. 5 U.S .C.
§ 704. To be "final," agency action must (1) "mark the consummation of the agency's
decisionmaking process" and (2) be action "by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow." US. Army Corps of Eng'rs v.
Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78
(1997)). On both fronts, the Government's termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record
qualifies as final.
First, the Government's termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record "mark[ ed] the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process." Id. at 597. The termination was
not "merely tentative or interlocutory." Id. And there was "no further agency action for
[plaintiff] to invoke or to exhaust." Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Azar, 943 F.3d 953,
958 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see also Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *9 (noting "there was no
further agency action to come on the decision" to terminate plaintiff's SEVIS record).
Second, the termination had "legal consequences" and determined plaintiff's "rights
or obligations." Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (citation omitted). Termination of a SEVIS
record for failure to maintain status requires the foreign student "to leave the country
immediately." Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *9; see also Patel, 2026 WL 587640,
at *6. Federal law makes this crystal clear. See 8 U.S .C. § l 184(a)(l) (requiring that "upon
12
failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted," an "alien will depart from the
United States").
The Government insists that termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record, on its own, did
not automatically terminate his immigration status. See Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 8.
Horsefeathers! The Government's own declaration in this case states, plain as day, that
plaintiff's "visa was revoked" on or around April 14, 2025. First Watson Deel. ,r 8. And
the Government's own website confirmed that the termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record
for "otherwise failing to maintain status" meant that plaintiff was required to "leave the
United States immediately." Compl. ,r 35 (including screenshot from ICE website); see
also Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *9. These are "direct and appreciable legal
consequences" that subject the Government's termination decision to APA review. Bennett,
520 U.S. at 178.
C. Whether the SEVIS termination was arbitrary and capricious.
Having concluded that plaintiff's APA claim is amenable to judicial review, I will
now address whether the Government's termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Based on the sparse record before me, I have "no trouble concluding"
that the termination of plaintiff's SEVIS record was arbitrary and capricious. Patel, 2026
WL 587460, at *9; Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *10.
Final agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" if the agency "relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
13
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass 'n of US., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). While a court may not "substitute its
judgment for that of the agency," it must set aside agency action where the agency fails to
provide a "reasoned basis" for its action. Id.
It is undisputed that the Government terminated plaintiff's SEVIS record solely
because plaintiff was "identified in [a] criminal records check," which the Government
interpreted as a failure to maintain status. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3; Opp'n to Mot. for Summ.
J. at 9; First Watson Deel. ,r 7. As the undisputed facts here show, plaintiff was flagged
during a criminal records check based on his October 2022 arrest in Texas for driving while
intoxicated. Mot. for Summ. J. at 2; First Watson Deel. ,r 7; see also Ex. A to Opp'n to
Mot. for Summ. J. ('"Admin. R. Excerpt") [Dkt. #26-1] at 1. Plaintiff was charged under
Texas Penal Code § 49.04(d), which is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by a jail term
""not to exceed one year." Id. § 12.21(2). 4 Plaintiff was never convicted, and his charge
was ultimately dismissed pursuant to a deferred adjudication plea. Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.
To say the least, this is not ""the type of 'criminal activity' that constitutes a failure
to maintain status." Bushireddy, 2026 WL 759480, at *10 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 214.l(g)).
4
The parties' filings are inconsistent as to the class of misdemeanor with which plaintiff was charged. See Compl. ,r 26 (alleging plaintiff "was arrested for a Class B misdemeanor DWI"); Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 (stating plaintiff "was arrested for a Class C misdemeanor DWI"). The administrative record reviewed by ICE states that plaintiff was charged with a Class A misdemeanor under Texas Penal Code§ 49.04(d). See Adm in. R. Excerpt; Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 9. I will therefore base my review on that version of the facts. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,420 (1971) (APA review is "based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision"). Ultimately, however, the SEVIS termination here cannot not be supported on any version of the facts.
14
Under federal regulations, a nonimmigrant's "conviction ... for a crime of violence for
which a sentence of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed ... constitutes a
failure to maintain status" under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1 (g)
(emphases added). Plaintiff was never convicted of anything. See Admin. R. Excerpt
(noting that prosecution was "DEFERRED"). And state driving-under-the-influence
offenses are generally not considered "crimes of violence." See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U.S. 1, 3-4 (2004) (holding that Florida driving-under-the-influence offense was not a
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and therefore not a deportable offense).
The Government has not provided any "satisfactory explanation" for why it
terminated plaintiff's SEVIS record based on a 2022 driving-under-the-influence charge
that never resulted in a conviction. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. Moreover, the Government
identifies no other basis for concluding that plaintiff failed to maintain his immigration
status. See 8 U.S.C. § 214.l(d)-(f); 8 C.F.R. § 214.l(e)-(f). Accordingly, in terminating
plaintiff's SEVIS record for unauthorized reasons, the Government "relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The
Government's action was "arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside." Bushireddy,
2026 WL 759480, at* 11; see also Patel, 2026 WL 587640, at *9. 5 To say the least, the
Government should be ashamed of itself!
5
Plaintiff also asserts that his SEVIS termination was arbitrary and capricious for several other reasons, including that it was ultra vires action and that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because I conclude that the SEVIS termination was arbitrary and capricious for the simple reason that it was unsupported by federal regulation, I need not rule on plaintiff's additional grounds. See Qassim v. Trump, 927 F.3d 522,530 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
15
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I will DENY the Government's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and GRANT plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. A separate
order will accompany this opinion.
RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge
16