United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
MIGUEL GONZÁLEZ-AROCHO,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Marcos E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Thompson, and Rikelman,
Circuit Judges.
Eric Feigin, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States
Attorney, Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States
Attorney, and Claire Groden, Attorney, United States Department of
Justice, were on brief, for appellant.
Celso Javier Pérez Carballo, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, with whom Rachel Brill, Federal Public Defender, and
Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were
on brief, for appellee.
July 9, 2026
- 2 -RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. We must decide whether the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when federal
agents executing a search warrant knowingly seize and search an
iPhone that is different from the device specified in the warrant.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that
the government had not met its burden of justifying the application
of the good faith exception on the record here and thus suppressed
the evidence discovered during the search. We agree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
In October 2021, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
agents in Puerto Rico received notice that participants in an
online chatroom had illegally exchanged child pornography. An
investigation revealed that one of the participants used a local
phone number ending in -7611. The agents then served a summons on
T-Mobile, the service carrier for the phone number. In response
to the summons, T-Mobile identified Miguel González-Arocho
("González") as the registered user and indicated that the phone
number was assigned to a gray Apple iPhone 6s 64GB, with a unique
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number ending
in -1711.1
1Electronic devices such as cell phones and tablets each have
a unique 15-digit IMEI number that enables carriers and law
enforcement to identify the device and track it. See What Is An
- 3 -Based on the available information, HSI Task Force Agent
Albert Villanueva applied for a search warrant. In his attached
affidavit, he described his extensive experience in
"investigat[ing] criminal violations relating to child
exploitation and child pornography," including "online child
exploitation and various electronic crimes." He also explained
his familiarity with the security features on Apple devices and
the general use of cell phones to store and distribute child
pornography. Given his almost ten years with HSI, his wealth of
experience and training, and the findings from the chatroom
investigation, he stated that he had "probable cause to believe
that evidence of [child pornography] . . . [was] located in the
Apple iPhone 6S 64GB cellular phone" described in the T-Mobile
summons.
A magistrate judge issued a search warrant for
González's phone in May 2022. The warrant stated:
The property to be searched is Apple iPhone 6S
64GB IMEI: [***********]1711 with number
[******]7611 (the DEVICE), belonging to or
being used by Miguel GONZALEZ-Arocho.2 This
warrant authorizes the search and seizure and
forensic examination of the Device and
authorizes the search of the person, named and
IMEI Number & How Can I Find Mine?, T-Mobile USA, Inc. (Sep. 23,
2025), https://www.t-mobile.com/dialed-in/wireless/what-is-animei-number? [https://perma.cc/G5F4-TNSL].
2 We omit the full phone number and IMEI listed in the warrant
for privacy reasons.
- 4 -depicted in the photo below, to search for the
DEVICE.3
One week later, HSI agents executed the warrant,
intercepting González outside of his home. Villanueva and his
partner, Agent Alek Pacheco, seized the phone in González's
possession -- an iPhone 13 Pro Max (the "iPhone 13") -- and
escorted him to the back of their car.
After detaining González, the agents immediately began
conversing with him in Spanish.4 To start, they explained that
they had a search warrant "for an Apple iPhone" with González's
phone number. They did not, however, specify the iPhone model
listed in the warrant. The agents next handed González a Miranda
form, written in Spanish, and confirmed that he could read and
write. Then, without asking González whether he understood or
could read English, the agents gave him an English-language copy
of the search warrant.5 They restated that the warrant authorized
their search of "the cellular," but again omitted the specific
iPhone model described in the warrant.
3 We refer to the "DEVICE" defined and described in the warrant
as the "iPhone 6s."
4 The agents filmed González's entire interview, and the
district court entered the video recording as evidence during the
motion to suppress hearing. We draw heavily from the recording,
and the accompanying English-translated transcript, in recounting
the agents' interaction with González.
5At oral argument, González represented that he is not fluent
in English and had availed himself of a court interpreter at his
hearings before the district court.
- 5 -The agents then proceeded to explain the purpose of their
investigation and asked González about his participation in an
online chatroom in which child pornography had been shared.
González provided the agents with the passcode to the iPhone 13,
but only after they inquired if his phone had a passcode. The
agents promptly began searching the phone; they found that the
chatroom application of interest was "downloaded" but "empty" and
thus would require "forensic [to] see what they can pull."
Eventually, González asked whether he would continue to
"have a telephone" after the interview concluded, and the agents
informed him that they were "going to seize" the iPhone 13 for
further examination. In the meantime, however, they offered to
write down for his reference any contact information stored in the
device. Over the course of their approximately 50-minute
interaction with González, the agents did not mention or ask him
about the iPhone 6s.
That same day, Villanueva completed and signed an
inventory form documenting that the agents had seized an "Apple
i[P]hone 13 with" the -7611 phone number. He then delivered the
phone to the forensics team, which found over 100 files of child
pornography on it.
B. Procedural History
A grand jury indicted González in September 2022 for
knowingly possessing and receiving child-exploitation material, in
- 6 -violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (a)(2). He was arrested
one week later.
González moved to suppress the evidence discovered on
the iPhone 13. He argued that the warrant did not authorize the
search of that device but instead permitted the agents to search
only the iPhone 6s with the -1711 IMEI number. Thus, he
maintained, the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment rights,
requiring suppression of all evidence obtained during the search.
The government opposed the motion, asserting that
González consented to the search. The government also argued that
even if González's consent was not voluntary, the warrant covered
the iPhone 13, and in any event, the agents acted in good faith.
The magistrate judge held a suppression hearing, which
featured live testimony by Villanueva. Villanueva explained that
he had received formal training on "technical areas
of . . . electronic devices" and also had learned about various
types of cell phones, including iPhones, through "on-the-job"
experience. He confirmed that he knew "the differences
between . . . all of [the iPhones]," and that he recognized both
the iPhone 6s and iPhone 13 devices.6
An iPhone 13 and iPhone 6s differ in their dimensions,
6
weight, screen size, and configuration. Compare iPhone 13 Pro
Max - Technical Specifications, Apple Inc.,
https://support.apple.com/en-us/111870 [https://perma.cc/37J9-A9AP] (last visited July 7, 2026), with iPhone 6s - Technical
- 7 -When pressed about his search of González's phone,
Villanueva initially stated that he did not notice the model of
the phone when he seized it because he "hand[ed] it over to
the . . . forensic agents" and thus did not "have the opportunity
to examine" it. In fact, he testified, he was "sure [the device]
was an iPhone 6S" throughout his questioning of González.
(Emphasis added.) According to his testimony, he only noticed
"[l]ater on" -- indeed, "days later" -- that the device was an
iPhone 13.
But Villanueva revised his account when confronted with
the inventory form during cross-examination. For example, he
conceded that he knew that he had seized an iPhone 13 on the day
of the search, and that he could discern the device model just "by
seeing it." He also acknowledged that he had not immediately
handed the device to the forensics team but instead that he and
Pacheco had held onto it throughout their 50-minute interaction
with González.
Although Villanueva had previously stated that the
"focus" of his investigation was the -7611 phone number, he
admitted on cross-examination that he understood the search
warrant to be device-specific. He testified:
Specifications, Apple Inc., https://support.apple.com/enus/111952 [https://perma.cc/U8LD-YCYD] (last visited July 7,
2026).
- 8 -Q: And what you wanted to search was a device,
right? Not a phone number.
A: The search warrant is for the device.
Q: Is it your understanding that just by
having a phone number, you are authorized to
search any device?
A: With just the phone number? No.
Q: You need more information?
A: Correct.
Q: Would you . . . need a description of the
device?
A: Well, if, if, if it's inside the, the
description of what the, the device is, you
add the description. Is it an iPhone 6S;
iPhone 13?
Q: Because the person who executed the warrant
needs to know what is the physical
description --A: Correct.
Q: -- of what he is allowed to seize?
A: Yes.
Q: And in this case, you did not seize the
device that was covered by the search warrant,
right?
A: Right.
Villanueva also conceded that, despite knowing that the
search warrant was limited to "the device" (that is, the
- 9 -iPhone 6s), neither he nor Pacheco had told González "the
model[,] . . . the type[,] . . . [or] anything else" about the
cell phone covered by the search warrant. Nor did they mention to
González the IMEI number listed in the warrant, even though
Villanueva acknowledged that each device has a unique IMEI.
Instead, the agents explained only that the warrant applied to an
iPhone with his phone number.
The magistrate judge ultimately issued a report
recommending the denial of the motion to suppress. He concluded
that the agents may have exceeded the scope of the warrant and
that González did not validly consent to the search of the
iPhone 13. But he also determined that the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule applied to the agents' search of the
iPhone 13. Relying on Villanueva's testimony that the
investigation "focus[ed]" on the phone number, the magistrate
judge determined that the agents reasonably believed that the
warrant authorized their search of the iPhone 13 because its phone
number matched the one listed in the warrant. The magistrate judge
further explained that the agents could have reasonably deduced
that González recently upgraded his iPhone and that he transferred
his relevant data to the new device.
González promptly filed an objection to the magistrate
judge's determination that the good faith exception applied, and
the district court ruled in his favor. It held that the good faith
- 10 -exception did not salvage the search. The court emphasized that,
based on the undisputed factual record, Villanueva knew that he
had seized a device different from the one specified in the warrant
on the same day that he had seized the iPhone 13. It then noted
that no exigency justified the agents' search of a device not
covered by the warrant. And absent any exigency, the court
concluded that the agents should have obtained a new warrant before
searching the iPhone 13; failing to do so, it held, indicated a
lack of objective good faith. Thus, the court granted González's
motion to suppress.7
The government timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On review of a district court's order granting a motion
to suppress, we apply a mixed standard, reviewing findings of
fact . . . for clear error and conclusions of law de novo." United
States v. Vick, 145 F.4th 191, 197 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation
modified). As to the facts, we view them "in the light most
favorable to the district court's ruling, but only to the extent
they are not clearly erroneous." Id. (quoting United States v.
Rivera, 988 F.3d 579, 581 (1st Cir. 2021)). And we may "uphold a
suppression ruling on any ground made manifest in the record."
7 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's
determination that González did not validly consent to the search
of the iPhone 13. The government does not challenge that ruling
on appeal.
- 11 -United States v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2023). Whether
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, however,
is a legal question, so our review of that issue is de novo. See
United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93, 96 (1st Cir. 2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Helpfully, the government concedes for the purposes of
this appeal that we may assume that the HSI agents exceeded the
scope of the warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by
searching the iPhone 13. Thus, "the sole question before us is
whether the exclusionary rule requires . . . suppression." United
States v. Medina, 125 F.4th 310, 316 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting
United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635, 638 (3d Cir. 2015)).
According to the government, the evidence obtained from
the iPhone 13 is admissible under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. But on the facts before us, viewed in the light
most favorable to the district court's ruling, we conclude that
the government has not met its "heavy burden" of demonstrating
that the HSI agents acted with objective good faith. United States
v. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th 140, 149 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United
States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013)); see Vick, 145
F.4th at 197.
A. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
- 12 -unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. It
also instructs that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." Id.
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment generally may not be admitted to
prove guilt. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139
(2009). But given the rule's "substantial social costs," exclusion
is improper when the officers who conducted the search "acted in
objective good faith or their transgressions [were] minor."
Medina, 125 F.4th at 315 (first quoting United States v. Levin,
874 F.3d 316, 322 (1st Cir. 2017); and then quoting United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984)). This "good faith exception"
derives from the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule: "to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct." Herring, 555
U.S. at 144. Importantly, however, even "unintentional mistakes
may still preclude the application of the good faith exception" if
exclusion can appreciably discourage the police conduct at issue.
Medina, 125 F.4th at 316; see Herring, 555 U.S. at 141.
Determining whether the good faith exception applies
does not depend on "a bright-line test." United States v.
Pimentel, 26 F.4th 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2022). When (as here) the
Fourth Amendment violation centers on the improper execution of a
- 13 -warrant, our inquiry turns on whether it was nonetheless
objectively reasonable for the officers "to believe [that their
actions] were covered by the warrant," given their "knowledge and
experience." Id. at 91-92 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 n.19);
Herring, 555 U.S. at 145. In conducting this analysis, we consider
"the language of the warrant" and all "attendant circumstances at
the time of the warrant application and its execution." Pimentel,
26 F.4th at 92; Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 149 (quoting United States
v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2001)). The government
bears a "heavy burden" to demonstrate that the good faith exception
applies. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 149 (quoting Wurie, 728 F.3d at
13).
The government contends that the district court legally
erred by focusing its good faith analysis on the lack of exigency.
We agree that the government should not be foreclosed from invoking
the good faith exception here simply because the agents may have
had time to obtain a new warrant. Instead, exigency (or lack
thereof) is relevant to the good faith inquiry only insofar as it
bears on the reasonableness of an officer's understanding at the
time of the warrant's "execution." Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 149
(quoting Brunette, 256 F.3d at 17); see Herring, 555 U.S. at 145
(clarifying that the "good-faith inquiry is confined
to . . . whether a reasonably well trained officer would have
known that the search was illegal in light of all of the
- 14 -circumstances" (citation modified)). Thus, our analysis focuses
on the HSI agents' reasonable belief about what the warrant
authorized, "in light of 'all of the circumstances,'" when they
seized and searched the iPhone 13. Herring, 555 U.S. at 145
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).
B. Analysis
As the government sees it, the good faith exception
applies because the agents had a warrant to search an iPhone with
a certain phone number that belonged to González, and they
proceeded to search an iPhone with that phone number, which
González admitted belonged to him. According to the government,
the fact that the device that the agents seized was a different
iPhone model does not negate the existence of good faith. In
support of its position, the government points to our cases
upholding searches of residences even when the warrants specified
different apartment numbers or addresses.
Although we appreciate the force of the government's
argument, we cannot agree that it has met its burden to justify
the application of the good faith exception based on the record
here. Specifically, we find objective good faith lacking because
(1) the warrant unambiguously described the iPhone 6s as the
device to be searched and (2) the agents realized immediately that
they had seized a different model iPhone but made no effort to
- 15 -resolve the discrepancy between the device they seized and the
device listed in the warrant.
1. The Warrant
We begin with "the language of the warrant." Pimentel,
26 F.4th at 92. As González points out, the warrant clearly
identified the iPhone 6s as "the DEVICE" to be searched. It
defined the subject of the search as an "Apple iPhone 6S 64GB" and
specified the device's unique -1711 IMEI number. The warrant also
repeatedly referenced that iPhone 6s device, thus limiting the
search of any digital files to those found on that device. And
Villanueva expressly stated in his affidavit supporting the
warrant application that he had probable cause to believe that
evidence of child pornography was "contained within the Apple
iPhone 6S." On that basis, he requested a "search warrant for the
Apple iPhone 6S 64GB cellular phone." Thus, a plain reading of
the warrant indicates that it was tailored specifically to the
iPhone 6s.
The government argues that González overemphasizes the
importance of the physical "DEVICE" listed in the warrant. What
matters, in its view, is that the warrant identified the -7611
phone number, which was connected to the iPhone 13. Because the
investigation "focus[ed]" on the phone number, not the device
itself, the government maintains that the agents reasonably
understood the warrant to cover the iPhone 13.
- 16 -But the warrant and underlying application suggest that
the physical device was very much the focus of the warrant. For
example, in his affidavit, Villanueva explained that the search
for incriminating evidence would involve examining the device's
physical hardware. He further observed that a cell phone enables
a user to "download[]" and "store[]" material from the internet on
the phone's "hard drive," making it "an ideal repository for child
pornography." Accordingly, the warrant permitted the agents to
search for evidence "that may be stored or found within the [iPhone
6s], or on any memory storage device that might be located within
the cell phone." Thus, as Villanueva acknowledged at the
suppression hearing, the "search warrant [wa]s for the device,"
because he suspected that evidence would be stored in the
iPhone 6s's hardware.
Further, Villanueva did not seek -- and the warrant did
not authorize -- the search of any device associated with the -7611
phone number. Rather, the warrant expressly approved a search of
"the DEVICE," defined as the iPhone 6s, and any relevant files
stored on it. And Villanueva conceded that he understood as much,
casting serious doubt on the government's claim that he acted in
objective good faith by searching the iPhone 13, at least without
further inquiry about the status of the iPhone 6s. See Herring,
555 U.S. at 145 (noting that courts may consider "a particular
- 17 -officer's knowledge and experience" when conducting a good faith
analysis).
Indeed, the government admitted at oral argument that
the good faith exception would not apply if the agents had
proceeded to search any Apple device associated with the same phone
number -- such as an iPad -- that they found in González's
possession when they detained him. Yet some iPad tablet products
are similar in size and functionality to the iPhone 13.8 And in
an age when an individual may have multiple iPhones,
physical-device details supply critical information in
circumscribing a warrant's scope. Cf. United States v. Underwood,
129 F.4th 912, 936 (6th Cir. 2025) (upholding a search warrant for
an iPhone in part because the warrant "provided [the] correct
physical details of that phone" and thus left "no reasonable
probability [that the] officers would search the wrong phone").
For that reason and on the record before us, we are not convinced
by the government's contention that the iPhone's "model number and
8For example, the iPad mini has dimensions comparable to
those of the iPhone 13. Compare iPad mini - Technical
Specifications, Apple Inc., https://www.apple.com/ipadmini/specs/ [https://perma.cc/9YTR-NM8X] (last visited July 7,
2026), with iPhone 13 Pro Max - Technical Specifications, Apple
Inc., https://support.apple.com/en-us/111870
[https://perma.cc/37J9-A9AP] (last visited July 7, 2026).
- 18 -IMEI number were . . . nonessential physical descriptors" in
interpreting the warrant.9
As the Supreme Court stated more than a decade ago,
smartphones (like the iPhone) are "minicomputers," and a search of
a smartphone may be more intrusive than a search of one's home.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393-97 (2014) (describing the
significant privacy concerns raised by searches of modern cell
phones). Thus, we must proceed with caution in upholding searches
of iPhones that are not explicitly authorized by a warrant (or by
some other well-established exception to the warrant requirement).
See id. at 401-03.
Given the facts here, we also cannot accept the
government's analogy to our decision in Pimentel. In that case,
we applied the good faith exception to uphold a search of the
defendant's third-floor residence, even though the warrant
contained a reference to the second floor. See Pimentel, 26 F.4th
at 92-93. We observed that the warrant there "directed the
officers toward the apartment 'which is occupied by' [the
Relatedly, the government argues that the warrant was
9
ambiguous in identifying the correct device. It maintains that
the warrant was "not tailored to searching an iPhone 6S" because
it "authorized officers to use the 'facial recognition feature' to
unlock the device," even though the iPhone 6s does not have
facial-recognition capabilities. The government did not, however,
advance this argument to the district court and did not press for
plain error review on appeal. Thus, this argument is waived. See
United States v. Colón-De Jesús, 85 F.4th 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2023).
- 19 -defendant]" -- a phrasing that we described as "not an exemplar of
grammatical precision." Id. at 93-94. We then concluded that "no
reading of [that warrant] [wa]s free from ambiguity." Id. at 93.
Given the imprecise description, we held that the warrant could
reasonably be read to authorize the search of the defendant's
"residence within the building," irrespective of the floor on which
it was located. Id.
Unlike in Pimentel, the search warrant in this case was
unambiguous. Although the warrant described the iPhone 6s as
having a -7611 phone number and belonging to González, it expressly
defined the iPhone 6s and its unique IMEI number as "the DEVICE"
to be searched. This fact cuts against the conclusion that it was
objectively reasonable for the agents to search a different
device.10
10 For similar reasons, we also reject the government's
analogy to our decision in United States v. Moss, 936 F.3d 52 (1st
Cir. 2019). That case concerned the search of a package pursuant
to a warrant that accurately listed the package's "exclusive
tracking number" but, due to a clerical error, a description of a
different package was attached to the warrant. Id. at 60. We
concluded that between the correct listing of the "unique" tracking number and the executing officer's extensive "familiarity with the
[correct] package's physical characteristics," the warrant
satisfied the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. Id.
at 60-61.
Moss did not involve the good faith exception and thus has
limited relevance to the issues before us. But to the extent the
government suggests that Moss should inform our reasonableness
analysis, we think it cuts in favor of suppression. As in Moss,
the warrant here contained a unique identification number (the
IMEI) for the property to be searched. But unlike in Moss, the
- 20 -2. The Agents' Failure to Inquire About the iPhone 6s
Turning to the agents' questioning of González, the
government argues that their interaction with him engendered an
objectively reasonable belief that the warrant covered the
iPhone 13. In particular, the government highlights González's
cooperation during the interview, in which he acknowledged that
the iPhone 13 belonged to him and bore the -7611 phone number.
The government also notes that the agents provided González with
a copy of the warrant for his review, and he raised no issues with
it. And finally, the government contends that based on González's
conduct during the interview, the agents made a series of
reasonable inferences to conclude that they were authorized to
search the iPhone 13.
But viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the suppression ruling, we conclude that multiple aspects of the
agents' interaction with González indicate a lack of objective
good faith. See Vick, 145 F.4th at 197. First, the agents knew
(or should have known) as soon as they seized the phone from
González that it was different from the one identified in the
HSI agents seized a device with a different IMEI. Further, in Moss, we excused the erroneous physical description attached to
the warrant because the executing officer had substantial
familiarity with the correct package to be searched. See id. Here, the HSI agents also knew the difference between the two
iPhone models but nevertheless proceeded to search the wrong device (that is, they knowingly searched the wrong "package"). Id. at
61.
- 21 -warrant. Indeed, Villanueva conceded at the suppression hearing
that he knew -- just "by seeing it" -- that the seized device was
not the iPhone 6s described in the warrant. And he confirmed that
understanding in writing on the day of the search when he
documented the iPhone 13 in the inventory form.
Second, when the agents described the warrant aloud to
González after seizing his phone, they skipped over the words in
the warrant making clear that it authorized a search of an
iPhone 6s with a specific IMEI number. Instead, the agents
described the property to be searched simply as an "iPhone" that
was associated with the -7611 phone number. Even if the agents
did not deliberately skip over that critical information when
explaining the warrant's scope, "unintentional mistakes may still
preclude the application of the good faith exception" when
exclusion would serve to deter police misconduct going forward.
Medina, 125 F.4th at 316; see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (noting
that the exclusionary rule serves to deter "reckless[] or grossly
negligent conduct"). And the fact that the agents provided
González with a copy of the warrant does not cure their
omission: The warrant was written in English, and the agents never
confirmed that González could read or understand English. In fact,
they conducted the entire interview in Spanish and took care to
hand González a Miranda form written in Spanish.
- 22 -Third, the agents failed to ask any clarifying questions
of González to resolve the discrepancy between the device listed
in the warrant and the device in his possession. In the
government's view, the agents "natural[ly] infer[red]" that
González had upgraded his phone, transferred all the data from the
iPhone 6s to the iPhone 13, and discarded the iPhone 6s -- and
that T-Mobile's records were simply outdated. According to the
government, González implicitly confirmed the agents' inferences
when, later in the interview, he asked whether he would still have
a phone after the agents left. But González raised this question
over 25 minutes into the interview, at which point the agents had
already seized and unlocked the iPhone 13 and rifled through its
contents multiple times. And even if the agents reasonably
surmised that González exclusively used the iPhone 13 to conduct
his day-to-day affairs, he still could have possessed the
iPhone 6s. Yet the agents did not mention the iPhone 6s once
during the 50-minute interview, let alone test the other inferences
necessary to conclude that they were authorized to search the
iPhone 13.
For this reason, we reject the government's argument
that the agents' "on-the-scene discoveries" made their
understanding of the warrant's coverage reasonable, just like in
Pimentel. 26 F.4th at 93. In that case, during "their initial
sweep of the premises," the officers discovered that the defendant
- 23 -and his family -- all of whom were identified in the
warrant -- lived on the third floor of the apartment building, not
the second. Id. They also learned that the guns subject to the
search were in the defendant's bedroom, and that his bedroom was
on the third floor. See id. Only after verifying those facts did
the officers conduct the search. See id. Conversely, the agents
here did not take any steps to clarify the discrepancies between
the warrant's description of "the DEVICE" and their "on-the-scene
discoveries" before they searched the iPhone 13. Id.
Given the combination of the agents' knowledge that they
had seized the wrong device, their omission of critical text in
describing the warrant's scope to González, and their failure to
ask González if he still possessed the iPhone 6s, we conclude that
the government has not met its burden of establishing objective
good faith. Once the agents knew that they had seized a different
electronic device, they had a simple next step available to
them: asking González if he still owned the iPhone 6s or if he had
upgraded his old phone to the iPhone 13. But the agents failed to
put forth the "reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the
[device] intended to be searched." Id. at 94 (quoting Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987)). Indeed, they did not ask any
of the clarifying questions that a "reasonably well trained
officer" with Villanueva's "knowledge and experience" would be
expected to pose in this context. Herring, 555 U.S. at 145; cf.
- 24 -United States v. Giambro, 126 F.4th 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2025)
(conducting reasonableness analysis in the context of the
emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement and noting that
"officers may not ignore obvious and available options for
gathering facts to determine if an emergency actually exists"
before entering a home without a warrant).
In short, the agents here simply proceeded to search a
different electronic device from the one specified in the warrant.
Thus, they did not "refrain[] from searching the wrong" device.
Woodbury, 511 F.3d at 99-100 (applying the good faith exception
when the police declined to search the wrong apartment after they
"were told by the occupant that [the defendant] did not live
there"). Exclusion is warranted to deter such conduct in the
future. Cf. United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 620 (7th Cir.
2019) ("At its core, Leon is about encouraging responsible and
diligent police work.").
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we affirm the district court's
order granting González's motion to suppress.
- 25 -