Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC2024-0669
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
JONIDA GOGA, et al.,
Respondents.
July 9, 2026
GROSSHANS, J.
This case requires us to clarify the standard of appellate
review to be applied when a trial court dismisses an action for fraud
on the court. In the decision below, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal partially reversed a trial court’s dismissal order, applying “a
more stringent abuse of discretion standard.” Goga v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 383 So. 3d 490, 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)
(quoting Beseler v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 291 So. 3d 137, 139
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020)). District courts across Florida have reached
conflicting results in applying this unique abuse of discretion standard to analogous facts. 1 See, e.g., Willie-Koonce v. Mia.
Sunshine Transfer & Tours Corp., 233 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017).
The First District Court of Appeal recently considered this
issue as well. See Pro Choice Remediation, Inc. v. Old Dominion Ins.
Co., 400 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Applying traditional
standards of review to each aspect of the trial court’s ruling, the
First District reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for
competent, substantial evidence; its legal conclusions de novo; and
its choice of sanction for abuse of discretion. Id. Notably, the First
District did not employ a specialized or “more stringent” abuse of
discretion standard in the fraud on the court context. See id.
For the reasons that follow, the framework of review outlined
in Pro Choice is correct. Applying those standards here, we quash
the Fourth District’s decision in Goga and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 2
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
2. We also disapprove the Third District’s decision in WillieKoonce insofar as it applied a standard of review inconsistent with the framework we adopt here.
-2-I
Jonida Goga was shopping at a Publix supermarket in
Pompano Beach, Florida, when she slipped on spilled dish soap and
fell. Security footage from the store showed that after her fall, Goga
continued shopping. After perusing the wine section, a customer
service manager helped her find a bottle of champagne, which she
ultimately purchased.
Nevertheless, citing her slip-and-fall incident, Goga sued
Publix for premises liability. She alleged that she sustained injuries
to her neck, back, pelvis, and hip area and claimed to have received
seven months of medical treatment for her spine. She sought
damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages.
More than two years after the incident, Goga answered
interrogatories from Publix addressing the extent of her injuries.
According to her answers, she was unable to “lift anything heavy” or
“do [physical] activities” such as playing in the pool. Nor could she
“walk or stand for long periods” or “go places with both [of her]
children alone.” In sum, she claimed that she would never be able
to do many of the activities she did before the slip and fall.
-3-Publix later deposed Goga. When asked if there were activities
she could no longer do, she replied that there were “a lot of cant’s.”
Among other things, she insisted that she could not lift her young
children and had not done so since her slip and fall. She also
testified she could neither bend at the waist nor run. After her
deposition, Goga responded to a supplemental interrogatory from
Publix, in which she again claimed to have a severely limited range
of motion as well as difficulty walking.
Unbeknownst to Goga, Publix hired a private investigator to
surveil Goga while discovery was ongoing. The investigator videoed
Goga doing many, if not all, of the things she allegedly was unable
to do. These included picking up and carrying her children,
bending at the waist as she loaded and unloaded her vehicle,
walking with groceries in hand, and even playing in the pool—all
without restriction or apparent discomfort.
Given the discrepancy between these video recordings and
Goga’s interrogatory answers and deposition testimony, Publix
moved to dismiss her complaint for fraud on the court. In support
of dismissing the entire action, Publix cited the Third District Court
of Appeal’s decision in Willie-Koonce as “extremely analogous.”
-4-After holding an evidentiary hearing at which Goga testified
and the video recordings were played, the trial court granted
Publix’s motion and dismissed her entire complaint with prejudice.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Goga
intentionally and repeatedly lied about her alleged physical
limitations after the slip and fall and that her contrary testimony at
the hearing was not credible. It therefore determined that she
defrauded the court by “set[ting] in motion [an] unconscionable
scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability
impartially to adjudicate a matter.” The trial court further
concluded that because Goga’s fraud “comprehensively infect[ed]
the integrity of th[e] action,” dismissal of her complaint in its
entirety was the proper sanction.
Goga appealed. In reviewing the trial court’s rulings, the
Fourth District applied a “more stringent abuse of discretion
standard,” reasoning that a “trial court’s discretion is narrowed
where dismissal is imposed as a sanction for fraudulent conduct.”
Goga, 383 So. 3d at 493 (quoting Beseler, 291 So. 3d at 139).3
3. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Fourth District explained that it was reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions under the
-5-Applying this less deferential standard of review, the Fourth District
affirmed as to the finding of fraud but reversed as to the sanction.
Id. at 495-96. Devoting most of its analysis to the choice of
sanction, the district court noted that “the trial court did not
appropriately balance the policy favoring adjudication on the merits
with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial
system.” Id. at 497. In the district court’s view, the proper sanction
was to dismiss only the portions of the complaint seeking damages
for pain and suffering and lost wages, which depended on Goga’s
“subjective testimony.” Id. at 496. Thus, the Fourth District
remanded for the trial court to reinstate Goga’s claim for medical
expenses, which relied on “objective evidence” not informed by her
fraudulent statements. Id.
Asserting that the decision below expressly and directly
conflicts with the Third District’s factually analogous decision in
Willie-Koonce, Publix sought our review. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.
Const.; Askew v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 385 So. 3d 1034,
traditional abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 495 (quoting Bass v. City of Pembroke Pines, 991 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).
-6-1037 (Fla. 2024) (explaining that jurisdiction based on an express
and direct conflict exists when at least two district court decisions
apply “a rule of law in a manner that results in a conflicting
outcome despite ‘substantially the same controlling facts’ ” (quoting
Kartsonis v. State, 319 So. 3d 622, 623 (Fla. 2021))).
In Willie-Koonce, a woman fractured her femur when she was
struck by a vehicle. 233 So. 3d at 1272. She later sued the owner
and driver of the vehicle. Id. at 1273. In answering interrogatories
and while testifying at her deposition, the woman claimed that, as a
result of the accident, she had a permanent limp, which
necessitated the use of a cane. Id. She also said she had difficulty
carrying large items. Id.
As in Goga, an investigator for the defense had covertly
surveilled the woman. Id. Videos recorded by the investigator
showed that the woman was lying—she had no limp, did not use a
cane, and was able to carry bulky items without assistance. Id.
Following an evidentiary hearing, during which she testified and the
investigator’s videos were played, the trial court granted the
defense’s motion to dismiss her entire complaint with prejudice for
fraud on the court. Id.
-7-The Third District affirmed. Id. at 1272. In doing so, it
purported to also apply a “ ‘narrowed’ abuse of discretion standard.”
Id. at 1273 (quoting Empire World Towers, LLC v. CDR Créances,
S.A.S., 89 So. 3d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)). However, the
district court focused almost exclusively on the trial court’s
determination of fraud rather than applying this stricter standard to
the sanction itself. See id. at 1274. Once the Third District
determined the trial court was justified in its finding of fraud, it
affirmed the sanction without further analysis. See id.
To resolve the conflict between Goga and Willie-Koonce, we
granted review.
II
The central issue underlying the conflict here is the proper
scope and standard of appellate review when a trial court dismisses
an action for fraud on the court. Whether the Fourth District
applied the correct standard of review is itself a question of law, so
our review is de novo. See Alahad v. State, 362 So. 3d 190, 197
(Fla. 2023) (citing Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 252 (Fla. 2013)).
We begin by discussing fraud on the court and the origins of
the “more stringent” abuse of discretion standard applied in Goga,
-8-Willie-Koonce, and other district court cases. We then explain our
process of identifying proper standards of review as a general
matter. Against this backdrop, we explain why the First District’s
approach in Pro Choice is correct and why the unique abuse of
discretion standard used by other courts is erroneous. Finally, we
apply the appropriate standards of review to the trial court’s ruling.
A
We have long recognized that cases may be dismissed for
fraud on the court. See Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 194 (Fla.
1934) (noting that “a court has authority by summary means to
prevent an abuse of its processes, and to peremptorily dispose of a
cause of action that is frivolous or wholly vexatious,” including by
“dismiss[ing] the cause”).
Three decades ago, the Fifth District Court of Appeal became
the first district court to incorporate a definition of fraud drawn
from a federal court of appeals decision:
The requisite fraud on the court occurs where “it
can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a
party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable
scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s
ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly
influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the
presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.”
-9-Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (quoting Aoude
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989)).
The Fifth District concluded that trial courts must “carefully
balance a policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing
policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system.” Id. (citing
Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1117-18). The district court emphasized that
dismissal, which the trial court in Cox had ordered, is the “most
severe” sanction and thus “should be employed only in extreme
circumstances.” Id. (citing Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138,
139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)).
Even so, the Fifth District opined that “where a party lies
about matters pertinent to his own claim, or a portion of it, and
perpetrates a fraud that permeates the entire proceeding, dismissal
of the whole case is proper.” Id. at 47 (citing Savino v. Fla. Drive In
Theatre Mgmt., Inc., 697 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). “The
integrity of the civil litigation process,” it explained, “depends on
truthful disclosure of facts.” Id. Ultimately, the district court
concluded that although it “might have imposed a lesser sanction”
than dismissal, the question was “close enough” such that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion. Id.
- 10 -In the years following Cox, district courts began to tailor a
unique standard of review applicable to a trial court’s dismissal for
fraud on the court. Namely, in Jacob v. Henderson, the Second
District Court of Appeal explained that precedent had “narrowed a
trial court’s discretion in cases involving dismissal for fraud.” 840
So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (quoting Young v. Curgil, 358
So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), for the proposition that a “trial
court’s power to dismiss a case based on fraud ‘should be
cautiously and sparingly exercised and only on the most blatant
showing of fraud, pretense, collusion or other similar
wrongdoing’ ”). In light of this narrowed discretion, and because
dismissal is an “extreme” sanction, a “more stringent abuse of
direction standard” was warranted. Id.
Three things are noteworthy about Jacob. First, although the
Second District did not clarify how “stringent” this standard was, its
review was more rigorous than it would have been under the
traditional abuse of discretion standard. The latter is “highly
deferential,” Williams v. State, 415 So. 3d 168, 173 (Fla.) (quoting
Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1013 (Fla. 2023)), cert. denied, 146
S. Ct. 994 (2025), for it asks whether “no reasonable person would
- 11 -take the view adopted by the trial court,” State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d
120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (quoting White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806
(Fla. 2002)). By contrast, the standard in Jacob entailed a more
searching review of the trial court record. 840 So. 2d at 1169-70.
Second, the court in Jacob justified its imposition of a more
stringent standard on the grounds that dismissal is an “extreme”
sanction and that trial courts have “narrowed” discretion in the
fraud context. Id. at 1169. Drawing on the latter consideration,
some district courts, such as the Third District in Willie-Koonce,
have referred to this standard as narrowed abuse of discretion. 233
So. 3d at 1273 (quoting Empire World, 89 So. 3d at 1038); see also,
e.g., Ramey v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 993 So. 2d 1014, 1018 (Fla.
2d DCA 2008) (applying “an abuse of discretion standard that is
somewhat narrowed” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Howard v. Risch, 959 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007))).
Third, and finally, the Second District in Jacob applied this
more stringent standard to the trial court’s dismissal order as a
whole—including its findings of fact and conclusions of law—rather
than to its choice of sanction in particular. A number of decisions
have followed suit, effectively treating the trial court’s fraud-based
- 12 -determinations as being interwoven with its exercise of discretion.
See, e.g., 940 Ocean Drive, LLC v. Sobe USA, LLC, 403 So. 3d 1048,
1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“This standard of review takes into
account the heightened clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
regarding . . . allegations of fraud. For the trial court to properly
exercise its discretion regarding dismissal of a case for fraud on the
court, it must have an evidentiary basis to make that decision.”
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ramey, 993 So. 2d at 1018)). Yet, some district courts have
focused their application of this special abuse of discretion
standard only on certain aspects of a trial court’s ruling. Compare,
e.g., Goga, 383 So. 3d at 496 (focusing on sanction), with WillieKoonce, 233 So. 3d at 1274 (focusing on factual findings).
B
“A standard of review is ‘a limiting mechanism which defines
an appellate court’s scope of review,’ and hence its power.” Ronald
R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74
Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) (quoting Patrick W. Brennan,
Standards of Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 379 (1984)). The
standard of review identifies the degree of deference, if any, afforded
- 13 -to the court whose decision is under review. See id. In essence, it
operates as “a statement by an appellate court indicating which
level of the judicial system is granted primary authority to resolve
the issue.” Brent E. Kidwell, Note, A Nation Divided: By What
Standard Should Fourth Amendment Seizure Findings Be Reviewed
on Appeal?, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 117, 130 (1992). Not only may different
standards of review be applicable in one case, but more than one
standard may apply to a single issue.
For example, determinations of law are reviewed de novo on
appeal. See Pinellas County v. Joiner, 389 So. 3d 1267, 1269 n.2
(Fla. 2024) (citing Knight v. State, 286 So. 3d 147, 151 (Fla. 2019)).
Thus, any legal conclusion made by the trial court receives no
deference from the appellate court on review. See D’Angelo v.
Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003).
Factual findings, by contrast, are reviewed for competent,
substantial evidence. See Cartenuto v. Just. Admin. Comm’n, 260
So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. v.
Freeman, 921 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 2006)). This standard of review
is appropriate considering that “the trial court is in a superior
position ‘to evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based
- 14 -upon its observation of the bearing, demeanor, and credibility of the
witnesses.’ ” Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999)
(quoting Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976)). Whereas
the trial court can see and hear witnesses as they testify live, the
appellate court typically has only a “cold record”—a lifeless
compilation of documents and transcripts. Smith v. State, 330 So.
3d 867, 888 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Sweet v. State, 248 So. 3d 1060,
1066 (Fla. 2018)).
Finally, matters committed to a trial court’s discretion are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Rivera v. State, 260 So. 3d
920, 925 (Fla. 2018) (citing Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 817
(Fla. 2005)). This standard of review is a means of ensuring that
trial courts make reasonable decisions even when exercising the
discretion they possess. See Coney, 845 So. 2d at 137 (quoting
White, 817 So. 2d at 806).
With these background principles in mind, we examine the
nature of the trial court’s decision here—dismissal as a sanction for
fraud on the court—and the role of the appellate court on review.
C
Whether a party perpetrated a fraud on the court that
- 15 -permeated the entire action presents a mixed question of fact and
law. This is so because a trial court’s ruling on this issue depends
on its application of the governing law—i.e., a particular legal rule—
to a case’s facts, which “define ‘who did what, when or where, how
or why.’ ” Alahad, 362 So. 3d at 199 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583
U.S. 387, 394 (2018)).
Factual findings in this context primarily consist of the nature
and extent of a party’s deception in filing the complaint, answering
interrogatories, testifying during a deposition or at a hearing in
court, and making other factual assertions during litigation. Of
course, mere mistakes of fact do not constitute intentional deceit.
See Cox, 706 So. 2d at 45, 47 (explaining that plaintiff inadvertently
providing wrong social security number in her interrogatories was
not fraudulent). And on appeal, a trial court’s findings of fact may
not be disturbed if they are supported by competent, substantial
evidence. See Cartenuto, 260 So. 3d at 910 (citing Freeman, 921
So. 2d at 601).
By contrast, the trial court’s legal conclusions consist of its
application of the law to its factual findings. See Alahad, 362 So.
- 16 -3d at 198 n.4 (citing Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 606 (Fla.
2001)). If the trial court concludes, based on its factual findings,
that a party committed a fraud on the court that permeated the
entire proceeding, it has discretion to impose a sanction. See
Savino, 697 So. 2d at 1012 (affirming dismissal when the plaintiff
repeatedly “lied about matters which went to the heart of his claim
on damages” and “undermined the integrity of his entire action”);
Hogan v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla.
4th DCA 2001) (same); Cox, 706 So. 2d at 47 (“[W]here a party lies
about matters pertinent to his own claim, or a portion of it, and
perpetrates a fraud that permeates the entire proceeding, dismissal
of the whole case is proper.” (emphasis added) (citing Savino, 697
So. 2d 1011)). Applying de novo review, the appellate court should
ask whether the individual’s deceit was so egregious and pervasive
that it amounted to an intentional scheme to undermine the
impartial adjudication of the case. See Cox, 706 So. 2d at 46.
This leads us to the trial court’s choice of sanction (or its
decision not to impose one), which should be reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. In applying this standard of review, an appellate
court must determine whether the sanction, if any, imposed by the
- 17 -trial court was reasonable considering the severity and extent of the
fraud. Coney, 845 So. 2d at 137 (“[D]iscretion is abused only where
no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court.” (quoting White, 817 So. 2d at 806)). This standard cuts both
ways. By that, we mean a trial court’s decision not to dismiss an
entire action, despite concluding that a party committed fraud on
the court that permeated the whole case, might also under some
circumstances amount to an abuse of discretion. See Metro. Dade
County v. Martinsen, 736 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
As discussed earlier, the First District recently applied these
traditional standards of review in the fraud context rather than the
“more stringent abuse of discretion standard” used by other district
courts. Pro Choice, 400 So. 3d at 791 (quoting Beseler, 291 So. 3d
at 139). We agree that this approach is sound and consistent with
established methods of appellate review.
D
By contrast, applying a “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse
of discretion standard in the fraud on the court context is
inconsistent with established principles of appellate review. As
Judge Winokur observed, “link[ing] a standard of review to a
- 18 -particular kind of ruling . . . ‘often leads to a generalization that is
not helpful.’ ” Id. at 792 (quoting Philip J. Padovano, Florida
Appellate Practice § 19.4 (2024 ed.)).
Courts have offered two related justifications for their use of
this special standard: (1) trial courts are afforded less discretion in
the fraud on the court context, and (2) dismissal is a severe
sanction. Neither justification is sound.
Begin with the premise that a trial court has narrow discretion
in deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for fraud on the court.
This simply means dismissal should be imposed cautiously given
the extreme nature of the sanction. However, whether the trial
court can employ its discretion in this context depends on its
conclusion that sanctionable fraud has been committed on the
court—that determination is not one of discretion, but of fact (what
happened) and law (whether that amounts to fraud). See, e.g.,
Bearden v. State, 161 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (Fla. 2015) (observing that
a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion, but its interpretation of “the evidence code
and applicable case law” is reviewed de novo (quoting Pantoja v.
State, 59 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 2011))).
- 19 -To ask whether a trial court abused its discretion presupposes
that the challenged ruling was discretionary. If the court lacked
discretion to make the decision, the issue is not abuse of discretion
but legal error. A trial court can only abuse discretion it possesses.
See DiStefano Constr., Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 597 So. 2d
248, 250 (Fla. 1992) (explaining that a trial court’s ruling on “a
matter committed to sound judicial discretion” is reviewed on
appeal for an abuse of discretion). Thus, before an appellate court
can undertake an abuse of discretion analysis, it must be of the
view that the trial court was acting within its discretionary
authority—in this context, that it had properly reasoned, based on
supported factual findings, that an individual’s actions rose to the
level of fraud on the court. 4 But nothing requires the appellate
court to hold the lower court to a “more stringent” reasonableness
standard once it has determined the court had the discretion to act.
This unique standard of review also cannot be defended on the
4. Granted, we have often said that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it acts “well within its discretion.” E.g., Colley v. State, 432 So. 3d 454, 483 (Fla. 2025). But statements of this sort merely recognize that a court generally acts reasonably when it does not come close to exceeding the bounds of its discretion.
- 20 -ground that dismissal is one of the severest sanctions a trial court
may impose. Appellate courts routinely apply the traditional abuse
of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s choice of sanction.
See, e.g., Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The
availability of a lesser sanction may affect the reasonableness of the
trial court’s choice to impose a harsher one. See id.; see also Ham
v. Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2004). In that regard, a
sanction’s severity is already taken into account under the ordinary
abuse of discretion standard.
The unpredictable and inconsistent application of this
standard across the district courts only magnifies its flaws. As we
have explained, some appellate courts have applied the standard to
the entirety of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for fraud
on the court—including its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
See, e.g., 940 Ocean Drive, 403 So. 3d at 1054. Other courts have
applied this standard only to discrete aspects of the trial court’s
ruling. For example, the district court in Goga emphasized the
necessity of reviewing the trial court’s sanction, 383 So. 3d at 496-97, whereas the court in Willie-Koonce focused its analysis almost
entirely on a sufficient finding of fraud, 233 So. 3d at 1274.
- 21 -Finally, this unique standard of review invites the appellate
court to reweigh the evidence, as Publix argues the Fourth District
did here. See Goga, 383 So. 3d at 496; see also 940 Ocean Drive,
403 So. 3d at 1054-55. In fact, we see no other process by which
an appellate court could apply this type of review to the case as a
whole. At its core, this blanket approach to the standard of review
blurs the line separating a trial court’s discretionary authority from
the distinct factual findings and legal conclusions on which its
ruling also rests.
For these reasons, we reject the “more stringent” or “narrowed”
abuse of discretion standard applied in Goga, Willie-Koonce, and
other district court cases.
III
Applying the proper standards of review here, we conclude
that the Fourth District erred in partially reversing the trial court’s
dismissal order.
First, the trial court’s factual findings regarding the nature
and extent of Goga’s fraudulent conduct are supported by
competent, substantial evidence. As revealed by the videos taken
by Publix’s private investigator, Goga repeatedly lied in her
- 22 -interrogatory answers and in her deposition testimony about her
physical limitations after the slip and fall. Moreover, ample
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Goga was not
credible in her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, during which
she unsuccessfully sought to reconcile the discrepancies between
her factual assertions and the video recordings. With this, the
Fourth District seemed to agree.
Furthermore, applying de novo review, we conclude that the
trial court properly reasoned that Goga had committed fraud on the
court based on its factual findings. Goga’s pervasive lying about
the extent of her physical limitations was an intentional “scheme
calculated to interfere with the [trial court]’s ability impartially to
adjudicate” her premises liability claims “by improperly influencing
the trier of fact.” Cox, 706 So. 2d at 46 (quoting Aoude, 892 F.2d at
1118). Likewise, Goga’s fraud permeated the entire case—in the
trial court’s words, her actions “comprehensively infect[ed] the
integrity of th[e] action.” To the extent the Fourth District held to
the contrary, it erred.
Lastly, we disagree with the Fourth District’s determination,
echoed by the dissent, that the trial court’s dismissal of Goga’s
- 23 -entire action was improper. 5 Given its sound legal conclusion that
Goga committed a fraud on the court that permeated the entire
proceeding, the trial court had discretion to dismiss her complaint
in its entirety (or impose a lesser sanction). The possibility that
other judges may have permitted certain of her claims to proceed
does not justify reversal. Given the abundance and gravity of
Goga’s lies, we cannot say that no reasonable judge would have
imposed the sanction of dismissal.
IV
For the reasons set out above, we quash the Fourth District’s
decision in Goga and remand for reinstatement of the trial court’s
order dismissing Goga’s entire complaint with prejudice.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
5. We are also unpersuaded by the assertion that any of Goga’s claims, including her claims for medical expenses, could be supported by “purely objective” evidence.
- 24 -LABARGA, J., dissenting.
The plaintiff in this slip and fall case testified during her
deposition that she could not lift her young children and had not
lifted them at all since her fall. She also testified that she could not
bend at the waist. Goga v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 383 So. 3d
490, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). A private investigator hired by the
defendant conducted several video surveillances that depicted the
plaintiff picking up and carrying her children across parking lots,
loading and unloading her vehicle with multiple bags of purchases,
walking, and bending at the waist without any visible difficulty. Id.
Based on the information depicted in the various video
surveillances, the trial court, after an evidentiary hearing where the
plaintiff testified regarding the apparent discrepancies between her
sworn discovery statements and what was depicted in the videos,
entered an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
entire action with prejudice. Id. at 493.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed the trial
court’s order, relying on its decision in Beseler v. Avatar Property &
Casualty Insurance Co., 291 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), where
it held that “[a] trial court’s dismissal of a claim for fraud upon the
- 25 -court is reviewed under a more stringent abuse of discretion
standard, as the trial court’s discretion is narrowed where dismissal
is imposed as a sanction for fraudulent conduct.” Goga, 383 So. 3d
at 493; see also Arzuman v. Saud, 843 So. 2d 950, 952 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2003) (stating that fraud on the court must be established by
clear and convincing evidence).
Today, however, the majority rejects the “more stringent”
abuse of discretion standard applied by the Fourth District and
remands the case with instructions that the trial court’s order
dismissing Goga’s entire complaint with prejudice be reinstated.
Majority op. at 22, 24. I disagree.
Trial courts inherently possess the requisite authority, in the
exercise of their sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action
when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court. Kornblum
v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). However,
because the Florida Constitution guarantees every person open
access to the judicial system to redress injuries,6 courts must
6. Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides: “The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”
- 26 -carefully balance the policy condemning fraudulent actions with the
fundamental constitutional right to have cases adjudicated on their
merits.
As the Fourth District specified in Goga, “[w]hen reviewing a
case for fraud, the court should ‘consider the proper mix of factors’
and carefully balance a policy favoring adjudication on the merits
with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial
system.” Goga, 383 So. 3d at 495 (quoting Arzuman, 843 So. 2d at
952). The Fourth District added:
In balancing the policy favoring adjudication on the
merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity
of the judicial system, trial courts must keep in mind
that misconduct that falls short of the rigors of the fraud
on the court test, including inconsistency, nondisclosure,
poor recollection, dissemblance and even lying, is
insufficient to support a dismissal for fraud, and, in
many cases, may be well-managed and best resolved by
bringing the issue to the jury’s attention. In other words,
allegations of inconsistency, nondisclosure, and even
falseness, are best resolved by allowing the parties to
bring them to the jury’s attention through cross
examination or impeachment, rather than by dismissal of
the entire action.
Id. at 494-95 (second emphasis added) (citation modified).
Ultimately, the Fourth District agreed the trial court properly
dismissed the portion of the plaintiff’s claims associated with
- 27 -damages for pain and suffering and lost wages. The court did so
“because the plaintiff’s repeated pretrial lies about her limitations
and pain demonstrate her willingness to lie under oath at trial,
which ‘comprehensively infects the integrity of this action’ seeking
pain and suffering damages and lost wages.” Id. at 497. However,
in keeping with the preference for adjudication on the merits of
claims that do not infect the integrity of the action, the Fourth
District held that “[t]he plaintiff remains entitled to pursue claims
for medical expenses because such claims can be determined by
objective evidence without reliance on the plaintiff’s subjective
testimony.” Id. In doing so, the Fourth District upheld the integrity
of the judicial system while safeguarding plaintiff’s constitutional
right to seek judicial redress for a portion of her damages.
Unfortunately, by excising the more stringent abuse of
discretion standard, the majority in effect enlarges the scope of the
discretion of trial courts. Consequently, trial courts are now
empowered to subordinate the policy of favoring adjudication on the
merits—an aspiration enshrined in the Florida Constitution—to
competing interests aimed at safeguarding judicial integrity.
- 28 -Because I cannot agree with this course of action and its potential
consequences, I respectfully dissent.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D2023-0011
(Broward County)
Edward G. Guedes and Blayne J. Yudis of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida,
for Petitioner
Annabel C. Majewski of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, Florida,
for Respondents
Tiffany Roddenberry and Kathryn Isted of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, Florida; and William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Reform Institute
Bryan S. Gowdy of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association
- 29 -