IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Christain Z. Wall,
Jul 10 2026, 9:01 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
July 10, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-1767
Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court
The Honorable Michael A. Christofeno, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-2312-MR-000006
Opinion by Judge Felix
Judges May and Mathias concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 1 of 20
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Christain Wall murdered Jalen Young and Michael Pike during a parking lot
brawl. A jury found Wall guilty of two counts of murder, and he admitted to
using a firearm while committing both murders. The trial court sentenced Wall
to 144 years of incarceration. Wall now appeals and raises four issues for our
review:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Wall’s claim of
self-defense;
2. Whether the lack of a voluntary manslaughter instruction constituted
fundamental error;
3. Whether Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11(i) prohibited the trial court
from sentencing Wall on both firearm enhancements; and
4. Whether Wall’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B).
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 13, 2023, Wall, his girlfriend, her aunt, and her aunt’s boyfriend
Danny Purdon all ate dinner together. After dinner, Purdon took Wall to a
“bar to shoot pool” in Elkhart, Indiana. Tr. Vol. II at 154. Wall and Purdon
started their night at The Galley and left to go to another bar a “[c]ouple hours”
later, id. at 161. Wall was kicked out of the second bar, so he and Purdon
returned to The Galley. While at The Galley the second time, Wall was
“[b]ickering” with other patrons about playing pool. Id. at 221. Wall also
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 2 of 20
urinated or spilled a drink on himself, so some patrons “were . . . saying, ‘Get
him out of here, he’s too drunk.’” Id. at 190. Young and Pike were not
involved in any of these events. Wall was eventually kicked out of The Galley;
Purdon stayed behind to “finish[ his] drink and pa[y] the bar tab.” Id. at 177.
[4] At approximately 12:13 a.m. on December 14, Wall was outside The Galley,
stumbling through the parking lot on the way to Purdon’s SUV. There was
about one parking space separating the passenger side of Purdon’s SUV from
the driver’s side of Rashaun Smith’s sedan. Wall waited near the front
passenger side of Purdon’s SUV.
[5] At approximately 12:17 a.m., Young left The Galley with Smith and Aubrey
Naylor; Purdon left at about the same time. As Young went to get into Smith’s
sedan, Wall “called [Young] over.” Tr. Vol. III at 52. After a brief verbal
exchange, Wall “swung” at Young, Tr. Vol. III at 52, and a physical fight
ensued. In less than 20 seconds, Young had “knock[ed Wall] down” and
proceeded to “g[e]t on top of” Wall and hit him, id. at 123. Purdon “tried to
interfere,” but Smith prevented him from doing so by placing Purdon in a
“chokehold.” Id.
[6] In the meantime, Pike and a friend left The Galley, approached the fight just as
it appeared to be settling down, and helped finish breaking it up. Wall got back
on his feet. Young, Smith, and Naylor got into Smith’s sedan, and Smith
started backing out of their parking space. As they did so, Purdon knocked on
the sedan’s driver’s window, asking, “Hey, are you okay? Hey, is everything all
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 3 of 20
right?” Tr. Vol. III at 126. Young then said, “F[*]ck this,” and got out of the
sedan’s backseat. Id. Purdon immediately approached Young, and Smith
parked his vehicle so he and Naylor could check on Young.
[7] While Purdon was reigniting the scuffle, Wall retrieved a handgun from the
front passenger side of Purdon’s SUV. Once Wall obtained a handgun, he
walked to where the fight was continuing, he “made direct eye contact with”
Naylor and told her, “I’m about to kill this n[*****].” Tr. Vol. III at 54. Wall
then walked up to Young—who was not participating in the fight—and from
just more than an arm’s length away, Wall shot Young in the head. Young
immediately dropped to the ground. Smith, Naylor, and two bystanders fled in
the bystanders’ vehicle.
[8] Pike, who had not been involved in any of the fighting, “ran up and tried to get
the gun from” Wall, but Wall “pistol-whipped” him several times, causing Pike
to fall to the ground. Tr. Vol. III at 190. Wall “stumbl[ed] again” and
“fiddl[ed] with the gun,” “aiming it around, like he[ was] looking for somebody
else.” Id. Pike “stood up,” id., but “was very disoriented,” id. at 192. A
bystander yelled for Pike to “run.” Id. at 190–91. Pike “looked over” at the
bystander, and from less than four feet away, Wall “shot [Pike] in the head.”
Id. at 190. Approximately three minutes elapsed from when Wall first swung at
Young to when he shot Pike.
[9] Right after Wall shot Pike, all remaining bystanders left the scene. Wall, for an
unknown reason, did not get into Purdon’s SUV but instead entered the open
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 4 of 20
front passenger side of Smith’s sedan and remained there until law enforcement
arrived less than two minutes later. The first officer on scene repeatedly told
Wall to put his “hands up,” State’s Ex. 129 at 09:19–10:00, so the officer could
“help the people next to” Wall, id. at 09:58–10:00. Wall was “not really
compliant” with the officer’s instructions, id. at 09:53–09:56—“he would start
to comply, and he would slowly look at [the officer] or look away; and then he
would put his hands down, like a divided attention thing,” Tr. Vol. IV at 52.
Officers were able to safely detain Wall, who had blood on his hands, and later
found his handgun underneath the front passenger seat of Smith’s sedan.
[10] Both Young and Pike died from the single gunshot wounds Wall inflicted.
Young was still conscious when the first officer arrived, but he died after being
taken to an ambulance; Pike died within approximately two minutes of the first
officer arriving on scene.
[11] Wall was taken to a local hospital because officers suspected he was
intoxicated. While at the hospital, Wall told investigators that he “was walking
to [his] car and a guy just started shooting at” him because “the guy [did not]
know how to take his f[*]cking L in pool.” State’s Ex. 302 - Hospital Interview
at 01:22–33; 1 see also id. at 08:13–38, 10:08–10:50. Wall stated he did not
1
State’s Exhibit 302 contains two video files: (1) “Christain Wall @EGH 12-14-2023,” which is a video of
law enforcement’s interview with Wall at the hospital, and (2) “Christain Wall 12-14-2023,” which is a video
of law enforcement’s interview with Wall at the Elkhart County Homicide Unit’s office. For clarity, we refer
to the first file as “State’s Ex. 302 - Hospital Interview” and the second as “State’s Ex. 302 - Office
Interview.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 5 of 20
“remember anything” other than “the f[*]cking gunshots going off and . . .
looking down like, ‘Oh, f[*]ck, like I’m f[*]cking bleeding.’” Id. at 13:50–14:08.
One of the investigators asked Wall if he “ha[d] a gun tonight,” and Wall
answered, “No.” Id. at 15:23–15:26. In a subsequent interview, Wall again
denied possessing a gun at the time of the shootings, claimed someone else was
the shooter, and denied having any knowledge of what led to the shootings or
the immediate aftermath. Wall told the detective that he did not engage in a
physical fight. When asked if he had told an officer he acted in self-defense,
Wall “looked at [the detective] like [she] was an idiot for asking him” that
question, telling her, “[N]o, there would be no reason why.” Tr. Vol. IV at 192;
see also State’s Ex. 302 - Office Interview at 1:01:02–1:01:43. The detective told
Wall she had watched surveillance video of the entire incident and described
what she had seen; afterward, she asked Wall what he would say if their roles
were reversed, and Wall responded, “I probably would say, your best chance is
just looking at self-defense,” id. at 1:49:47–1:49:58; see also id. at 2:03:10–
2:03:21. Wall eventually admitted the handgun was his. At no point during
these two interviews did Wall ever claim he acted in self-defense.
[12] The State charged Wall with two counts of murder 2 and alleged he used a
firearm in committing these offenses 3. At trial, Wall argued that he acted in
self-defense. The jury found Wall guilty as charged, thereby rejecting his self2
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
3
I.C. § 35-50-2-11(b)(1), (d).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 6 of 20
defense claim. Wall admitted to using a firearm in committing both murders.
The trial court sentenced Wall to 144 years executed at the Indiana Department
of Correction (“DOC”). This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut Wall’s Claim of
Self-Defense
[13] Wall challenges the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting his claim of selfdefense. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence
rebutting the defendant’s self-defense claim, “the standard of review remains
the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Turner v. State, 253
N.E.3d 526, 533 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind.
1999)).
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” HanczBarron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews
only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is
shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State],
226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 7 of 20 [14] “Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal
conduct,” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 534 (citing Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670
(Ind. 2021)), and is “a complete bar to conviction,” id. (citing Hill v. State, 497
N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind. 1986)). “Once the defendant invokes self-defense, the
State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element
of the justification.” Id. (citing Hill, 497 N.E.2d at 1064).
[15] Indiana’s self-defense statute provides that a “person is justified in using
reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person
from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). If a person “reasonably believes that [deadly]
force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person
or the commission of a forcible felony,” then the person “is justified in using
deadly force” and “does not have a duty to retreat.” Id. Importantly, to assert
self-defense, the person must have been “in a place where he had a right to be”
and must have “acted without fault.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541 (quoting
Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670). “A person who provokes, instigates, or participates
willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of selfdefense.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017)).
[16] Wall contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to rebut his
claim that he acted without fault and reasonably feared or apprehended death
or great bodily injury. Assuming arguendo that Wall demonstrated all three
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 8 of 20
elements to claim self-defense, he has not established that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to rebut at least one of those elements.
[17] Wall’s arguments on appeal are essentially requests for us to reweigh the
evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Konkle, 253
N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). For instance, Wall argues
that he “did not provoke or instigate the violence that immediately preceded the
shootings,” Appellant’s Br. at 17, but was instead “react[ing] to a renewed and
escalating confrontation,” id. at 19. In pursuing this argument, Wall completely
fails to acknowledge Naylor’s testimony about Wall swinging at Young when
starting the first scuffle, and Wall saying, “I’m about to kill this n[*****]”
during the second scuffle and just prior to shooting Young, Tr. Vol. III at 54.
Considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting
the verdict, Wall did not act without fault. See Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541. Wall
is the one who approached Young and threw the first punch, thereby instigating
all the violence thereafter. On the facts of this case, Wall cannot rely on
Purdon continuing the fight to negate Wall’s own provocation of the entire
violent incident, especially when Wall was already retrieving his handgun
before the fight fully reignited, State’s Ex. 2 - Event20231214001622037 at
04:10–04:30. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to rebut Wall’s claim of self-defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 9 of 20
2. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error in Instructing
the Jury
[18] Wall contends that the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing
the jury. In requesting we review for fundamental error, Wall acknowledges
that this issue is waived because he did not object or request a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. See Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024)
(quoting Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022)) (failing to object
results in waiver); Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (Ind. 2011) (failing to
tender a jury instruction results in waiver). We may review a waived claim of
instructional error under the “narrow exception” of fundamental error. Dunn,
230 N.E.3d at 914 (quoting Miller, 188 N.E.3d at 874).
[19] An error is fundamental if it (1) “made a fair trial impossible” or (2)
“constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due
process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Carr v.
State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 460 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645,
652 (Ind. 2018)). If a trial court “could recognize a viable reason why an
effective attorney might not object” or tender an instruction, “the error is not
blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.” Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652
(quoting Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014)).
[20] Wall’s justification for the shooting was that he acted in self-defense when he
shot Young and Pike. “A voluntary manslaughter instruction would likely
have conflicted with this theory of the case.” Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070,
1076 (Ind. 2001). Voluntary manslaughter is murder that is “mitigat[ed]” by
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 10 of 20
“[t]he existence of sudden heat.” I.C. § 35-42-1-3(b). “Sudden heat exists when
a defendant is ‘provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree
sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and
premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.’” Carmack
v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459–60 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91
N.E.3d 566, 572 (Ind. 2018)). Wall’s defense was that he acted in self-defense,
which necessarily meant that he acted without fault, see Turner, 253 N.E.3d at
541 (quoting Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670). Here, the trial court could have
recognized a viable reason why Wall’s attorney did not seek a voluntary
manslaughter instruction—such an instruction would have been inconsistent
with Wall’s self-defense claim. Therefore, any error in not instructing the jury
as to voluntary manslaughter was not so blatant as to constitute fundamental
error.
3. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11(i) Prohibited the Trial Court from
Sentencing Wall on Both Firearm Enhancements
[21] Wall next claims the trial court improperly applied Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 to enhance both of his murder sentences. We generally review a trial
court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d
256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.
2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.
2007)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 11 of 20
(quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490). However, to the extent Wall’s claim
raises questions of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Waggoner v.
Anonymous Health Sys., Inc., 274 N.E.3d 1245, 1249 (Ind. 2026) (citing ESPN,
Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)).
[22] Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 provides two frameworks under which a
defendant’s sentence may be enhanced for use of a firearm. First, pursuant to
Subsection (g), a defendant’s sentence will be enhanced if the State proves
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant] knowingly or intentionally
used a firearm in the commission of [an] offense,” as that term is defined in
Subsection (b). I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g); see also id. § 35-50-2-11(d). An “offense”
includes a felony under Indiana Code article 35-42 that resulted in death or
serious bodily injury. Id. § 35-50-2-11(b)(1). Second, pursuant to Subsection
(h), a defendant’s sentence will be enhanced if the State proves “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the [defendant], while committing a felony or
misdemeanor . . . , knowingly or intentionally . . . pointed a firearm; or . . .
discharged a firearm . . . at an individual whom the [defendant] knew, or
reasonably should have known, was a police officer.” Id. § 35-50-2-11(h); see
also id. § 35-50-2-11(e). Importantly, pursuant to Subsection (i), a defendant
“may not be sentenced under [S]ubsections (g) and (h) for offenses, felonies,
and misdemeanors comprising a single episode of criminal conduct.” Id. § 35-50-2-11(i).
[23] Wall argues that Subsection (i) applies when a defendant is sentenced for (1) at
least two enhancements under Subsection (g), (2) at least two enhancements
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 12 of 20
under Subsection (h), and (3) at least one enhancement under Subsection (g)
and at least one enhancement under Subsection (h). The State argues that
Subsection (i) applies only to the third situation.
[24] By its plain language, “[S]ubsection (i) prohibits a trial court from imposing a
sentence enhancement on more than one conviction where a defendant is
convicted of multiple offenses comprising a single episode of criminal conduct,
even if more than one of the offenses would otherwise be eligible for a
sentencing enhancement.” Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 267 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018), trans. denied; see also Jarrett v. State, 160 N.E.3d 526, 538–39 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2020), trans. denied. Regardless of how many firearm enhancements are
proven and under what subsections they are brought, if the offenses to which
those enhancements apply comprise a single episode of criminal conduct, then
Subsection (i) allows for only one of those offenses to be subject to the
sentencing enhancements in Subsections (g) and (h). See Howell, 97 N.E.3d at
267–68. Accordingly, Subsection (i) applies when a defendant may be
sentenced (1) at least twice under Subsection (g), (2) at least twice under
Subsection (h), or (3) at least once under Subsection (g) and at least once under
Subsection (h).
[25] Because Wall was sentenced twice under Subsection (g), we must determine
whether his murder convictions comprise a single episode of criminal conduct.
See I.C. § 35-50-2-11(i). An “episode of criminal conduct” refers to “offenses or
a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and
circumstance.” Id. § 35-50-1-2(b); see Howell, 97 N.E.3d at 268–69 (applying
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 13 of 20
I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b) to I.C. § 35-50-2-11(i)). “Whether certain offenses constitute
a single episode of criminal conduct is a fact-intensive inquiry determined by
the trial court.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157
(Ind. 2002)). “While the ability to recount each charge without referring to the
other offers guidance on the question of whether a defendant’s conduct
constitutes an episode of criminal conduct, we focus our analysis on the timing
of the offenses and the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the
crimes, if any.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. State,
856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ind. 2006)).
[26] In less than one minute, and within mere feet of each other, Wall shot both
Young and Pike. Wall shot Young and then shot Pike as Pike attempted to
disarm Wall. On the facts of this case, Wall’s murders of Young and Pike are
so closely related in time, place, and circumstance that they comprise a single
episode of criminal conduct. Accordingly, Wall could not be sentenced twice
under Subsection (g), and one of his two firearm enhancement sentences must
be reversed. We reverse Wall’s firearm enhancement sentence for his murder of
Pike. 4
4
Because there is essentially no difference here between reversing the 10-year firearm enhancement sentence
for Young’s murder and reversing the 10-year firearm enhancement sentence for Pike’s murder, we have
simply chosen to reverse the latter as the later-in-time event. Our choice should not be read as announcing a
rule for determining which firearm enhancement sentence should be reversed when, as here, the imposition
of more than one such sentence violates Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11(i).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 14 of 20
4. Wall’s Amended Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate
Rule 7(B)
[27] Finally, Wall argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to
independently review and revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Tillett v.
State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). That
authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to
revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,” we
conclude “that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” Id. (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)).
[28] The defendant bears the burden of producing compelling evidence that “his or
her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Tillett, 278
N.E.3d at 366 (alteration omitted) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073,
1080 (Ind. 2006)). A defendant “need not ‘necessarily prove’” that the sentence
is inappropriate based on both the nature of his offense and his character, Lane v.
State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (emphasis in original) (quoting Connor v.
State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)), but “to the extent the evidence
on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be
all the stronger to justify relief,” id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).
[29] Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366
(quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). “We generally
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 15 of 20
defer to the trial court’s decision,” id. (citing Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,
876 (Ind. 2012)), but “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators
found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). We “focus
on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or
concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual
count.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1225 (Ind. 2008)). “Our role is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ which means we
exercise our authority only in ‘exceptional cases.’” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366
(quoting Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 856 (Ind.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424
(2024)).
[30] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without
regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 489. When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the
advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494).
Here, Wall was convicted of and sentenced on two counts of murder. “A
person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between
forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five
(55) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (emphasis added). On his two murder
convictions, the trial court sentenced Wall to 62 years executed at the DOC.
Because the trial court determined Wall had used a firearm in committing the
murders, each murder conviction was to be enhanced by an additional fixed
term between 5 years and 20 years, provided the two offenses did not comprise
a single episode of criminal conduct. See id. § 35-50-2-11(g), (i). The trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 16 of 20
enhanced each murder conviction sentence by 10 years, resulting in two 72-year
sentences. However, because Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11(i) applies here to
prohibit a second firearm enhancement sentence, see supra ¶ 26, Wall has one
72-year sentence and one 62-year sentence. The trial court ordered Wall to
serve his murder sentences consecutively, so his total amended sentence is 134
years executed at the DOC. The maximum sentence Wall could have received
was 150 years—65 years for each murder and 20 years for the firearm
enhancement. Therefore, Wall’s sentence is 16 years less than the maximum
possible sentence.
[31] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor
we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the
offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’
offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.”
T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway
v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26,
2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint,
regard and lack of brutality.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson v.
State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).
[32] After starting and losing a fist fight with Young, Wall shot Young in the head.
When Pike tried to disarm Wall so he could not shoot anyone else, Wall pistolwhipped Pike and then shot him in the head, as well. Both Young and Pike
languished for some time before ultimately dying from the single gunshot
wounds Wall inflicted. Wall’s murders of Young and Pike were egregious and
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 17 of 20
“totally senseless,” Tr. Vol. V at 138, and Wall did not exhibit any modicum of
restraint, regard, or lack of brutality in committing these killings.
[33] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad
consideration of a defendant’s qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing
Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or
persistent examples of good character,” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting
Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).
[34] Wall was 22 years old when he murdered Young and Pike. At 16 or 17 years
old, Wall began using marijuana “frequently,” and at 19 years old, he “began
drinking alcohol on a regular basis.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 187. Wall had
a blood alcohol content of 0.191 less than two hours after he murdered Young
and Pike. Wall was convicted in North Carolina of three misdemeanors:
providing fictitious information to an officer, possession of marijuana, and
possession of stolen goods. Wall was on probation for the possession of stolen
goods conviction when he murdered Young and Pike. For approximately one
year prior to December 2023, Wall was unemployed.
[35] Less than six months before the offenses in this case, Wall witnessed the
shooting death of one of his brothers. Yet this did not stop Wall from inflicting
the same trauma he experienced on those who witnessed him shoot Young and
Pike.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 18 of 20 [36] Furthermore, although Wall remained at the scene after shooting Young and
Pike, he did nothing to help them. And when the first law enforcement officer
arrived, Wall did not comply with his instructions, which prevented the officer
from rendering aid to Young and Pike until other officers arrived and were able
to detain Wall. Wall also lied to investigators at the hospital about what
happened, stating an unknown man was the shooter.
[37] Based on the egregious nature of Wall’s offenses and his less-than-exemplary
character, we cannot say that Wall has produced compelling evidence
demonstrating that the nature of his offenses or his character renders his
sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119.
Conclusion
[38] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Wall’s self-defense
claim, the lack of a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not fundamental
error, the trial court erred by sentencing Wall on both firearm enhancements,
and Wall’s amended sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).
We therefore affirm Wall’s convictions and amended sentence, reverse the
firearm enhancement sentence on his conviction for murdering Pike, and
remand for the trial court to enter an amended sentencing order in accordance
with this opinion.
[39] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 19 of 20 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Lisa M. Johnson
Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Kelly Loy
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-1767 July 10, 2026 Page 20 of 20