IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Latrell Vaughn, Jul 10 2026, 10:07 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
July 10, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-306
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court
The Honorable David L. Francisco, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D02-2501-MR-000003
Opinion by Judge Felix
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 1 of 9
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] During a firearms transaction turned robbery, Latrell Vaughn shot and killed a
teenage victim. After the first jury trial on murder and other charges resulted in
a mistrial, Vaughn pled guilty to robbery resulting in serious bodily injury as a
Level 2 felony and admitted to a firearm enhancement. Vaughn’s plea
agreement contained an appeal waiver, in which Vaughn agreed to waive
appellate review of his sentence. Vaughn was sentenced to 40 years, and he
now appeals, raising several issues that we restate as the following issue:
Whether Vaughn has waived appellate review of his sentence.
[2] We dismiss.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On January 21, 2025, the State charged Vaughn with murder; armed robbery as
a Level 3 felony; and pointing a firearm as a Level 6 felony; the State further
alleged Vaughn used a firearm in committing the murder. The charged offenses
stemmed from a firearms transaction turned robbery during which Vaughn shot
and killed a teenage victim.
[4] Vaughn’s first jury trial resulted in a mistrial. Before the case could be retried,
Vaughn agreed to plead guilty to robbery resulting in serious bodily injury as a
Level 2 felony and admit to the firearm enhancement. The plea agreement
provided for a minimum and maximum executed sentence of 20 and 40 years,
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 2 of 9
respectively, and it contained a Creech 1 provision waiving Vaughn’s right to
appeal his sentence so long as he was sentenced within the terms of the plea
agreement. The trial court sentenced Vaughn to a total of 40 years with 35
years executed and 5 years suspended—25 years for the robbery offense, with 5
of those years suspended to probation, and an enhancement of 15 years
executed for Vaughn’s use of a firearm. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Vaughn Has Waived Appellate Review of His Sentence
[5] Vaughn asks this court to review his sentence despite his appeal waiver. Appeal
waiver provisions have been the subject of increased attention by the Indiana
Supreme Court. See Ortiz v. State, 278 N.E.3d 1151 (Ind. 2026); Anderson v.
State, 269 N.E.3d 817 (Ind. 2025); Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229 (Ind. 2023).
The court has consistently “reaffirmed ‘the validity’” of such provisions, Ortiz,
278 N.E.3d at 1156 (quoting Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 821), and emphasized the
“contract principles” that underlie them, Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 821. A
sentence imposed following a plea agreement, along with an appeal waiver
insulating that sentence from review, represents the bargained-for agreement a
defendant willingly accepts in exchange for concrete benefits. Id. at 823. For
example, a defendant may bargain for a more lenient sentence or the
1
Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 3 of 9
prosecutor’s agreement to forgo seeking higher-level or a greater number of
convictions. Id.
[6] As such, where a valid and enforceable appeal waiver is present, a defendant’s
right to appeal his sentence must yield to the “text and scope of the waiver.”
Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 821. The lone exception is “where the sentence
imposed is contrary to law and the Defendant did not bargain for the sentence.”
Id. (quoting Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1236 n.3). “[A] sentence is ‘illegal’ only if it is
outside the prescribed statutory range or is unconstitutional.” Id. at 822. And
not just any “alleged constitutional defect” will “suffice to avoid” an appeal
waiver. Id. at 823.
[7] Vaughn challenges two aspects of his sentence. First, Vaughn argues that his
firearm enhancement violates the protections against double jeopardy. Second,
Vaughn argues that his 40-year sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate
to the nature of the offense. We address each challenge in turn.
a. Firearm Enhancement
[8] Vaughn argues that despite his appeal waiver, his right to challenge the firearm
enhancement remains intact. Vaughn’s appeal waiver provided, “I hereby
waive my right to appeal my sentence . . . so long as the Judge sentences me
within the terms of my plea agreement.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 60. The
firearm enhancement was part of the plea agreement, so the appeal waiver
clearly covers it. See Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 820 (noting that an appeal waiver
using similar language was “clear,” “comprehensive,” and “far-reaching”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 4 of 9 [9] Vaughn argues his right to appeal the firearm enhancement is not foreclosed by
the appeal waiver because the enhancement amounts to an “unconstitutional”
imposition of “double jeopardy.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Vaughn’s firearm
enhancement, however, does not present a constitutional double jeopardy issue.
[10] The term “double jeopardy” encapsulates two related but distinct doctrines.
A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1065 (Ind. 2024). Procedural double jeopardy
“bars successive prosecutions for the same offense,” whereas substantive double
jeopardy “refers to claims related to multiple convictions for the same offense in
a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066 (citing Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 246–47
(Ind. 2020)). Because Vaughn’s firearm enhancement and his underlying
robbery conviction were imposed during the same proceeding, he is essentially
making a substantive double jeopardy argument. Under Indiana law,
substantive double jeopardy is not governed by the Indiana Constitution. A.W.,
229 N.E.3d at 1065–66. Substantive double jeopardy is instead governed by
“statutory rules.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 236.
[11] Vaughn makes no separate double jeopardy argument regarding the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Vaughn thus does not
2
Any challenge under the federal Double Jeopardy Clause is thus waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A)(8)(a) (requiring cogent reasoning for arguments presented); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind.
2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. not sought) (holding
appellate courts will not make arguments on behalf of litigants).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 5 of 9
present a constitutional issue that would permit review of the firearm
enhancement.
[12] Moreover, Vaughn expressly agreed to the firearm enhancement in his plea
agreement. The exceptions to the appeal waiver rule explained in Anderson
were geared toward preventing “unbargained-for” illegalities, not terms to
which the defendant specifically agreed. Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 818; see also
Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Ind. 2013) (“[T]he waiver of the right to
appeal contained in a plea agreement is unenforceable where the sentence
imposed is contrary to law and the Defendant did not bargain for the
sentence.”). Vaughn’s challenge to the firearm enhancement is therefore
waived.
b. Disproportionate Sentence
[13] Vaughn also argues that his 40-year sentence is disproportionate to the nature of
the offense in violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.
Vaughn does not explain the reason he believes his sentence remains reviewable
on these grounds despite his appeal waiver, though presumably it is because
proportionality is a constitutional issue.
[14] The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson, 269 N.E.3d 817, leads us to
conclude that Vaughn’s proportionality challenge, though constitutional in
nature, is not one of the limited constitutional challenges that permit piercing
an appeal waiver. In Anderson, the defendant signed a plea agreement
containing a “comprehensive” appeal waiver that barred appellate review of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 6 of 9
“any sentence imposed by the Court” so long as it was “within the terms” of the
plea agreement. 269 N.E.3d at 820. The defendant thereafter was sentenced to
a term within the range provided under the plea agreement. Id. at 819. After
this sentence was imposed, the defendant appealed, arguing that her sentence
was “unconstitutional” due to “due process concerns in the sentencing
procedure,” namely the trial court’s reliance on “improper factors” and failure
to consider a mitigating factor. Id. at 823–24.
[15] The court held that this argument did not “suffice to avoid” the appeal waiver,
noting “there is no general constitutional-argument exception to waivers in plea
agreements.” Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 823 (quoting United States v. Adkins, 743
F.3d 176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014)). The court explained that “[s]ome constitutional
arguments, however, likely would circumvent an otherwise valid appeal
waiver.” Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 823. It gave as an example a challenge to “a
sentence based on constitutionally impermissible criteria, such as race or the
deprivation of some minimum of civilized procedure (such as if the parties
stipulated to trial by twelve orangutans).” Id. (quoting Adkins, 743 F.3d at 192–
93). The court concluded by emphasizing the “mutuality of benefits”
represented by a plea agreement, which merited “limiting when courts will find
that policy reasons warrant ignoring such agreements.” Id. Both defendants
and the State “would be deprived of the benefit of their bargain” if appeal
waivers could be “circumvented merely by claiming the trial judge improperly
weighed or considered aggravators and mitigators.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 7 of 9 [16] Here, Vaughn’s appeal waiver was similarly comprehensive, waiving review of
any sentence “within the terms of [his] plea agreement.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
II at 60. Vaughn’s 35-year executed sentence was below the maximum range to
which he agreed in the plea agreement. And Vaughn does not contend that his
sentence was based on any unconstitutional “impermissible criteria.” See
Anderson, 269 N.E.3d at 823 (Adkins, 743 F.3d at 192). Rather, his
proportionality challenge is merely an attack on the length of his sentence,
which was within the statutory range for the offense he committed and within
the sentencing range to which he agreed. To permit such a challenge to
Vaughn’s sentence would undermine the parties’ agreement and deprive them
of the “benefit of their bargain.” Id. at 823.
[17] Because Vaughn’s proportionality challenge is not a sufficient argument to
permit piercing his appeal waiver, his challenge to the proportionality of his
sentence is waived. As Vaughn’s firearm enhancement challenge is similarly
waived, his appeal must be dismissed.
[18] Dismissed.
[19] Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
A. Robert Masters
St. Joseph County Deputy Public Defender
Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti, P.C.
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 8 of 9 Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-306 July 10, 2026 Page 9 of 9