Rel: July 10, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-0848
C.M.
v.
Mobile County Department of Human Resources
Appeal from Mobile Juvenile Court
(JU-15-934.05)
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
C.M. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered by the Mobile
Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that terminated her parental rights
to P.M. ("the child"). Because the juvenile court did not receive sufficient
evidence demonstrating that the child likely would be adopted once the
mother's parental rights were terminated, we reverse the judgment.
CL-2025-0848
Background
The child was born in 2014 and, at the time of his birth, was
addicted to opiates. The child has no legal father. Shortly after the child
was born, the Mobile County Department of Human Resources ("DHR")
placed the child with his maternal grandmother, who had adopted the
mother's two older children. When the child was five months old, the
mother had sufficiently rehabilitated herself to regain custody of the
child; however, in 2015, the Baldwin County Department of Human
Resources picked up the child again when the mother became intoxicated
and solicited strangers to take care of the child. The child was later
adjudicated to be a dependent child, and, on August 3, 2016, the juvenile
court awarded legal and physical custody of the child to his maternal
grandmother.
Two months after the custody award, without DHR's knowledge or
a court order modifying the custody of the child, the maternal
grandmother returned the child to the mother. The mother cared for the
child for the next seven years, during which he was diagnosed with
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") and developed
behavioral problems. In March 2023, DHR received a report that the
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child had attended five different schools in the Mobile County school
system and that the mother had been banned from school property
because of her erratic and disruptive behavior. DHR filed an emergency
custody petition, regained custody of the child, and obtained an order
suspending visitation between the mother and the child until the mother
could undergo a psychological evaluation.
In June 2023, a psychiatrist diagnosed the mother with a history of
substance abuse and drug addiction, psychosis, paranoia, and suspected
antisocial personality disorder. The mother declined treatment. The
mother resumed supervised visitation with the child, but, in March 2024,
the mother tested positive for methamphetamine. On April 11, 2024,
DHR held an individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting, during which
the mother denied that she needed any services; she agreed only to
submit to random drug screens and to supervised visits. At that point,
DHR established a primary permanency plan for the child to be placed
with a relative and a concurrent plan of adoption with no identified
adoptive resource.
In September 2024, the mother was convicted of felony theft, and
she was placed on probation. Shortly thereafter, the mother appeared at
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the DHR office with firearms. When the police were notified, the mother
fled the scene, and she was arrested. Following that incident, on
September 11, 2024, DHR banned the mother from its premises, and it
conducted another ISP meeting during which the primary permanency
plan for the child was changed to adoption with no identified adoptive
resource. As part of that plan, DHR agreed "to submit the paperwork to
find an adoptive resource for [the child]" and "to look for placement for
[the child] that will meet his behavioral needs."
On September 20, 2024, DHR filed a petition to terminate the
mother's parental rights. On September 30, 2024, the mother's probation
was revoked, and she was incarcerated in the Julia Tutwiler Prison for
Women. On December 18, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order
establishing adoption with no identified adoptive resource as the
permanency plan for the child. The juvenile court scheduled the
termination-of-parental-rights trial for June 26, 2025, but, on that date,
DHR moved the juvenile court to continue the trial so that it could
continue to explore adoptive resources for the child. The mother was
released from prison on July 2, 2025, and the juvenile court rescheduled
the trial for August 14, 2025.
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On August 18, 2025, the juvenile court entered a final judgment
terminating the mother's parental rights. In the judgment, the juvenile
court found, among other things, that there were grounds for
termination, that there was no relative available to assume custody of
the child, that leaving the child in foster care was untenable because of
the mother's disruptive behavior, that it was in the best interests of the
child to terminate the mother's parental rights, and that DHR had made
reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan for the child. The
judgment also provided, in pertinent part:
"[A]lthough the child does not have an adoptive resource
currently[,] the Court finds that he is adoptable. The child is
only eleven years old. Although he disrupted several foster
care placements in the past, he has been in residential
treatment for behavior issues for almost a year. Once the child
is eligible for adoption, the State DHR office, in coordination
with the county office, can start recruitment efforts that are
not available before termination of parental rights. Those
efforts include placement of the child on various websites and
private agencies devoted to finding families for foster
children. According to the social worker, the State office has
facilitated seventy-three adoptions through these efforts so
far this year."
The juvenile court awarded permanent legal custody of the child to DHR
"for permanent placement for adoption."
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CL-2025-0848
On August 25, 2025, the mother filed a postjudgment motion in
which she argued, among other things, that DHR had failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that it had made sufficient efforts to
identify an adoptive resource for the child and that DHR had failed to
present specific evidence regarding the likelihood that the child would be
adopted considering his special needs. The juvenile court denied the
postjudgment motion. The mother timely appealed. This court heard
oral argument regarding the appeal on May 12, 2026.
Issues
The mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court lacked
sufficient evidence of grounds for termination, that the juvenile court
erred in failing to maintain the status quo as a viable alternative to
termination, and that the juvenile court erred in finding that it was in
the best interests of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights
"where DHR relied on an adoption plan that was uncertain and not childspecific, with no identified adoptive resource, no home study underway,
and no evidence that adoption was a realistic permanency outcome for
this older child with special needs." The mother's brief, p. 4. We find the
last issue dispositive of this appeal.
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CL-2025-0848
Standard of Review
A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence, which is " ' " [e]vidence that, when weighed
against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact
a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. " ' " C.O. v. Jefferson
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)
(quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting
in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).
" '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate
affirmance of a judgment based on a factual
finding in the context of a case in which the
ultimate standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing evidence is
evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to
clearly and convincingly … establish the fact
sought to be proved.'
"KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ.
App. 2006)].
"… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of
the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d
202 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through
a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence
before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon
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CL-2025-0848
the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce
in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each
element of the claim and a high probability as to the
correctness of the conclusion. ' § 25-5-81(c)[, Ala. Code 1975]."
Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not
reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact
made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile
court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971
So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence,
this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of
correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
Analysis
Section 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
"In a hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court
shall consider the best interests of the child." Thus, in addition to finding
grounds for termination and exhausting all viable alternatives, before
terminating parental rights, a juvenile court must consider whether that
remedy will serve the best interests of the child. "Even in cases in which
grounds for termination exist and no other viable alternative may be
implemented, a juvenile court still must make a separate determination
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CL-2025-0848
that termination of parental rights serves the best interests of the child,
and, if it does not, it may not terminate parental rights." J.A. v. S.L., 406
So. 3d 129, 139 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).
As this court explained in J.A.:
" 'Whereas the first two elements exist to protect the
parent's rights, this third element exists to protect the child's
interests.' Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d [1051] at 1068 [(Ala.
2022)] (Parker, C.J., concurring specially). The best-interestsof-the-child inquiry focuses exclusively on the impact of the
termination on the needs and interests of the child. In
considering the best interests of the child, a juvenile court is
determining not whether it can terminate parental rights, but
whether it should terminate parental rights for the benefit of
the child for whom the remedy is intended. See S.D.P. v.
U.R.S., 18 So. 3d 936, 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (Moore, J.,
concurring specially).
"In examining whether termination of parental rights
promotes the best interests of the child, a juvenile court
should consider all the traditional best-interests factors, see
Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981) (holding that,
in deciding what is in the best interests of the child, the factfinder should consider, among other things, the emotional,
social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child),
but the court should primarily focus on the effect of the
proposed termination on the child's needs for security,
stability, and permanency. See S.D.P., 18 So. 3d at 944
(Moore, J., concurring specially). By allowing a juvenile court
to involuntarily sever the rights of a parent so that the child
can be adopted without the consent of that parent,
termination of parental rights is a remedy that is specially
designed to meet the particularized needs of a child for a
stable and permanent custodial arrangement. See T.W. v.
Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [391 So. 3d 306 (Ala. Civ.
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CL-2025-0848
App. 2023)]. Thus, at a minimum, when deciding whether
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a
child, a juvenile court should focus on whether termination of
the legal relationship between the child and the parent will
protect the welfare of the child and promote the stability and
permanency of the child. Id."
Id.
In this case, the juvenile court concluded in the final judgment "that
termination of parental rights and adoption by foster parents is in the
best interest of the child." The juvenile court implicitly determined that
the termination of the mother's parental rights would serve the child's
interests in achieving stability and permanency through adoption.
However, the evidence showed that no foster parent had come forward to
adopt the child, despite DHR's having implemented a permanency plan
of adoption for the child as early as April 11, 2024. By the time of the
trial on August 14, 2025, the sole permanency plan for the child had been
adoption with no identified adoptive resource for almost one full year.
During that year, the child had been residing in a group home, and DHR
had not identified a foster parent who was willing to adopt the child or
any other adoptive resource for him. In June 2025, DHR obtained a
continuance of the trial to allow it to continue to explore adoptive
resources for the child, but those efforts were obviously unsuccessful.
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In her postjudgment motion, the mother argued, among other
things, that DHR had failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
the child would likely be adopted. The mother pointed out that the DHR
social worker who testified in the case had expressed his general opinion
that the child was adoptable, but, she argued, he "failed to support his
opinion with specific evidence concerning the child." On appeal, the
mother reiterates her argument.
The mother first points out that the child is a special-needs child
for adoption purposes. That point is not in legitimate dispute. Rule 660-5-22-.06(2)(a)2.(ii), Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), defines a
special-needs child to include a child who "has a known emotional
disturbance/ behavioral issue that requires on-going treatment and that
has been documented by a mental health professional." Rule 660-5-22-.06(2)(a)2.(v) also classifies a child over the age of five years old as being
a special-needs child. The undisputed evidence in this case shows that
the child is 11 years old and that he has been diagnosed with emotional
disturbance/behavioral issues for which he is receiving ongoing
treatment, as documented by a mental-health professional. The DHR
social worker confirmed that the child had again been diagnosed with
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CL-2025-0848
mental-health and behavioral problems in 2023 and that he was
currently addressing those problems through medication and therapy
that was overseen by a qualified therapist in the group home where he
now resides.
For the purposes of the Alabama Minor Adoption Code, Ala. Code
1975, § 26-10E-1 et seq., "[a]ny minor who is available for adoption may
be adopted ...." Ala. Code 1975, § 26-10E-6. A judgment terminating
parental rights makes a child available for adoption without the consent
of his or her parents. See Comment to § 26-10E-6. Under Alabama law,
a child with special needs is "adoptable" even if the child has serious
mental-health and behavioral problems. However, as r. 660-5-22-.06(2)(a)2., a DHR regulation, recognizes, a child with special needs
requires "more than ordinary parental duties from the adoptive parents;
that children with special needs usually incur extra expenses; and that
parenting children with special needs is more challenging tha[n]
parenting children without special needs." Accordingly, Alabama law
acknowledges that a child with special needs is less likely to be adopted
than a child without special needs.
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Recognizing that fact, in T.W. v. Calhoun County Department of
Human Resources, 391 So. 3d 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), this court held
that,
"before proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the
parents of special-needs children, a juvenile court must
consider whether the children will likely achieve permanency
through adoption. ... In order for the juvenile court to consider
that factor, it was incumbent upon DHR to present clear and
convincing evidence of the viability of adoption so that the
juvenile court could make an informed evaluation and
decision."
Id. The mother argues that DHR did not present sufficient evidence of
the viability of adoption for the child for the juvenile court to determine
that termination of her parental rights would be in his best interests.
The DHR social worker testified that, when DHR implements a
permanency plan of adoption with no identified adoptive resource, the
county agency typically fills out a packet of information and submits it to
the state office overseeing adoptions. Together, the county and the state
officials assigned to the case then search for a foster parent to adopt the
child. The DHR social worker did not testify as to whether that happened
in this case. The DHR social worker then testified that, after DHR
obtains a judgment terminating parental rights, DHR can submit the
child's information to various adoption websites and private adoption
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CL-2025-0848
agencies that otherwise would not solicit potential adoptive parents for
the child. The DHR social worker testified that he had personally
overseen approximately 20 cases in which a child was adopted after
termination of parental rights when the permanency plan was adoption
with no identified adoptive resource. Of those cases, he said,
approximately 80% of those children qualified as special-needs children.
However, the DHR social worker did not testify as to the nature of those
children's special needs. According to the DHR social worker, in the fiscal
year 2025, 73 children across the state had been adopted with the same
permanency plan following the termination of parental rights. The DHR
social worker opined that the child was adoptable and that it would be in
the best interests of the child to be freed for adoption.
On cross-examination, the DHR social worker was asked why it
would be in the best interests of the child to terminate the mother's
parental rights when no adoptive resource was waiting to adopt the child.
The DHR social worker repeated that the child was adoptable and
explained that the fact that no one had come forward at that point as a
potential adoptive resource did not mean that the child would not be
adopted. The DHR social worker also testified that the child would
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benefit from the termination of the mother's parental rights because the
judgment would allow DHR to pursue avenues for recruitment of an
adoptive resource that were dependent upon the child's being available
for adoption without legal risk. The DHR social worker did not know the
success rate of the websites and private agencies that DHR could utilize
after termination of parental rights, but he considered them successful.
The DHR social worker predicted that, if a proper home could be found
for the child, the child could be adopted within a year, although, he said,
it sometimes took two or three years.
The mother correctly notes that the record contains no evidence
indicating that an adoptive resource had been identified for the child,
that no adoptive home study was underway, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-10E-19 and § 26-10E-19.1 (requiring home studies for prospective
adoptive parents of minor children), and that no one had been introduced
to the child as a prospective adoptive resource. Those circumstances do
not necessarily require reversal of the judgment. Our legislature has
authorized juvenile courts to terminate parental rights for children
whose permanency plan is adoption with no identified adoptive resource.
See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-315(a)(2). The fact that DHR has been
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unable to identify an adoptive resource and that an adoptive resource is
not waiting to adopt the child does not mean that a juvenile court cannot
terminate the mother's parental rights. See R.B. v. State Dep't of Hum.
Res., 669 So. 2d 187, 191 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). However, those
circumstances are highly relevant to whether it is in the best interests of
the child to terminate parental rights. Id. It would not be in the best
interests of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights for the
purpose of facilitating an adoption that will not occur, leaving the child
to languish in long-term foster care with no real opportunity for achieving
permanency.
When DHR adopted the permanency plan of adoption with no
identified adoptive resource in April 2024, it was required to use
reasonable efforts to execute that plan. See § 12-15-315(c). DHR placed
the child in several foster homes, but none of his foster parents came
forward to adopt the child, and the child was ultimately placed in a group
home because he had disrupted his foster-home placements with his
unruly behavior. The record contains no other evidence regarding the
efforts DHR undertook to recruit an adoptive resource for the child, but,
whatever they were, those efforts failed. Even after DHR obtained a
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CL-2025-0848
delay of the trial to continue its recruitment efforts, DHR did not present
any evidence indicating that it had located anyone who could
prospectively adopt the child. When considering the serious mentalhealth issues and behavioral problems of the child, that evidence strongly
suggested that the child was not readily adoptable. The DHR social
worker nevertheless testified that the child was adoptable.
In In re Brian P., 99 Cal. App. 4th 616, 624, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326,
332 (2002), the California Court of Appeal for the First District, applying
California law that requires clear and convincing evidence of the
likelihood that adoption will take place within a reasonable time, see In
re Amelia S. 229 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 280 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1991), held that,
when assessing the likelihood of adoption, a juvenile court may not
premise a finding that a child is likely to be adopted on an opinion of the
county Social Services Agency that the child is adoptable and that his or
her prospects for adoption are "very good." The court explained that
"[t]he issue of adoptability requires the court to focus on the child, and
whether the child's age, physical condition, and emotional state make it
difficult to find a person willing to adopt." 99 Cal. App. 4th at 624, 121
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332.
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In this case, DHR's social worker acknowledged that DHR would
have to disclose to prospective adoptive parents that the child suffered
from severe behavioral problems that had led to multiple disruptions of
foster homes. To prove that the child likely would be adopted, the social
worker testified that DHR had, in the past, successfully recruited
adoptive families for other children with unspecified special needs and
with the same permanency plan following termination of parental rights.
However, the DHR social worker did not inform the juvenile court of the
number of children with special needs who had not been adopted. The
juvenile court heard that 73 children were adopted in 2025, but it did not
receive any evidence of the overall number of children in DHR's custody
who were awaiting adoption. The evidence does not demonstrate
whether DHR had secured adoptions for 73 out of 100 children or for 73
out of 1,000 children, and the evidence did not show that an available
pool of prospective adoptive parents exists for a child like the child in this
case. Without that information, the juvenile court could not determine
that the child would probably be adopted. Cf. Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't
of Hum. Servs., 732 S.W.3d 56, 64 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026) ("Regarding
adoptability, the Department's adoption specialist testified that she ran
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a data match with MC's characteristics, that there were 333 potential
adoptive resources and that MC was likely to be adopted.").
DHR did present evidence of the broader range of services that it
could access to assist it in recruiting an adoptive resource for a child after
a termination of parental rights, cf. D.M. v. Dale Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 413 So. 3d 750, 755 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (noting a lack of evidence
of the methodology used to recruit adoptive resources when reversing a
judgment terminating parental rights), but the fact that a child is eligible
for more social services designed to facilitate adoption does not bear on
the pivotal question of whether the child is likely to be adopted. See In
re Brian P. 99 Cal. App. 4th at 624, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 332 ("The June 20
'assessment' merely concluded that Brian was 'approved for adoptive
services because of lack of parental compliance with the case plan.' This
says nothing about his adoptability.").
As DHR's attorney admitted in his closing argument when
commenting on the state of the evidence: "Maybe [the child] would be
adopted in a year, maybe he would never be adopted." However, Alabama
law does not allow a juvenile court to gamble on the adoptive prospects
of a child. Unlike in other states, see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-337;
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705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/2-34; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 635; Okla. Stat. tit.
10A, § 1-4-909; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.302; Wash. Rev. Code §
13.34.215, in Alabama, once parental rights have been terminated to
facilitate adoption, those rights cannot be restored when the
contemplated adoption fails. See V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 710
So. 2d 915, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) ("[T]he termination of parental
rights is a drastic measure, and we know of no means by which those
rights, once terminated, can be reinstated."). Under Alabama law, if a
child is not adopted following the termination of parental rights and an
award of permanent legal custody to DHR, the child will likely remain
orphaned and dependent upon the state until the child ages out of the
system. That outcome does not serve the best interests of the child.
Conclusion
In this case, the juvenile court determined that it would be in the
best interests of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights to
facilitate the adoption of the child. However, the record does not contain
evidence from which the juvenile court could have been clearly convinced
that the child would likely achieve permanency through adoption. For
that reason, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed. However,
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nothing in our opinion should be construed as requiring the juvenile court
to reunite the child with the mother or to leave the child in foster care
indefinitely. The child remains dependent and within the custody of
DHR with a permanency plan for adoption. DHR must continue to use
reasonable efforts to execute that plan, and if, through its efforts or
otherwise, it eventually appears the child will likely be adopted, it may
again petition the juvenile court to terminate the mother's parental
rights. Likewise, if the mother rehabilitates herself so that she can safely
regain custody of the child, the juvenile court may consider returning the
child to her care. We hold only that, on the state of this record,
termination of the mother's parental rights was not proven to be in the
best interests of the child. See T.W., 391 So. 3d at 318.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Edwards and Bowden, JJ., dissent, without opinions.
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